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The intention of writing this book is to retell the story of the transition in the 
field of housing in the Czech Republic using the concept of housing policy ef-
ficiency and effectiveness as the language tool for the narration.1
Along with most other European post-socialist states, the Czech Republic 
underwent a profound reform of its political, social and economic systems 
after 1990; a process which we are accustomed to calling ‘transition’. Transi-
tion is generally understood to be the temporary process of system (regime) 
change from a planning economy and one-party (totalitarian) government to 
a market-based economy functioning in a democratic framework, although, 
as in the West, models of governance, as well as social and economic organi-
sation might vary.
The notion of ‘transition’ has been criticised by some commentators as ‘an 
implicitly unilinealist concept implying a common and clearly defined start-
ing point (communist legacy) and end point (Western market economies)’ 
(Kemeny & Lowe, 1998, p. 168). The word ‘transition’ resembles the effort to 
imitate the systems of Western democracies and market economies by the 
application of some ‘cookbook of capitalism’.
“From that perspective, the road to an advanced capitalist economy is the same road, 
regardless of the starting point, whether that can be from Sao Paulo, Singapore or 
Slovenia…[T]here exists some singular yardstick against which we could measure the 
particular cases as differing in degree, whether that can be the intensity, speed, or 
level of development of the assertion of democratic impulses.” (Bruszt & Stark, 1998, 
pp. 11, 15).
Bruszt & Stark (1998) thus favour the term ‘transformation’ which, on the 
contrary, resembles the effort to innovate old institutions in a new economic 
environment and stresses the importance of path dependence, strengths of 
historical social norms and specific institutional patterns leading to diver-
gence in the development. They see this process more as a ‘reconfiguration’ 
than the ‘replacement’ of existing institutional elements (Bruszt & Stark, 1998, 
p. 83). Other names for this period, used in the social science discourse, such 
as ‘managerial capitalism’ (Szelényi et al., 1996), ‘banking socialism’ (Vecerník 
& Mateju, 1998) or ‘state capitalism’ (Mlcoch, 1997), all are far away from the 
ideal of market economy,2 support the idea of a very gradual and path-depen-
dent transformation process drawn by too many specific national colours to 
cohere in one universal post-socialist picture. The nature of housing policy re-
forms applied in transition countries also supports this thesis, though, as I 
will show, only partially.
Stated with some caution and exceptions,3 the following institutional mod-
el was shared by many socialist countries prior to 1990. Most of the economy 
was in state ownership, the economic and political systems were dominat-
ed by the central state and political power was in the hands of one political 
party. In the field of housing (housing finance) this meant relatively exten-
sive public (mostly state) interventions to decommodify housing production, 
housing management and housing consumption; interventions supporting 
new housing construction via extensive state subsidies, influencing tenure 
structure through property expropriation, and controlling housing consump-
tion through rent and price regulation (Lux et al., 2002; Lux (ed.), 2003; Lowe & 
Tsenkova, 2003; Donner, 2006).
This specific housing system is sometimes called the East-European Hous-
ing Model (Hegedüs & Tosics, 1998) where the state controls both demand and 
supply sides of the housing sector and does not allow the market mechanism 
to develop as an integrating mechanism. After several decades of operation, 
however, the system that tried to make housing a pure public good lacked 
financial resources. It was soon characterised by unskilled housing manage-
ment, bureaucracy, free-riding, low-quality construction, inefficiencies, and 
encouraged the existence of illegal practices, black market, clientelism and 
corruption (Lux et al., 2003).
When socialism collapsed, the national governments freed from the dic-
tate of Soviet power could return to or partially reflect the pre-socialist na-
tional traditions and specific cultural patterns, as well as come up with their 
unique new visions of their own ways to democracy and market economy. In 
the competitive environment of the global market, economic differences be-
tween countries of the former Soviet bloc quickly became apparent (World De-
velopment Indicators). Before 1990, such discrepancies were hidden due to inac-
curate economic measurement and unequal returns from non-market based 
international trade within the socialist bloc.
While the goal to establish (return to) market economy and democratic po-
litical structures has been officially articulated elsewhere, the meaning of ‘de-
mocracy’ and ‘market economy’ may very well have deviated from what we 
know as the Western model with the appearance of an entire assortment of 
motives, timing and, especially, particular reform acts; such divergence was 
clear even in the field of housing policy.4 Though some international organisa-
tions, such as the World Bank, tried to impose similar housing reform strategy 
throughout the region, their influence weakened in time and further develop-
ment fully damaged the remaining pieces of the East-European Housing Mod-
el (except for some hidden and implicitly cultural patterns; see below).
The notion of transition as a universal linear process with clear evolution-
ary stages is thus hardly sustainable (less due to the initial position than to 
its real progress). However, as this book will concentrate on reforms begun or 
achieved specifically in the Czech Republic or those European post-socialist 
states that wanted to enter the European Union and became EU members 
in either 2004 or 2007, we can sustain the working definition of transition as 
the progression from a planning economy and one-party political system to 
the Western type of market economy functioning with a democratic political 
framework. Political, economic, social and institutional reactions to the chal-
lenges presented along this way may, however, vary largely among post-so-
cialist countries.
The book describes and analyses the process of housing system establish-
ment (reform) in the Czech Republic during the period of transition. As the 
establishment (reform) process is very complex, it was necessary to target 
the goal of the book to some particular facts. Transition, as defined above, is 
mainly the process of building new (or transforming old) social institutions. 
Such a process is far from spontaneous; on the contrary, it is highly regulated 
and shaped by political power, especially by the representatives of the state. 
The strong role of the state is one of the prerequisites of transition though its 
aim might paradoxically be (and in reality was) to ultimately reduce the pow-
er of the state. Transition, at least at the very beginning, enabled the repre-
sentatives of the state to come up with a new social contract or, more realisti-
cally, with a new interpretation of social and economic reality. The ideological 
myths of the past were abandoned and empty ‘interpretation’ space had to be 
refilled. In highly centralised post-socialist societies the representatives of the 
state played the decisive role in such ‘meta-narratives’ (Lyotard’s term, 1979). 
The behaviour (actions, interventions) of the state in the field of housing thus 
forms the main research focus of my book; sometimes this type of analysis is 
labelled as state-centred analysis or policy analysis.
Again, the state’s activities in the field of housing vary largely as the state 
may intervene in many fields – housing production, housing consumption, 
land zoning, housing finance, distribution and redistribution, allocation, loca-
tion (Doling, 1997, p. 8). The transition in housing policies was connected to 
changes in all these fields and, moreover, with substantial decentralisation of 
power over housing policy from the central to local levels of public admin-
istration. Both governments and citizens of transition societies paid, howev-
er, special attention to the ‘housing needs problem’ or ‘housing affordability 
problem’. Housing affordability, as one would expect, worsened during the re-
forms, though, as I am going to show, unequally for different groups of society. 
Due to the fact that such a trend could endanger public support for the whole 
transition project, housing affordability became the most reiterated housing 
issue and policy target. This has been documented, for example, by a survey 
conducted in six transition societies in 2002 (Lux (ed.), 2003). As Doling stat-
ed (1997), “Governments may intervene in ways that improve the lot of those 
who would not otherwise be able to consume housing of a reasonable size 
and quality, but such an outcome is a consequence of an underlying moti-
vation to preserve the social order” (p. 10). Housing affordability is especial-
ly connected to the level and quality of housing consumption and therefore 
those state interventions directed at influencing housing consumption (ex-
plicit or implicit subsidies to maintain or increase housing affordability) are 
chosen as the main focus of my book. These interventions should not only be 
described but also assessed, because description alone does not allow full un-
derstanding of their impact on housing consumption or housing affordability. 
Simply mentioning that some type of subsidy was introduced does not show 
its real influence on the level and quality of housing consumption.
Separating policy in the field of housing consumption from the wider so-
cio-economic and political context, or from parts of other policies attaching, 
for example, housing production, is not a valid research approach since hous-
ing is logically embedded in a wider economic and political system and hous-
ing policy activities in different fields influence one another. The fact that I 
focus on the problems of housing affordability and consumption, does not 
mean that they will be analysed outside their social and economic context 
or outside those state interventions that are connected, for example, more 
with housing production than housing consumption. On the contrary, knowl-
edge of wider context is an important precondition for developing any serious 
conclusions about housing policy in the field of housing consumption or its 
change. Narrowing the focus (i.e., ‘dependent variable’) on state policies in the 
field of housing consumption is necessary only as a methodological device 
that ensures the coherence of this book and helps me to avoid the temptation 
to describe and evaluate ‘everything’ but only formally and inconsistently, as 
would necessarily happen. Such limitation has no effect on the variability of 
contextual factors (i.e., ‘independent variables’) used to explain the specific 
policies in the field of housing consumption. The description of social, eco-
nomic and political contexts will thus form an important part of my book.
The analysis of the unique housing policy in the Czech Republic without 
relative comparison with the situations in other transition countries could re-
sult in a somewhat biased picture. Though the main goal of this book is not 
comparative, a partial comparative analysis of policies in the field of housing 
consumption in selected transitional countries will be also provided to better 
understand and evaluate the state policy unique to the Czech Republic.
The main goal of this book is therefore to describe, analyse and evaluate 
the state housing policy (state interventions, subsidies) in the field of housing 
consumption between 1990 and 2005 (the period of economic transition) in 
the Czech Republic. This will be derived from:
 description and assessment of transitional housing policy in the field of 
housing consumption in the Czech Republic between 1990-2005; the as-
sessment is based on policy outcomes (performance) and in comparative 
context; and
 analysis of possible reasons for particular Czech transitional housing pol-
icy; by searching the possible causes both through international compari-
son of relevant factors influencing policy formulation as well as through 
analysis of particular ideologies and institutions in the Czech Republic it-
self.
Only a few studies have tried to explain why transitional housing policy did 
not follow the same pace of reform as other state policies did (see Lowe & 
Tsenkova, 2003; Hegedüs & Tosics, 1998); even fewer studies could make any 
such conclusion (evaluations) at all. The goal of my book is therefore to fill 
this gap by, firstly, to evaluate housing policy during the transition and, sec-
ondly, to understand the reasons for such policy performance.
The goal of the book as stated above opens many methodological and theo-
retical questions. These should be addressed before the goal is finally opera-
tionalised into a set of research questions. Such preliminary questions are, as 
follows:
1. How should the establishment (reform) of the particular housing system in the 
Czech Republic be described? What theoretical background would be useful for the 
description and analysis of housing systems? How have others in general narrated 
the establishment (reform) of housing systems?
2. What is the theoretical (rational) reason behind any state intervention in housing 
markets? What is the theoretical role of the state in the field of housing? Are state 
interventions justifiable in theory – why and in what fields? Are state interven-
tions in the field of housing consumption theoretically justified? Why and in what 
forms?
3. How should state interventions in the field of housing consumption be assessed to 
understand their impact on housing consumption and housing affordability? What 
kind of assessment is appropriate to use to understand the influence of state inter-
ventions on housing consumption and affordability? What methodological device is 
suitable for this purpose?
4. What relevant international comparison of interventions in the field of housing con-
sumption can be used to better understand the process unique to the Czech Repub-
lic? What methodological features should such international comparison necessar-
ily hold?
The following sections on the theoretical framework and subsections on 
methodological framework should help to refine the definition of the research 
questions provided at the end of this chapter. They serve as a necessary intro-
duction to the problem of describing and evaluating housing systems.
The application of an appropriate theoretical framework is a prerequisite to 
meet the goal of this book and to answer the preliminary questions stated 
above. Clearly such a framework should be based on:
 theories and methodological tools related to the description of housing 
systems (often used in comparative housing studies);
 theories and methodological tools related to the understanding and evalu-
ation of the role of the state in housing; especially the role of the state in 
the field of housing consumption (often used in policy studies).
In the following section I would like to answer the first preliminary question, 
namely:
1. How should the establishment (reform) of particular housing system in the Czech 
Republic be described? What theoretical background would be useful for the de-
scription and analysis of housing systems? How have others in general narrated 
the establishment (reform) of housing systems?
The theoretical framework used to describe, classify and understand housing 
systems, understand their evolution and interactions, can be found in com-
parative housing studies. The goal of comparative housing studies is to de-
scribe similarities and differences in the development of housing systems be-
tween regionally or culturally separate units (mostly national states) and, less 
often, to find the causes for the existence of such similarities or differences, 
and causes for the potential divergence or convergence of systems. Housing 
systems are therefore described and analysed in a way that allows for iden-
tification of the main factors influencing the specific and common features 
in their development; factors leading to processes that are shared among 
countries as well as unique in particular countries. Comparative studies try 
to understand specific national patterns in one housing system by comparing 
them with the patterns of other systems. It is this feature that explains why 
comparative housing studies might substantially help answer this first pre-
liminary question.
According to Boelhouwer et al. (2000), since the end of the 1970s there has 
been a revival in international comparative housing research. Comparative 
information can be found in the majority of housing research papers; among 
the papers most often cited as methodological benchmarks are those belong-
ing to Donisson, Ungersson (1982), Ambrose & Barlow (1986), Ball et al. (1988), 
Barlow & Duncan (1994), Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden (1992, 1993a), Kemeny 
(1992, 1995), Harloe (1995), McCrone & Stephens (1995), Balchin (1996), Klein-
man (1996), Oxley & Smith (1996), Donner (2000, 2006) and others. They in-
clude the following types of comparative studies:
1. Useful numerical and statistical overviews (sometimes with short com-
mentary) of large and diverse groups of nations, regions, cities, and so 
forth, using a standardised set of indicators with no or only a weak ambi-
tion to deal with context and underlying causes of differences, and defi-
nitely no ambition to verify a pre-formulated housing system theory (ty-
pology, development). For example, the statistics collected and provided by 
organisations such as UN/ECE, Eurostat, OECD, IMF, World Bank, European 
Central Bank, Bank for International Settlement, European Mortgage Fed-
eration, CECODHAS, IUT, publications such as Housing Statistics in EU (2005), 
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004) and many others.
2. More or less detailed descriptions and comparison of particular aspects 
of housing systems (or whole housing systems) within a bloc of countries 
(or between just two countries) with stronger emphasis on the underlying 
social and economic context, and with at least a weak ambition to detect 
factors (causes) influencing differences and similarities among selected 
countries – sometimes called ‘middle-level comparative studies’ (Oxley, 
1999). For example, hundreds of housing comparative papers written an-
nually in diverse languages throughout the world and including housing 
policy comparisons and evaluations. Often these studies are commissioned 
by governments for relevant intelligence on ‘how things work elsewhere’ or 
by international organisations to regulate or influence the development of 
housing systems elsewhere.
3. Scientifically sophisticated studies starting with the formulation of an ap-
propriate theory and leading hypotheses, and providing empirical veri-
fication of theoretical arguments concerned with the detailed analysis of 
housing systems in a set of countries – sometimes called ‘high-level com-
parative studies’ (Oxley, 1999) – to which only a few research studies be-
long; most of these are cited above as ‘benchmark’ studies.
The studies in the third group are rare and mostly provided by researchers 
fully committed to comparative studies, although often not exclusively ori-
entated to housing. They are aimed at putting forward theories on whether, 
how and why housing (welfare) systems differ among countries, whether they 
converge or diverge and what might be the causes for similarities and differ-
ences among them. With their elaborated theoretical concepts, the studies of 
the third group are also among those I need to use in order to find an appro-
priate theoretical framework for my description and analysis of housing sys-
tem in the Czech Republic. Such studies are traditionally divided into follow-
ing categories: convergent studies and divergent studies.
Convergent studies
Convergent studies present the view that homogenising policies is the over-
riding trend in the evolution of housing (welfare) systems (Milligan, 2003). 
Convergence theory played a key role in housing market studies until the 
mid-1980s (Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1993a, p. 373); and they were es-
pecially connected to studies of functioning (growth) of the welfare state 
(Wilensky et al., 1987). Doling (1997) lists the convergent theories as those 
based on the conviction in ‘objective historical progress’ or ‘natural develop-
ment’ in ethics (growing social conscience), in perception of human rights 
during the process of modernisation (from civil to social rights), in industri-
al development (the further industrialisation develops, the closer and more 
similar a welfare state becomes), or in social class formation and struggle 
(once all societies are free of human economic exploitation). In most of these 
studies the elements of determinism, historicism, and existence of ‘objective’ 
laws embedded in historical progress were present; they often drew on Marx-
ist economic theory or were closely connected with welfare state theories 
(from later studies, e.g., Harloe, 1985).
An often cited convergent study is by Donnison (1967) who saw the ratio-
nale for convergence of housing policies in common economic and demo-
graphic developments in countries despite their different political and insti-
tutional differences (though economic determinism following from ‘logic of 
industrialism’ is rejected here). Donnison classified the housing systems of 
selected developed countries in three categories: embryonic, social and com-
prehensive. The classification of systems itself has connotations of evolution. 
As this is not particularly the goal of this book, there is no need for me to 
provide any further criticism of the assumptions, methodology and conclu-
sions of these studies (see Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1993a; Doling, 1997; 
Giddens, 1976; Kemeny, 1981, 1992; and others); such criticism became stron-
ger when states retreated somewhat from housing policy and welfare state 
regimes began changing radically since mid-1980s.
Divergent studies
Studies defined as divergent contend that housing policy is shaped by very 
specific social, cultural, economic and political contexts and therefore there is 
little possibility for any future convergence in a common end. Divergent stud-
ies are more recent and may be reactions to historicism and the deterministic 
explanations contained in earlier convergent studies, to rupture in the ‘linear’ 
development of welfare states and ultimately the disintegration of the former 
Communist bloc and the intellectual shift away from Marxist theory as well 
as other types of deterministic theories. In the sociological theoretical (as well 
as methodological) debate at least, disillusionment produced by the instabil-
ity of results from ambitious ‘exact’ social scientists (the vagueness of social 
‘principles’ or ‘historic objective laws’, the sense of futility derived from the 
impossibility of grasping social reality in its entirety within a fully exhaustive 
theory) or produced by the abuse of ‘objective’ research results by the bru-
tal ideologies of the 20th century meant that the social scientists’ effort is in-
creasingly aimed at ‘understanding’ rather than ‘objective measurement’ or 
‘prediction’.
Divergent housing studies concentrated on detailed and more comprehen-
sive understanding (description, categorisation or evaluation) of housing sys-
tem formation. These studies lowered the level of abstraction and often high-
lighted important aspects of each housing system established (developing) in 
various cultural, social and economic environments. They arose from theories 
of corporativism and agency (Schmidt, 1989; Clapham et al., 1990; Lundqvist, 
1988; Boddy, 1989), political structuralism and pluralism (Lundqvist, 1992), 
path dependence (Kleinman, 1996), structural functionalism and social regu-
lation (Berry, 1999), social constructivism and ideology (Kemeny, 1992, 1995; 
Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992), economic individualism (Friedman, 
1990), welfare state pluralism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and others.
To quote Milligan (2003): “There is growing recognition that they are not 
mutually exclusive explanations and greater emphasis is being placed on 
accounting for both similarities and differences in housing systems.” (p. 40). 
Thus convergence as such is not fully rejected by a recent housing researcher 
(seeing, at least, some convergence in the shifts of housing policies from sup-
ply to demand-side subsidies) but the aspect of evolution has lost its ‘objec-
tive’ and ‘necessary’ status and far more attention is paid to the context.
As I am going to focus on Czech housing policy changes after 1990, that is, 
during a period of substantial social reforms, those theories based on a grad-
ual evolution of systems (e.g., welfare state growth, ‘logic of industrialism’) 
would not give me the needed theoretical insight. Though transition in the 
field of housing policy (tenure, finance) basically shares a common starting 
point (Hegedüs & Tosics, 1998), it has not been a universal process by far (both 
by means and timing) and important differences among post-socialist poli-
cies have emerged (Lux et al., 2003; Donner, 2006). By admitting divergence in 
housing systems development and due to the fact that I am going to concen-
trate on policies in the field of housing consumption, I will take inspiration 
from the studies that are policy-orientated and, in context of housing system 
analysis, stress the importance (influence) of:
 ideology, social norms (Kemeny);
 traditional problem solution patterns; past receipts of today’s problems 
(Kleinman);
 recent social (Berry) as well as political (Lundqvist) structures.
Path dependence (present mainly in expectations, prejudices, norms and so-
cial values of ordinary people who often did not understand the meaning 
and goals of transition), revolution in macro-narratives, norms and ideol-
ogy followed by the media and politicians (substituting the values of Marx-
ism and collectivism with the values of liberalism and individualism) and the 
emergence of ‘new’ social and political institutions (new institutional links 
between economic capital, bureaucracy and the political elite) will thus rep-
resent the main contextual features of transition used here to understand 
housing system formation (reformation) in the Czech Republic.
Here follow a few statements on the main theoretical (methodological) 
concepts selected for the analysis of the housing system in the Czech Repub-
lic.
Path dependence, a concept used originally in economics, refers to the ten-
dency for solutions to problems to become locked in (through institutional 
setting and ideology) and difficult to change (Kleinman, 1996, p. 15). In other 
words, past experience, past form and content of public discourse, past poli-
cies and ideologies, past forms and behaviour of institutions and even past 
patterns of thinking about problems and their solutions strongly influence 
the present situation. Any revolutionary change is, therefore, hardly possible 
(and if there is some rapid social system change then it may only be formal 
or, if factual, it can elicit social disorder, ‘contra-revolution’). As Kleinman dis-
covered in his comparative research, despite common convergence patterns 
following on from European integration, economic globalisation or political 
shifts to neo-liberalism, there are powerful countervailing political and in-
stitutional forces in individual countries. He especially denied the notion of 
‘best’ housing policy (and thus the ideal of convergent theories): “Trying to 
determine which country has the ‘best’ housing policy is an utterly fruitless 
exercise” (Kleinman, 1996, p. 16). The concept of path dependence was applied 
especially by Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden in their comparative studies 
(1993b).
The regulation approach is a concept closely connected to structural func-
tionalism (studies by T. Parsons, B. Malinowski) as well as to the concept of 
path dependence. Its goal is to find and describe longstanding specific nation-
al patterns of housing policies reflected in specific types of social regulation. 
It was used by Berry (1999) who defines the type of regulation as “the set of 
institutional forms and processes which determines how and to what extent 
social reproduction is actually achieved” (p. 111). Locally specific econom-
ic factors and needs, and a limited number of publicly and ideologically ac-
cepted alternatives to meet them, may stay behind the specific type of social 
regulation, that is also behind a specific type of state housing interventions.
Political structuralism stresses the role that ideology and the interests of 
specific political parties or, more importantly, the process of political decision 
making itself, influenced or directed by powerful interest groups behind po-
litical structures, may have in shaping and developing state policies (studies 
by R. Dahl, G.W. Domhoff, N. Poulantzas and other political sociologists). Lun-
dqvist (1992) applied this theory to housing policies and put his main empha-
sis on actual distribution of political power, that is on who is recently in pow-
er – whether political parties with related bureaucracy and interest groups 
having a market-weak position or political parties with related bureaucracy 
and interest groups having a market-strong position. Market-weak parties 
promote non-market solutions, public interventions in the housing market 
while market-strong parties promote market solutions.5 Power relations of 
various agents internal or external to housing provision are uneven and lo-
cally specific.
Political structuralism is also close to the sociological concept of social con-
structivism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) which postulates that social reality is 
socially constructed; such social reality includes not only such soft interpre-
tations as ideology, norms, ethics, national ‘myths’ but also the such institu-
tions as markets, money, government, police, housing. The repeated recipro-
cal interactions between individuals are institutionalised and in the process 
of such institutionalisation, meaning is embedded in a society. The meaning 
of social fact is thus subject to discussion, manipulation and political strug-
gle. There is no true, ‘objective’ essence, neither only one right way, nor one 
true meaning, but the only reality is the battle of competing meanings given 
to social facts by the conflicting interests of particular social groups (see also 
studies by the postmodern sociologists Z. Baumann, J.F. Lyotard). The group in 
power may construct (manipulate) reality in such a way that would allow it to 
pursue its economic interests and, if it is in power a long time, to even cap-
ture the whole market (Mills, 1956; Bourdieu, 2005; and others).
The role of social norms (ideology) in housing system development (espe-
cially in tenure structure) is stressed in several studies by Kemeny. Kemeny 
(1981, 1991, 1995) paid attention to the wider social arrangements and ideo-
logical dispositions in various countries; and not to the economic logic or 
particular configuration of political power. He is thus close to social construc-
tivism as his main emphasis is on the meanings (ideas, norms) assigned to 
reality rather than on reality an sich; according to Kemeny, however, such so-
cial norms cannot be changed by one temporal political representation and 
have a stable long-term character. Kemeny (1981) distinguished two general 
types of housing systems – home-owning and cost-rental. Using data on sev-
eral industrialised countries including three case studies he concluded that 
there has been an important divergence between countries with prevailing 
social ideologies (reflected in their social policies) – whether it be collectivism 
or privatism. Such an ideological framework had an effect on ‘political tenure 
strategy’. Thus governments create environments that favour one or another 
type of tenure and strongly influence tenure decisions of its citizens. In other 
words, governments set up tenure-specific subsidies directed either to home-
owners or renters; the form of such subsidies is also an important aspect of 
policies as the subsidies might be connected to the stigmatisation of some 
types of tenure. Kemeny (1995) then distinguished state policy models as du-
alist (stigmatising one type of tenure) and unitary (tenure neutral) and made 
a somewhat normative judgement about the causes of divergence – while a 
dualist model is applied to protect private and the for-profit sector, a unitary 
model is applied to ensure that the housing system as a whole meets general 
welfare goals.
In this section I would like to address the second preliminary question, name-
ly:
2. What is the theoretical (rational) reason behind any state intervention in housing 
markets? What is the theoretical role of the state in the field of housing? Are state 
interventions justifiable in theory – why and in what fields? Are state interven-
tions in the field of housing consumption theoretically justified? Why and in what 
forms?
It is not possible to understand the role the state plays in the field of hous-
ing without understanding the specific phenomenon of housing itself. After 
this introductory section on housing specificity I will go on to discuss in the 
next section the theories describing the role of the ‘ideal’ state (independent, 
interest-free) in the field of housing.
Housing is not a simple category that can be viewed from a single perspec-
tive. On the one hand, it is one of the basic human needs and the right to ad-
equate housing has been classified as a basic social human right in most de-
veloped countries around the world. On the other hand, housing constitutes 
a special type of private property, traded on the market. Although trade-offs 
between the social and economic aspects of housing may come into play, the 
purpose of both central and local housing policies lies in searching for a con-
sensus that assures both the effective functioning of the housing market and 
the financial affordability of housing for all social groups in society.
From a purely economic perspective, housing mainly constitutes private 
property because it is not available in a non-competitive manner and does 
not have the character of public goods.6 However, housing economics ob-
serves the following essential differences between housing and standard 
market commodities (Maclennan, 1982; Fallis, 1985; Lux (ed.), 2002):
1. Housing is a heterogeneous, complex and multidimensional good. Individ-
ual houses and apartments differ in floor space, design, age, quality, stan-
dard, furnishings, tenure, size and number of additional spaces or build-
ings (garage, garden), location, quality of the environment, accessibility 
and so on. It is very difficult to measure the unit of output and the demand 
for housing in general because the rent paid for a small flat can be the 
same as for a larger family house, even under conditions of optimal distri-
bution and market equilibrium. Therefore, housing economics introduced a 
theoretical construct called ‘housing service’. It is assumed that in a state 
of equilibrium the price per housing service unit will be the same in all 
types of dwelling units. Households or individuals thus demand housing 
services rather than housing on the market.
2. Housing is a durable good and as such it becomes subject to both con-
sumption and investment. “There are two housing markets. In one, the 
consumer good, housing service, is exchanged, and the price per unit of 
housing service is determined. In the other, the investment good, housing 
stock, is exchanged and the price per unit of housing stock is determined” 
(Fallis, 1985, p. 6). In a perfect market, the price of a housing stock unit will 
equal the discounted present value of housing service flows (discounted by 
the interest rate and depreciation). However, housing consumption and in-
vestment motives may conflict: the consumer wishes to maximise utility 
but the investor chooses from all the options a housing unit with a maxi-
mum net present value of expected future returns. Moreover, a household 
willing to acquire housing must make an important decision: to rent or to 
buy. By choosing to rent a dwelling, the household is participating only in 
the market of housing services; by choosing to buy a dwelling, the house-
holder also becomes an investor).
3. Housing is a spatially fixed good and cannot be moved from one location 
to another. To buy a dwelling means not only to buy a particular dwelling 
but also to buy the socio-economic status of a neighbourhood and the level 
of accessibility to the place of employment. The price per unit of homoge-
neous housing services varies with distance: near the centre of employ-
ment the price will be higher than farther away. The access-space trade-off 
model developed by Alonso (1964) explains why prices for the land produc-
tion factor must decrease with the distance from the centre of employ-
ment.
Other specific features of housing include, in particular:
 High transaction costs of potential moving, that is, as finding and furnish-
ing a new dwelling and moving involves considerable expense (not only 
monetary expenditure but also time and emotions invested) that do not 
relate directly to the acquisition of a new dwelling. These constitute the 
‘transaction costs’. The market adapts to changes in household income 
(the income effect) very slowly, compared to potential adaptations, if the 
transaction costs equal zero. “Such costs may range between 5 and 10% of 
the total price of a house, particularly where movement entails both sell-
ing and purchase costs” (Maclennan, 1982, p. 61). Transaction costs are of-
ten so great (especially if intermediaries such as real estate agencies are 
included) that they, to a large extent, influence the selection of future 
housing itself.
 Housing is a relatively illiquid good, at least in comparison to financial as-
sets, and at the same time a very expensive good. Therefore, people are 
extremely careful before they make the final decision to buy and it takes 
them far more time to make this decision than is the case with other con-
sumer goods.
 It is impossible to attain perfect knowledge about the situation on the 
market. Neither the buyer nor the seller can acquire perfect knowledge 
about all the offers for various housing services in such a dispersed mar-
ket. As mentioned above, housing is a heterogeneous good and to behave 
rationally (to make a decision) it is necessary not only to know the price 
of a dwelling but also the price of particular housing attributes in various 
regions and locations.
Due to its durability, lack of transparency (in prices), low liquidity, high trans-
action costs as well as high price itself, supply of housing adjusts only slowly 
to changes in demand; that is, in the short term the housing market is often 
in stage of disequilibrium. High income elasticity of housing demand, scarci-
ty of land for new housing development and the above-mentioned low price 
elasticity of housing supply are all factors making housing (residential real-
estate) suitable for pure, relatively safe investments; the nominal as well as 
real house prices follow the long-term growth trend (OECD, BIS, ECB), hedg-
ing well against inflation (Montezuma, 2004). The high level of speculation 
(short-term investments) can, however, increase market distortions, volatility 
of house prices and contribute to undesirable price bubbles on the housing 
market (Malpezzi & Wachter, 2002). Finally, due to the special fixity of hous-
ing, many externalities (both positive and negative) appear on the housing 
market.
If a market is perfectly competitive, all the participants (buyers and sellers) 
consider the price to be a given and assume that their individual behaviour 
cannot change it. In such a market, there must be a large number of sellers 
and buyers and none of them may control the market or a significant seg-
ment thereof. In such a case, the price equals the marginal utility of consum-
ers and the marginal costs of producers and the market finds itself in a Pa-
reto optimum. As Fallis postulates (1985, p. 148), even a market with a smaller 
number of actors on the supply side may obtain an equilibrium price and the 
optimum amount of exchange, but such a market must be ‘open to competi-
tion’. It must be a market where potential newcomers on the supply side may 
acquire complete information about its functioning, operate at the same cost 
and under the same production conditions as the existing producers and the 
entry to or the exit from the market must not be contingent upon any special 
costs. If the market is open to competition, even a market with only a few en-
tities on the supply side may produce optimum output.
Although a perfect situation can never be attained, if we compare the 
number of players on the housing market with respect to the numbers of sell-
ers and buyers in other markets, we will most likely come to the conclusion 
that on both sides of the market there is a relatively large number of play-
ers (by players I mean sellers and buyers of dwellings, not number of hous-
ing developers or construction firms; for new housing development itself the 
market might be characterised by oligopoly on its supply side). Even if we ex-
amine the market with owner-occupied housing separately from the market 
with rental housing, we will still find a great number of participants on the 
supply and demand sides. As Fallis states: “It is sometimes popularly asserted 
that a few companies own a large fraction of the rental stock. This is simply 
untrue – the rental stock is widely held in Canadian cities” (Fallis, 1985, p. 149). 
Maclennan adds: “In general, economists assume that the housing market is 
atomistically competitive. In the British context, assumptions of monopoly 
ownership have been made by political commentators or Labour Party legisla-
tors only in relation to private rental housing. Even in quite small areas of cit-
ies, the ownership of rented property is considerably dispersed and the devel-
opment of new housing is also deconcentrated. Ironically, it is really only the 
local public authorities who are monopolists in a market sense and their mo-
nopoly may be reflected, not only in exploitative prices but also in poor prac-
tice which, in some cases, may result in some tenants paying council rents in 
excess of probable market rentals” (Maclennan, 1982, p. 155-6).
However, the adjustment of a housing supply on changes in housing de-
mand, as mentioned, is slow; besides the stated factors this is also due to in-
elastic new housing supply (Meen, 2001, 2002). The price inelasticity of new 
housing supply is caused partially by state regulations (land zoning, urban 
planning, and building rules) but also by the specific features of housing as 
a good. Due to the lengthy time taken by housing construction and due to 
the fact that housing is so expensive, there are a number of specific business 
risks. This kind of activity presupposes capitally-strong developers having a 
good channel to banking project finance; for smaller developers the danger of 
a skewed investment portfolio may be too high. This leads to concentration, 
which may decrease housing market efficiency, become a market failure and 
which also be one of the reasons for supply inelasticity (Bourdieu, 2005).
Another example of market failure involves externalities. The indirect con-
sumer externalities, those following from housing stock reconstruction/re-
generation and from land use, are usually considered to be the most signifi-
cant ones in the housing market. Indirect consumer externality arises when 
the consumption of one household influences the total utility of another 
household’s consumption indirectly, through another factor. For example, the 
housing consumption of one household (excessive number of people living in 
a flat as a result of the specific social situation of that household) may influ-
ence the crime rate in a given area (aggressive antisocial behaviour). This, in 
turn, may influence the total utility of housing consumption of other house-
holds. Health problems (infections), vandalism, intentional destruction and 
sabotage of the environment may serve as other examples.
In addition to negative externalities, there are also positive externalities on 
the housing market following from housing stock renovation. When purchas-
ing or renting a dwelling, people consider not only the quality of such a dwell-
ing but also the quality of the surroundings. If an owner invests in repairs and 
the renovation of his/her house, then not only the owner but also everyone 
else living in the neighbourhood gain from the renovation (also known as the 
‘neighbourhood effect’). There is a problem, though: if all owners renovated 
their houses, the profit would be much greater than if only one of them does. 
Thus owners must often consider whether or not to go ahead with renovation 
because they do not know whether other owners will renovate their houses 
too (the well-known ‘prisoner’s dilemma’).
As mentioned above, housing is also perceived as a basic social need of hu-
man beings and its standard greatly influences the standard of welfare of the 
whole society. Housing insecurity can have far reaching consequences for the 
labour market, as well as for the political stability of a particular country. In 
view of the increased acceptance of the post-World War II concept of welfare 
state (a concept which is even more clearly redefined today) the right to ad-
equate housing has become a fundamental social right in all economically 
developed countries and responsibility for housing provision has partially 
transferred from the consumer and family to public authorities and public 
finance.
The right to housing is a social right, and social rights constitute the third 
element of human rights (the other two being political and civil rights). The 
right to housing as a human right is formulated in a number of internation-
al documents, the oldest being the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
which the UN General Assembly adopted in December 1948. Article 25 of this 
document states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services…”. Principle 
4 of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, adopted in November 1959, 
states that “the child shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, rec-
reation and medical services...”. Part II, Article 10 of the Declaration on Social 
Progress and Development, adopted in December 1969, states that “the basic 
freedoms can be attained also by provision for all, particularly persons in low 
income groups and large families, of adequate housing and community ser-
vices.” Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights adopted in 1966 states that “the State Parties to the present Cov-
enant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to 
the continuous improvement of living conditions”. To support the realisation 
of the obligations under this international document, the UN Council for Hu-
man Rights has issued numerous recommendations, explanations and com-
mentaries. In some countries, the right to housing was included directly in 
the Constitution.7
The right to housing is mostly understood as ensuring affordable housing 
(a housing price level that will ensure the fulfilment of basic needs in the field 
of housing, including the possibility of obtaining social support in cases when 
the family cannot ensure this fulfilment by its own means) and the avail-
ability of housing for disadvantaged and endangered social groups (seniors, 
children, physically handicapped individuals, victims of natural and other di-
sasters, etc.). In November 1988 the UN General Assembly adopted a princi-
pal document concerning housing titled Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 
2000 which stated: “The right to adequate housing is generally recognised by 
the international community. All nations without exception recognise some 
form of obligation in the housing sector, such as the establishment of minis-
tries or other institutes for housing issues, allocation of funds to the housing 
sector and creation of housing policies, programs, and projects. All citizens of 
all states, including the poorest ones, have the right to expect that their gov-
ernments will pay attention to their housing needs and will adopt fundamen-
tal measures leading to the protection and improvement of housing…”. Simi-
larly, the European Social Chart of the Council of Europe, adopted in 1961, the 
revised version of which was adopted in 1996 by a number of Member States 
of the Council of Europe, states in Part I that “Member States adopt as the ob-
jective of their policies the attaining of conditions under which the following 
rights and principles will be effectively fulfilled”. Number 31 of the rights and 
principles states that “Every person has a right to shelter”. In Part II, Article 31 
states the pledge to “adopt measures with the aim to support accessibility of 
housing of adequate quality in order to prevent homelessness and to imple-
ment measures securing affordable cost of housing for those who do not have 
sufficient financial means”.
Housing is often termed a ‘merit good’ (term of R. A. Musgrave). Merit good 
is defined as a good about whose consumption society collectively believes 
that is inherently desirable and therefore, unlike the consumption of other 
goods, should be publicly supported (mainly due to such wider welfare goals 
as social cohesion, political stability, social integration, improving health and 
education). Merit good does not mean a public good. Education is another fre-
quently mentioned example of merit good.
State housing policies challenge both the economic and social perspectives 
of housing and theoretically (if we assume the state is an independent in-
terest-free actor) they are thus led by the effort to eliminate market failures 
and ensure that the housing market functions more efficiently, and by the ef-
fort to redistribute housing consumption or, to put it more precisely, to en-
sure affordable housing for all groups of households. Such housing policies 
form a part of general welfare state regimes directed at increasing efficiency, 
reduction of inequality, supporting living standards and improving social in-
tegration (Barr, 1998, p. 9-11).8 Although both main objectives – improving ef-
ficiency and reducing inequality in housing consumption – are far from com-
plementary (being mostly contradictory), through their housing and other 
types of policies public authorities strive to eliminate monopolies and ‘inter-
nalise’ externalities following from the imperfect functioning of the market 
and, at the same time, they introduce various restrictions, regulations, licens-
es, plans and various fiscal subsidies for selected groups of households which 
do indeed lead to the erection of other market barriers and an even more im-
perfect functioning of the housing market. The double role of the state as ra-
tional economist and understanding paternalist (Lux et al., 2003) may be illustrat-
ed from the point of view of the welfare economics in Figure A.1 (Edgeworth 
box), shown in Appendix A (based on Barr, 1998).
The role of a public authority as rational economist derives in particular from 
the well-known definition of the economic optimum developed by Italian so-
ciologist and economist Vilfredo Pareto. According to his theory, the market 
finds itself in an optimum if there is no possible allocation of goods other 
than the existing one (another manner of production, other legislative envi-
ronment etc.) that could increase the utility of one of the participants without 
decreasing the utility of the other participants. If the situation on the market 
precludes any public inference that could increase the utility of one without 
decreasing the utility of another, we talk about a Pareto optimum (also the 
highest economic efficiency). If, on the other hand, the total utility could in-
crease without decreasing the utility of any of the actors, then the process of 
‘improvement’ is called optimisation, a ‘Pareto improvement’. Such improve-
ment involves, for example, the elimination of monopolies from the housing 
market or ensuring greater information dissemination among actors entering 
the market, that is, interventions leading to the elimination of market fail-
ures.
Public entities, however, also enter the housing market as understanding 
paternalists and come with a certain (diverged) concepts of a welfare state. It 
is clear that the scope and type of public interventions depend largely upon 
which type of welfare concept the particular administration favours. In the 
case of libertarians and liberals (right-wing parties) it is more likely that they 
will consider housing to be primarily a private issue and will leave respon-
sibility for ensuring their housing to the individual citizen or his/her family. 
In the case of socialists and communists, on the other hand, it is more likely 
that they will consider housing to be a public matter and therefore the re-
sponsibility for ensuring housing will be placed on the shoulders of the state, 
municipalities, and public institutions. (The potential conduct of a public 
authority ‘headed’ by libertarians, utilitarians, egalitarians, and socialists is 
briefly outlined also in the Appendix A, based on Barr, 1998.)
A majority of the politicians will most likely consider housing to be both 
a public and private matter and therefore in all developed Western countries 
(even very liberal ones) we find housing policies aimed at ensuring great-
er equality in housing consumption (i.e., we find the state in the role of the 
understanding paternalist). The dual role of the state as understanding pa-
ternalist and rational economist may be rewritten into policies towards the 
(economic) efficiency of market functioning on the one hand, and towards 
the (social) effectiveness (equity) in market distribution of housing services 
on the other. Ensuring the efficiency of market functioning rests in the elimi-
nation of market barriers, in Pareto optimisation; ensuring effectiveness (eq-
uity) rests in the redistribution of housing consumption. A ‘trade off’ situa-
tion commonly arises between efficiency and equity (Barr, 1998, p. 11). Barr 
concludes that while “the efficiency aim is common to all theories of society 
… redistributive goals depend crucially on which definition of social justice is 
chosen” (1998, p. 69).
In addition to the wide range of sociological system theories explaining the 
role of the state interventions in the field of housing,9 several social justice 
theories based on abstract assumptions of classic rationalism and rational 
choice (independent state) explain why public authorities behave not only as 
rational economists, eliminating market failures and externalities, but also 
as understanding paternalists. According to Downs (1957, in Barr, 1998), ‘the 
poor’, acting either on behalf of themselves or in a coalition, take advantage 
of their right to vote to increase their wealth through wealth redistribution. 
According to Tullock’s (1970) presuppositions of rational choice, politicians be-
have selfishly and with the expectation of expanding their power, status, or 
income, they strive to maximise the number of potential electoral votes for 
themselves in the next elections. And because income distribution is mostly 
pyramidal (relatively few people with high incomes but many people with low 
incomes), politicians maximise the number of electoral votes by supporting 
the redistribution from the wealthy to the poor (theory of coerced redistribu-
tion). Total property equality will not occur only because:
 there is a certain fear among politicians of the consequences of complete 
property equality on the efficiency of market functioning (e.g., nationalisa-
tion of enterprises, high taxation);
 the minority of wealthy people usually concentrate relatively great influ-
ence on social and political events (elites) and manage to defend them-
selves against certain pressures;
 many poor people also ‘want’ a certain degree of property inequality to re-
main since they also wish to one day become lucky enough to be wealthi-
er and more powerful than others – they never completely relinquish this 
possibility.
Another is the voluntary redistribution theory proposed by Hochman & Rod-
gers (1969, in Barr 1998), that suggests it is in the rational interest of every 
wealthy person to redistribute the wealth in the direction of the ‘poorer’ fel-
low citizens and therefore wealthy people do so not under pressure from the 
state, but voluntarily. The theory is based on the assumption that there are al-
ways several externalities on the market (the housing market is a typical one) 
and therefore the consumption utility of each individual is significantly in-
fluenced by the consumption of others. Thus, the consumption utility of ‘the 
wealthy’ is influenced by the degree or form of the consumption of ‘the poor’. 
Moreover, redistribution is justifiable with respect to quasi-efficiency. Let me 
assume that there are only two citizens, wealthy W and poor P; in the sim-
plest version their own utility functions (U) are influenced only by their own 
incomes (Y):
UW = f( YW )
UP = f( YP )
Now let me assume that the amount of the utility of the wealthy citizen will 
depend not only on his own income but also on the income of the poor citizen:
UW = ƒ(YW , YP)
Then redistribution will follow from rational conduct of the wealthy citizen 
and will last until:
0>
YW
UW−
Yp
UW
that is, until the moment when an increase in the utility of the wealthy per-
son’s consumption following from the increase in the poor person’s income 
by a unit equals the fall in the wealthy person’s utility due to a decrease in 
his income by the same unit as a consequence of redistribution towards the 
poor person (  is the mark for partial derivation). The model is sometimes 
criticised, especially for neglecting the phenomenon of ‘free riders’ who al-
ways appear if there are not only two but n other people.
Rawls’s theory of justice (Rawls, 1971) became especially influential in this 
field. The actors in his theory follow their rational selfish interest but they are 
supposed to be behind a veil of ignorance, meaning they know nothing about 
themselves, their histories, social status, income, or expected life careers. The 
negotiators follow their own interests but are unable to separate themselves 
from others. When considering the principle of social justice the only ratio-
nal consensus reached by negotiators would be to maximise the welfare of the 
least well-off individual (as nobody knows who it is and there is always some 
probability that each of them might be the least well-off). Such a conclusion 
leads to the imperative to redistribute the wealth till the point when complete 
equality is established. However, the assumption of this theory, the existence 
of a veil of ignorance, makes it more an abstract theory on social justice than 
an explanation of why redistribution of wealth actually occurs in practice.
In addition to the theory presupposing the purely rational and ‘selfish’ be-
haviour of social actors, sociological theories of ethics and social solidarity 
also study the reasons for the redistributive aspects of public authorities’ be-
haviour. These theories emphasise the aspects of values, emotions and norms 
in individual and social lives that economists tend to neglect. Regardless of 
in which social-economic theory the grain of truth can be found, the fact is 
that the redistribution of housing consumption has become the axis of hous-
ing policies in most modern states and an important part of their welfare re-
gimes. Differences, however, appear when analysing particular housing policy 
instruments and power.
The aim of this section is to answer the third preliminary question, namely:
3. How should state interventions in the field of housing consumption be assessed to 
understand their impact on housing consumption and housing affordability? What 
kind of assessment is appropriate to use to measure the influence of state inter-
ventions on housing consumption and affordability? What methodological device is 
suitable for this purpose?
Firstly, it is necessary to describe the scale of possible state interventions in 
the field of housing consumption (housing subsidies and/or regulations) and 
then, in the second part of this section, to analyse a potential methodological 
device for their evaluation, assessment, and mutual comparison.
In principle, there are two ways in which the (independent, interest-free, ‘ide-
al’) state as understanding paternalist can ensure greater social equality and 
greater financial affordability of housing for low and middle-income groups 
of households: cash allowances increasing the income of needy households 
(housing or income allowance), or a subsidy lowering the cost of housing (op-
eration and capital subsidies, rent regulation). With respect to the efficiency 
of both types of redistribution (defined here as optimal total consumption 
utility) it appears that the cash allowance is more efficient than an allowance 
aimed at decreasing the costs of housing. This comparison is shown in Figure 
A.2 of Appendix A which captures the impact of both types of state interven-
tion on a housing consumption utility of needy households.
In reality, however, the situation may not be quite so simple. This case 
captures a situation where one household chooses between two types of 
goods – in practice there are many heterogeneous households that make de-
cisions among a wide range of goods (including work and leisure time). More-
over, the goal of wealth redistribution is usually not merely to achieve the 
highest possible efficiency of state intervention but also to achieve greater 
effectiveness of the intervention, that is, the means allocated for increasing 
housing consumption must actually be used for housing by those in need. For 
the state as understanding paternalist effectiveness is often more important 
than efficiency and therefore we can imagine a situation where the state opts 
for a less efficient solution but the aid really does end up where it should.
Notice, for example, that in the case of intervention directed at decreasing 
the cost of housing, the household in Figure A.2 would consume more units 
of housing services than if a cash allowance were provided, although the cash 
allowance would move the household to a qualitatively higher level of total 
consumption, a higher level of total utility. If the objective of public interven-
tion is to increase housing consumption (e.g., improve housing conditions, as-
suming housing is a merit good) and not so much to increase the consump-
tion of all other goods (to increase the living standard as such) then of the 
above-mentioned possibilities the public authority would tend to opt for an 
intervention that decreases the cost of housing. Although it is theoretically 
possible to prove that a decrease in the cost of housing leads to a lower total 
consumption utility than a direct cash allowance does, it is not necessarily 
the case when modelling situations with actual macro-economic conditions, 
including the estimated elasticity of the supply side of the housing market 
(i.e., risking ‘capitalisation’ of income subsidies into higher housing prices).
In reality public interventions aimed at decreasing housing costs may, for 
political reasons, be preferred over a cash benefit as a minimum level of hous-
ing consumption is often easier to ensure and monitor by the first type of in-
tervention. Similarly in education it is easier to ensure that the poor receive 
free basic education than to pay an allowance to the poor so that they may pay 
for their education. In order to support this fact with a formal analysis, let me 
turn again to Barr (1998) to expand the argument concerning the interweaving 
of utility functions of the rich and the poor which I have used above. Let me 
assume now that the amount of the total utility (U) of wealthy citizen W is giv-
en by his income and the consumption (C) of his poor fellow citizen P. Let me 
also presuppose this time that the utility of the rich person is influenced by 
the consumption of the poor person rather than by the poor person’s income:
UW = ƒ(YW , CP )
From the point of view of the wealthy citizen (i.e., based on his/her evaluation, 
his/her own values and norms), the consumption of poor citizen CP may be 
broken down into ‘good’ consumption (CPgood) consisting of, for example, the 
consumption of quality housing, and ‘bad’ consumption (CPbad) consisting of, 
for example, the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, etc. Thus, we would tran-
scribe the utility function of the rich citizen in the following manner:
UW = ƒ(YW , CPgood , CPbad )
If the rich citizen decides to redistribute resources toward a poorer fellow citi-
zen, the rich citizen will naturally strive to direct the resources exclusively to 
good consumption, which simple cash benefit does not necessarily guarantee. 
In the case of a simple cash benefit, the poor citizen may support what the 
rich citizen may view as bad consumption, which in turn would decrease the 
total utility of the rich citizen. Therefore, redistribution through intervention 
aimed at decreasing housing costs (e.g., the support for the construction of 
social housing) offers the rich citizen a better guarantee that his/her money 
will be used for good consumption by the poor fellow citizen and thus con-
tribute to an increase in his/her own total utility. Similarly, even the poor citi-
zen may, under certain conditions, favour supply support over a cash allow-
ance because he/she will perceive such a situation as less stigmatising than 
‘having to stand in line for social benefits’.
The following are fundamental public housing policy instruments aimed at 
securing greater financial affordability of housing, that is, the most common 
public interventions in the field of housing consumption:
1. rent policy/rent regulation (in social and/or private rental housing);
2. allocation policy for social rental housing;
3. supply-side subsidies (both capital and revenue) for social rental housing;
4. demand-side subsidies for rental housing (housing allowances);
5. subsidies to promote the affordability of owner-occupied housing (tax sub-
sidies, interest subsidies, grants, qualified loans, housing allowances and 
other indirect supports for housing finance).
Social housing (representing the subsidies aimed at decreasing the cost of 
rental housing) and housing allowances (representing the subsidies aimed at 
increasing the income of needy households) form the pillars of public hous-
ing policies in the sector of rental housing in most developed countries. Simi-
larly, the tax subsidy (called sometimes fiscal subsidy) is often the most im-
portant subsidy in the segment of owner-occupied housing. However, I must 
point out that there are great differences among countries (Donner, 2000): for 
example, housing allowance plays a marginal or even no role in countries 
with income-related rents applied in social housing (Belgium)10 and also in 
countries like Italy or Spain; on the other hand, there are some countries with 
no or only few social rental flats (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland) and 
countries that have already substantially decreased the level of tax subsidies 
(UK, France, Scandinavian countries).
The next part of this section provides more details of the main practical 
examples of state intervention in the field of housing consumption: social 
rental housing, housing allowances and subsidies to promote the affordability 
of owner-occupied housing.
Social rental housing
The meaning of the term ‘social housing’ changes with cultural context. Al-
though the term is widely used, different social policy ideological constructs, 
historical traditions and experiences, various routes of economic develop-
ment and diverse applications of welfare state principles have altogether cre-
ated too many ‘national’ colours to draw one universal picture. In developed 
Western countries, the term most often relates to rental housing (but we find 
exceptions in UK, Greece, Spain and probably other countries where it is also 
used for state-supported owner-occupied housing; or in Sweden, Germany, 
Netherlands or Denmark where it also relates to cooperative housing) which 
is rented out by public or private landlords on a non-profit basis (but in some 
countries, such as Germany, private landlords can obtain limited profit). The 
dwellings are generally built and/or operated with subsidies from public bud-
gets to keep rents affordable for low-income households (but an increasing 
number of developed countries have substantially cut their supply-side subsi-
dies, which has resulted in a substantial growth in social rent). The dwellings 
are allocated according to the principle of need (but in many countries social 
housing landlords receive large autonomy in this respect and in some coun-
tries the dwelling allocation is not limited by any ceiling or target).
The sector of social rental housing is found in almost every ‘old’ EU mem-
ber state. It varies from 1% of housing stock in Spain up to 34% in the Neth-
erlands. Social landlords must fulfil explicit provisions concerning the social 
housing operation when using a grant or preferential loan from public bud-
gets. These provisions concern mainly the allocation system and the system 
of rent setting. The allocation of social flats often depends on the fulfilment 
of certain social criteria. In many countries, national law sets explicit income 
ceilings for access to the social rental sector (e.g., France) or it simply speci-
fies target social groups (e.g., Great Britain). The Swedish concept of social 
housing, where neither income testing nor other examination of social needs 
is applied during dwelling allocation (about 20% of Swedish housing stock) is 
an example of a country where the social housing sector is open to all house-
holds. Rents in the rental social housing stock are regulated by special laws. 
They are mostly calculated on the assumption of non-profit construction 
and management. Although maintenance of the social housing stock was of-
ten subsidised early on (and this kind of subsidy continues in some cases up 
to the present), in general the rent covers all costs connected with housing 
(‘cost rent’): operation, maintenance, administration, repairs and construction 
loan repayments (historic capital costs). Belgium, Portugal and Ireland use the 
model of income-related rent (social dwelling rent is computed according to 
the income of the resident household).
There are many types of social housing operators: state, municipalities, 
housing cooperatives, non-profit housing associations, and private investors 
(Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992; Donner, 2000). Wide-ranging housing re-
forms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s increased reliance on private capi-
tal to finance social rental housing construction and regeneration. The role 
of public budgets (not only in the sphere of financing) decreased and inde-
pendent social landlords gained more freedom in the UK, Ireland and Nether-
lands (Maclennan & More, 1997).
Housing allowance
An income-tested rent/housing allowance is the second important instru-
ment of housing and welfare policy in developed European states, again es-
pecially in the field of rental housing. With respect to housing policy, this is a 
demand-oriented instrument that directly influences the demand for housing. 
Indirectly, it may affect the supply. Increasing the disposable income of the 
population by providing an allowance stimulates demand based on purchas-
ing power; the reaction to an increase in demand should be a corresponding 
increase in the supply. Income-tested housing allowances were implemented 
in the developed Western countries from the middle of the 1960s (Germany 
1965) onwards, but especially during the 1970s (Great Britain 1972, France 
1977) and 1980s. The basic principle of housing allowances is to provide en-
titled households from the rental or owner-occupied housing sectors a benefit 
amounting to the difference between the actual and normatively settled level 
of household burden by rental/housing costs, defined as the share of hous-
ing expenditures from total household income. When calculating housing al-
lowance, three factors in particular are taken into account: household income, 
housing expenditures and size of household (an international comparison of 
different models is found, for example, in Kemp (ed.), 2007).
Social housing versus housing allowance
There is a long-standing discussion, both scientific and practical, about the 
comparative benefits of supply and demand-side subsidies for rental housing. 
The following are often-cited advantages that supply-side subsidies (social 
housing support) may have over demand-side subsidies (housing allowances) 
in the field of rental housing (Maclennan, 1982; Fallis, 1985; Barlow & Duncan, 
1994; Thalmann, 2004; Ball & Harloe, 1998; Laferrére & Le Blanc, 2004; Oxley & 
Smith, 1996; Wilcox & Meen, 1995; Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992; Don-
ner, 2000; Haffner & Oxley, 1999; and many others):
 in some cases the state can react to expected trends or a sudden housing 
deficit more flexibly than the market, because market entities have to ac-
count for the relatively high risks of long-term housing construction;
 the state/municipality has the power to ensure low construction costs rel-
atively quickly and flexibly (e.g., through subsidy policy, provision of land 
lots for the construction site free of charge);
 support for social housing construction directly increases the supply of 
dwellings in a given housing market and thus creates pressure on reduc-
tion of rents and prices;
 if housing supply elasticity is low then in the short term the market will 
react to the demand shock with a price increase; unlike private landlords, 
social landlords will not use excess demand to generate economic profit 
‘from insufficiency’;
 in the case of social housing the crowding out effect of private investment 
is probably low, because the private sector is not very interested in provid-
ing standard-quality housing to relatively risky groups of consumers;
 private rental housing constituted by minor investors owning one or two 
dwellings for lease is not a true alternative to long-term lease agreements 
in social housing – there may also be institutional investors in the private 
market, but their interest in this field generally decreases (Thalmann, 2004; 
Ball & Harloe, 1998).
The following are the most-cited disadvantages of the social housing alterna-
tive:
 high likelihood of poor effectiveness in allocating social dwellings;
 high likelihood of poor efficiency in constructing social dwellings – con-
struction costs are higher due to missing competition pressures than in a 
free-market situation;
 low mobility of households due to the fear of losing privileged access to 
the social housing sector in a new place of residence, which may have neg-
ative consequences for the labour market;
 danger of poor efficiency of the support in a long run – the eligibility to 
social housing, once allocated, often does not terminate once a household 
reaches a higher income;
 danger of creating an artificial housing shortage since in the social hous-
ing sector rent is kept lower than the market level, while housing demand, 
even among those who could afford market rent, is concentrated precisely 
in the social housing sector;
 danger of a black market in social dwellings – if the difference between 
market rent and controlled rent in the social housing sector is consider-
able, then there are only a few people who will leave social dwellings 
and many people will be interested in being allocated such a dwelling – if 
a household no longer needs a social dwelling, it is profitable for such a 
household to rent such a dwelling illegally at higher than the regulated 
rent or to ‘sell’ the right to the low rent.
Demand-side subsidies may have the following advantages over the social 
housing alternative:
 since this is an income-tested benefit, it is in principle an efficient hous-
ing policy instrument which, at least in the short run, is cheaper for public 
budgets than constructing and operating social dwellings;
 unlike administrative allocation of social dwellings, a housing allowance 
does not restrict the entitled household’s choice of where to live accord-
ing to their own preferences, and thus results in greater utility of housing 
consumption;
 high effectiveness of support (income targeting) and great flexibility of the 
amount of this benefit if the social situation of a household changes;
 regardless of the danger of the poverty trap, the housing allowance sup-
ports flexibility on the labour market more than a rigid system of social 
housing with low rents – the allowance is a transferable benefit that can be 
claimed in various locations;
 within the entire area of housing policy, the housing allowance allows 
greater rent deregulation and re-arrangement of relations on the often dis-
torted rental housing market (removes black market);
 a properly constructed housing allowance model stimulates households to 
seek adequate housing (and removes ‘over-consumption’ of housing).
These are the most-cited disadvantages:
 stimulating housing demand by allowance results in a rent price increase, 
inflation pressures, at least on a short-term horizon (Le Blanc & Laferrére, 
2001);
 standard disadvantages of all means-tested social benefits such as stigma-
tisation, personal deprivation due to the necessity to apply at regular inter-
vals for the benefit, often also the bureaucracy involved when completing 
the relevant forms;
 significant administrative costs (direct and indirect) related to the payment 
of the allowance (Oxley & Smith, 1996, p. 143);
 as with other benefits, the allowance with a high taper may create an anti-
stimulation effect on the labour market, that is, it may lead to poverty trap;
 prioritising the allowance in combination with rent deregulation in social 
housing usually leads to an acceleration of the social exclusion process;
 private investments in rental housing are unstable and greatly influenced 
by the actual interest rate, house price appreciation and returns from al-
ternative investments – a housing allowance can then become a very ex-
pensive instrument for maintaining the interest of private investors in the 
rental housing;
 the shift away from social housing to a housing allowance and private cap-
ital does not address the issue of a growing number of homeless people, 
socially disadvantaged households, and income polarisation, that is, the 
need to give efficient help to those who sorely need it (Fitzpatrick, 1998).
Support for homeownership
Support for homeownership was especially popular in 1990s and is still very 
popular today. In some countries support for the acquisition of owner-occu-
pied housing is becoming one of the main pillars of state housing policy if not 
of domestic policy in general. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) note that in the 
US both President Bill Clinton in 1994 and President George Bush in 2002 indi-
cated support for owner-occupied housing to be the foundation of American 
housing policy:
“...Homeownership strengthens families and stabilises communities.... Today, I am re-
questing that you lead an effort to dramatically increase homeownership in our na-
tion over the next six years.... Your programme should include strategies to ensure 
that families currently underrepresented among homeowners – particularly minor-
ity families, young families, and low-income families – can partake of the American 
Dream.” (letter from President Clinton to the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development Henry Cisneros, on 3 November 1994, cited by Gabriel & Rosen-
thal (2005, p. 102)).
“The goal is that everybody who wants to own a home has got a shot at doing so. The 
problem is we have what we call a homeownership gap in America. Three-quarters of 
Anglos own their homes, and yet less than 50 percent of African Americans and His-
panics own homes. That ownership gap signals that something might be wrong in the 
land of plenty. And we need to do something about it.” (President Bush’s comments 
at a press conference on 18 June 2002, cited by Gabriel & Rosenthal (2005, p. 
102)).
Owing one’s own home is a part of the norm for American society, or at least 
part of its convictions and ideological assertions, usually articulated as ‘the 
American dream’. A strong preference for homeownership is equally pres-
ent in other Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, United 
Kingdom), but it can also be seen in Belgium, and in places where the United 
States or the United Kingdom have had a relatively strong influence on do-
mestic policy (Latin America, India and other Commonwealth countries); sur-
prisingly in recent years it has also been true to a lesser extent for the Neth-
erlands. The most recent form of grant support for acquiring owner-occupied 
housing in the United States is called the ‘American Dream Down Payment 
Program’. It is said of Belgians that they are born with a ‘brick in the stomach’ 
(Stephens, 2003, p. 1013), allegedly a result of the strong influence of the Cath-
olic political parties. The social doctrine of the Catholic Church, expressed 
explicitly in several Papal encyclicals, regards homeownership not only as a 
guarantee of the quality of individual and family life, but also as a guarantee 
of social order in society (De Decker & Geurts, 2003, p. 23). In these countries 
owning one’s own home is often the primary stimulus behind economic ac-
tivity, and setbacks in this regard are accompanied by frustration.
Unlike people who rent their housing, homeowners enjoy several addition-
al rights that are tied to ownership in general – the option to exclude all oth-
ers from the consumption of housing in their flat or family home, the right 
to make full use of their property as they wish (including the option to lease 
their property or to re-mortgage it to acquire money for other consumption 
purposes), and the right to sell their property. The option of being able to rent 
and sell their property can also bring homeowners some capital gain, as is the 
case with other investments. In absolute values the housing expenditures of 
homeowners are usually higher than those of tenants, especially when they 
are paying off a mortgage loan, but unlike tenants outright homeowners can 
limit these expenditures to essential items if they find themselves in a tight 
financial situation. They usually have substantial wealth lodged in the house 
or flat they own, often the main share of their personal wealth, and for own-
ers this provides a sense of security and stability.
People who own their housing have by definition (owing to the above-men-
tioned external factors and the investment nature of homeownership) an in-
terest in maintaining good neighbourly relations and in the development of 
the vicinity they live in, and given that they tend to share this interest with 
others around them, they usually live in environments that are less anony-
mous and affected by criminality (DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser & Sac-
erdote 1999). They benefit from the fact that other homeowners are willing 
to contribute more to the development of the local community than tenants 
generally are. There is a general consensus that homeowners look after their 
homes or flats better than tenants (Henderson & Ioannides, 1983), and that 
they are also more successful in the labour market (not just because they 
need to pay off their mortgage loan, but also because they belong to larger 
and more stable social networks than tenants). Homeowners are obviously 
far less mobile than tenants (they move less frequently) and the stability of 
the social structure in the neighbourhood they live is an advantage, as a large 
turnover of inhabitants in a certain area leads to the destruction of social net-
works and in extreme cases, when multiple negative factors coincide in effect, 
can also lead to certain pathological patterns of behaviour (vandalism, crimi-
nality, anti-social behaviour). In the United States much has been said and 
written about homeownership also being positively linked to the performance 
of children at school (Boehm & Schlottman, 1999; Aaronson 2000; Haurin et 
al., 2002), life satisfaction (Lam, 1985; Rossi & Weber, 1996), and better physical 
and mental health of homeowners (Macintyre et al., 1998).
On the other hand, considering how expensive owner-occupied housing 
can be, often the only means of acquiring such housing is by first obtaining 
a large amount of credit that is repayable over a long period of time. Thus for 
homeowners the risk of losing their housing if they experience a decrease in 
income can be much higher than it is for tenants. Credit repayment consti-
tutes a considerably large expense and can significantly interfere with other 
planned consumption expenses of a household. Unlike rental housing, owner-
occupied housing is a form of investment, and like any other investment it 
need not just to bring a profit; it can result in a loss, and this loss might be 
substantial and relatively long-term (Ioannides & Rosenthal, 1994; Arrondel & 
Lefebvre, 2001; Meyer & Wieand, 1996). House prices are highly volatile in all 
advanced countries and the cycles in the housing market usually last much 
longer than basic economic cycles tend to be (Girouard et al., 2006). In addi-
tion to the standard price cycles related to the macro-economic cycles, the 
residential property market also experiences price bubbles. The risks connect-
ed with homeownership (price volatility and market instability) became obvi-
ous during the credit crunch and mortgage crisis of 2008.
As transaction costs associated with the purchase or sale of property are 
much higher, homeowners tend to be less mobile (Rohe & Stewart, 1996; 
Lundberg & Skedinger, 1999; Wheaton, 1990). While this brings a number of 
positive aspects, one negative consequence is that it makes it far more com-
plicated for homeowners to move, which can be a problem when there is a 
rise in unemployment or an economic crisis. When house prices fall home-
owners are often reluctant or even unable to sell their homes and move else-
where (Oswald, 1997; Partridge & Rickman, 1997; Engelhardt, 1994). Owner-oc-
cupied housing connotes ‘stability’, and as such it may be at odds with other 
developments in contemporary society, the world economy (global markets), 
and the labour market, which are now more characterised by ‘flexibility’. It 
may ultimately make economic crises even worse in the future (Smith, 2005; 
Stephens, 2005; Burchard & Hills, 1998; Ford & Quilgars, 2001). Public subsidies 
of owner-occupied housing may on the one hand lead to a more affluent so-
ciety and social stability (as a result of the financial and other concomitant 
socio-cultural ‘gains’ derived from owner-occupied housing) but may on the 
other hand lead to increased social and individual risks in an already unsta-
ble ‘risk society’ (Beck, 2004).
It is more difficult to distinguish between supply-side and demand-side 
subsidies in the segment of owner-occupied or cooperative housing, than it 
is in the rental housing segment. Strictly speaking, most public subsidies of 
owner-occupied housing takes the form of demand-side support, which is not 
about directly financing the construction of ‘reasonably priced’ new flats but 
rather about increasing the public’s disposable income and purchasing pow-
er – for example, by providing favourable loans, interest subsidies, premiums 
(in housing-savings schemes), guarantees (for repayment of private loans), 
grants (down payment grants that cover the difference between the maxi-
mum credit obtainable from private sources and the end cost of the owner-
occupied housing), or tax subsidies (e.g., the option to deduct the repayment 
of the principal or interest from the tax base or from the tax; exemption from 
the capital gains tax or exemptions/discounts from the tax on imputed rent).
However, these forms of subsidy may also be conditional on investment in 
new housing (i.e., they are only provided when the housing is new), in which 
case they should be regarded more as supply-side subsidies, even though the 
flat owner, flat user, and subsidy recipient are one and the same person, and 
that this form of subsidy also increases the income and the purchasing power 
of the recipient. Moreover, public subsidies on the construction of rental or 
cooperative housing, which, usually over a fixed period, are sold at a residual 
(low or even zero) price to flat occupants, that is the privatisation of ‘social’ 
housing, is most certainly a supply-side subsidy. In this case we can speak of 
an economic subsidy, that is a hidden subsidy derived from the seller’s op-
tion to suspend the historical growth of housing prices (to forgo the capital 
revenue from the price appreciation of the residential real estate investment), 
without incurring any real loss that would have to be covered by public re-
sources. It is more an opportunity cost than an explicit form of public subsidy.
The comparative advantages and disadvantages of subsidising supply and 
demand in the sphere of owner-occupied housing are similar to those cited 
in the sphere of rental housing. Supply-side subsidies increase and moder-
nise housing stock and push the prices of existing housing down. Indirect 
demand-side subsidies can have the opposite effect on the price of existing 
housing, however, it does not restrict the recipient of the subsidy to choos-
ing just new housing, and in terms of targeting there is less of a bias towards 
higher-income households, which is the group that tends most often to ac-
quire new housing. The second option also manages to avoid generating the 
various social injustices that arise from the selective and arbitrary privatisa-
tion of flats at favourable prices to existing occupants.
Another important observation is that, owing to the low price elasticity of 
the supply in the residential real estate market, subsidising demand in the 
sphere of owner-occupied housing can have far greater unintended and, prob-
ably, negative effects on the housing market (e.g., from the capitalisation of 
subsidies into an increase in the prices of properties for sale) than in the case 
of demand-side subsidies affecting rental housing. Examples can be taken 
from the UK or the Netherlands, countries with low price elasticity of supply, 
where in the past fifteen years there has been an increase in the indicator of 
the price-to-income ratio (the ratio of the average price of a flat to the aver-
age annual net household income) from values around four to values around 
seven (Lux et al., 2008); in these cases this may rather be due to the liberalisa-
tion of the mortgage credit market and low inflation rates.
Given that owner-occupied housing is a very expensive good, one most of-
ten acquired by households with mid-to-high incomes, public subsidisation 
of owner-occupied housing is also often regressive – that is it tends to help 
higher-income households more than lower-income ones. It is precisely be-
cause owner-occupied housing is expensive to acquire that it is usually very 
difficult to target subsidisation, and unlike rent subsidies, for example, in 
the sphere of rental housing, it can never achieve the same kind of effect: a 
‘small’ subsidy is in its scope insufficient to make a difference for the major-
ity of lower-income households and therefore is of no interest to them (even 
targeting this support would do little to change things), while a ‘large’ subsidy 
generates much greater market distortion (especially when directed at the 
purchase of existing flats), false expectations (it dramatically alters market 
preferences), and is usually too costly for public budgets. Unfortunately, the 
subsidisation of owner-occupied housing tends to be more or less regressive.
There is a genuinely diverse range of specific forms of intervention. Gener-
ally it can be said that in ‘old’ EU member states there is a tendency to limit 
tax subsidies and reduce direct public expenditures (Lux, 2005a). While there 
are genuinely fewer and fewer low-interest loans being provided by the state, 
and it is generally possible to see a reduction in the significance of direct sub-
sidisation of owner-occupied housing, in the second half of the 1990s and in 
the early years of the new millennium in some countries (USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands, and until recently also Germany) new forms of down payment 
grants were introduced. This return to grant subsidies can depend largely on 
the position that the main political authorities in a country take on how sub-
stantial the social and personal gains are to be derived from the high degree 
of owner-occupied housing in the country, or even an attempt to drawn more 
low-income households into the owner-occupier housing sector (Lux, 2005a).
Recent housing policy shifts
Although no government has ever questioned the important role of the public 
sector in ensuring greater equality in housing consumption (the role of un-
derstanding paternalist), achieved especially through the use of instruments 
aimed at increasing the affordability of housing for low and middle-income 
households, most EU countries in the 1980s and 1990s saw dynamic reforms 
of housing policies, massive cuts in public housing expenditures and a move 
away from social housing construction and operation support towards sup-
port through income-tested housing allowances and support for the acquisi-
tion of owner-occupied housing (Donner, 2000; Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 
1992, 1994; Priemus, 1997; Maclennan & More, 1997). The move away from sup-
porting supply towards supporting demand in the field of rental housing is 
most visible in Great Britain, Netherlands and Sweden, that is – and this is 
very important – in those EU countries with the highest share of social hous-
ing in the total housing fund. The following reasons are most often cited as 
being behind the housing policy reforms (Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 
1992; Priemus, 1997; Maclennan & More, 1997):
 the need to decrease public budget spending (due to budget deficits, grow-
ing economic globalisation creating the pressure on tax systems or the 
need to comply with Maastricht criteria upon entering the EMU) assuming 
that demand-side subsidies are cheaper than supply-side subsidies;
 low performance efficiency of social housing providers (bureaucracy, in-
flexibility, inefficient management, high construction and management 
costs);
 low effectiveness of social housing provision using the argument that low 
rents are often paid also by households that do not need state aid;
 the political will to meet the growing preference for homeownership (often 
exaggerating the positive aspects of homeownership and hiding the risks);
 the attempt to return private investors back to the housing market from 
which they were pushed out by post-war massive public housing construc-
tion;
 the conviction that the problem of post-war housing shortage is no longer 
a problem.
While many of the above-mentioned arguments are generally correct, a pro-
found context-based cost-benefit analysis was often missing when reforms 
were implemented. For example, according to Amann & Mundt (2006) the 
share of public housing expenditures in the GDP of ‘conservative’ Austria is 
currently lower than in many countries that underwent policy reform. Even 
if re-orientation of housing policy may actually lead to lowering public hous-
ing expenditure, other, insofar neglected public expenditure may rise and 
compensate for part of the achieved public benefit. A comparison of demand 
and supply-side subsidies is not a simple equation with one optimal result 
and both types of subsidies may have relative advantages and disadvantages, 
mainly when taking into account the wider context in particular country.
The fact is that in the period between the two United Nations Conferences 
on Human Settlements, HABITAT in 1976 and HABITAT II in 1996, in which 
policymakers from almost the entire world took part, there was a complete 
change in the understanding and perception of housing with respect to the 
responsibility of the government and the state. Generally, this shift is sum-
marised by the slogan: ‘from housing supply to enablement’. According to 
Global Strategy Until 2000 (1988), states should focus on the creation of a le-
gal and economic framework for citizens, non-governmental organisations, 
and the private sector so that they all can ensure housing and related ser-
vices more efficiently than the state ever could. In the famous World Bank re-
port entitled Housing: Enabling Markets to Work (World Bank, 1993), the issue of 
housing and urban development is defined as part of a more general econom-
ic strategy. The most important items of the strategy concerning housing are: 
ensuring property rights; development of private long-term mortgage credits; 
support rationalisation; stimulation of infrastructure development support of 
the private sector in all spheres. Changes during the 1980s and 1990s in the 
understanding of the state housing policy and the role of individual actors on 
the housing market may also be formulated as moving ‘from housing needs 
to housing rights’.
Over the past few decades, the absolute scope of public finance allocated 
for the construction of social housing has significantly decreased (see the 
special volume of Housing Studies 12/4; Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992; 
Priemus, 1997; Maclennan & More, 1997; Van der Heijden, 1999) and monitor-
ing of efficiency/effectiveness of social landlords’ performance (through mea-
surement of different performance indicators) grew in importance (especially 
in the UK where it is led by the Housing Corporation and the Audit Commis-
sion). Furthermore, in some countries a dominant position in the sphere of 
new social rental housing construction has been given to private non-profit 
landlords (housing associations) that up to this point had played only a mar-
ginal role (UK, Ireland). In the Netherlands (the EU country with the highest 
share of social housing in the total housing stock) where non-profit housing 
associations historically became almost exclusively social landlords, they 
were completely cut off from state resources in the mid-1990s (Priemus, 1997). 
In the future, housing associations in the Netherlands are to cover the costs 
of their ‘noble’ activities solely from private loans and their own capital (Salet, 
1999; Boelhouwer, 2007). Housing associations in UK are also increasingly be-
ing forced to use private capital. In the 1990s they became the exclusive de-
velopers of new social flats and the share of capital expenditures for social 
housing construction covered by grants from the Housing Corporation funds 
(the state budget, in fact) fell in the course of the 1990s from 90% to 50% of 
total construction costs (Maclennan & More, 1997; Malpass, 1999; More et al., 
2003; Housing Corporation, 1997, 2001).
In Sweden the conservative government launched a tax reform in the 
1990s related to a sharp cut in public subsidies on social housing (Turner, 
1997) that forced public operators of social dwellings (municipalities) to trans-
fer the burden to the tenants, thus making housing less affordable (housing 
expenditures to income ratio in Sweden is the highest among EU countries 
and grew the fastest in the 1990s). Social housing reform in France led to an 
expansion of the semi-public/semi-private legal form of housing associations 
called OPAC (to the detriment of the completely public form), that have on the 
one hand obtained greater power because of their position as a private com-
pany but, on the other hand, now receive less public funding (Edou, 1998).
After summarising several hypothetical and practical examples of state inter-
vention in the field of housing consumption, in this section I will go on to 
discuss a possible methodology for their assessment. There may be a whole 
range of possible evaluation tools to assess policies (state interventions) in 
the field of housing consumption but welfare economics is gradually becom-
ing the standard approach in policy studies. “Welfare economics is a branch 
of economics that uses micro-economic techniques to simultaneously de-
termine allocative efficiency within an economy and the income distribution 
associated with it. It analyses social welfare, however measured, in terms of 
economic activities of the individuals that comprise the theoretical society 
considered” (Wikipedia).
As mentioned above, the dual role of an ‘ideal’ (independent, interest-free 
and corruption-free) state in the field of housing policy as rational economist 
and understanding paternalist can practically be rewritten in policies direct-
ed towards the (economic) efficiency of housing market functioning on the 
one hand, and towards the (social) effectiveness (equity) in distribution of 
housing services on the other – they thus simultaneously include allocative 
efficiency and income distribution, that is the main subjects of welfare eco-
nomics. Common trade-off situations arise between efficiency and effective-
ness. Redistributive interventions, though very effective may be at the same 
time inefficient and may thus distort the function of housing market. While 
efficiency is a common concept for all economic systems, the concept of ef-
fectiveness (equity) crucially depends on the selection of the type of welfare 
state (or concept of social justice) in a particular social and political environ-
ment.
The concept of efficiency originated in neoclassical economics and in the 
field of welfare economics was applied in the social welfare function – simply 
by summing comparable (similar!) individual utility functions (the work of F.Y. 
Edgeworth, H. Sidwick, A. Marshall described in Ng 1983; Just et al., 2004 and 
others). However, this approach would produce rather different conclusions 
about ‘efficient’ social welfare; including such distributions that would lead to 
deep income and wealth inequalities in a society. The New Welfare Economics 
(studies by V. Pareto, J. Hicks and others) has clearly distinguished the efficien-
cy and equity (effectiveness) parts of theory – the first is analysed using the 
Pareto criteria of efficiency and the second can be analysed only in close con-
junction with particular social norms and values, welfare state regime and/
or social justice theory. In this way the concept of efficiency has been ‘freed’ 
from the influence of varied normative statements and/or social justice theo-
rising. In contrast, the concept of distribution (of incomes, wealth or goods 
and services) has become fragmented into various theories of social justice 
and, consequently, into many types of particular welfare state regimes.
It was mentioned that efficiency is defined through the Pareto lens: if any 
alternative allocation of goods increases utility from consumption for at least 
one actor on the market and at the same time does not decrease utility from 
consumption for other actors then we say such allocation is inefficient and 
there is room for improvement in market performance. This is called Pareto 
optimisation or Pareto improvement. Such improvement may often be en-
sured only by state intervention. For housing markets, particular examples 
of market failure may be the existence of oligopoly or monopoly in housing 
finance or production (leading to above-normal profits for service suppliers), 
asymmetric information among market agents (information access barriers), 
externalities during housing production or consumption. An example of this 
inefficiency may, however, be the existence of public subsidies (state interven-
tions) that crowd out the private investments, impede lower taxation and dis-
tort efficient market functioning. A final example, which points to my main 
interest, is the situation when the state spends tax-payers’ money for pro-
duction and allocation of goods or services that could be allocated similarly 
(or even more efficiently) by private entities, or the situation when alternative 
subsidy settings can produce, under the condition of holding the same quality 
and quantity of consumption distribution, public savings.
Effectiveness (equity) is closely associated with the idea of social justice, 
welfare state; it relates to the ‘fair’ distribution part of social welfare stud-
ies. As such, it is closely connected with particular welfare state regimes and 
particular social norms. The redistribution of wealth (achieved generally by 
states) forms a crucial part of the whole concept as this is the only possibil-
ity for ultimately attaining ‘fair’ or ‘desirable’ wealth distribution. In fact, ef-
fectiveness and equity, terms I used as synonyms up to now, do not hold in 
theoretical welfare studies the same meanings. The concept of effectiveness 
is a broader one. The effectiveness may be understood as the degree to which 
the originally defined goals of state intervention are met, that is, whether 
public funds are actually spent where they were allocated and whether those 
for whom they were intended actually are helped. The goals of state interven-
tions vary and do not have to necessarily relate to redistribution of housing 
consumption towards low income households (equity); the example in hous-
ing policy may be creating incentives for housing stock modernization. Some 
intervention targets, like for example higher take-up of social transfers, relate 
to the wealth redistribution and equity goals indirectly. Equity is a subset of 
effectiveness, clearly relating to the income and wealth redistribution goals.
The concept of equity is thus not left to a vague ‘definition infinity’ of the 
concept of effectiveness; the concept is not left solely to the will of lawmak-
ers or governments who define the intentions of the state interventions. The 
equity as a subset of the concept of effectiveness is, at least partially, gen-
eralised into the common shared assumption that whatever state redistribu-
tion of wealth is finally applied, it should decrease income inequalities in so-
ciety, that is, redistribution policies should help the worse-off with the costs 
of the better-off (it relates to income distribution). The scale of income and 
wealth redistribution may be small (residual welfare state regime) or high (so-
cial-democratic welfare state regime) but in either case, all modern concepts 
of social justice share the assumption of the direction of redistribution from 
high-income to low-income members of society. Going in the opposite direc-
tion, redistribution would breach theoretical foundations, on which modern 
democracy and the concept of human rights stand. It would not be sustain-
able if the state pronounced on the equality of human beings and, at the 
same time, asked for support to be directed to high income households, thus 
asking for higher income inequality. The concept of equity and equality are all 
derivates of modern liberalism and political democracy, clear and living rel-
icts of liberal thought.
Welfare economics also distinguishes between vertical and horizontal eq-
uity (Barr, 1998). Vertical equity measures the degree of redistribution of in-
come and wealth from the rich to the poor. In the case of particular housing 
subsidy it measures the extent to which such subsidy is actually allocated to 
low income households. It measures whether it ultimately decreases income 
(wealth) inequality in society. Horizontal equity is connected with the idea of 
setting a minimum income (wealth) that would be ensured for all members 
of society, as well as with the assumption that all low income (poor) house-
holds have equal and unrestricted access to subsidies, that is none of the low 
income (poor) are excluded from such redistribution. In the case of particular 
housing subsidy it measures whether any low income (poor) household is not 
eligible to apply for the subsidy. Some low income households are excluded 
from subsidies because, for example, the programme has been set up badly 
or the potential claimants are badly informed (or may be afraid of potential 
social stigmatisation).
On the second side, theoretically more generalized concept of equity does 
not take into account, when compared to the concept of effectiveness, par-
ticular aspects of particular policies. It applies the idea of ‘fair’ redistribution 
from high-income towards low-income households by simply measuring the 
scale of income distribution brought about by state interventions. However, 
in housing policy particularly, the households in need of public help do not 
have to be often those with the lowest incomes; and this may be especially 
the case in transition countries. Let me give the example of a housing sys-
tem with two main rental housing segments – segment A with low regulated 
rents and segment B with much higher market rents. The difference in rents 
between segments A and B for comparable dwellings is really high – rents in 
segment B are, let’s say, six times higher than rents in segment A. The govern-
ment introduced housing allowance which is well designed to help especially 
low-income households, by setting maximum income of eligible household 
and maximum notional housing costs on very low levels. However, as it is of-
ten the case, the turnover in segment A is low and many households do not 
have other option than to find their housing in segment B. As the amount of 
housing allowance is computed from low notional housing costs (for example, 
reflecting rents in segment A), many low-income households, though eligible 
for an allowance, find out that an allowance is not high enough to allow them 
to pay six times higher market rents. Moreover, households with slightly 
higher incomes (middle income households) are due to their higher incomes 
no more eligible for an allowance – even though that they spend, for example, 
more than two thirds of their incomes on market rent they do not receive any 
effective help from the state. The main inequality arising from such situation 
is not income inequality but inequality in rent-to-income ratio (housing costs 
burden). Housing allowance under such situation would be evaluated as equi-
table (redistribution well towards low income households), but it could hardly 
be evaluated as effective. Under the situation of such market segmentation, 
effective way of redistribution (i.e., the application of the role of the state as 
understanding paternalist) should not be restricted only to the redistribution 
towards low income households – though equitable from the point of view of 
income redistribution it produces substantial social, though not strictly in-
come, inequalities.
Another example may be a housing allowance which leads, due to its high 
(let’s say 100%) taper, to the situation of poverty trap. It is well designed to 
help especially households with the lowest incomes but the fact that the al-
lowance amount decreases in the same pace as potential income from em-
ployment leads rather to preservation of existing social inequalities than to 
their reduction (many people will stay unemployed). Social and income in-
equalities are not always the same, and this is particularly the case for hous-
ing policies and particularly the case for transition countries, as I am going 
to show in more detail below. Therefore in this book I am going to use the 
concept of effectiveness (and terms ‘effectiveness’ instead of ‘equity’; ‘verti-
cal and horizontal effectiveness’ instead of ‘vertical and horizontal equity’) 
though it will be narrowed to the role of the state as understanding pater-
nalist in the field of housing consumption, i.e., to interventions (housing sub-
sidies) aiming at decreasing income but also broader social inequalities. Al-
though I am not going to use the term ‘effectiveness’ as synonym for ‘equity’ 
I will assess only those interventions that are connected with redistribution 
of housing consumption towards those in need. The evaluation itself will use 
almost the same theoretical and methodological device as studies of equity; 
the only but important change of perspective is that social inequalities in the 
particular practical field of housing consumption (housing accessibility, hous-
ing affordability) do not have to be always connected with income inequali-
ties and households in need of public help do not have to be always low in-
come households. The other reason for use of the term ‘effectiveness’ rather 
than ‘equity’ lies also in restricted statistics in transition countries, including 
the Czech Republic – measurement of income redistribution effect (equity) of 
particular housing subsidies is often impossible due to non-existing data. The 
redistribution effect of subsidies can be often estimated only indirectly but, in 
such a case, only on more broadly defined social inequalities. Finally, my deci-
sion can also be justified by an earlier version of the “Welfare Economics” of 
Barr (1993) where only terms ‘horizontal and vertical effectiveness’ are used 
to assess the state policies from the point of view of their targeting and meet-
ing the redistributive goals of the state.
The concept of efficiency is also, as described above, broader. Next to in-
terventions in the field of housing consumption it also relates to state in-
terventions concerned with the general functioning of the housing market, 
covering for example problems such as price speculations, oligopoly struc-
tures in housing supply, restrictive urban planning, asymmetric information, 
etc. Therefore, in my book I limit the concept of efficiency to the efficiency of 
those state interventions that have direct influence on housing consumption, 
or defined more precisely, those state interventions aimed at redistributing 
wealth, goods or income. In this way I relate the concept of efficiency directly 
to the concept of effectiveness (with respect to housing consumption) or, in 
other words, I subordinate the concept of efficiency to the concept of effec-
tiveness.
In sum, I will firstly analyse and assess both horizontal and vertical effec-
tiveness of particular state interventions (subsidies) in the field of housing 
consumption and, secondly, analyse and evaluate the efficiency of the same 
set of subsidies from the somewhat restricted perspective of the efficiency 
concept. Efficiency will be limited to the analysis of possible public savings 
under an alternative subsidy setting, or under an alternative set of subsidies, 
and only for those state interventions that will be evaluated from the point 
of view of effectiveness. Efficiency will be thus subordinated to effectiveness 
and narrowed to potential public savings; it will be limited mainly to a cost-
benefit analysis of selected state subsidies.11
There is often a trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness of housing 
subsidies. Clearly, the lower the public support per household (or per dwell-
ing), the lower the public spending and the higher the efficiency of the sub-
sidy (one euro of subsidy produces more euros of private investments). On 
the other side, small public subsidies often help only those who do not need 
them; they are seldom targeted well at those in highest need. Such trade-offs 
are solved in this book by subordinating efficiency to effectiveness. In other 
words, the main intention is to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of 
subsidies, because the main goal of wealth redistribution (intervention of the 
state as understanding paternalist) is to decrease social and income inequali-
ties; otherwise it loses all meaning. The subordination of the concept of effi-
ciency in my state-centred analysis is therefore a natural methodological step.
I can now define a set of assumptions, used in my further empirical work, 
which derive from the definitions of efficiency and effectiveness stated above.
For effectiveness the assumptions are as follows:
Main assumption 1: Effective subsidies assist lower-income (needy) households more 
than higher-income (less needy) households. (Vertical effectiveness)
Main assumption 2: Effective subsidies do not exclude any lower-income (needy) 
household. (Horizontal effectiveness)
Sub assumption 1: The absolute amount of subsidy should be significantly higher 
in the group of lower-income (needy) households than in the group of higher-income 
households (less needy).
Sub assumption 2: The subsidy should contribute to a reduction in the level of in-
equality in the society.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of a certain measure should therefore be 
based on a comparison of the degree of inequality in society before and after 
that measure is introduced. If the effect of such a measure reduces the level 
of inequality in society, it can be assessed as positive in terms of its effective-
ness. Given that the income of households with more members tends to be 
higher, attention will be paid not only to the distribution of subsidies accord-
ing to the total household income but also according to the equivalent in-
come, that is household income adjusted according to the OECD equivalence 
scale.12
For efficiency the main assumption is, as follows:
Main assumption: Subsidies are efficient when it is not possible to meet redistributive 
goals in the field of housing consumption in a less costly way, that is, under an alter-
native setting of the subsidy or an alternative setting of the whole set of subsidies.
Appendix B lists the questions formulated for the purpose of evaluating effec-
tiveness and efficiency of different housing policy instruments in the Czech 
Republic as well as in selected transitional countries used in this book for a 
partial policy international comparison. All the questions are intended to esti-
mate approximately whether the subsidies are well-targeted to those in need 
of help (effectiveness) and whether they are introduced in a way that would 
ensure an economical use of public sources (efficiency).
Besides the ‘working’ questions listed in Appendix B, the evaluation of ef-
fectiveness will be improved by the use of statistical methods and concrete 
measurable indicators. I applied standard statistical tests for the evaluation 
according to sub assumption 1. The literature points to no general rule for de-
termining at which rate of redistribution a given instrument exhibits high ef-
fectiveness or at which rate of redistribution its effectiveness is poor. Setting 
limits is always a normative decision. For the purpose of the following analy-
ses the assumption was that if 90% of the total sum of resources distributed 
by means of a given instrument went to 50% of the lowest-income house-
holds and at the same time 75% of the total sum of resources went to 30% of 
the lowest-income households, then the given instrument shows a relatively 
high degree of effectiveness.
For an evaluation according to the sub assumption 2, I used indicators of 
inequality presented, for example, in Barr (1998, pp. 149-152). These indica-
tors were used to compute income inequality in a society before and after the 
application of a particular subsidy; the difference shows whether or not the 
subsidy reduced the income inequality. One of the simplest indicators of in-
come inequality is the standard deviation computed as follows. 
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The disadvantage of standard deviation is that it is sensitive to the absolute 
income level. This may be eliminated by the coefficient of variation, which 
standardises standard deviation in relation to mean income, as follows.
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The main disadvantage of the coefficient of variation is that it does not take 
into account the level at which income redistribution occurs. In other words, 
if CZK 1,000 is transferred from a household with an income of CZK 20,000 to 
a household with an income of CZK 6,000, it expresses itself in the value of 
the coefficient of variation equally to what it would if CZK 1,000 were trans-
ferred from a household with an income of CZK 500,000 to a household with 
an income of CZK 400,000. The variance of the log-income makes it possible 
to take into account the greater weight of redistribution in favour of low-in-
come groups, as follows.
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Probably the most commonly used measure of income inequality is the Gini 
coefficient (represented by the Lorenz curve). Each point on the Lorenz curve 
denotes what portion of the total income is distributed among x% of the low-
est-income population. The Gini coefficient is calculated as one-half of the 
arithmetic mean of the absolute value of the differences between all the pairs 
of incomes standardised in relation to mean income.
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Another recommended indicator (Wiles, 1974) of income inequality is the ra-
tio between the mean income of 5% of the highest-income households and 
the mean income of 5% of the lowest-income households (hereinafter this 
indicator will be referred to as W). All the aforementioned indicators will be 
used in the following analyses (the Gini coefficient will be graphically illus-
trated by the Lorenz curve) if data on allocation of subsidies and income of 
eligible households are available. In all other cases I will have to find alterna-
tive data sources, such as sociological (attitude) surveys.
Measurement and evaluation of efficiency of subsidies is far more dif-
ficult than measurement and evaluation of their effectiveness. For example, 
housing policy reforms (alternative subsidy settings) could lower public ex-
penditures and increase efficiency of public spending in the short term, but 
many side effects, caused by speed of reform and application of the ‘black-
and-white’ perspective in practical policies, may create substantial drawbacks 
in the long term. Policy changes often create, some while after their imple-
mentation, the need for unexpected additional public expenditures. Such ex-
penditures may offset substantial parts of the achieved public savings. It was, 
for example, demonstrated by Lux (2004) or Wilcox & Meen (1995) that public 
costs following the housing policy reform in favour of demand-side subsidies 
in UK (or Scotland) may be, in fact, far higher than generally quoted, if we 
also include administrative costs with allocation of housing allowances, costs 
following from up-rating pensions and benefits (when social rent increases 
are reflected in CPI), costs following from growing social segregation (from 
vacant flats in residualised ghettos, or social prevention programmes), addi-
tional public costs following from rent inflation in the private rental sector 
(due to low elasticity of supply) and ‘labour market’ costs following from the 
growing dependence of eligible households on housing benefit (‘poverty trap’). 
These societal costs are, however, neglected when simple calculations of pub-
lic savings (efficiency) are made. Another case is the ‘capitalisation’ of public 
subsidies to promote homeownership into house prices (in this case the ef-
ficiency of demand side subsidies is substantially reduced due to the inelastic 
housing supply).
From the methodological point of view the assessment of efficiency of sub-
sidies is a difficult issue. Cost-benefit analysis estimating the level of public 
finance wastage or savings requires the use of profound econometrics. To 
be fully precise, I should simulate all the economic and social consequences 
of different subsidy alternatives in the long term. Such simulations of com-
plex and mutually related markets are so complex that they can hardly be 
achieved for all types of selected subsidies. In this book, I will measure ef-
ficiency through econometric simulation of the broader economic and social 
consequences of alternative subsidy settings in only one, albeit very impor-
tant subsidy in the Czech environment – the economic subsidy stemming 
from rent regulation. In all other cases I will check only whether short-term 
public savings could be achieved if the current subsidy rules are changed 
(with no regard for interaction with other housing subsidies and only weak 
attention for the broader economic and social consequences). This ‘restricted’ 
methodology results from the limits of econometrics itself and also reflects 
the subordinated position of the concept of efficiency in my book.
This section should answer the final preliminary question that relates to 
the quest for an appropriate methodology for the international comparison 
of housing systems or international comparison of state interventions in 
the field of housing consumption. Though the goal of this book is not com-
parative, as I metioned before, we cannot fully understand the situation and 
changes in the specific Czech environment without at least partial compari-
son with the situation in other transition societies. This section should ad-
dress the preliminary question:
4. What relevant international comparison of interventions in the field of housing 
consumption can be used to better understand the process unique to the Czech Re-
public? What methodological features should such international comparison neces-
sarily hold?
After 1990 in most post-socialist countries there emerged an interest in dis-
covering how housing systems in the prosperous West function and how oth-
er transition countries were dealing with the up to now unknown problems 
of transition. Comparative studies, articles and statistics soon followed. Some 
were prepared by international organisations (the World Bank, UN/ECE) or lob-
by organisations (CECODHAS, FEANTSA, IUT, EMF); others by national lobby 
associations (associations of tenants, landlords and/or homeowners). They 
produced a diverse array of information (and interpretations) that could easily 
lead to misunderstanding. Let me now demonstrate one such misunderstand-
ing on the example of social housing tenure.
Before 1990, state interventions created the segment of mass public (public 
company) rental housing stock with rents and utility prices kept at very low 
levels. Rental dwellings were allocated freely and strong security of tenure 
guaranteed the occupancy title for both the beneficiary and his or her rela-
tives.
What makes the description of social housing tenure in transition coun-
tries difficult is mainly the fact that social housing was not defined during 
socialism. We cannot simply apply this term to mass public (state) rental 
housing stock built in former socialist countries, especially because of actual 
dwelling allocation procedures. At the time the state was responsible for pro-
viding housing to all its citizens and not just to those who were financially 
worse off. The general right to housing was guaranteed by the state, and al-
though it could take many years before that right was satisfied, everyone was 
entitled to register on various lists to await allocation of a rental (semi-rental) 
flat with a low regulated rent. State housing (state rental flats, state company 
flats, semi-state cooperative flats) should originally have replaced all other 
housing tenures as a part of the plan to liquidate private property (though lat-
er on this plan was changed due to its unrealistic nature). And because state 
housing was for everyone, it was particularly quickly allocated among those 
people who, through their clientele networks, or even straightforward corrup-
tion, were more skilful in the process of acquiring housing than others – that 
is, usually for people who did not rank in the category of the neediest. To use 
the adjective ‘social’ for the mass public rental housing in socialist countries 
would thus, even from today’s perspective, be inappropriate.
Sooner or later the transition states stopped their massive capital subsi-
dies to public housing construction but price and salary liberalisation led to 
sharply increasing costs of housing production. As the logical consequence, 
overall housing output volumes dropped dramatically and newly established 
households (young people, recently divorced) found it more and more difficult 
to acquire affordable housing. Mortgage banking was undeveloped, especially 
due to high inflation, bad legislation and low competition. New institutional 
and cultural patterns appeared: unemployment, homelessness, income polar-
isation, and market uncertainty. All of this required substantial reform in the 
exploitation of existing public housing and the establishment of a new sys-
tem of housing subsidies, reforms that would direct public aid more to those 
who really needed help under the new market conditions. Instead, the gov-
ernments in transition countries remained ‘locked in’ the institutional and 
ideological settings of the past.
With exceptions – such as Poland and the Czech Republic – most transi-
tion governments opted for the strategy of a quick mass sale of existing 
public housing to sitting public tenants under very advantageous price con-
ditions. Such massive sale of housing could hardly take into account the cri-
teria of need and social justice. As part of the decentralisation of power, the 
former state (state company) housing was often transferred free of charge to 
the ownership of municipalities. Despite that, the states gave public tenants 
the right to buy the flats that they occupied under the conditions set by the 
central legislation. The rights of municipalities were thus restricted by the 
will of central state to sell public dwellings at a very low price to the sitting 
tenants (in fact, free of charge in countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, 
Albania and others). Various motives lay behind this important institutional 
change – one of which was to protect existing public tenants from a future 
sharp rise in housing costs. In a few years the housing systems dominated by 
public rental housing transformed into the systems dominated by owner-oc-
cupied housing. Public rental housing for new or needy households practically 
disappeared; in contrast, a large portion of affluent public tenants received 
substantial public help in the form of cheap owner-occupied dwelling.
There were a few exceptions to the main stream. For example, in Poland 
and the Czech Republic right-to-buy legislation was not passed and public 
housing privatisation remained a possibility open to municipalities. Conse-
quently, in these countries municipal rental housing remained an important 
part of the total housing stock. However, these states decided to preserve the 
original pre-1990 type of non-targeted centrally-controlled regulation of rents 
both in municipal and restituted private rental housing (as well as to keep 
most of the pre-1990 forms of tenure protection), and to allow only small and 
very gradual rent increases. Rent regulation, similar to massive sale of pub-
lic housing, closed the doors of the affordable rental housing segment to all 
needy newcomers and once again distributed hidden subsidy in the form of 
cheap rent to a substantial portion of affluent households. Logically, these 
regulations also led to the creation of black markets with rights for regulated 
rents. Though not privatising public housing, governments tried, using differ-
ent means, again to protect all existing public tenants from growth in housing 
costs.
In fact, the same part of the population in both groups of countries re-
ceived hidden public subsidies – either in the form of an owner-occupied flat 
gained at a very low price or free of charge, or in the form of rental hous-
ing with very low regulated rent. Income and/or social situations of eligible 
households were not important to the allocation. Institutional and moral pat-
terns of socialism (assumptions of general equality and universal applicabil-
ity) intervened thus in the market systems with growing income and social 
inequalities.
With regard to the social housing, considerable confusion may surround 
the figures used for international comparison. Whenever a country opted for 
the strategy of mass public housing privatisation, then in the course of sever-
al years the proportion of public (municipal) housing decreased to a marginal 
share. If a country chose the strategy of preservation of rent regulation, then 
municipal housing stock remained relatively large. According to a simple 
principle commonly applied in comparative studies of social housing, in the 
countries that opted for the first strategy, ‘social housing’ suddenly ceased 
to exist (e.g., according to Scanlon & Whitehead (2004), in Hungary 4% of the 
housing stock was in the category of ‘social renting’), while in the countries 
that chose the second strategy, ‘social housing’ constitutes a significant por-
tion of the total housing stock (e.g., according to Scanlon and Whitehead 
(2004), in the Czech Republic it was 19% of the housing stock). A fatal error 
of such approach is that it lacks the perspective of the flat-users, ignores the 
meaning of public housing during the socialism, hides the similar motives of 
transition states behind the allocation of hidden subsidies (no matter what 
type) and does not take into account the fact that rent regulation in munici-
pal housing might increase (instead of decrease) social inequalities in society 
due to the preservation of original social structure of tenants. In the Czech 
Republic the rent-controlled housing sector is sometimes called ‘quasi-hom-
eownership’ (Šmídová, 1996), as the official owner of the flat (municipality, 
private landlord) is not the same person as the one who exercises most of 
the property rights (tenant). This form of housing tenure is thus much closer 
to the homeownership tenure than it would arise from standard statistics.
If we take into account the imperative of allocation of social dwellings 
according to the principle of need, we could probably, label the remaining 
marginalised segment of municipal housing in the first group of countries 
as ‘social housing’ but we cannot do the same for municipal housing in the 
second group of countries. This also reflects the views of transition govern-
ments themselves. They often refuse to call municipal housing social housing 
(with some exceptions, such as Russia) or they use definitions which relate 
social housing to only a small part of municipal housing – only those dwell-
ings with very basic standards and/or located in unattractive places that are 
explicitly allocated to those in acute housing need (e.g., Poland, Czech Repub-
lic) or to households with very low incomes (e.g., Romania); and/or new mu-
nicipal dwellings built with the use of post-1990 public subsidies to target the 
housing needs of specific groups of households (social care housing, protect-
ed housing, pensioner housing, half-way housing, housing for war refugees, 
housing for households with an income below the living minimum, housing 
for Roma households and other vulnerable households). The number of such 
new municipal dwellings is low, however, with few exceptions (Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia) due to limited public budgets.
Consequently, in all transition countries only a very small portion of rent-
al housing stock explicitly serves those in housing and social need (Hegedüs, 
2008). Social housing as the real policy concept thus largely remains only as 
an open possibility for the future. Such important specific contextual features 
are, however, often marginalised in general comparative housing discourse.
In comparative studies generally, the various goals, the range of methods 
used, alternative definitions of indicators and specific approaches to gener-
alisations all leave considerable room for an entire ‘market’ of comparative 
statements to emerge, for the competition and contrasting of statements in 
professional journals, studies and monographs. The social sciences long ago 
rejected the idea that there is just one true and correct statement on social 
reality (or one correct and applicable method with which to determine it); the 
understanding is that there can always be many statements, that they can be 
contradictory, and that they all have the right to compete with each other in 
the arena of scientific discourse. Knowledge of real scientific value emerges 
out of this competition, this institutional openness, which often broadens our 
understanding of particular phenomena in a very useful way. In other words, 
the diversity of perspectives, methodological approaches, the range of state-
ments on a certain theme, and particularly the competition between them 
in open scientific discourse is the first guarantee for scientifically valuable 
knowledge to emerge.
The institutional openness and the competition of scientific statements is 
an essential precondition of scientific knowledge but is by no means in itself 
sufficient. I believe that it is not the ‘scientificity’ of the method (e.g., quan-
titative versus qualitative methodology), but the ‘scientificity’ of the work of 
the individual researcher that is the important condition for gaining valu-
able knowledge from international comparison which would avoid the above-
mentioned type of misunderstanding. What is meant by the ‘scientificity’ of 
an individual scientist’s approach? Even using statistical ‘exact’ methods it is 
possible to arrive at the conclusions the researcher is looking for if the da-
ta are fittingly modified; most social relationships are not strong enough to 
withstand this kind of ‘modelled distortion’. Blaming qualitative approaches 
(narrative methods, contextual analyses, in-depth, non-representative focus 
group discussions and interviews, biographical sociology) for producing state-
ments that are more normative and subjective is usually just a ‘blow below 
the belt’ on the part of quantitative sociology and mathematical economics 
and simply an expression of intolerance. However, another matter altogether 
is how much scientists actually try – whether out of their own will or under 
pressure from the party commissioning the research – to prove a conclusion 
formulated beforehand.
The most important virtue of a scientist is perhaps the capacity for ab-
straction, and the desire to discover something new. But no less important 
a virtue of social scientists, especially those who conduct comparative stud-
ies, is their subtlety, sense of detail and context, openness to interpretations, 
which I would refer to as individual openness. This type of openness is not in-
stitutional in character, but individual and intellectual – as such it is difficult 
to recognise, criticise, or commend it. Attaining the full ideal of individual 
openness is practically impossible; it is not possible to execute a specifically 
human activity while eliminating every aspect that is so intrinsically a part 
of being human (language and cultural barriers). On the other hand, it is pos-
sible to work towards such an ideal, if the following imperatives on valuable 
comparative research are taken seriously:
 Always create an international network of researchers or at least find re-
munerable local informants that are as informed as possible about the 
subject in the comparison (rule of thumb: one country – one local infor-
mant);
 Draw up a set of indicators (interpretations) on the economic, social, and 
cultural context in the given countries, discuss it with local informants 
and adjust it according to their comments;
 Regard informants as sources of equal status by letting them prepare a 
part or the whole report for the given country.
These imperatives are followed in this book, though the international com-
parison forms only a supplementary part. I especially use the findings from a 
comparative housing policy-orientated project undertaken in six transitional 
countries between 2000 and 2002. The project was called Local Government and 
Housing and it was funded by the Local Government Initiative of the Open So-
ciety Institute in Budapest. Local housing researchers were hired in follow-
ing countries: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia. All local researchers conducted their own research and prepared their 
own paper on the housing policy development in their own country though 
the main targets were agreed during the first team workshop. All local re-
searchers were well remunerated by the Open Society Institute. The contribu-
tions of local researchers were then presented in common at conferences and 
summed up to the main conclusions; these were discussed during the second 
team workshop. Finally, all individual contributions together with the com-
monly accepted text of main conclusions were published in Budapest in 2003 
in the book Housing Policy: an End or a New Beginning? parts of which were, later 
on, translated into local languages and published in local language editions 
(Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian and Estonian). Further details of this research can 
be found in Lux et al. (2003).
Having tried to answer the preliminary questions I can finally define the main 
research questions that will target the goal of my book. The research ques-
tions will be addressed in the following chapters. They are, as follows:
1. What was the background to the development of the specific housing policy and 
housing system in the Czech Republic? What were the ideologies (norms), tradi-
tional problem solution patterns and institutional as well as political structures 
that might influence the formation and development of the housing system (includ-
ing the formation of general social policy and its history)?
2. How effective and efficient were state interventions in the field of housing con-
sumption during the transition in the Czech Republic if the theoretical framework 
and methodological device of welfare economics is used for such assessment? How 
effective were such interventions from the point of view of both vertical and hori-
zontal effectiveness? How efficient were such interventions if we narrow the wide 
concept of efficiency to the cost-benefit analysis of state interventions in the field 
of housing consumption (i.e., subordinate efficiency to effectiveness)? How efficient 
and effective were these interventions when assessed against the assumptions on 
efficiency and effectiveness of subsidies?
3. How efficient and effective were state interventions in other transition countries 
(if the imperative on individual openness of researchers during the international 
comparison of housing policies is met)? What explanations for particular levels of 
effectiveness and related (subordinated) efficiency of state interventions in the field 
of housing consumption in the Czech Republic can be found in a partial interna-
tional comparison? Can such a partial international comparison help me to under-
stand the specific situation in the Czech Republic?
4. What general conclusions can be drawn about the application of the role of ‘under-
standing paternalist’ by the Czech state between 1990 and 2005? What reasons 
for particular levels of effectiveness and related (subordinated) efficiency of state 
interventions in the field of housing consumption can be found from housing sys-
tem evolution analysis? What influence did ideologies (norms), traditional problem 
solution patterns and institutional as well as political structures have on the de-
velopment of specific state interventions in the field of housing consumption, and 
what effects did they have on the efficiency and effectiveness of these state inter-
ventions?
5. Do the main findings of the research conducted for this book show whether it is 
possible to increase efficiency and effectiveness of state intervention in the field of 
housing consumption in the Czech Republic? If so, what would be the policy recom-
mendations?
In the following, mainly descriptive chapter, I will focus on a partial interna-
tional comparison of housing policies in the field of housing consumption 
in six selected transition countries. The purpose of this second chapter is to 
show what generally happened during transition in the field of housing policy 
and what similarities as well as differences among transition countries can 
be detected in this process. I will also provide details of two policies that il-
lustrate the growing diversity among transition countries – the policy to sup-
port supply of rental housing in Poland and the policy to support homeown-
ership in Hungary.
In the third chapter, again more or less descriptive, I will focus attention on 
one transitional country which represents the main subject of my book – the 
Czech Republic. I will try especially to answer my first research question and 
therefore will describe the context in which housing policy was formed and 
reformed during transition. This includes descriptions of the political, insti-
tutional, economic and demographic contexts as well as the history of both 
social and housing policies applied in the territory of the current Czech Re-
public in the past. This chapter will also comprehensively describe and dis-
cuss the changes in housing conditions (including tenure structure), housing 
policy, housing finance and housing affordability in the period 1990-2005 in 
the Czech Republic.
The main goal of the fourth chapter, analytical by nature, is to evaluate the 
effectiveness and subordinated efficiency of state interventions in the field of 
housing consumption (policies) introduced in the Czech Republic in the pe-
riod 1990-2005. This chapter addresses my second research question. For this 
purpose I will employ data sets from a range of empirical surveys and apply 
statistical methods and econometric simulations.
The fifth chapter, again analytical, should answer the third research ques-
tion, that is whether we can analyse and compare, albeit partially, the ef-
fectiveness and subordinated efficiency of housing subsidies among at least 
some of the selected transition countries, taking seriously into account the 
imperative of ‘individual openness’ in comparative research. This chap-
ter builds on the information provided in Chapter 2, that is, a description of 
the differences and similarities in housing reforms among selected transi-
tion countries. The conclusions will help me understand the reasons for the 
application of specific policies in the Czech Republic, as well as the reasons 
for the particular effectiveness and subordinated efficiency of Czech housing 
subsidies. The purpose of this chapter is not comparative; the comparison is 
included to help understanding of the specific situation in the Czech Repub-
lic. The aim is to discover which specific ‘national’ factors are visible only via 
network of several ‘out-national’ reference points.
The sixth chapter attempts to answer the fourth research question and 
thus tries to complete the conclusions stemming from the previous chapter, 
especially by attempting to find other reasons (other than following from in-
ternational comparison) for the introduction of particular types of policies as 
well as for the particular levels of effectiveness and subordinated efficiency 
of housing subsidies specific to the Czech Republic. For this purpose I apply 
the propositions of selected theories of housing systems, as well as the com-
prehensive description of the context presented in Chapter 3. The sixth chap-
ter relates to both the fifth (analytical) and third (descriptive) chapters of the 
book. In its final part I also address the final research question and suggest 
policy recommendations.
The seventh and concluding chapter of the book summarises the main 
findings and provides an overview of the conclusions (answers) to all five re-
search questions. The mutual relations between chapters and the relation of 
chapters to research questions are illustrated in Figure 1.1. The dotted line 
represents the subdivision of descriptive chapters from the analytical ones.
Research questions 1
Research questions 2
Research questions 3
Chapter 6
Chapter 5
Chapter 4
Chapter 3
Chapter 2
Research questions 4
Research questions 5
Figure 1.1 Outline of the book

The purpose of this chapter is the partial international comparison of the 
reforms and development paths of housing policies in selected transition-
al countries. The aim is to show what generally happened during transition 
in the field of housing policy and which similarities as well as differences 
among transition countries can be detected in the process. This description 
may help me understand the specific processes that occurred in the Czech 
Republic and will especially help me with the partial international compari-
son of the effectiveness and subordinated efficiency of selected subsidies in 
transition countries provided in Chapter 5.
The question often put to housing researchers is: what similarities and dif-
ferences arose in the reforms of housing policies and housing finance during 
the transformation of the economy and society of former communist coun-
tries? What did they share in common and where did individual approaches 
win on the way to a market economy? I will concentrate on those transition 
countries that decided to enter the European Union and succeeded in that in 
2004 or 2007, namely, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (always limited by the avail-
ability of information). I can hardly be expected to make an overall systemic 
evaluation of the whole transformation process or to set a new typology of 
housing systems here. The goal of this chapter is far less ambitious: to es-
tablish the relative position of the Czech Republic within the group of more 
developed transition countries to help understanding of specific policy chang-
es applied in the Czech Republic. To this end I will use the conclusions of a 
project called Local Government and Housing which was conducted between 
2000-2002 in six transitional countries. The following countries were included: 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania.
The international comparison will be supplemented by two detailed case 
studies – the case of supply-side subsidies for construction of rental housing 
in Poland and the case of indirect subsidies to promote owner-occupied hous-
ing in Hungary. These cases should demonstrate large differences in policies 
influencing housing consumption among transition societies and help under-
standing of the specific position of the Czech Republic. The selection of cases 
is not random: specific supply-side subsidies to support rental housing were 
characteristic of Poland and specific subsidies to promote homeownership 
were characteristic of Hungary. In the region Poland represented the model 
supporting, very significantly, non-profit rental housing, whereas Hungary 
represented the model favouring especially owner-occupied housing. Most of 
the information presented here relates to the period of 1990-2002.
After the collapse of the socialist regimes, most reforms in the field of 
housing were consequences of wider economic and political changes. The re-
forms of the wider economy led to the liberalisation of construction material 
prices and privatisation of construction firms where salaries were liberalised. 
Energy prices were also liberalised, although some weaker form of price regu-
lation was established under anti-monopoly legislation. These reforms facili-
tated the growth of the private economic sector that was supposed to replace 
the former public companies and public subsidies.
The wider political changes led to the restitution of part of the housing 
stock back to the original owners or their relatives (part of general restitu-
tion of property expropriated by communists during the previous regime) and 
decentralisation of power over housing policy from the centre to the local lev-
el (part of the wider decentralisation policy). Decentralisation with regard to 
housing policy was often accompanied by the transfer of public rental hous-
ing from state to municipal ownership. Fiscal decentralisation generally went 
far more slowly.
As these actions were mostly part of the wider reform package we can say, 
with some caution, that though these steps appeared in most of the countries, 
they were not directly related to housing policies and were more the intended 
or unintended consequences of wider economic and political changes. On the 
contrary, when housing policy appeared on the scene, the differences became 
much clearer.
Table 2.1 shows the tenure structure changes in selected transitional coun-
tries between 1991 and 2001. A glance at Table 2.1 shows us that many coun-
tries completely changed their tenure structure in favour of homeownership. 
Both relatively well developed countries such as Hungary, Slovenia and Esto-
nia, as well those countries with lower levels of GDP such as Romania, Lithu-
ania are among those where political representatives of the state decided to 
radically change their existing housing model in favour of homeownership. In 
other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Latvia, public rental 
housing remained the important tenure even in 2001. In Bulgaria, homeown-
ership was already common in the previous regime and so no substantial ten-
ure change took place there.
In countries with substantial tenure changes, right-to-buy legislation was 
passed and therefore public housing tenants received generally favourable 
rights to buy the flat under the conditions set by the central government. (In-
deed in some countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania, the transfer was al-
most free-of-charge as a part of a voucher privatisation process). No matter 
that at the time housing stock was often transferred to municipal ownership, 
it was the state that gave the public tenants the chance to gain easy access to 
homeownership. Even in Bulgaria the conditions of transfer were set at the 
central level and in Latvia the entire process was only slightly delayed. Poland 
and the Czech Republic did not pass right-to-buy legislation and, in this sense, 
municipalities were respected as the full owners of housing stock. These 
countries left it to the discretion of municipalities as to whether and under 
what conditions they would privatise their housing. We can thus distinguish 
three groups among the selected countries: fast privatisers, slow privatisers 
and the special status of Bulgaria.
Fast privatisers
Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Latvia (with 
some delay) belong to this group. In Romania, for example, all households 
willing to buy their dwelling were offered a qualified loan from the Savings 
and Deposits Bank, with a 25-year maturity and 4% nominal annual interest 
rate (for married couples under 35 years of age, the maturity was 30 years 
with a 2% interest rate). The price was very low, dependent on the date of 
construction. All adults permanently living and working in Estonia received 
‘privatisation vouchers’ (according to the length of time they had worked 
in Estonia since 1945) and the purchase of public apartments was achieved 
mostly through such vouchers. Direct financial costs consisted only of the le-
gal transaction fees, not exceeding 1% of the total price. Lithuania had an al-
most similar situation. The Privatisation of Municipal Flats Act was one of the 
first acts of the independent Slovak Republic; in 1995 and 1998 it introduced 
amendments that strengthened the power of tenants wanting to purchase 
their flats. Prices, regulated by legislation, were low.
Slow privatisers
In the Czech Republic the Ownership of Apartments and Non-residential 
Premises Act (1994) enabled privatisation of individual public dwellings and 
allowed the establishment of homeowners’ associations, but it did not intro-
duce tenants’ right-to-buy. A look at the Polish situation gives the same pic-
ture: dwellings were privatised generally at market prices although various 
discounts were granted. The extent of the discount, as well as the selection of 
the stock to be privatised, remained under the competence of the individual 
municipalities.
Bulgaria
Unlike other transitional countries, Bulgaria started its democratic develop-
ment with a high percentage of homeownership, consisting of 91% of the 
total housing stock. The privatisation and restitution processes caused no 
significant change in tenure structures. During the previous regime, hous-
ing initially built to be state or municipally owned, was later sold to the ten-
ants. Each tenant had the right to buy the dwelling after occupying it for two 
years and could benefit from soft loans from the State Savings Bank with a 
2% nominal annual interest rate. Construction of public housing was subsi-
dised by the state and prices were thus widely affordable. A new regulation 
was adopted in 1994, supposedly to prevent further privatisation of municipal 
housing stock and introduce more stringent criteria for its allocation, but this 
moratorium was cancelled in 1996.
In some countries (such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) the housing co-
operative sector still commands a significant share of the total housing stock. 
This sector is sometimes labelled a part of social housing but, in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, it would be more appropriate to see it as a part of ho-
meownership sector – housing cooperative members received significant 
rights of disposal.
There were also important differences in rent control systems indirectly 
influencing the tenure structure: for example, Estonia and Bulgaria abolished 
their central (state) rent control regimes till the end of 2005, whereas in Po-
land and the Czech Republic the state decided to retain strong tenant protec-
tion and rent control for all running tenancies up to the present day. In both 
countries rent control affected not only public housing but also private rental 
housing created from the restitution of property, thus starting the long, pain-
ful and fierce battle between the state and both private and public landlords.
If we leave public housing privatisation and tenure structure changes aside 
and look more closely at new housing policy strategies, we see that the dif-
ferences between countries are again more obvious than similarities. While 
some countries were characterised by the lack of any direct supply-side sub-
sidies in the field of rental housing, either due to insufficient public budgets 
(e.g., Bulgaria) or the prevailing neo-liberal economic dogma (e.g., Estonia), 
some other countries started new supply-side subsidy programmes and pro-
active housing policies. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (Hungary 
and Romania later on), directed a part of the housing subsidies at the con-
struction of rental housing. New non-profit housing associations with the 
goal of offering ‘social’ rental housing were legally established in Poland and 
Slovenia and became especially active in Poland (see below). In contrast, sub-
sidies for new rental housing were allocated exclusively among municipali-
ties in the Czech Republic (see the next chapter for a detailed description of 
the Czech situation).
As mentioned above, Poland is an example of a country that explicitly did 
not stop its supply-side subsidies at the beginning of transition (continued 
in the generous support of cooperative housing till the middle of 1990s) and 
later transformed these subsidies into support for new non-profit housing (in-
spired mostly by the French system of HLM). The Polish supply-side subsidy 
system is unique in the region and this specificity may be of crucial impor-
tance for understanding the specificity (or conformity) of the system applied 
in the Czech Republic. In the region Poland represents the housing model sig-
nificantly supporting non-profit rental housing. It is necessary to know more 
details of this kind of support to relate it to the particular situation in the 
Czech Republic.
In 1994 a complete reform of rental housing took place in Poland. From 
1994, gminas (municipalities) have been able to set their own rents up to a 
maximum of 3% of the unit’s replacement value. The replacement value is set 
quarterly by edict of the voivoda (chairman of the regional council) as the av-
erage current replacement value (based on current construction costs) in the 
region (voivodship). It has been argued that rent equal to 3% of replacement 
value per year would cover all maintenance and renovation costs. Under the 
reforms, part of the gminas rental stock would be designated social housing 
for the lowest income households and households with a high measure of so-
cial need (household incomes under the living minimum or in relative pov-
erty). These flats should be of a lower technical quality and their amenities 
should be of a lower standard. The rental contract in social housing flats is 
concluded for only a pre-defined time period (usually one year) and the rent 
is much lower than in other gminas flats.
The 1995 Act on Selected Forms of Support for Housing Construction cre-
ated the National Housing Fund. The Fund is financed from subsidies from 
the state budget, interests on extended loans and credits, interests on Fund 
deposits held with banks, donations and repayments of credits. Its housing 
subsidies may have only the form of a preferential loan and may be allocat-
ed only among social housing associations (see below) and housing coopera-
tives for the construction of rental dwellings. The gminas can obtain the loan 
only for the installation of the technical infrastructure associated with hous-
ing construction but not for housing construction itself. The loans may cover 
maximum of 70% of the project costs. According to the Act the interest on the 
loan cannot exceed the discount rate of the National Bank of Poland. By fur-
ther edict of the Ministry of Finance the interest rate for new rental construc-
tion was set at 50% of the discount rate. Dwellings in buildings constructed 
using a preferential loan from the Fund cannot be turned into private prop-
erty. The Minister of Physical Planning in co-ordination with the Minister of 
Finance defined the specific rules and procedures for awarding preferential 
loans:
 construction costs cannot exceed the replacement value per m2 set quar-
terly by edict of the voivoda, taking into account the size of the residence, 
the structure of the housing stock and other factors;
 the applicant must have a suitable guarantee (mortgage) of repayment;
 new rental flats must fulfil explicit provisions on the insulation of walls, 
floors and ceilings to conserve energy (heating), and the area of the flat 
must be higher than the normative area indicated in the edict;
 the National Housing Fund can amortise 10% of the construction costs if 
the building was constructed on time and according to the conditions set 
forth in the credit contract. (This is the only financial aid in the form of 
grant.)
One of the most important contributions of reform concerned the introduc-
tion of a new type of social housing operator. Social housing associations 
(TBS, Towaryszystwa Budownictwa Spolecznego) were established by the above-
mentioned Act of 1995. A TBS can take various legal forms: limited liability 
company, joint-stock company or cooperative of legal persons (but not physi-
cal persons who could set up the housing cooperative). In fact, more than 90% 
(probably more than 95%) of new housing associations operating in Poland 
now are in the form of limited liability companies. A TBS can be started by 
a gmina, and in fact more than 90% of currently operating associations were 
started by gminas. Even when a TBS is set up by another entity, the gmina or 
gminas on whose territory the TBS operates has/have the right to appoint rep-
resentatives to the Supervisory Board. A TBS cannot make a profit (it does 
not pay income tax), its status and rules (articles) and all its changes must 
be accepted by the President of the State Office for Housing and Urban De-
velopment. Its primary function lies in the construction and management of 
rental housing units. In addition to their main activity the association may 
also purchase dwellings, carry out repairs, lease commercial space in build-
ings operated by the association, administer buildings under commission for 
third-party owners (gminas), and carry out other activities connected with the 
construction of housing and associated infrastructure.
The rents in TBS housing are regulated and set by the Gmina Council. The 
rent cannot exceed 4% of the replacement value of a dwelling set by the voivo-
da in its quarterly edicts and the sum of rent payments from all dwellings 
owned by a TBS must cover all maintenance and repair costs, as well as the 
repayment of the qualified loan from the National Housing Fund (cost rent). 
There are explicit rules for allocating new rental flats too. A TBS can only rent 
a dwelling to someone if no member of the household has a legal title to an-
other dwelling and if the total household income does not exceed the average 
monthly salary in the given region (set by the Chairman of the Central Sta-
tistical Office for every region biannually) by more than: (a) 20% in a single-
person household, (b) 80% in a two-person household and (c) a further 40% 
for each additional household member in larger households. Moreover, the 
tenant household must present to the TBS a declaration of average month-
ly household income for the past year once every two years. If the declared 
household income exceeds the aforementioned coefficient, the association 
may charge a free market rent. Since a TBS operates as an independent as-
sociation not receiving financial grants from the public budget and repays the 
loan from rents, it tends to allocate its flats to households with economical-
ly active members with permanent and secure incomes (i.e., middle income 
households). Each TBS thus sets internal rules concerning the minimum 
household income.
TBS housing has been constructed in Poland since 1996. Up to the end of 
2004 the construction of some 50,000 dwellings had started. The rents are 
relatively low and the new dwellings serve families with middle and lower 
incomes (though not those with the lowest incomes). After several years of 
operation, evaluation of the system is not straightforward. While there is a 
clearly positive result in the growing number of new dwellings rented out at 
affordable rent, generous targeting and mainly high public expenditures give 
grounds for the criticism and discussion of the system reform. The state bud-
get supported the Fund by more than PLN 3,000 m. (EUR 700 m. in current 
value) and the bank behind the Fund (BGK) services additional debt following 
from loans from EBRD, IMF and EIB. The indebtedness of the bank (and on-
going request for additional contributions from the state budget) and indebt-
edness of some TBSs have become an important financial problem. Moreover, 
many tenants view their rent as their own repayments of the loans and are 
asking for the right to buy their dwellings for the residual cost price. Though 
privatisation is forbidden by the law some highly indebted TBSs would wel-
come a change to the regime.
Up until 2002, housing allowances had been introduced in, for example, Po-
land, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia (part of the subsistence ben-
efit). Bulgaria introduced only a special type of energy allowance (extended 
during winter and covering part of heating expenditure) and Romania intro-
duced no housing allowance in this period.
If the housing allowances of the selected transition countries at the be-
ginning of the 21st century had some common feature, it was their marginal 
significance. Their role was limited to income maintenance for the lowest in-
come families, rather than being an effective demand-side housing policy in-
strument. Many restrictive conditions demonstrate this. Two types of income 
ceilings can be distinguished: implicit and explicit. Implicit ceilings arise from 
the formula used for calculating the housing allowance, whereas explicit ceil-
ings are set strictly by the Act. Housing allowances in Poland, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic and Estonia included implicit or explicit income ceilings. In 
2002 the explicit housing expenditure normatives (notional expenditures) 
were also applied in almost all the above-mentioned countries, except for Po-
land and Estonia. Notional costs were often set at a low level, reflecting the 
situation in the ‘privileged’ regulated rental sector. Households living in the 
free market rental sector (paying market price for their housing) were thus 
generally excluded from any effective help through the allowance. In Esto-
nia, however, real housing costs were taken into account although they were 
limited by ceilings (maximum values); such ceilings were set by the munici-
palities. In Poland real housing costs were also included in the calculation of 
an allowance with only indirectly set ceilings (comparable costs in municipal 
housing).13
The normative rate of burden of a housing allowance is defined as the 
share of household income that a household is expected to spend on housing. 
In other words, it sets the minimum financial contributions of a household 
to its housing expenditures not directly (in absolute values) but indirectly in 
a form of a percentage of the total household income. In the Czech and Es-
tonian models the normative rate of burden varied according to the compo-
sition and size of the household (due to their connection to the concept of 
a subsistence level). In the Polish model the coefficient varied according to 
income level. However, in all analysed CEE models, the rate did not increase 
with the level of housing costs (assuming constant income), which means 
that there was no differentiation according to the level of rent (being gener-
ally higher for better equipped and better located flats).
The ‘taper’ shows the amount by which housing allowance decreases when 
the income of a household increases by one currency unit. In most of the ana-
lysed countries, the taper was relatively gentle and only the Estonian model 
with its 100% taper was an exception. The Estonian allowance thus might lead 
to a substantial poverty/unemployment trap. With the exception of Poland, 
housing allowances were paid from the state budget. In Poland the gminas 
(municipalities) were mainly responsible for covering housing allowance ex-
penses, but they obtained a grant from the state budget, calculated according 
to two relatively complex formulas. On average, they received a subsidy equal 
to 50% of the total payment duty. A brief comparison of the models is con-
tained in Table 2.2 (Bulgarian energy allowance excluded).
Table 2.3 shows the outstanding residential mortgage balance as a share of 
GDP in selected countries in 2003. As it is clear from the level of mortgage 
debt the role of market-based housing finance varied greatly between coun-
tries and was not simply influenced by GDP per capita or national homeown-
ership rate.
Until 2002, many countries established state housing funds to channel the 
international donations and budget contributions to support the purchase of 
owner-occupied housing or private housing construction (Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Lithuania); various mediators appeared between the state and mar-
ket, called the National Housing Agencies (Romania). The guarantees and 
preferential loans were extended, for example, by the Estonian Housing Fund 
(before its abolition in 2001) to young families with children and tenants in 
restituted housing; the KredEx fund provided loan guarantees to young and 
employed professionals. Slovakian State Housing Development Fund offered 
qualified loans (up to 80% of purchase/construction price) and grants (up to 
50% of purchase/construction price). After its establishment (1996) the Fund 
fell quickly into the debt as many households were eligible for the support. In 
later years the conditions for the subsidy allocations changed.
Romania established the special legal person, the National Housing Agen-
cy, instead. The Agency acted both as a developer and loan-funding institu-
tion. As a public interest institution, it approved contractors, supervised the 
construction process and, finally, sold the units to eligible households. Sales 
were made in cooperation with commercial banks that issued a ‘solvency cer-
tificate’ for each applicant showing that he/she is able to repay a loan. Special 
arrangements enabled the Agency to keep its dwelling prices lower than mar-
ket prices (land is provided free of charge by municipalities, the occupier is 
exempt from property tax and building permit issue costs are covered by the 
Agency). Tax relief (on interests from mortgage loans) was introduced in the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Baltic States and Hungary but did not appear in Slo-
vakia and Slovenia.
Another public subsidy coped with the ‘old loan liabilities’ of former state 
banks, mainly in those countries with larger volumes of private (Hungary) or 
cooperative (Poland, former Czechoslovakia) housing loans extended during 
the previous regimes. Solutions to the problem varied again in countries: in 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland the state covered fully or a substan-
tial part of the difference between the new market and the original fixed in-
terest on old loans, (in 2000, about 40% of Polish housing expenditures still 
addressed this problem), whereas Hungary applied a programme of prefer-
ential loan buy-down.14 The highest public expenditure to cover ‘old loan li-
abilities’ (expressed as a percentage of state budget) was probably in Poland, 
where the dominant state PKO BP bank subsidised housing lending till 1996.
The state had also another important role in this field: to undertake the 
reform of the whole banking sector. Both gradual reforms (Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania) as well as radical reforms (Czech Republic, Estonia) led to unexpect-
ed financial crises. In some countries such as Slovenia15 and Lithuania, the 
state kept its decisive influence in the banking sector far beyond 2000; in oth-
er countries the banks were privatised. The countries generally enacted laws 
permitting mortgage lending (often under a Law on Collateral, Banking Law 
or as a part of the Civil Code) but some of them did so only partially or much 
later. Foreclosure and eviction of borrowers-in-default with no requirement to 
offer them alternative housing was passed, for example, in Romania as late as 
1999.
There were substantial differences among transition countries in their so-
lutions to the ‘tilt problem’.16 The Czech Republic mainly used interest subsi-
dies (only very occasionally loans denominated in foreign currency appeared); 
Hungary deferred payment mortgages alongside interest subsidies; Poland in-
troduced and extended indexed mortgage loans (dual-index mortgage) while 
in most other countries (including partially Hungary and Poland) loans de-
nominated in foreign currencies became very popular. ‘Exclusive’ mortgage 
banking (the establishment of special mortgage banks with the right to issue 
mortgage bonds) was introduced in Hungary and Poland. The legislation on 
mortgage banking was also introduced in some other countries (Latvia, Esto-
nia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania) but without the require-
ment for the establishment of a separate specialised institution. This means 
that universal banks can obtain a license for mortgage bond issuance so long 
as mortgage banking operations and assets are kept in separate legal and ac-
counting records.
In 1993 Poland established a special institution, the Mortgage Fund, in co-
operation with USAID, EBRD and the World Bank; its goal was to provide ad-
ditional liquidity to universal banks through securitisation of loans. However, 
as there was little demand for such a service the project did not gain much 
success and later on the World Bank and EBRD withdrew their resources. Oth-
er selected countries did not introduce secondary mortgage market facilities 
(although they were discussed in Romania).
The main differences among the countries appeared in the field of state 
support to housing saving schemes. The Czech and Slovak Republics intro-
duced the housing saving schemes closed to the German Bausparkasse in 1992, 
Hungary in 1997, Romania in 2003 and Bulgaria in 2004 and though the law on 
Bausparkasse was passed in 1997 in Poland too, it has not yet been applied in 
practice. There are many variations to the system in the countries: systems 
differ in the premium bonus paid to savers, the minimum saving period to 
obtain the bonus, minimum saving period to withdraw savings, etc. In the 
Czech and Slovak Republics the scheme became very popular with the public 
(and expensive for the state), but the opposite was true for the same system 
in Hungary, and in Poland the system existed only on paper. In Slovenia the 
National Housing Scheme was also established in 1999 but it operated within 
the existing banking system, interest rates on savings and loans were variable 
and a very low interest margin was left to meet the operational costs of banks 
so it was effectively a non-profit scheme.
The Hungarian system of support for the acquisition of owner-occupied hous-
ing was unique in the region and this may help understanding of the specific-
ity of the support for owner-occupied housing applied in the Czech Republic. 
Hungary represents the model of a housing policy mainly favouring owner-
occupied tenure; it introduced special subsidies to promote homeownership 
and market-based housing finance.
In Hungary mortgage lending was relatively widespread even under the 
previous regime (though dissimilar to the mortgage loans commonly seen to-
day). In 1989 the outstanding mortgage balance for residential housing rep-
resented 17% of GDP. In 2000, the mortgage debt fell considerably to just 1.5% 
of GDP. This decrease was due to a state programme aimed at motivating 
borrowers to pre-pay ‘old loans’, to the slow development of a new system 
of market-based housing finance, and also to the fall in house prices in the 
1990s(!). The Hungarian housing market stagnated in the first phase of transi-
tion – in 1998 the average real house price was almost one half of what it had 
been in the final years of socialism (1989), a unique phenomenon in compari-
son with the situation in other transition countries.
At the start of 2000 the mortgage industry in Hungary was still marginal 
in significance, the mortgage credit portfolio equalled 130 million HUF, and 
outstanding mortgage debt constituted only 1.5% of the country’s GDP. How-
ever, four years later, in 2004, the portfolio of unpaid mortgage loans equalled 
almost 2 billion HUF and the share of outstanding mortgage debt out of GDP 
had risen to 10% (!!) despite the fact that in 2000 inflation in Hungary was still 
at the level of 10%, and in 2003 at the level of 5%. What was the cause of such 
accelerated growth? The efficiency of the mortgage industry, Hungarians’ pre-
vious experience with financing housing through long-term loans, or the sud-
den increase in housing demand that had just been deferred for a time?
Admittedly, the macro-economic situation stabilised, inflation gradually 
decreased, housing prices, which had been falling for many years, began to 
grow again, and some form of competition appeared in the mortgage credit 
market. However, the country’s GDP had already grown in the second half of 
the 1990s, inflation remained relatively high even in the first years of the new 
millennium, and in 2002 the largest savings bank, OTP, still had a two-thirds 
(66%!) share of newly granted mortgage loans. Unfortunately, it is likely that 
the decisive cause was none of the above-mentioned reasons, but rather more 
the generous state subsidies. In 2000 the Hungarian government introduced 
several important state subsidies that signified a major incentive for mort-
gage financing. The constant political debate over the financially untenable 
nature of these subsidies, and the threat of their being abolished, created an 
increased demand for mortgage loans on the part of people who otherwise 
may not have been planning to buy or build housing, but did not want to lose 
out on the very favourable terms of the subsidies.
The first subsidy was a very generous interest subsidy on loans (called a 
subsidy to increase the demand for mortgage loans). It was equal to the yield 
from government bonds minus four percentage points (approximately 7.5% in 
2000). In order for a borrower, and implicitly for a bank, to be able to partici-
pate in the subsidy programme, the interest on a loan could not exceed the 
government bond yield plus four percentage points. The margin for mortgage 
lenders (defined as the difference between the rate on government bonds and 
rate on mortgage loans) was thus limited to 4%, which, compared to the aver-
age profit margin of lenders in the Czech Republic (Sunega & Lux, 2007) was 
very generous. The interest subsidy was provided for the full term of credit 
repayment. The terms of subsidy enabled a flexible response to the change in 
market interest rates, while the client (creditor) at all times made repayments 
with a maximum annual interest rate of 8% throughout the entire repayment 
period.
The second subsidy was an interest subsidy on mortgage bonds, at 3% in 
2000. It was eligible only when interest on a mortgage loan financed from the 
subsidised bond did not exceed the market bond interest rate by more than 
1.5 percentage point. If, for example, the market interest rate on mortgage 
bonds was 11%, the maximum interest rate that could be set on a mortgage 
loan covered by the bonds was 12.5%. In such case the bank could request a 
3% interest subsidy, which effectively reduced the bank’s costs to 8% (and in-
creased the margin to 4.5%). This interest subsidy was increased in 2001 from 
3% to 6% and through a new mechanism it reached a record 10% in 2002! This 
subsidy is one of the factors behind the enormous boom in mortgage banking 
and large emissions of mortgage bonds in Hungary.
The third programme was a tax relief programme. First, it was possible to 
deduct annually 20% of the mortgage payments (both interest and principal 
payments) from income tax, but only to a limit of 35,000 HUF (around 180 
USD). In 2001 it became possible to deduct 40% of the mortgage payments and 
the maximum limit rose considerably. In 2002 it became possible to deduct 
interest payments up to 240,000 HUF (around 1,000 USD), that is seven times 
more than in 2000.
The entire subsidy system was financially untenable in the long term and 
contributed a substantial increase to the state debt and budget deficit. In De-
cember 2003 the government made the expected cuts. The interest subsidy on 
loans was reduced to 60% of the yield from government bonds, and the inter-
est subsidy on mortgage bonds was reduced even more to 40% of the yield 
from government bonds. The maximum limit for tax deductions was reduced 
to half and a tax deduction was generally allowed only for the first four years 
of mortgage loan repayment. Although it was expected that there would be a 
radical decline in the interest in mortgage loans after these changes, the de-
crease was not that sharp – loans denominated in foreign currency substitut-
ed subsidised loans in HUF. In 2004 one half of newly granted mortgage loans 
were denominated in foreign currency. An interesting conclusion to the devel-
opment of the mortgage market in Hungary is the fact that even in the mort-
gage loan sector miracles just do not happen. There was nothing more behind 
the ‘miraculous’ boom in the mortgage market in Hungary in 2000 than the 
state and the ‘visible’ hand of regulation.
Clearly, there were very different approaches to housing privatisation, rent 
regulation, the establishment of new supply-side as well as demand-side sub-
sidies, housing finance tools and state support of owner-occupied housing. 
What, then, were the similarities? What did these countries on their way to 
EU share in common in housing reforms, if we suspend those changes that 
were the logical outcomes of wider economic and political reforms?
One fact is generally marginalised in comparisons of transition housing 
systems. Most international comparisons of state interventions in the field of 
housing consumption focus only on explicit subsidies, whether they are di-
rect or indirect. Such subsidies are often well documented in public expen-
diture sheets, national budgets, and macro-economic statistics. However, one 
group of subsidies generally left unmeasured and definitely not demonstrat-
ed in official statistical figures comprises the economic (hidden) subsidies. 
These often concealed (and uncounted) subsidies are equal to the difference 
between the market and actual price for goods and services. In other words, 
people pay for a service (housing) less than they would pay under market 
conditions.
I have shown that there was no common shift in tenure structure during 
the transition among the selected countries. Although the mass privatisation 
of former public housing prevailed in the region at least two countries (Po-
land, Czech Republic) did not apply a right-to-buy policy. However, in all the 
countries analysed here, a substantial part of population received the same 
housing economic subsidy, either in the form of an owner-occupied flat pur-
chased for a very low or at no price, or in the form of rental housing with very 
low regulated rent. This hidden economic subsidy probably formed the main 
financial subsidy in the field of housing during the transition and its margin-
alisation may lead to a distorted picture of housing reform in those countries. 
The allocation of huge economic subsidies became the common feature of 
housing reforms in all the analysed countries; it is one of the detectable simi-
larities.
Also evident is that central governments were reluctant to surrender con-
trol over the main levers that decisively influence the form of housing con-
sumption. In spite of the proclaimed decentralisation of policy to munici-
palities, central governments did not want to be compromised by the reform 
programmes of local governments and retained the exclusive power to lead 
housing reforms. In this way they preserved the housing privileges for exist-
ing occupants of public housing, whether by giving them flats for ‘give-away’ 
prices or by giving them low rents and generous tenant protection. In spite 
of the common rhetoric on the decentralisation of housing policy at the be-
ginning of transition, in all the analysed countries this field remained deci-
sively influenced by the state (central) policies. Later, this dominant central 
role weakened but the dominancy of central decision makers in housing poli-
cies of 1990s was another common similarity among transitional countries 
(though poorly visible behind the decentralisation rhetoric and some legisla-
tive activities).
Taking it another step reveals another outcome. In the field of housing 
consumption the dominant states decided to allocate huge economic subsi-
dies but eligibility for these subsidies had to be, logically, restricted. The state 
could not give the same level of economic subsidy to all existing and newly 
created households as then the state budget would end up bankrupt. Only 
the existing tenants, and especially existing tenants of former public housing, 
were those who could be labelled as the winners of housing policy transitions. 
The income and/or social situation of the eligible household was not impor-
tant in this allocation process; the only criterion was the occupancy title. As 
the allocation of huge economic subsidies was not means-tested these sub-
sidies probably increased the income and social inequalities in transitional 
societies (note, however, that this conclusion is not verified for all selected 
states).
There is another clear and now proven outcome of policies in selected 
transitional societies: the economic subsidies divided households into two 
very different groups. The ‘insiders’ enjoyed low housing costs and tenure 
protection (with no regard of their social needs or income levels) while the 
‘outsiders’ were often left to the uncompromising market forces. Additional 
subsidies directed at outsiders (if any) were marginal, when compared to the 
hidden economic subsidies to insiders. This insider-outsider tension was, in 
fact, even more substantial because market housing was inflated by the lack 
of incentive for insiders to move or rationalise housing consumption. Though 
this problem did not overflow into significant social conflict thanks to the tra-
ditional inter-generational transfer of housing privileges, it is obvious that the 
costs and benefits of housing reform were unequally distributed.

This chapter follows the international comparison of policy changes in se-
lected transitional countries presented in Chapter 2 but it focuses on a more 
detailed description of the particular situation in only one of the countries 
included: the Czech Republic. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe the con-
text in which housing policy in the Czech Republic was formed and reformed 
during the transition. The description derives from the theoretical framework 
specified in the first chapter; especially from the intention to look at the ide-
ological (normative), institutional (path dependence), political and economi-
cal factors behind the evolution of the housing system. This chapter thus in-
cludes a description of the political, institutional, economic and demographic 
contexts as well as a description of the history of both social and housing 
policies applied in the territory of the current Czech Republic in the past. I 
also describe and discuss the changes in housing conditions (including tenure 
structure), housing policy, housing finance and housing affordability in the 
period between 1989 and 2005 in the Czech Republic.
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question elabo-
rated above. This question is as follows:
1.   What was the background to the development of the specific housing policy and 
housing system in the Czech Republic? What were the ideologies (norms), tradi-
tional problem solution patterns and institutional as well as political structures 
that might influence the formation and development of the housing system (includ-
ing the formation of general social policy and its history)?
By nature, this chapter is more descriptive than the previous one. The de-
tailed information provided here will, however, be useful in the analyses of 
effectiveness and subordinated efficiency of housing policy in the Czech Re-
public provided in the next chapter and they will be especially crucial in de-
tecting the factors that influenced state interventions in the field of housing 
consumption provided in the last chapter of this book. The context described 
here and the assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of housing policy 
presented in Chapter 4 will be put together in the last chapter of the book.
At the very beginning of transition the political system based on one-party 
dominance17 changed completely in favour of a multi-party system and de-
mocracy. As the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had 
already been mentioned in the pre-1989 Constitution, such radical change in-
cluded the preparation and introduction of a new written Constitution and 
Declaration of Human Rights; introduction of the new electoral law; and the 
establishment of new political (state) institutions (such as the new chambers 
of Parliament, the Constitutional Court and others). The Parliament of the 
Czech Republic (after the 1993 division of the former Czechoslovakia) is com-
posed of two chambers – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (the Senate 
remained vacant for the whole legislative term and the first elections to the 
Senate were not held until 1996). “The Czech Republic has a parliamentary re-
gime. This is by no means a banal assertion, at the very least for two reasons. 
The overwhelming majority of present-day Western consolidated democracies 
have a parliamentary regime, while by contrast the majority of the former 
communist countries have a semi-presidential regime. Generally, in a parlia-
mentary regime, the formation of a government constitutes the fundamental 
link between the result of a legislative election and the policy of the executive 
power” (Novák et al., 2005, p. 10).
According to the Czech Constitution, following the parliamentary election 
a newly formed government is required to appear before the Chamber of Dep-
uties within 30 days of its appointment and ask for a vote of confidence (Ar-
ticle 68). If the government fails to win the vote, it must submit its resignation 
(Article 73). “We may then say that the Czech Republic is one of the countries 
where an incoming government must necessarily have an explicit, formal 
legislative investiture… [this] makes the process of forming minority cabi-
nets much more difficult” (Novák et al., 2005, p. 11). The parliamentary (and 
not semi-presidential) character of political system, the proportional electoral 
system to the main chamber (see below) and the necessity of investiture of 
the incoming government all have important consequences on political sta-
bility (especially the stability of executive power) and are, in my opinion, im-
portant in understanding the role that housing policy played during transi-
tion in the Czech Republic.
The electoral system for elections to the chamber with decisive legislative 
powers, the Chamber of Deputies, is founded on the principle of proportional 
representation. Only parties that pass the legal threshold of 5% of the votes 
on a nationwide basis can be allocated seats. Until 2002, seats were distribut-
ed on the level of the eight voting regions using the Hagenbach-Bischoff For-
Č
mula. The electoral regions were identical to regional government territories, 
that is seven regions and the capital city Prague. The unused votes for par-
ties from the first scrutiny were carried over into the second scrutiny, which 
was calculated in a single nationwide constituency. Here the remaining votes 
cast for the individual parties from the regions were calculated and further 
seats allocated, once again using the Hagenbach-Bischoff Formula. If not all 
the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (200 seats) had been allocated after the 
first calculation of the second scrutiny, the remaining seats were allocated to 
the parties with the largest share of the remainder of the vote.
This system, with its five-percent legal threshold, prevented very small 
parties getting into the Chamber of Deputies. The legal threshold, how-
ever, was the only element that had a reductive effect on the party system. 
The system secured a relatively high level of proportionality among the par-
liamentary parties that managed to exceed the five-percent legal threshold. 
“This was the effect of at least three favourably adjusted variables. The elec-
toral districts (regions) were very large, and so distortion of proportionality 
was kept to a minimum. If a small disproportion occurred in the allocation of 
the seats in the regions, it was reliably compensated for in the second scru-
tiny. As a result there were no instruments to enable easier formation of gov-
ernments” (Lebeda, 2005, p. 109).
There was only one significant attempt at electoral reform. In 2001 the 
leading right-wing party and leading left-wing party (ODS – conservatives; 
CSSD – social democrats) jointly produced an electoral reform bill in order 
to substantially strengthen the majority-forming effects of the electoral sys-
tem. Ultimately it was not implemented as a consequence of a ruling by the 
Constitutional Court, which annulled the key parameters of electoral reform. 
Instead, in 2001 we saw the achievement of some ‘cosmetic’ amendments to 
the electoral system. The first change to the mechanism of seat allocation 
was the replacement of the original Hagenbach-Bischoff Formula with the 
D’Hondt divisor. The second reform variable was the legal threshold for the 
entry of parties into parliament. In the new system, however, the threshold 
for individual parties remained unchanged at 5% and the changes related on-
ly to the levels for coalitions (this meant that parties were not longer moti-
vated to enter into pre-election cooperation). The third reformed variable was 
the number of scrutinies. As I mentioned above, the original electoral system 
used two scrutinies. Dropping the second scrutiny was related to the choice 
of voting formula – the D’Hondt divisor distributes all the seats directly at 
the basic level of the voting districts. Therefore there is nothing left to be car-
ried over to a second scrutiny. The last primary variable to be changed was 
the magnitude of the districts. Instead of the original eight electoral districts, 
fourteen new districts were established, identical in borders with the new 
self-governing regional authorities.
“From the point of view of the overall impact on the proportionality of the 
electoral results and the representation of individual parties, the new system 
has changed very little. There have been a few small shifts bringing margin-
al advantages to strong parties at the expense of the weak” (Lebeda, 2005, p. 
120). For over ten years (1996-2006) the Czech Republic lacked an executive 
that was stable, enjoyed a majority and was capable of effective action mainly 
as a consequence of the prevailing proportional electoral system, the parlia-
mentary character of the political regime and the necessity of government in-
vestiture. Since the elections of 1996 there have been eight successive govern-
ments, but not single one has fulfilled all three conditions.
The first Czech government, with Mr. Vaclav Klaus as prime minister, was 
installed on the 3rd of July 1992. After the federation ceased existence (Janu-
ary 1993) Mr. Klaus’ government led the new independent Czech Republic. It 
was a coalition of leading right-wing conservatives (ODS) and small right and 
centre-orientated parties – Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL, KDS) and liberals 
(ODA). At the time the coalition had a majority of 105 seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies. The main opposition was the Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM). The communists refused to convert to social democracy (as 
did former communists in other transition states like Hungary or Poland). 
“The communists were unacceptable to the other parties, and their coalition 
potential was almost non-existent … The Czech Republic was in fact the only 
country in Central Europe where a comparatively strong and to a certain ex-
tent dogmatic Communist Party prevented a healthy alternation of govern-
ments for quite a long time” (Novák et al., 2005, pp. 47-48).
The year 1995 saw a substantial increase in support for the other left-wing 
party (social democrats, CSSD). The 1996 parliamentary elections had put im-
portant changes onto the political map – growing support for social demo-
crats who replaced the communists in the role of the main opposition par-
ty; and the end of stable majority Czech governments. The elections of 1996 
ushered in the first two-year period of unstable and ineffective government. 
The minority coalition government of Prime Minister Klaus (ODS), again 
formed by the ODS, KDU-CSL and ODA with a narrow minority of 99 depu-
ties in the Chamber of Deputies, held on for about 18 months. The crisis at 
the end of 1997 effectively brought down the government. It was replaced by 
a second minority government headed by Mr Josef Tošovský as prime min-
ister (independent, former governor of the Czech National Bank), which in-
cluded a number of non-partisan members and representatives of new small 
right-wing orientated party (US) and the KDU-CSL, and was supposed to be 
a caretaker government to bridge the period up to the early elections at the 
beginning of the summer of 1998. Not even these elections, however, led to 
a solution. A majority government could not be formed nor a stable execu-
tive established for the following four-year term. Politicians responded to this 
situation with the somewhat unconventional ‘Opposition Agreement’ con-
cluded between the governing CSSD and ODS, the strongest opposition party. 
This was the basis for the third minority government, this time headed by Mr. 
Milos Zeman (CSSD); it was also the first government led by left-wing political 
party (social democrats) since 1992. While stable thanks to the agreement, it 
was hardly capable of any effective action.
The 2002 elections once again resulted in a stalemate. While it proved pos-
sible to form a majority government coalition of three parties (CSSD, KDU-CSL 
and US, led again by left-wing social democrats), the majority in question was 
the smallest possible (101 deputies). This government survived for two years. 
Its prime minister, Mr. Vladimír Špidla (CSSD) resigned following the extreme 
failure of the CSSD in the European Parliament elections. In the summer of 
2004 a new government was formed under Prime Minister Stanislav Gross 
(CSSD) composed of the same three parties and once again with the small-
est majority possible (101 deputies). At the beginning of 2005 this government 
was replaced by the same coalition under Prime Minister Jirí Paroubek (CSSD) 
with the same majority of 101 deputies.
The parliamentary election of 2006 led once again to an unstable political 
situation. No political party had been able to establish a majority coalition 
government and due to growing tensions between two main political parties 
(left-wing CSSD and right-wing ODS), there was only a little space between 
them for mutual agreement in the minority government. In fact, after the 
2006 election, the Czech Republic had no government for six months, though 
in that time there was an attempt to establish one (by ODS members). This at-
tempt failed when the government did not get the necessary majority support 
in the Chamber of Deputies. Only thanks to two former CSSD deputies, who 
decided to support another right-wing oriented coalition government of ODS, 
KDU-CSL and Green Party, was it possible to establish the new government 
with a weak majority of two votes.
Since 1996 the lack of effective and powerful government (i.e., a govern-
ment that can effectively fulfil its political programme) has been the main 
feature of the political situation in the Czech Republic. Right-wing ODS led 
the governments in the period 1992-1998; left-wing CSSD led the govern-
ments in the period 1998-2006. Due to the proportional electoral system, the 
governments were always coalitions; for example, the relatively small centre-
orientated party of Christian Democrats – KDU-CSL – has participated in all 
governments since 1992 with no regard to whether these governments were 
led by CSSD or ODS.
Another characteristic feature concerns ideology. As Mateju & Vlachová 
(1998) have confirmed, the vast majority of Czech adults have been able to 
place themselves on the political left-right scale. Novák comments, “Most im-
portantly, with gradual crystallisation, this left-right orientation is acquiring 
content. Research has shown that in Czech society self-placement on the left-
right scale has been quite stable in a bell-shaped distribution with a slight 
deflection to the right since 1991… Behind this stability of self-declared po-
litical leanings, however, a significant development of attitudes related to the 
left-right axis has taken place. In their attitudes and values, Czechs have been 
leaning slightly to the left for several years” (Novák et al., 2005, p. 52).
The transition has also been connected with profound reforms of existing 
institutions. Even if we put aside those substantial institutional changes con-
nected with economic reform (end of planning economy and establishment 
of markets, stock exchange, private economic subjects of different legal form, 
transfer of production of industry and services via privatisation and restitu-
tion from state to private hands), dozens of formal changes touched all fields 
of public administration and intervention: local government (establishment 
of local governments – municipalities and regions – and decentralisation of 
power to the local level), the police (fundamental reform of police and secret 
services), the army (substantial reform of army structure leading, finally, to 
an establishment of professional army), central administration (closing some 
ministries and establishment of new ones), education (reforms of secondary 
and university education), research (cessation of many research institutes 
and partial reform of scientific research), and health care policies (social pol-
icy, tax policy, etc). Besides many other goals, these changes were aimed at 
‘clearing’ the public administration of former collaborators of the communist 
secret service (especially in high posts in police, army, secret service, science, 
education, public administration) and ‘freeing’ industry, the public adminis-
tration, education, research institutes and others from the ballast of commu-
nist ideology (by dismissing people whose posts were especially related to the 
assurance of appropriate communist morale). A description of all these insti-
tutional changes would be enough for a full historical monograph; as this is 
not the goal of this book, I will concentrate only on those changes that were 
connected with housing.
As mentioned above, the former ‘hard-line’ communists did not transform 
themselves into a more democratic left-wing party and remained organised 
as a political party, embedded by rhetoric and day-to-day politics in the past 
(praising the former communist regime; reflecting the nostalgic yearning for 
communism present among many retired people). Though they received at 
the beginning of transition, a relatively high share of parliamentary election 
votes and until 1996 they always ranked in second place after the winning 
political party, thanks to this they were paradoxically cut off from real politi-
cal power. Among the important goals of institutional reform this one goal 
(exclusion communists from political power) was fulfilled more successfully 
here than in countries such as Hungary or Poland (though some institutions, 
namely courts, are often denoted as unreformed even today). This does not 
mean that the communists disappeared. They were only relatively success-
fully (bearing in mind that there are always some exceptions) cut off from 
the work in public administration, army, police and other public institutes 
as well as in the educational structures and central government. They often 
used their former contacts (social capital) as well as their wealth stemming 
from their considerable legal and illegal incomes acquired during socialism to 
become influential economic actors in the first phases of transition. In many 
ways, the communists were best prepared for changes in the regime and of-
ten successfully used their accumulated economic and social capitals under 
market conditions.
However, institutions in the broader sense also include social norms, pat-
terns of behaviour and expectations; not only those institutions that have 
a clear material existence and hierarchy. Change in the less visible institu-
tions can hardly be expected to be achieved just as quickly. The most com-
mon strategy regular people employed to survive the socialism of 1970s and 
1980s (economic shortages, low incomes) is reflected by the following proverb: 
‘Those who do not prey on the state prey on the family’. A commonly held 
norm during the communist regime was that one could barely survive with-
out ‘preying on the state’, or taking part in illegal ‘black markets’ and infor-
mal networks (clientelism) or often without straightforward corruption. Social 
networks and bribes were essential for getting a good job, a higher standard 
of health care, a state rental flat, for ensuring a good education for children, 
even for such mundane things as being able to buy oranges or bananas in the 
shops. Unfortunately this sad proverb characterised the personal ‘strategies’ 
people employed in most transition countries even long after the change of 
the regimes. Clientelism (influential informal networks, the establishment 
of powerful lobbying networks with significant influence in the political de-
cision-making process), the culture of breaking laws (illegal incomes, black 
markets, shadow economy, ‘preying on the state’) and wide-scale corruption 
are still main barriers to the improvement of efficiency of the functioning of 
the entire social and economic system in the Czech Republic. The Transparen-
cy International CPI Index 2006 measurement of perception of corruption in 
163 countries ranks the Czech Republic ranks at 46th – 48th position, far behind 
the overwhelming majority of ‘old’ EU member states (with the exception of 
Greece or Italy). The judicial process is still time-consuming. In 2005 civil dis-
putes took on average 15 months compared to six months in 1989 (Statistický 
prehled soudních agend, 2006).
The economic context of the early transitional period has been accurately 
characterised by politologist J. Rupnik in the introduction to one of the most 
influential evaluations of the first decade of transition in the Czech Republic 
(Vecerník & Mateju (eds.), 1998, pp. 13-14):
“The Polish and especially the Hungarian left enforced a truly liberal eco-
nomic policy whereas the Czech right got stuck in social-democratic, consen-
sual politics, the consequences of which are today well-known. This policy, 
together with radical free market rhetoric was economically counterproduc-
tive but highly successful politically…An absolute majority of Czechs are in 
favour of a strong and socially generous state. In other words, ‘right-wing lib-
eralism’ was acceptable to Czech society only when it was limited to rhetoric 
and accompanied by social-democratic practice. The bon mot of Jirí Vecerník 
from 1996, ‘think left, vote right’, accurately captures the Czech situation of 
the 1990s.”
After 1989 the denationalisation of the entire economy took place. Privatisa-
tion of enterprises and services was divided into ‘small privatisation’ of shops 
and business premises, and ‘large privatisation’ of state enterprises. The resti-
tution of property expropriated by the communists since 1948 (for small firms 
since 1955) represented the third form of factual privatisation. The most strik-
ing feature was a form of ‘large privatisation’ called voucher privatisation. 
Voucher privatisation began in 1992 when all adult Czech citizens received 
equal numbers of vouchers to use for the purchase of stocks in former state 
enterprises. It was the reflection of the ideals about equality (and also popu-
lism) of the early Czech transition governments – everyone should be given 
the same opportunity to become successful on the emerging stock markets. 
From the very start there was strong public support for this specific form of 
privatisation, including from highly educated people. However Vecerník & 
Mateju (eds., 1998) state that “voucher privatisation has undoubtedly shaken 
up the structures of ownership, but has remained far from achieving the de-
sired state…Those most successful in privatisation were those individuals 
who, thanks to their ‘revolutionary ethics’ did not hesitate to capitalise upon 
legal loopholes and were able to profit by avoiding the entanglement of own-
ership rights”.
Most vouchers were invested through different private investment funds 
which, in the course of time, were often transformed in such a way that al-
lowed abuse of the invested capital for the enrichment of individual funds’ 
managers. Moreover, fragmentation of the enterprises’ ownership structure 
established by ‘millions of investor’ during voucher privatisation gave a key 
position in privatised enterprises to the managers who also often began fol-
lowing their own selfish interests (i.e., contrary to the interests of fragmen-
tised inactive owners). The ‘large privatisation’ of some enterprises was not 
done solely through vouchers but often through a combination of various 
methods. However this combined ‘privatisation strategy’ was again prepared 
by the managers themselves. Vecerník and Mateju state, “We can only specu-
late as to what extent the chosen method was based upon an open and sin-
cere reliance on essentially blind economic laws and to what extent the tac-
it transfer of state property into the hands of its previous direct or indirect 
managers had been expected.... Rather than human capital and high ethical 
standards, previous positions, contacts and information, detailed knowledge 
of the given organisation, or simply belonging to certain closed networks of 
people were more decisive for the success of a proposed privatisation project” 
(Vecerník & Mateju (eds.), 1999, pp. 77, 84).
Another important feature of the first decade of transition was, on the one 
hand, the effort to privatise state enterprises in private entities as soon as 
possible but, at the same time, to keep the majority state portion of owner-
ship in the banking sector, which owned many private investment funds ac-
tive during voucher privatisation. This system has been called ‘state capital-
ism’ (Mlcoch, 1997, p. 110) or ‘banking socialism’ (Vecerník & Mateju (eds.), 
1999, p. 78) and it had, in the first instance, especially important consequenc-
es for the labour market and wealth redistribution (see ‘social policy’ below), 
and, in the second instance, on the sustainability of economic growth in the 
Czech Republic. After the first necessary economic recession in early 1990s, a 
short period of economic growth was interrupted by another economic reces-
sion in 1997-1998 (Figure 3.1). Though there is no consensus on the causes of 
the second unexpected economic recession (it did not appear in any neigh-
bouring countries such as Slovakia, Hungary or Poland), the crisis in the un-
sustainable soft system of ‘banking socialism’ is often mentioned in this con-
text (Vecerník & Mateju (eds.), 1999; Vecerník, 1998). The following two figures 
(3.2 and 3.3) show the development of rates of inflation and unemployment 
during transition in the Czech Republic.
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Knowledge of social policy and its development, including the long-term so-
cial norms incorporated in policy systems is crucial for understanding the de-
velopment of housing policies, housing systems. As housing policy forms, in 
fact, part of social policy, here I will provide a description of the development 
of social policy in the territory of the Czech Republic that delves more deeply 
into the history; since the end of WWI and the establishment of the ‘first’ in-
dependent Czechoslovak Republic.
After the Russian Bolshevik revolution (1917) and WWI (1918) there was a 
clear general shift of political preferences to the left throughout the whole of 
Europe, including the new independent Czechoslovakia. However, ‘socialism’ 
in Czechoslovakia also had other roots: a general disregard for nobles closely 
related to the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire who were mostly of non-
Czech nationality18 and a general ill feeling towards the Catholic Church, the 
religion closely connected with the Habsburg dynasty. Both the nobility and 
the Church owned significant portions of Czech land.
The so called ‘social question’ also formed a significant part of the dis-
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Figure 3.2 Inflation in the Czech Republic, 1990-2006 (in %)
Source: Czech Statistical Office
course provided by the new political elite long before 1918: the first presi-
dent of Czechoslovakia, former professor of sociology at the Charles Univer-
sity – T. G. Masaryk – wrote a monograph entitled ‘Social Question’ and the 
same title was used by future minister of Finance K. Engliš for his own mono-
graph written during the WWI. Shortly after the establishment of the new re-
public in 1918, the eight-hour working day had already been introduced. The 
first political election in 1919 was won by left-wing parties (Czechoslovak So-
cial Democratic Party and Czechoslovak Socialist Party). The right-wing Agrar-
ian party also took part in the first Czechoslovak government but only due to 
the effort to exclude all German political parties from executive power (Ger-
mans formed about 25% of population of the new independent state). A num-
ber of strikes were organised by radical workers of the time and the General 
Strike of 1920 was suppressed only through violent interventions by the army 
and police. In 1921 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was formally es-
tablished.
Land reform was orientated mainly against the nobles (e.g., Schwarzen-
berg, Czernin, Colloredo-Mansfeld, Lichtenstein or Habsburg) and the Catholic 
Church (the biggest land-owner in the territory of Czechoslovakia with about 
500,000 hectares of the land). Several reforms with hidden nationalistic goals 
(directed de facto against landowners of German and Hungarian origins) were 
passed between 1919 and 1920; all agricultural land with an area more than 
150 hectares was ‘annexed’ by the state (almost 30% of the total area of the 
new state). ‘Annexation’ did not mean expropriation but the disposal rights of 
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land-owners were greatly reduced. Afterwards the annexed land was gradu-
ally purchased from the landowners by the state for the usual prices of 1913-
1915 (i.e., at pre-WWI prices). Due to the fact that in the post-WWI period of 
hyper-inflation land prices were much higher, such a ‘purchase’ was, in fact, 
an expropriation of land (Prucha et al., 2004, p. 85). The purchase of annexed 
land had not finished even 15 years after the law had come into force and in 
the mid-1930s large parts of annexed land (about 56%) remained in the own-
ership of the original owners; purchases stopped and further progress was 
postponed for another 20 years (i.e., up to the 1950s).
Collective agreements between representatives of employers and employees 
(trade unions) became common after 1918 though they had no legislative ba-
sis. The power of trade unions grew quickly. The membership of the most influ-
ential trade union (OSC) increased from 75,000 in 1918 to 856,000 in 1920. The 
trade unions asked for larger ‘socialisation’ of the economy, expropriation of 
private industry, and even the first president of Czechoslovakia, T.G. Masaryk 
did not oppose this idea in 1919 (although he stressed the pre-conditions). The 
social insurance system was improved by reducing the share of insurance pre-
mium paid by the insuree, by aggregation of small insurance companies into 
financially stronger groups and by extending the period of eligibility for illness 
benefit. By 1918 the state unemployment benefit had been legally introduced to 
meet the challenge of the poverty of unemployed people (but the benefit was 
not universal as it was allocated to only about 50% of the unemployed). Rent 
regulation for all current rental contracts was also introduced in 1918. The state 
debt quickly increased, partly due to this new social legislation.
After the ‘deflation crisis’ of 1921-1923, the 1920s were a period of sig-
nificant economic boom and this helped to blunt revolutionary aspirations 
(though the communists, especially in the Czech territory remained very 
powerful, often coming in second in parliamentary elections). Only a few 
new social laws were passed during the boom (the right to equal leave for all 
workers, pension insurance for workers) and, generally, social policy began 
getting less generous. The economic depression (1933-1938) meant a return 
to substantial state interventionism – support for monopolisation, numerus 
clausus in many industries, economic protectionism, export subsidies as well 
as higher wealth redistribution (especially in the field of unemployment ben-
efits). However, with the exception of a reformulation of unemployment ben-
efits there were no additional programmes to target the growing unemploy-
ment, poverty, income differentiation, and housing foreclosures (in villages). 
This was also due to the growing state budget deficit (Prucha et al., 2004). The 
social and economic consequences of the economic recession remained very 
painful and became an important part of the collective memory in Czech so-
ciety.
As Krebs et al. (2005, p. 90) mentioned, in post-WWII socialist Czechoslova-
kia (1948-1989) there was no social policy whatsoever. In general, there were 
only the activities of the monopolistic state in all fields of human life – in-
cluding social matters. As Krebs mentions (p. 91), the term ‘social policy’ dis-
appeared from official vocabularies at the beginning of 1950s because from 
the ideological point of view under the new socialist order there would be no 
social problems that such policy could potentially address (of course in re-
ality those problems did exist but they were hidden by propaganda or over-
employment). The wide-scale and non-transparent redistribution of wealth 
reflected the officially proclaimed egalitarianism (not social justice) and this 
led to the confusion between the economic and social spheres. As Krebs ex-
plains, “Social policy has been deformed especially by the fact that these were 
only activities of the state that had a monopoly on any interventions in the 
social field. The role of other actors has been suppressed (family, citizen) or 
completely suspended (charity, church, non-government organisations). The 
whole system was centralised and was broadly undemocratic” (Krebs et al., 
2005, p. 91).
The state had total monopoly. It controlled all economic activities and all 
activities in the social field. This was a tool used to make people complete-
ly dependent on the state and to create in them a mood of ‘adoration of the 
state’. Social paternalism was an instrument of both social security and po-
litical control (Vecerník & Mateju (eds.), 1999, p. 198). Only the state could give 
people such ‘gifts’ as employment, low-priced milk or bread, low-cost housing, 
low interest loans on buying furniture or a car, free education or free health 
care. The state became a substitute for other religion symbols; it accumulat-
ed all powers in social, political and economic life (and consequently also in 
the social field) and was vindictive to any other competitors, especially those 
coming from underneath. Official egalitarianism did not, however, exclude 
distribution of certain important privileges to people who represented impor-
tant pillars of the state and the communist party hegemony (the policy, army, 
secret service, ideologists, apparatchiks, nomenklatura).
Financing for all of this was provided exclusively by the state budget. 
Therefore after two decades of socialism (starting in the 1960s and continuing 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s) the system became increasingly character-
ised by shortages, a decrease in service quality, corrections to original goals; 
in short: crisis. Although equal, people began being equal more in their pov-
erty than in their affluence. For most families it was barely possible to cover 
household expenses on one salary (and therefore women were forced to re-
turn to the labour process very soon after the birth of their children). Alloca-
tion of state rental flats took longer and longer (and the numbers of people in 
forced cohabitation grew, especially during the population boom of the 1970s). 
Meanwhile, the consumption of goods increasingly perceived as standard in 
the West were more often considered a luxury in communist Czechoslovakia 
(e.g., quality meat, tropical fruits, an unpolluted living environment or poor 
quality cars).
During communism it had become almost folklore to blame the state for 
any type of shortcoming (it was logical – the state was everywhere so who 
else could you blame?) and the dependence on paternalistic and monopolis-
tic ‘omnipotent’ state had actually become a powerful social norm. The com-
munists succeeded in transforming large numbers of free and independent 
individuals with personal ambitions and values into a highly state-dependent 
submissive mass that ultimately sold out to a demonic contract. This contract 
said that the people’s tolerance of ideological, cultural and political suppres-
sion would be given in exchange for the other party to the contract, the com-
munist state, promise to continue providing them with ‘gifts’ – employment 
(where the work was more pretence than real), free housing, free education, 
free health care and others.
This powerful social norm, dependence on the ‘omnipotent’ state, has been 
shown to play a significant role during the post-1989 social and housing pol-
icy reforms. As noted by Krebs et al. (2005), “Such systemic change cannot be 
realised in a short term. It is the process in which the elements of old and 
new systems coexist together: the old system lost its original function but at 
the same time the new system does not function in the whole its integrity.” (p. 
93). Since most Czech citizens had no experience of anything other than the 
communist type of administration of social matters, any truly profound and 
quick reform in social policy was hardly possible. However, this was no ex-
cuse for the long time it took for reforms to take place, as was finally the case.
During at least the first 16 years of transition (until 2006) the role of social 
policy was to create a safety net for the shocks stemming from liberalisation 
and privatisation of the economic system (loss of Eastern European markets, 
competition for national production with goods imported from Western mar-
kets, the banking crisis, unemployment, the rise in income differentiation, 
cuts in public spending, tax reform, price liberalisation, etc.). The transitional 
governments did not come up with any general long-term concepts for social 
policy. The first ‘scenario of social reform’ came about in 1990, followed by the 
Subsistence Minimum Act No. 463/1991 Coll. in 1991. The next ‘reform’ of so-
cial support, the State Social Support Act No. 117/1995 Coll. of 1996 targeted 
the most probable social risks stemming from economic reforms and espe-
cially defined a safety net aimed at keeping social order in the event negative 
consequences of economic reforms appeared. In this manner the act set the 
minimum wage, the subsistence minimum (minimum income guaranteed by 
the state), allowances to compensate for price liberalisation and other social 
benefits.
The Czech Republic established three basic pillars of social policy: social 
insurance, social support and social assistance. Through social insurance citi-
zens put aside part of their consumption in the event of any uncertain so-
cial circumstance in future, which could result in partial or full loss of income. 
The possible reasons for a loss in income include maternity, the care of a fam-
ily member, illness, disablement, old age, loss of provider, or loss of employ-
ment. The aim of the insurance, in such cases, is to maintain the reasonable 
standard of living attained by the insured and their families. Social security 
premiums and the state employment policy at 12.5% are deducted from em-
ployees’ gross wages. The employers cover a further 35% and transfer the to-
tal premium sum to the relevant authorities.
Social support contributions help families to cover increased costs due to 
the presence of persons still not (or not yet) earning an income and help fam-
ilies to cope with specific life situations in which they lack the ability or re-
sources to do so for themselves. Social support contributions may be divided 
into two sub-categories according to the method in which financial resources 
are redistributed. If this concerns redistribution from families with and with-
out children, then it is called horizontal redistribution. Contributions belong-
ing to this category include: family, birth, and guardian allowance. Payment 
of these allowances may be terminated depending on the achieved income 
level. If this concerns redistribution from high to low-income families, this is 
called vertical redistribution. The level of allowances in this category is based 
on examining the real income situation of a family and this includes: child al-
lowance, additional social allowance, housing allowance and transport (travel) 
allowance. The level of allowance decreases as income rises, so the moment a 
family achieves a certain income level, its claim to benefit is terminated. Vir-
tually the entire structure of social support allowances was based on the sub-
sistence minimum concept – this minimum amount is used, particularly in 
the second sub-category of social assistance, to determine the income ceiling 
(n-multiple of the subsistence minimum) so that an applicant may become en-
titled to a specific allowance.
Social assistance is designed for people (families) unable to secure their 
basic living requirements. In other words, social assistance is designed for 
families whose income is beneath the subsistence minimum limit. The basic 
level of this assistance in practice in most cases usually corresponds to the 
difference between the level of the household’s income and its subsistence 
minimum. When examining a household’s claim, its property circumstances 
and possibilities of increasing its income are also considered.
The subsistence minimum is defined as a socially recognised minimum in-
come level under which a state of material emergency occurs. It defines the 
level of necessary funds for a household to temporarily secure the basic living 
requirements of its members at a very modest level. The subsistence mini-
mum in the Czech Republic consists of two components: the sum required 
to secure the needs of each person in the household and the sum required to 
secure the necessary expenses of the whole household. The first part of the 
subsistence minimum therefore applies to the basic personal requirements 
of each household member, which includes food, clothing, footwear, other in-
dustrial consumables, services and personal development. Five different lev-
els are determined for the sums to secure personal requirements; four for un-
provided children of various ages, the fifth for other citizens. The second part 
of the subsistence minimum serves to cover other common household costs, 
that is, mainly housing costs and related services.
The subsistence minimum has been regularly valorised by a government 
decree provided that the consumer price index rises by at least 5%. The goal 
of social policies up to 2006 – create a relatively soft social policy to cush-
ion against social disorder and political instability during economic transfor-
mation – is reflected by such system features as highly progressive income 
taxing, high social insurance payments (in fact, social insurance dues repre-
sented more tax than the insurance), regular valorisation of subsistence mini-
mum (and all related social support benefits), a two-component structure for 
the subsistence minimum and relatively generous additional social benefits.
At the beginning of transition there were efforts to escape the redistribu-
tive model of social policy (known, for example, from Scandinavian countries) 
and move towards a meritocratic (corporatist) model (using Titmus’s classifi-
cation of 1974) and the rhetoric of the first right-wing governments was even 
in favour of a third – residual – model of social policy. However, no govern-
ment (including those led by the right-wing conservative ODS political party) 
was brave enough to make its rhetoric a reality. The system remained firmly 
embedded in the past, highly redistributive, with an especially high redistrib-
utive burden put on the middle classes (Vecerník & Mateju (eds.), 1999, p. 149). 
The social security system was so generous that it created a significant unem-
ployment trap situation (especially when connected with economic subsidies 
stemming from rent regulation) and prevalent abuse of social contributions 
(shadow labour market). The lack of real reform led to unsustainable growth 
in the state’s social expenditures. As Krebs put it, “Solidarity is not just a mat-
ter for those who gain from solidarity funds, it is also a matter for those who 
contribute to those funds…. Distribution of tax burden and excessive redis-
tribution may become in the long term as significant problem as the problem 
of welfare versus poverty…. It is necessary to reduce excessive ‘paternalistic’ 
solidarity, which becomes an unbearable burden for payers (especially the 
middle classes) and naturally increases state social expenditures…. Excessive 
solidarity or excessive redistribution by the state respectively worsen social 
problems in some way: work-dodging, maternity without marriage, rent ar-
rears, alcohol and drug addiction” (Krebs et al., 2005, pp. 454-457).
That the role of social policy during the first decade of transition was 
mainly to keep social peace and the public support for economic reforms 
had very important consequences. The profoundly long-term orientated re-
forms of economic and political systems were given preference to reforms in 
the field of social policy. The reform of social policy especially followed the 
short-term goals (safety net during the transition). It was not in the interests 
of the early transition governments to immediately and directly challenge the 
powerful social norm prevailing from communism, the general dependence 
of people on the state. The imperatives of efficiency, effectiveness and long-
term sustainability in policy interventions were not taken into account when 
the governments established their relatively comfortable ‘welfare state pillow’ 
based on relatively high wealth redistribution and the ideology of egalitarism. 
This helped to achieve the necessary economic reform changes but, at the 
same time, it strengthened the false inherited social norm of people’s high 
dependence on the state.
Thanks to the large public income from enterprise privatisations the state 
could afford to make such generous social policy at the beginning of transi-
tion. However, later on, when the spring of privatisation incomes had dried 
up, such ‘generous gifts’ were necessarily beginning to be distributed un-
equally. After a decade in action, this generous system was revealed by a sub-
stantial lack of public resources (kept topped up by the governments in power 
after 2000 only by fast growth in state debt), huge inefficiencies in redistribu-
tion, free-riding as well as significant social justice problems (insider-outsider 
tensions stemming from the unequal redistribution of ‘gifts’, as one in the 
field of housing described below).
However, this does not mean that the generous social policy was totally 
negative. The Czech Republic has the second lowest at-risk-of poverty rate 
in EU-25 (SILC, 2005); people enjoy free university education and largely im-
proved health care services; the problem of social segregation and exclusion 
still remains more a potential threat than actual reality. However, the prolon-
gation of the false social norms of egalitarism and dependence on the state 
might have increased the power of such norms – the people have learned that 
considerable social security can still be attained even under market economy 
conditions and they do not understand why these should be reformed in the 
future.
The Czechs have already experienced one example of such disillusionment, 
in the case of unemployment. In the early years of transition (till 1996) the 
unemployment rate was very low (under 4%, see above) in contrast to other 
transition and even developed countries. This is the result of many factors. In 
the early 1990s the majority of employed pensioners left their jobs and many 
entrepreneurial people left employment to start their own business (support-
ed by privatisation of services). There was a favourable educational structure, 
but the most important factor was probably the influence of the state on em-
ployment policies in major (though often privatised) industrial enterprises. 
The government (again the ‘omnipotent’ state) not only directed huge amount 
of ad hoc subsidies to save many private enterprises in economic problems, 
often unsuccessfully, but thanks to the majority state holdings in almost all 
Czech banks the government was able to force those unreformed banks to ex-
tend risky credits to enterprises in economic problems to sustain over-em-
ployment.
At the time preserving social order was the main government goal so long-
term concepts were put aside. Možný (1994) wrote that new political elite 
inherited the misfortune of the previous elite: social peace is no less impor-
tant to the feasibility of economic transition than it had been in decades of 
‘building socialism’ for the maintenance of the communist regime. Under 
such conditions the dream of a ‘never-ending’ high employment rate could 
last only a few years, only till 1996. After 1997 the unemployment rate be-
gan growing rapidly, and many state-owned banks found themselves close to 
bankruptcy due to their soft credit policies of the past (the widespread bank-
ing crisis of 1997 demanded huge additional state subsidies to prevent a total 
collapse of the banking sector). Economic growth was unprecedented (in com-
parison with the neighbouring transition countries) interrupted by the reces-
sion of 1997-1998. The government was dissolved and preliminary parliamen-
tary elections took place.
For the purpose of describing the demographic context I used the range of 
studies Population development in the Czech Republic published annually by the 
Department of Demography and Geodemography at Charles University (Eng-
lish versions). The baby boom typical of the majority of European countries 
after WWII was followed in the former Czechoslovakia by a decrease in fertili-
ty rates that continued until 1970. The beginning of 1970 saw a temporary rise 
in fertility (a second baby boom) and population growth stabilised during the 
1980s (zero population growth). ‘The demographic revolution’ began after 1989 
when natality and nuptiality rates substantially decreased and since 1994 the 
population has shown negative natural growth. Compared to the situation in 
1989-1991 (130,000 births on average), in 1996-1998 the number of births fell to 
only 90,000 (by 30%) and remained at this low level till 2001. Just for the com-
parison, in 1974, during the second baby boom, 194,000 children were born.
The total fertility rate fell to less than 1.14 children in 2001, which was 
one of the lowest in the world. This drop is all the more surprising because 
in this period the large number of women born during the second baby boom 
reached the age of maximum fertility. The period of maximum fertility also 
shifted from 20-24 years to the group aged 23-27 years. Since 1997 the Czech 
Republic has had more inhabitants over the age of 60 than children under the 
age of 15 and this predominance of older people rises every year. The fall in 
fertility rates after 1989 is closely related to the decline in the nuptiality rate.
Another important demographic aspect of transition concerns nuptial-
ity – the average age at marriage was relatively low before 1989 (24.5 years 
for men, 21.8 years for women in 1989) but it substantially increased during 
the transition (29.3 years for men, 26.9 years for women in 2001). Before 1989, 
about 90-95% of men and 96-97% of women were married at least once in 
their life but in 2000 the probability of being married at least once in a life-
time decreased to 65-70% among men and 72-75% among women. The per-
centage of married people up to the age of 60 dropped to the lowest level 
since WWII. In the younger age groups the percentage of single persons has 
risen, though cohabitation (with children) did not become as popular as it has 
in many Western countries. Worsening housing affordability, and new em-
ployment, travel and educational opportunities as well as new forms of self-
fulfilment are cited as the causes for the drop in nuptiality.
For a long time the Czech Republic had one of the highest divorce rates in 
Europe (similar to levels in Scandinavian countries or the UK). In 1997-1998 
42% of marriages were expected to end in divorce, annually more than 13 di-
vorces per 1,000 marriages. In 1996 the number of divorces reached its peak: 
33,000 divorces were granted, almost three times more than in 1950. Various 
social factors are mentioned as the causes: ease of divorce (legislation), social 
norms (marginal influence of the Church, atheism), low social prestige of the 
family, and living conditions.
In 1998 life expectancy at birth reached 72.1 years for men and 78.4 years 
for women, an increase of 4.3 years and 3.3 years respectively since 1987. The 
substantial improvement in general state of health and the level of mortality 
during the transition was caused by more attention paid to own health; life-
style changes (particularly in nutrition habits); liberalisation and demonop-
olisation of the health care system (considerable investments, rapid spread 
of up-to-date drugs); reductions in environmental pollution; improvement in 
work conditions; and low poverty rate.
According to the yearbook ‘Population Development in the Czech Repub-
lic’ the number of foreigners in the Czech Republic grew sharply until 1999. 
These were both foreigners with permanent residence status and foreigners 
with temporary 90-day visas. Since then, owing to tighter visa restrictions, 
the number slowly decreased until it rose sharply again after 2005. In 2000 
there were roughly 67,000 foreigners with permanent residence and 134,000 
foreigners with temporary residence in the Czech Republic, thus a total of 
approximately 200,000 people. Out of the total number of foreigners in the 
country the largest proportion was made up of Ukrainians (50,000), Slovaks 
(44,000), Vietnamese (23,000), Poles (17,000) and Russians (13,000). The propor-
tion of immigrants from advanced countries was relatively small. The major-
ity of foreign nationals living in the Czech Republic were (and still are) thus 
people from Slovakia, the former Eastern bloc, and Asia. The number of peo-
ple residing in the Czech Republic under political asylum was till 2005 negli-
gible. To these figures must be added foreigners living in the Czech Republic 
illegally – of which there were an estimated 100,000 in 2000. In the case of 
illegal residence these were again primarily people from the former Eastern 
bloc. The highest concentration of foreigners is in the capital city, Prague and 
its environs. In the year 2000 more than 30% of foreigners were living in and 
around Prague. Immigration (which in comparison with advanced countries 
over such a long period was relatively low) was made up predominately of 
people with temporary residence. The number of highly qualified immigrants 
from advanced countries employed in management positions in various in-
ternational firms was marginal, though not for Prague.
In the housing market, immigration thus comprised the major portion 
of the demand for rental housing of mid-level and lower quality (including 
pre-fab flats), located mainly in Prague and its surrounding areas. Given the 
scope and type of residence of foreigners in the Czech Republic, immigration 
has not had a substantial direct effect on the prices of owner-occupied hous-
ing. The effect could have been indirect – a growing demand for cheap rental 
housing could limit the supply of cheap flats in the owner-occupied sector. 
However, the strength of this effect is debatable considering the scale of im-
migration.
A much more significant factor affecting conditions in the housing mar-
ket was the domestic migration of Czech citizens. Since 1996 there has been 
a clear trend of people migrating from larger towns to municipalities with a 
population ranging between 50 and 5,000 people, mainly municipalities with 
between 500 and 2,000 inhabitants, in the wider environs of larger towns. The 
number of people living in the largest towns has decreased; most of all in 
Prague (although the population of Prague began to grow again in 2005). Sub-
urbanisation has also been considerable in Brno and in Pilsen, and less so in 
Olomouc, Liberec, Hradec Králové, and Ceské Budejovice. Over the course of 
the 1990s out of all Czech towns and cities, Prague lost the most inhabitants 
in absolute and relative figures, with a corresponding increase in population 
in the Central Bohemia Region.
The changes in housing conditions during the transformation period will be 
described here with a brief outline of housing policy prior to the transforma-
tion period, that is, between 1918 and 1990.
The independent Czechoslovak Republic was established in October 1918. Pre-
1918 housing policy had been provided by the Austrian-Hungarian Empire 
and it was, generally, marginal till the middle of the 19th century. In 1860 the 
law allowed the establishment of non-profit housing cooperatives (already 
present in England since 1809), but the idea of housing cooperatives was not 
very popular at the time. In 1892 another law created substantial tax incen-
tives for factories building flats for urban workers (exemption from house 
duty for the period of 24 years for all new apartment houses with floor areas 
of flats under 75 m2); this tax incentive was connected with soft rent control 
(maximum yield from investment set at 5%). In 1908 the Franz Joseph I Fund 
was established. Fund resources were used for preferential credit (3% annu-
ally) to housing cooperatives of state employees. In 1910 another fund, the 
State Fund for Small Flats, began extending preferential credit for construc-
tion of small flats. This was an incentive for the establishment of housing co-
operatives as well as the construction of municipal housing (though the scale 
of housing output provided by both of them remained marginal till the end of 
the Empire).
Real housing policy appeared after the WWI when the newly created 
Czechoslovak Republic struggled with a housing shortage. Firstly, the munici-
palities received the power to regulate local housing markets by the following 
means: rent control, restrictions on mobility, private landlords were bound to 
conclude new rental contracts with people needed by the municipality (state 
employees) and they were not allowed to unite flats or use them for any other 
purpose than housing without the consent of the municipality. Only newly 
built flats (built after 1917) were exempt from rent control at the start; since 
1924 this exemption was also extended to larger flats (four or more rooms), 
higher-income tenants, flats in houses owned by legal person and flats in mu-
nicipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. Due to the housing construction 
boom of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s (peaking in 1928 with almost 
100,000 flats finished in one year) the share of flats exempted from rent regu-
lation quickly grew and soon overtook the share of ‘protected’ older flats with 
controlled rents. Secondly, the state had the power to expropriate vacant land 
that could be used for housing construction if the owner of the plot did not 
start his own housing construction within a set deadline.
The state supported the housing construction boom mostly by indirect 
subsidies. Based on the Law on Housing Construction (first passed in 1919 
and then amended almost every year) the state mainly offered:
 state guarantees on part of mortgage loans extended on new housing con-
struction; firstly only on the construction of small rental flats (up to 80 m2 
of floor area) built by municipalities and non-profit construction associa-
tions (in fact, housing cooperatives) and between 1921-1927 on construc-
tion of small rental flats built by all persons (including the private for-profit 
orientated ones) as well as on the construction of small family houses for 
low-income households. Since 1927, in the case of apartment buildings 
state guarantees were once again provided only to municipalities and non-
profit associations and only on flats to low-income households.
 interest subsidy covering the whole or part of the interest payments from 
mortgage loans extended on the construction of new small flats for a pe-
riod of 25 years. Interest subsidy was originally allocated (since 1919) on-
ly among municipalities and non-profit construction associations and in 
the period 1921-1927 was allocated among all apartment housing builders. 
The interest subsidy was abolished in 1927 and a new state allowance on 
repayment of annuity of mortgage loans was introduced in 1930 (allow-
ance covering maximum of 2.5% of loan value annually for maximum of 
10 years); this allowance was allocated, in the case of apartment buildings, 
only among municipalities and non-profit associations for the construc-
tion of small flats for low-income households. In 1936 the state allowance 
was replaced once more by the interest subsidy.
 exemption from property tax for the period of 20 years for all new housing.
 one-off direct state grants covering a maximum of 40% of all construction 
costs of apartment rental houses begun in the years 1920 and 1921 (this 
subsidy lasted only two years) among all builders of apartment rental 
housing (including private ones), if the building was situated in a town 
(above 15,000 inhabitants); it had to comprise at least 4 flats; the commer-
cial area of the house could not exceed 30% of the total floor area; con-
struction costs need to be approved by the Ministry of Public Works; and 
the state must have received the first option.
The most effective incentive of the time appeared to be the exemption from 
house duty for private investors (including exemption from a number of other 
taxes and charges connected with house duty). Thanks to this indirect sup-
port and the non-existence of rent control for vacant and newly built flats the 
housing boom (mostly provided by private investors) saturated the housing 
need already at the beginning of the 1930s (though many flats were of low 
quality). Such a stable market situation remained only till 1938 when the Mu-
nich Agreement led to the loss of substantial Czechoslovak territories and the 
flow of Czech and Slovak migrants from those territories created tensions on 
the housing markets in the remaining territory of the Czechoslovak Repub-
lic. The housing shortage increased during the WWII due to the depression of 
housing construction after 1941 and much stricter rent control on the occu-
pied territories of the former Bohemia and Moravia.
Generally, during the period 1918-1938 (called the First Czechoslovak Re-
public), housing in urban centres was mainly provided and constructed by 
private investors (private landlords) viewing residential markets as profitable 
and safe investments. Though more active than during the Austrian-Hun-
garian Empire, state housing policy was characterised by a lack of long-term 
strategy, ad hoc subsidies and frequent (almost annual) amendments of the 
main legislative framework. It concentrated on indirect state subsidies (tax 
exemptions) for private rental housing construction.
In 1945-1946 the housing need created by war was partially satisfied by 
expropriated housing left by Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia soon 
after the war. However, in main urban centres with the most employment 
possibilities (mainly in the capital Prague) the housing shortage prevailed 
(besides the housing surplus in cross-border territories) and, moreover, the 
new baby boom began shortly after the war ended. Rent control was there-
fore preserved and a new central plan (for the period of 1946-1948) counted 
on state support for new housing construction. Due to the lack of resources 
and political instability these plans were not realised. In 1948 the Communist 
Party succeeded in its putsch against the democratic regime and Czechoslova-
kia entered the period of totalitarian one-party political regime and centrally 
planned economy.
After 1948 state housing policy was based on the principle that a home is 
such an important good in the life of a person that rising costs of building, 
repairing and maintaining housing should not be reflected in household ex-
penditures, or in other words, in a rise in the costs of housing. In Eastern bloc 
countries, including the Czechoslovakia, this policy resulted in an almost to-
tal expropriation of private apartment housing and in the attempt to apply an 
egalitarian approach to satisfying housing needs. At the time the state took 
on responsibility for ensuring the provision of housing for each member of 
society – especially by the state rental housing.
The consequences manifested themselves in the untenable burden on the 
state budget. The general lack of sufficient financing led to a substantial dete-
rioration in the quality of housing stock; the suppression of market relations 
led to the emergence of inequality in access to housing (protectionism and 
bribery over the allocation of new and vacated flats) and to the generation of 
a false ‘collective memory’ that it is the state’s job to ensure that everyone 
has a roof over their head.19 Extensive state-financed housing construction 
was increasingly confronted by limited resources, thus despite the continual 
declarations of ideological viewpoints, later on other forms of housing con-
struction were also permitted – enterprise, cooperative, and individual hous-
ing forms.
When it existed, enterprise-based housing construction was financed part-
ly from the resources of the state enterprises, partly from the state budget, 
and partly from long-term bank loans. This system was, however, abolished 
in 1981. Cooperative housing construction had been organised since 1958 by 
housing cooperatives and its costs were covered by contributions from the co-
operative’s members, state subsidies, and low-interest bank loans. Individual 
housing construction primarily involved the construction of family houses, 
financed primarily from the resources of the individuals, supplemented by 
contributions from local branches of state administration and long-term low-
interest loans from banks.
In the case of state rental flats, rent was determined by bureaucrats who 
set it at an unrealistically low level (e.g., until 1991 rent was frozen at the lev-
el set in 1964). The management of state flats was the responsibility of pub-
lic management enterprises that operated on the community level. As men-
tioned above, flats were allocated through administrative procedure, which 
despite the officially declared adherence to the principle of equality and need 
in reality resulted in injustice, bribery and protectionism. Paradoxically, state 
flats with low rents were often allocated on a priority basis to the members 
of communist nomenclature, top staff in the state and political apparatus, 
and members of the armed forces, that is, to people who held functions with 
higher incomes anyway.
Households chosen from the waiting list and assigned a flat usually re-
ceived something called a ‘decree to a flat’, which was the socialist analogy 
to a lease. Tenants that held such a decree acquired not only the right to low 
rent, but also broad legal protections securing them the right effectively to 
use the flat for their entire lives, the option to exchange their flat with some-
one else if necessary (wherein the same terms applicable to the original ten-
ant would apply also to the new tenant) and in particular the option to pass 
the flat on to their children for use after their own death. Consequently, a re-
lationship to the property emerged that is often referred to as ‘quasi-owner-
ship’ of the rental housing (Lux & Burdová, 2000; Šmídová, 1996).
Housing cooperatives, unlike the public management enterprises, had to 
maintain balanced budgets. Given that the payments made by tenants for 
occupancy of a cooperative flat had to defray the full costs of the operation, 
maintenance and repair of the building and cooperative members also had to 
repay bank loans, cooperative members spent more on housing than tenants 
in state flats.
Housing cooperatives differed from their counterparts in democratic coun-
tries. The pre-war housing cooperatives were forcibly merged into cooperative 
‘giants’ (e.g., in the 1950s, one housing cooperative emerged in Prague to man-
age the entire stock of cooperative housing built in the pre-war period within 
the territory of the city). New housing development (renewed at the end of 
the 1950s) was also conducted by large Building Housing Cooperatives, which 
over time in large towns were managing flats sometimes numbering in the 
thousands. Cooperative statutes were required to be uniform and deemed by 
rule that the cooperative members be nourished in the spirit of socialist and 
by extension communist morality. Differences were not tolerated, and owing 
to the massive numbers of members of these cooperatives, the initially dem-
ocratic procedures of the cooperative members were replaced with proceed-
ings among ‘delegates’. The ‘nationalisation’ of cooperative movement re-
sulted in particular in the destruction of the original idea behind cooperative 
associations as independent ‘self-help’ entities and it extinguished the notion 
of individual initiative and cooperative democracy. Cooperative housing be-
came perceived as simply a more expensive form of state rental housing.
Part of the solution to the shortage of housing was an attempt to limit the 
migration of the population to larger towns by creating a dense, state-subsi-
dised public transit network, which allowed rural residents to commute daily 
to urban centres. Pre-fab technology and uniform residential development 
plans were also used to remedy the discord between the demand for flats and 
limited public resources. The construction of large pre-fab housing estates be-
came a characteristic feature of the majority of socialist countries, the Czech 
Republic included. In 2001, 31% of the Czech population was still living in pre-
fab flats and in bigger towns even half the population lived there. Ultimately, 
at the cost of massive state subsidies and adherence to the principles of mass 
pre-fab housing construction, the housing shortage was overcome prior to 
1990.
A very specific feature in the Czech Republic was the widespread existence 
of secondary homes (cottages, summer houses). Vágner (Bicík et al., 2001, p. 
44) indicates that the “massive expansion and popularity of secondary homes 
stemmed primarily from middle or even lower-class backgrounds”, which is 
one important and distinctive feature in the Czech Republic in comparison 
with the majority of countries in the world. Ownership of a secondary home 
gradually gained in prestige and became a fashionable social matter, indicat-
ing a person had attained a certain social standing. Vágner (Bicík et al., 2001) 
indicates that an important milestone for the further development of the 
phenomenon of secondary housing was the events of the 1968 (occupation of 
Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Treaty armies), after which many people, hav-
ing been forced to change their employment, sought an escape into their own, 
private environment, where they could be themselves. In 1971 there were over 
156,000 buildings in the territory of the Czech Republic used for personal rec-
reation. In 1980 the number had increased to almost 225,000, and in 1991 it 
reached almost 268,000 (Bicík et al., 2001, p. 49).
As in other sectors of the economy, after 1989 the housing sector began to un-
dergo a transformation from an administrative flat allocation system to a sys-
tem based on market principles. According to the initial housing policy plans 
(Proposal for a State Housing Policy in the Czech Republic, 1991; Foundations and 
Principles of the State Housing Policy, 1993), based on neo-liberal economic prin-
ciples, the role of the state should have been limited to that of establishing 
the conditions in which a housing market could emerge.
Key events in housing policy during the transformation period were the 
restitution of part of the housing stock, the free-of-charge transfer of the 
unrestituted portion of the housing stock to municipal ownership, the pri-
vatisation of municipal housing, the introduction of new housing policy in-
struments, in particular the housing allowance, state premium to housing 
savings, interest subsidies to mortgage loans and tax relief.
The revenue subsidies for existing state rental dwellings and capital sub-
sidies for new state rental housing construction practically disappeared soon 
after the change of the regime; prices of construction materials were liber-
alised and quickly increased. Both factors led to the sharp decrease in hous-
ing construction volumes; housing construction output started to grow again 
after 1994, and especially after 1996 (Table 3.1). In the first period of transition 
“the market could not react in an environment of huge disparities between 
housing need and demand and the government was not willing to bridge the 
gap between the high need (but low purchasing power) of households and the 
sharply increased costs of housing production” (Sýkora, 2003). This situation 
changed in the most developed regions (especially in the capital Prague) af-
ter 2000 where real household incomes started to grow rapidly and the ratio 
of prices for existing dwellings to construction prices of new dwellings sub-
stantially increased (new housing supply started to compete with the existing 
housing stock). Private capital became dominant in new housing supply and 
the share of municipal housing construction on total housing starts steadily 
decreased (Table 3.2).
Just as the share of municipal housing construction out of total housing 
construction fell significantly, so did the share of rental housing construction 
of the total new housing construction (new rental flats comprised only 7% of 
the total volume of housing construction in 2005, the rest was built as owner-
occupied housing). Nevertheless some small investors buying their flats into 
ownership could lease them soon after their finalisation, so this piece of in-
formation may be slightly misleading.
In spite of the moderate scale of house construction, the number of per-
manently inhabited dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants increased from 360 in 
1991 to 372 in 2001 (Table 3.3). Other dwellings serve residential purposes, but 
their inhabitants do not have permanent residency there. If we take all hab-
itable dwellings, the Czech Republic had 427 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants 
in 2001 (Table 3.3). In comparison with other developed and transition coun-
tries (Figure 3.4) this result leads to the conclusion about relative housing suf-
ficiency; the ratio is even higher than in some old EU member states.
The housing shortage question is however more complex. As mentioned 
above, the housing market is regionally and locally specific. As in other coun-
tries, in the Czech Republic there are regions (the Northern Bohemia region) 
where vacant flats are starting to appear and the surplus supply is forcing 
housing prices to fall to a low level. Conversely, there are regions with accel-
erated economic development (Prague and surrounding areas) where there is 
still a high demand for housing and prices are disproportionately high. Re-
gional deficits, which can be found in all advanced countries, are not however 
a justification for claiming a housing crisis. This issue has been addressed in 
greater detail by Kostelecký & Lux (Lux et al., 2004) using several standard ap-
proaches, and the findings show that it is not possible to speak of a housing 
shortage in the Czech Republic. The authors state, “The indicators used do not 
confirm the widespread idea that in the Czech Republic there is a physical 
shortage of flats, and that because of this the situation in this country differs 
significantly from that in other countries in the European Union. The rela-
tively good position the Czech Republic has within the EU is to some extent 
‘improved’ by the fact that the ten new member countries caused the Euro-
pean average to fall slightly, but nonetheless even in comparison with old EU 
member states the Czech Republic is in this regard not doing that poorly” (Lux 
et al., 2004, p. 30).
Figure 3.5 shows an international comparison of the values of another in-
dicator measuring the housing conditions, which reveals the real deficit that 
the Czech Republic was and still is facing in comparison with other advanced 
countries. The indicator is the average size of total dwelling floor area per in-
habitant.
The average floor area per inhabitant is higher in the Czech Republic than 
in other selected post-communist countries (especially compared to Poland 
and Slovakia) but the value of this indicator shows how far behind the ad-
vanced countries of Western Europe it is still in this regard. In other words, it 
is not the physical lack of flats but the quality of the housing stock (floor area, 
the quality of pre-fab housing technology, the quality of the residential envi-
ronment on large housing estates, the long-term deficit in repairs and mod-
ernisation of housing stock) that appeared to be the real challenges for the 
housing policy makers in the changing socio-economic environment of the 
Czech Republic.
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Figure 3.4 Number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants, around 2000*
* The majority of figures refer to the situation in 2000, for some countries they refer to the situation in 2001, for 
Slovenia to the situation in 2002 and for France to the situation in 1999.
Sources: Housing statistics in the European Union 2002; Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Romania: www pages of national statistical offices
Restitution began in April 1991 and applied to the portion of the housing 
stock that had been expropriated by the state or became the property of the 
state between February 1948 and January 1990 under circumstances disad-
vantageous to the original owner. If the legal terms for the restitution of prop-
erty were satisfied, the property was returned to the original owner, or to their 
heirs or immediate relatives, as long as they were citizens of the Czechoslo-
vak Federal Republic (later the Czech Republic) and possessed permanent res-
ident status in the country. Sýkora (2003) shows that the majority of restitu-
tion claims were settled by the end of 1993. There are no exact statistical data 
on the volume of the housing stock returned to the original owners as part of 
the restitution process, though it is estimated that it was around 6-7% of the 
national housing stock. Restitution represented a significant form of interven-
tion in the ownership structure, especially in large town centres, for example, 
in the centre of Prague, where 70-75% of all buildings were returned to the 
original owners (Sýkora, Šimonícková 1994). Restitution entailed the creation 
of a private rental-housing sector and the formation of an important lobby 
group of private landlords.
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Figure 3.5 Average dwelling floor area in m2 per capita, around 2000*
* The majority of figures refer to the situation in 2000, for some countries they refer to the 
situation in 2001, for Slovenia to the situation in 2002 and for France to the situation in 1999.
Sources: Housing statistics in the European Union 2002; Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Slovenia: www pages of national statistical offices
In every country with a private rental sector there has always been ten-
sion between landlords and their tenants. After the WWI, when owing to a 
shortage of flats rent regulation was gradually introduced, this tension was 
transformed from ‘hallway’ arguments to a fully fledged social conflict rein-
forced by the extensive rent regulations introduced after WWII in virtually 
all advanced countries. (This was followed by a sharp decline in the share of 
private rental units on the total housing stock in advanced countries). How-
ever, sometimes as early as the 1960s, sometimes in the 1970s, rent prices in 
the private sector were gradually deregulated to acceptable levels allowing for 
landlord profit in most developed countries. At least private sector rents were 
less regulated than rent prices in the sector of social housing, thus partially 
abating the intensity of social conflict between private landlords and tenants.
Although original owners or their descendents were returned the buildings 
that had been unlawfully taken from them, the rent for running tenancies in 
those buildings remained, however, regulated by the state to the same degree 
as in state (later municipal) rental housing. Moreover, the central government 
decided to maintain the system of old-styled (or ‘first-generation’ in Lind, 
2001) state regulation of rents (untargeted, flat, with rent prices deeply below 
market levels and substantially below cost rent) inherited from the commu-
nist period. The strong tenant protection legally introduced in the Civic Code 
during the previous communist regime also remained almost unchanged till 
2006. Judicial procedures slowed down during the transition (due to the in-
creased number of cases and slow performance of courts) and, for example, 
the eviction process of tenants not paying rent could linger on for several 
years. Despite rent regulation no revenue subsidies were introduced to cov-
er the difference between low regulated rents and costs of maintenance. In 
practice a paradoxical situation arose when private owners could not increase 
the rent to a level sufficient at least to cover the necessary maintenance costs 
and received no subsidies from the state to cover the difference between the 
costs and income. The legislature (1993) only allowed the charging of market 
rent if the tenant was not a citizen of the Czech Republic and if the flat had 
been vacant before renting (new tenancy).
The first phase of very gradual rent deregulation in the Czech Republic was 
launched at the beginning of the 1990s. Since then the maximum monthly 
rent has increased every year according to the quality of a flat (four catego-
ries), size of a municipality and inflation coefficient. As a result, the limits of 
maximum rent per month per m2 of dwelling floor space in a Category I flat 
increased from the original CZK 2.50 in 1991 to CZK 37.07 in 2006 in Prague, 
CZK 24.76 in cities with a population over 100,000, CZK 18.31 in cities with a 
population of more than 50,000 and less than 99,999, CZK 16.42 in towns with 
a population between 10,000 and 49,999 people and CZK 15.23 in towns and 
municipalities with a population below 10,000. In 1999 the government policy 
led to a freeze in nominal rent values (rents were increased only with infla-
tion) and after 2002 the rents were frozen both in nominal and real values. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the rise in the rates of maximum regulated rent for Cat-
egory I flats according to municipality size categories. The difference between 
regulated and market rents remained high even in 2006, especially in prosper-
ing cities; in Prague, regulated rents were still about three times lower than 
their market counterparts for the same dwelling.
The process of decentralisation of power and the renewal of regional self-
government included the transfer of the housing stock from state to munici-
pal ownership. This transfer was initiated in 1991, and it affected 1.44 million 
flats (approximately 39% of the housing stock in the Czech Republic). The mu-
nicipalities were cast in the role of administrators of the housing stock, re-
sponsible for creating local housing policy, and were forced to bear the costs 
of the operation, maintenance and management of their newly acquired 
property. However, the transfer of housing stock was not accompanied by 
any increase in the contribution of supplementary financial resources to mu-
nicipal budgets, and the municipalities did not possess the procedures and 
systems to cope with their new role. In the majority of municipalities in the 
1990s the income collected from rent was not enough to cover management 
and maintenance costs, which meant an additional burden was put on mu-
nicipal budgets. This led to a continuation of long-term under-investment in 
the housing fund, and even to an attempt on the part of the municipalities to 
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Figure 3.6 Maximum controlled rents (CZK/m2/month) in the Czech Republic, 1990-2006 (Category I quality)
Source: Ministry for Regional Development
privatise at least part of the housing stock in an effort to alleviate the burden 
on the municipal budgets.
In 2000 the Constitutional Court decided that Decree No. 176/1993 Coll. 
regulating the level of rent in regulated rental housing contradicted certain 
articles of the Charter of Basic Human Rights and Freedoms, Article 1 of the 
Constitution of the Czech Republic and some other superior legal regula-
tions. It justified its decision, among other things, by the fact that the equal-
ity of entities (the landlords on the one hand and the tenants on the other) 
had been breached and the proprietary rights of certain groups of owners had 
been limited. By the Court’s decision, the decree should have become null and 
void by the end of 2001 and new terms and conditions when negotiating the 
level of rent should have come into force as of the beginning of 2002. How-
ever, no new act was accepted by parliament up to the end of 2001 and a new 
edict introduced by the Ministry of Finance was again declared null and void 
by the Constitutional Court in November 2002. Interestingly, at the time the 
government was willing to employ somewhat substandard legislative tricks 
in order to prevent the second edict being overruled. Once the Ministry of Fi-
nance learned that the edict was likely to be thrown out by the Constitutional 
Court it immediately issued a new one, which was an exact copy of the first 
one. Ministry representatives were hoping that while the Constitutional Court 
would overturn the original edict it would not extend that decision to the sec-
ond edict issued under a different number. The Constitutional Court did not 
acquiesce to this governmental trick and abolished both edicts (including the 
copy).
Between 2002 and 2006 rents were nominally frozen (depreciated in real 
values!) as no further legislation was passed in parliament and rents could 
not be increased unilaterally by landlords (without the consent of the ten-
ant). In the closing months of 2005 parliament passed the Rent Act allowing 
for gradual increases in regulated rents from the beginning of 2007 (the start 
of the second phase of deregulation was postponed due to the elections). The 
goal of the Act was to increase regulated rents to their market values up to 
the end of 2011; however there is a fear that under the conditions incorpo-
rated in the Act regulated rents will not reach their market values in this time. 
The act stipulates that over a five-year transitional period regulated rent is to 
increase differentially in different regions to a level that approximately cor-
responds to the level of market rent, and then a new, ‘second generation’ sys-
tem of rent regulation (Lind, 2001) is to be set up – the system of ‘locally rel-
evant rent’ used, for example, in Germany.
Despite this proposal private landlords and many representatives of mu-
nicipalities with thousands of charges turned to the European Court for Hu-
man Rights in Strasbourg and asked for state compensation for the loss 
caused by the regulations. In 2006 the Constitutional Court of the Czech Re-
public decided that the state should compensate landlords for the losses 
incurred by regulation because the state had postponed the solution of the 
problem for such a long time.
Municipalities acquired the right to manage, rent and sell public hous-
ing. Unlike the right-to-buy policies used in the UK and most other transition 
countries, no Czech law set forth any method of price calculation by which 
the municipal council should sell flats to the tenants, nor were the tenants 
given the right to buy as well. It was left entirely to the consideration of the 
municipal council to determine the price and the dwelling stock for privati-
sation. Thanks to the chaotic course of privatisation, many municipal rental 
flats, at least in the initial stage of transition, were ‘saved’ from privatisation 
(unlike the situation in Hungary or Estonia) and rental housing still formed a 
substantial part of the Czech housing stock in 2001.
However, insufficient fiscal decentralisation, the large inherited debt on 
housing maintenance, rent regulation and strong tenant protection all creat-
ed incentives for the privatisation of municipal housing. Unlike in other tran-
sition countries, Czech municipalities were not asked by the state to sell their 
stock but the incentives mentioned above (along with the fact that privatisa-
tion was generally popular among tenants and may have ensured better local 
election results) led to an acceleration in housing privatisation, especially in 
the second half of the 1990s and after 2002. Despite the gradual increase in 
the price of privatised housing units, purchasing a flat through privatisation 
was always several times less expensive than the cost of purchasing a flat of 
equal quality on the open market.
The decentralisation of power in this field was truly substantial. For ex-
ample Prague (with a population of 1,169,000 of inhabitants) is divided into 
22 administrative districts and 57 independent municipalities. Each of the 
57 municipalities has its own elected council, board and mayor. Act 172/1991 
transferred originally state housing stock to the ownership of the city of 
Prague. But based on the Act on the Capital City of Prague and Status of the 
Capital City of Prague, the overwhelming majority of the housing stock is 
managed independently by ‘municipalities’ (municipalities decide on privati-
sation, rent setting, allocation criteria, etc.). There is, therefore, a variety of 
privatisation approaches within the city. Some municipalities (e.g., Prague-
Repy) decided not to privatise even one dwelling till 2001, others (Prague 1) 
decided in the same time to privatise almost all public housing stock. The 
same applies for the whole territory of the Czech Republic that has been di-
vided into more than 6,000 independent municipalities; when taking into ac-
count the size of population (about 10 million inhabitants) the Czech Republic 
belongs among countries with the highest level of decentralisation in Europe.
Municipalities usually privatise housing only by offering it to sitting ten-
ants. Precise statistics on scale, forms of privatisation or price discounts are 
missing entirely. The municipalities are not obliged to provide any such in-
formation to the central administration or to the Czech Statistical Office. The 
Institute for Land Development (UÚR) con-
ducts regular surveys among 50 selected 
Czech cities and in large cities they conduct 
additional surveys in several small boroughs 
that are free to dispose of municipal housing; 
the institute sends the questionnaire to some 
114 municipalities and independent boroughs. According to the results of this 
non-representative survey 39% of all original municipal dwellings were priva-
tised by 2000, 45% by 2001 and 51% by 2002. Therefore municipalities owned 
only about 30% of their original housing stock by 2006.
Another source of data is the Local Government and Housing Survey (LGHS, 
see above) conducted among all municipalities with a population above 5,000 
inhabitants, but only in the year 2001. From the respondents of this survey, 
nearly all the municipalities were involved in the privatisation of municipal 
housing. Nearly one quarter of the municipalities had already finished their 
sales while over 70% of the local governments intended to continue with pri-
vatisation in the future (Table 3.4).
Up to 1994 public housing privatisation was in the form of the sale of 
whole buildings into the ownership of housing cooperatives established by 
building tenants for the specific purpose of privatisation. Since 1994 the new 
Act allowed the division of buildings into separate housing units and com-
mon areas and thus allowed the privatisation of separate housing units di-
rectly to tenants. The Act on Ownership of Apartments and Non-Residential 
Premises (Act No. 72/1994) that allowed the creation of a condominium form 
of privatised apartment houses was amended often (in 1994, 1996, 1999, 2000, 
twice in 2001, 2003 and 2005). The amendments of 2000 and 2001 were sub-
stantial. The high number of amendments shows how fragile the legislative 
framework was that dealt with the management of condominiums. The main 
reason for legislative changes was the inappropriate framework for effective 
management of the newly established Homeowners Associations. The orig-
inal Act in 1994 did not even include the obligation to establish a separate 
legal person after the privatisation of individual housing units. The manage-
ment form of building and even the fact whether any kind of housing man-
agement would appear was left completely to the will of the new homeown-
ers. The Act lacked regulations on how to make common decisions among 
various homeowners, regulations for specifying who would represent them 
with third parties and the procedural options for solving problems arising if 
a full consensus among homeowners concerning management or modernisa-
tion of the house were not achieved.
The Act did not presume that municipalities would start using it as their 
main legislative framework for further public housing privatisation or that 
the condominium form would expand. The authors of the Act assumed that 
municipalities would continue privatisation in the original manner – by sell-
ing whole buildings into the cooperative ownership of tenants. The con-
sequences of the incomplete legislative framework to the management of 
houses after the privatisation were highly significant. Many privatised houses 
were left unmanaged, the achieving agreement among homeowners was very 
difficult, there were no legal prescriptions for dealing with ‘free-riders’, those 
in breach of effective management or in arrears. There was a clear need for a 
substantial amendment to the Act.
This amendment came about with Act No. 103/2000 (passed in 2000) that 
first defined a duty to establish (by notary deed) a separate legal person – the 
Homeowners Association – and register it in the Business Register, if there 
were more than five housing units and more than two homeowners in the 
building. The Homeowners Association is not, however, established by its reg-
istration but automatically ex lege when a third privatised house homeowner 
is registered as a new dwelling owner in the Cadastral (real estate) Register. 
Though in such cases (registration of the building’s third homeowner in the 
Cadastral Register) homeowners were also obliged to establish the association 
formally, the Act did not state any terms for doing so or sanctions if it did not 
happen. Thus, new homeowners often remained passive for years, thus sus-
taining the problem of ineffective house management.
Moreover, following registration in the Business Register the associations 
began to be perceived as businesses and therefore also had to register with 
the Tax Office and pay income tax. Another unintended consequence of the 
registration was that homeowners started to be responsible for the liabilities 
of the association by their full wealth (not just limited to the value of their 
dwelling), and therefore homeowners could lose not only the dwellings they 
own, but also their other wealth and property in the case of an association’s 
insolvency. The next amendment of the Act in 2001 removed the problem of 
tax registration and income tax payment but did not set forth other needed 
amendments concerning the duty to establish an association formally with 
due time.
According to Act No. 103/2000 the Assembly of Homeowners is the main 
body of the association and it consists of all homeowners in the building. 
Each homeowner has the right to vote in meetings of the Assembly accord-
ing to his or her ownership share – the size of a share is generally computed 
as the proportion of the floor area of the dwelling in the sum of the total floor 
areas of all homeowners (or owners of commercial premises) in the building. 
In general, the Assembly may pass the resolutions if half the homeowners are 
present at the meeting (more precisely, homeowners possessing more than 
half of the total sum of shares) and approval of a resolution needs only a sim-
ple majority of those homeowners present. However, the Act explicitly speci-
fied that in the case of any change to some parts of the Association Charter a 
quorum of three-quarters of all homeowners would be required. Full consen-
sus among all homeowners was required for resolutions dealing with mod-
ernisation, refurbishment, and reconstruction (mostly interpreted as ‘sub-
stantial’ decisions) or in the case of taking a loan. As this was shown to be an 
overly restrictive and ineffective regulation (many homeowners did not live 
permanently in their flats or one homeowner could block a decision agreed 
upon by all other homeowners in the association), full consensus in the case 
of modernisation or reconstruction was replaced by the three-quarters quo-
rum in the last amendment of the Act in 2005 (Act No. 171/2005). Since then 
several governments have prepared a new Act that should completely re-
place the original Act (No. 72/1994) and all its later amendments. The propos-
als have been discussed several times in parliament but have not yet been 
passed.
Privatisation also had a significant effect on the cooperative housing sector. 
The basic objective of the Transformation Act No. 42/1992 (which regulated 
the transformation of all types of cooperatives, especially agricultural cooper-
atives), was to increase the ownership entitlement of cooperative members to 
used cooperative flats. Cooperative members occupying cooperative flats, un-
like occupants of municipal flats, acquired the right to ‘sell’ their flats (in real-
ity, to transfer cooperative ownership share together with the right to occupy 
particular cooperative flats) on the free market (i.e., at a market price) and 
in particular the right to the free-of-charge transfer of a cooperative flat into 
their full ownership. Cooperative housing thus became virtually part of the 
homeownership tenure though formally remained part of the rental sector.
All the aforementioned processes (restitution, free-of-charge transfer of 
the housing stock from state ownership to municipal ownership, cooperative 
and public housing privatisation) were reflected in a significant change in the 
tenure structure. This change can best be demonstrated by comparing the re-
sults of the censuses conducted in 1991 and 2001. Table 3.5 clearly shows a 
marked increase in homeownership rate (by more than ten percentage points) 
between 1991 and 2001 and conversely a reduction in the share of rental flats 
by almost 11 percentage points. The share of cooperative housing also de-
creased, by more than four percentage points.
Table 3.6 provides the tenure structure in Prague in the years 1991 and 
2001. The table clearly indicates that while the percentage of people who 
owned their family house in Prague remained almost unchanged between 
1991 and 2001, there was a significant increase in the percentage of private-
ly owned flats (by 10%) and a significant decrease in the percentage of rental 
flats (by almost 20%) out of the total number of permanent-residence dwell-
ing units. The percentage of cooperative flats also decreased noticeably (by 
more than 6%).
At the start of the economic transition households received an aggregate so-
cial benefit – the state compensatory subsidy, which was designed to offset 
increases in the cost of living and especially the increase in food prices. After 
1993 a new social benefit was created for tenants of rental and partially also 
cooperative flats – the rent subsidy. Households were entitled to this subsidy 
if their household income was less than 1.3% of the subsistence minimum 
level. In January 1996 the Act on State Social Assistance came into effect and 
defined the form of the housing allowance for a long period of the transition 
(till 2007). This housing allowance was intended for households with incomes 
lower than 1.6 times the subsistence minimum (up to 1998 only 1.4 times the 
subsistence minimum); the amount of allowance thus depended on house-
hold income, size and composition. The allowance (HA) was calculated using 
the following equation:
60.1×
×
−=
SM
YTC
TCHA , where
TC - notional ‘tariff’ housing costs;
Y - household income;
SM - subsistence minimum.
The housing allowance did not take into account the real but only notional 
(tariff) housing costs that were set at a relatively low level (with reference to 
regulated rents). It was tenure neutral, that is, allocated among both tenants 
and homeowners. In general some 7-9% of households were the recipients. 
The level of housing allowance and notional housing costs did not reflect ex-
isting regional differences in market rents or house prices or the difference 
in housing costs between households living in rent-controlled housing and 
households paying market rents. In 2007 a new housing allowance was intro-
duced that overcame many drawbacks of the first housing allowance concept. 
However, the inadequate reflection of both housing market segments (regu-
lated versus market rents) and large regional disparities in level of rents re-
mained. There is no necessity to provide details on this new allowance as it 
was introduced after the period my book concentrates on.
Neither social housing nor non-profit housing associations were legally de-
fined in the Czech Republic. The government however started to support new 
municipal rental housing construction in 1995 through subsidies amounting, 
a bit later on, to CZK 400,000 per new dwelling (EUR 14,200 in current value; 
about one third to one quarter of the average dwelling construction costs in 
the second part of 1990s). The output equalled to 62,000 housing starts be-
tween 1995 and 2002. Due to the fact that there were no biding cost or in-
come ceilings (targeting) for dwelling allocation and mainly the fact that the 
programme was transformed in a way that allowed speculation and abuse, it 
was highly criticised and, ultimately, amended considerably in 2003. The origi-
nal programme allowed for the creation of cooperatives between municipality 
and participants (future ‘tenants’): a municipality, with the help of a commer-
cial developer, often secured only the state subsidies and the remaining costs 
of house development were covered from down-payments by future ‘tenants’ 
and commercial mortgage loans. Though the right to buy was allowed only af-
ter 20 years from the year of completion, the share in the housing cooperative 
could be liquidated immediately under valid legislation.
Many cooperative flats constructed from by this form were therefore soon 
sold or rented out by participants profiting from state subsidies; moreover, 
some flats were constructed only as secondary homes and some as luxuri-
ous dwellings. The cooperative form was forbidden in 2003, when cost and 
income ceilings were also introduced; on the other hand, the subsidy was in-
creased to a maximum of CZK 630,000 (EUR 22,500) per dwelling. The abuse of 
the original system was criticised by the National Control Office in 2005 when 
it was discovered that high political representatives were also engaged in the 
programme.
The supported housing programme (introduced in 2003) was aimed at sup-
porting the construction of supported municipal rental flats for people with 
disadvantages in access to housing, particularly owing to health reasons (peo-
ple with disabilities) or age (the elderly). Supported flats include special flats 
for citizens with disabilities and flats in buildings with care services for the 
elderly, and also flats in halfway houses (for citizens living in some sort of 
conflict situation, risk environment or other special circumstances. This re-
fers for example to young people leaving children’s homes, people released 
from therapeutic and psychiatric care, shelters, social care institutes, prisons, 
or people living in segregated localities or dysfunctional families). It also re-
fers to start-up flats (for citizens who having tried all other social and hous-
ing policy programmes still found housing inaccessible, young people who on 
reaching adulthood left children’s homes, people who were undergoing re-so-
cialising programmes in halfway houses or shelters, people with refugee sta-
tus, etc.).
The capital subsidy in the form of a grant was allocated for the construc-
tion of the supported housing. The recipient of the subsidy was a municipal-
ity or group of municipalities. They were only allowed to combine financial 
resources with legal entities that were not engaged in commercial activities 
and were founded for the purpose of providing health or social services (with 
the exception of start-up flats, in which case financial resources could not be 
combined); the municipality had to however retain a majority share and was 
not allowed to ask for any financial contribution from future tenants. The pri-
vatisation of flats into the tenants’ ownership, the subleasing of flats, the sale 
of flats to a third party, or the mortgaging of flats for credit (with the excep-
tion of credit to acquire flats) were banned in the programme. The rental price 
was regulated but not at the low level of regular regulated rent.
Owing to the sharp withdrawal of the state from financing new housing con-
struction in the early 1990s, which manifested itself, among other ways, in 
a decline in housing construction, it became necessary to establish condi-
tions conducive to the introduction of standard financial market-based hous-
ing finance instruments. The first such instrument was the housing savings 
scheme, introduced as early as 1993, which represented a combined savings 
and credit product. The state supported the savings part of the scheme by 
state premium – its amount has decreased since 2004 when the Amendment 
to the Act on Building Savings was approved. The value of the state premium 
amounts to 15% of the annual deposit up to the limit of CZK 3,000 (approx. 
EUR 105 nowadays20), 25% of the sum of the annual deposit up to CZK 4,500 
(EUR 158) between 1993 and 2004. The housing savings scheme became a pop-
ular general savings product; as a consequence, payment of state premiums 
became a substantial financial burden for the state budget. The amount of 
state support grew from just under CZK 0.3 billion (EUR 10.5 million) in 1993 
to CZK 15 billion (EUR 527.4 million) in 2004. The cost of state premiums rep-
resented in 2004 and 2005 more than half of all state housing expenditure.
The housing savings scheme operated as a ‘closed’ system as in Germany 
or Austria (Bausparkasse), where loans were funded from deposits of banks’ 
clients. In other words, housing savings banks did not use additional funding 
(except the yields gained on the financial market due to investments of free 
financial resources into secure assets specified by law). Participation in the 
housing savings scheme could be divided into three basic phases – savings, 
granting of loan and repayment of loan. In the first phase clients accumulat-
ed deposits on their accounts in housing savings banks. If the client didn’t 
want a loan, the minimum savings period for eligibility for the state premium 
(calculated as stated above) was six years. If the client wanted a loan from 
the scheme, the minimum savings period was two years (but the client had 
to meet further conditions set by the housing savings bank if he/she wanted 
a loan so early). The client could also obtain a ‘bridging’ loan sooner than the 
regular loan (i.e., even immediately after starting to save). The difference be-
tween the deposit interest rate and the regular loan interest rate (the interest 
margin for housing savings banks) could not exceed three percentage points. 
During the third phase the loan was paid back in annuity instalments and the 
interest rate was fixed for the whole maturity of the loan. There was the le-
gal right of early repayment anytime during the maturity without prepayment 
penalty. Interests paid from building savings loan could be deducted from in-
come tax base (tax relief).
After 2004, the housing savings bank began using the potential of mort-
gage financing by offering special mortgage products – extending loans with 
long maturity to clients immediately, that is, even if the client does not have a 
saving account with the bank. In fact, these ‘mortgage’ products are combina-
tions of a ‘bridging’ loan and a regular loan from the housing savings scheme. 
The ‘bridging’ loan is usually granted at a higher interest rate than the regular 
loan. In the beginning, the clients paid back only the interest of the ‘bridging’ 
loan and at the same time saved deposits to meet the criteria for being grant-
ed the regular loan. When the granting criteria for the regular loan are met, 
the principal of the ‘bridging’ loan is paid off by the regular loan.
As Figure 3.7 shows, housing savings scheme became very popular espe-
cially for household general savings. The system played a very important role 
at the beginning of transition when mortgage legislation was missing or loans 
were unaffordable for most of the population. Annual inflation was high while 
the standard fixed interest rate on housing loan from the scheme was equal 
only to 6% p.a. However, the comparative advantages of the system, clearly 
visible in the ‘high inflation-high interest rate’ environment, gradually disap-
peared. The product remained popular among the public but only as an ad-
vantageous savings vehicle (thanks to state premiums); the reality of the sys-
tem thus departed from its original goals. Moreover, state support for housing 
savings led to a very high public financial burden: the biggest explicit housing 
subsidy. It is sometimes argued that the entire programme is not a part of 
housing policy but more a form of state support for general household sav-
ings.
Mortgage loan is clearly the most common means used to finance the con-
struction or purchase of a flat or house in developed countries. In the Czech 
Republic the necessary legislation for the extension of mortgage loans was 
passed in 1995. Mortgage financing did not spread as quickly as expected. 
This was mainly due to the macro-economic situation, particularly infla-
tion and high nominal interest rates on mortgage loans (in 1995 the nominal 
mortgage interest rates were around 11% and in 2000 they were still around 
8.5%), but there were also psychological reasons: people were wary of taking 
on a large debt for a long term (and unsure about their capacity to repay in 
the future), the future course of interest rates was uncertain, and there was 
still a feeling that living in debt is somehow immoral (Lux et al., 2005).
Since 1995, the state had provided interest subsidies for mortgage loans ex-
tended to physical persons for the purpose of acquiring their own housing (at 
first this applied only to newly constructed housing, but later it was extended 
to acquiring older housing by young first-time buyers) to tackle the ‘tilt’ prob-
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Figure 3.7 Number of newly signed and still valid leases per 1,000 inhabitants of the Czech Republic, 
1993-2004
Source: own computation, Association of Czech Building Savings Banks
lem. The subsidy was directly linked to the development of interest rates in 
the economy. More precisely, the value of the interest subsidy was set for a 
given year according to the average nominal interest rate from newly grant-
ed mortgage loans to physical persons during the previous year. From 1995 to 
January 2001 the interest subsidy on mortgage loans extended to new hous-
ing construction or purchase of new housing amounted to four percentage 
points, from 2001 to January 2002 it amounted to two percentage points and 
from 2002 to January 2003 to one percentage point.21 There has been no such 
subsidy since 2003. The amount of mortgage loan that could be subsidised 
was limited (the aim was not to subsidise luxury houses or flats). In 2002 the 
interest subsidy on mortgage loans for young first-time buyers was also in-
troduced. The applicants for the subsidy could not own another flat or house 
(except the flat or house that would be subsidised) and the subsidy could only 
be used to acquire older housing (at least two years on from the date of of-
ficial approval of a flat for use). The subsidy amounted to three percentage 
points from 2002 to January 2003, to two percentage points from 2003 to Jan-
uary 2004 and to one percentage point from 2004 to January 2005. The next 
section will show that the influence of the interest subsidy on the volume of 
mortgage loans granted (and volume of outstanding mortgage debt) was quite 
limited.
Borrowers were also entitled to tax relief. They could deduct the volume 
of annually paid mortgage interests (up to the limit of CZK 300,000 or EUR 
10,548) reduced by the potential state subsidies from their tax base (for the 
purpose of personal income tax).
The market-based housing finance system in the Czech Republic can gener-
ally be classified as deposit-based housing finance system comprising both 
universal and housing savings banks. Under current legislation the univer-
sal banks can also issue mortgage bonds (be active in mortgage banking) 
and they use this option. In summary, the lenders use retail banking (depos-
its), housing savings and sales of mortgage bonds to raise funds for mortgage 
(housing) loans. In 2005 eight universal banks in the Czech Republic were li-
censed to extend mortgage loans and an additional two banks were licensed 
and specialised exclusively in mortgage banking (mortgage banks). Altogeth-
er there were ten mortgage lenders. There were another six housing savings 
banks that extended fixed-interest rate housing loans.
According to the official statistics (see Figure 3.8) the level of Czech house-
hold indebtedness started to grow sharply from the beginning of 2000. The 
increase in household debt was closely connected with the growing volume 
of outstanding housing loans. In January 1997 the outstanding mortgage bal-
ance amounted to only 4.4% of total volume of outstanding loans. In February 
2005 this share (including the outstanding balance of housing savings banks) 
was already equal to 67.4%. The rapid increase in levels of outstanding hous-
ing loans was especially connected with the economic upturn, that is, falling 
nominal interest rates, inflation, growing household disposable income and 
growing GDP (see Table 3.7).
Figure 3.9 shows the total household indebtedness to GDP and the ratio 
of outstanding mortgage balance to GDP in 1995-2004. Despite the fact that 
household indebtedness in the Czech Republic has risen quickly since 2000, 
final values were still low in comparison with the situation in other devel-
oped EU countries (Table 3.8). The share of outstanding loans for residential 
purposes from the total outstanding loans granted to households almost dou-
bled between 2002 and 2004 but it was still quite far from the average ratio 
known in EU-15 member states. It is necessary to mention that in the Czech 
Republic mortgage loans could not have been used for anything other than 
housing purposes up to 2003, whereas in EU countries equity withdrawal 
mortgages were already common for almost a decade. The residential debt on 
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GDP in comparison with the situation in selected European countries (Figure 
3.10) was relatively low even in 2005 (7.6%). Figure 3.11 shows the structure of 
main sources used by the Czech mortgage lenders in 2004; clearly mortgage 
bonds were a very popular source of loan financing.
The spread between the average cost of mortgage loans granted in 2004 
(i.e., the average mortgage interest rate) and (weighted) average costs of 
funding of mortgage loans (i.e., rates on mortgage bonds, deposits, own cap-
ital) has been surprisingly low – equal to between 1.07 and 1.35 percentage 
points.22 The average gross margin, calculated as the difference between the 
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average weighted23 interest rate from mortgage loans granted by lenders in 
2000-2004 and the average annual gross yield of government five-year bonds 
during the same period, was 1.44 percentage points, with the margin falling 
over time to a value below one percentage point in 2004. Since 2004 the Czech 
mortgage industry has also started offering a relatively wide range of prod-
ucts characterised by a broad variety of repayment methods, maturities, LTV 
(loan to value) ratios, interest rate settings, etc. The mortgage loan could be 
used until 2003 only for a limited set of purposes connected with the hous-
ing needs of the applicant; these purposes had to be proved by the client. In 
May 2004 the mortgage loan was defined as every loan secured by real estate; 
equity withdrawal mortgages were allowed and limits on maximum LTV were 
relaxed (this new legislative framework was sometimes called the ‘mortgage 
revolution’). Maximum loan maturity was 30 years by 2004. The interest rate 
could be fixed at 1, 3, 5, 10 or 15 years according to the client’s wishes and 
the variable interest rate was linked to financial market interest rate develop-
ments (usually annual Prague Interbank Offered Rate – PRIBOR).
The maximum LTV ratio reached 100% by 2004; repayment options includ-
ed annuity instalments (most often used option), progressive payments (of-
fered usually to persons younger than 36 years) or degressive payments. In 
2005 ‘special’ products appeared: a mortgage loan without additional fees 
connected with setting up and administering a loan, a mortgage loan com-
bined with housing savings or life insurance (‘interest-only’ mortgage) and 
mortgage loans without proof of income (sub-prime). From 2003 there was 
an option to use mortgage loans for equity withdrawal. The default rate re-
mained low (in the period between 1995 and 2005 it was quite stable, around 
1%) and there was a continuous decrease in average mortgage loan interest 
rates (Figure 3.12).
However, Czech mortgage lenders, unlike the situation in countries with 
advanced markets, offered no advantages targeted at first-time buyers. The 
solvency criteria were applied more or less across the board to all applicants. 
The market in 2005 still lacked some specific loan products (flexible mortgag-
es, reverse mortgages, etc.) combined with a more elaborate supply of consul-
tancy services on the part of specialised institutions (this changed after 2005). 
Another problem concerned relatively high pre-payment penalties (about 1% 
of the pre-paid amount annually till the end of the fixed interest rate). Taking 
into account the additional fees connected with setting up and administering 
a loan the average nominal interest rate would increase by up to 0.4 of a per-
centage point for a standard CZK 1 mil. loan. This increase was perceived as 
quite substantial and means that at the time a substantial portion of the in-
terest costs remained, from the client’s perspective, ‘hidden’ in the fees (this 
has changed, especially since 2007).
There was a relatively high degree of mortgage market concentration. The 
five largest mortgage lenders (measured by their share on total volume of out-
standing mortgages at the end of 2004) controlled 96% of the market, and the 
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value of the Herfindahl index24 (2,359 points) was and still is relatively high in 
comparison with Western countries. However, it can be claimed with a dose 
of caution that the mortgage market in the Czech Republic is not, given its 
size, seriously negatively affected by monopolistic or oligopolistic behavioural 
features.
The aim of this section is to draw attention to the specific nature of measur-
ing housing affordability in transition countries, which requires the use of 
special modelling techniques. As I will attempt to demonstrate, primary data 
analysis can produce a distorted image of what the real scope of the problem 
of housing affordability or unaffordability is, and which groups of households 
are truly at risk of a high housing expenditures burden. Although such spe-
cific modelling techniques proposed here are unusual within the context of 
housing studies and are not used in advanced countries, I believe that owing 
to the specific nature of the economic transformation in the former commu-
nist countries and the inadequate, poor quality statistics available in these 
countries, the use of the techniques described herein could produce useful 
supplementary information.
43.5%
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Figure 3.11 Structure of financial sources used for financing of 
mortgage loans in the Czech Republic (weighted average), 2004
Note: The weights were the banks’ shares in the total amount of residential 
loans granted to citizens up to 31 December 2004.
Source: Mortgage loans in the CR survey, own computation
There are three basic approaches to analysing housing affordability (Garnett, 
2000): the indicator approach, the reference approach, and the residual ap-
proach. The indicator approach uses indicators to measure the household ex-
penditures-to-income ratio. Indicators usually represent the share of expen-
diture on housing out of household income. Hulchanski (1995) has pointed 
out that housing affordability becomes a problem for households when the 
share of their expenditure on securing adequate housing out of their total 
net income exceeds a certain limit. The indicators used may vary according 
to how housing costs and household income are defined. Housing costs may 
include just the expenditure on rent (in the case of households in the rental 
housing sector), or they may also encompass expenditure on energy or other 
services connected with housing, such as the repayment of loans secured to 
purchase or maintain housing (in the case of households in the owner-occu-
pied sector), etc. Housing costs entered into the calculations may or may not 
be decreased by the amount of the housing allowance that a household col-
lects. Household incomes can also be calculated as gross or net (i.e., after tax-
es and other mandatory insurance payments). The indicator most commonly 
used in evaluating the financial affordability of rental housing is the share of 
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Figure 3.12 Average mortgage loan interest rate in the Czech Republic, 1995-2005
Note: The weights were the banks’ shares in the total amount of residential loans granted to citizens up to 
31 December 2004.
Source: Mortgage loans in the CR survey
net rent or housing expenditure reduced by the amount of the housing allow-
ance out of total net household income – called the rent-to-income ratio or 
housing expenditures-to-income ratio.
There is no fixed maximum value of ratio used in the reference approach. 
Instead, the reference approach refers either to the situation in another sec-
tor of housing (e.g., the level of rent is fixed according to the level of rent in 
the sector of private rental housing) or to the need to secure housing for cer-
tain groups of the population (e.g., rent should be set at a level that is afford-
able to families of employee households with a number of children and with 
low wages). More commonly used is the residual approach, which starts out 
by evaluating the level of residual income, which is the amount of total net 
household income, reduced by expenditure on housing and the amount of the 
subsistence minimum, necessary to cover the other essential living costs of 
the individual household members.
However, none of the above approaches fully sheds the need for a certain 
normatively set maximum limit that when exceeded indicates that a house-
hold’s current housing is unaffordable – for example, a set maximum housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio or minimum residual income (hereafter afford-
ability limit). Like any other normative judgement, it is difficult to scientifi-
cally justify a fixed affordability limit. The definition of affordability used by 
The National Housing Federation in the United Kingdom and applied to social 
rental housing states that “rent is affordable if the majority of working ten-
ants do not fall into the poverty trap as a result of their dependence on the 
housing allowance or are not spending more than 25% of their net (house-
hold) income on rent” (Lux & Burdová, 2000). According to information from 
Bramley (1991), the Housing Corporation (an institution that monitors the ac-
tivities of housing associations in the UK and also distributes state subsidies 
among them) used an affordability limit of 33% of the rent-to-income ratio for 
the rental sector that is covered by housing associations (the rule of ‘rent at 
33%’, Bramley, 1991, p. 21). Except for some general housing-policy provisions, 
the British government does not explicitly stipulate any affordability limit. In 
the Netherlands the umbrella organisations of independent housing associ-
ations applied an affordability limit that equals 25% of the housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratio in the (predominant) social sector of rental housing, 
while in the United States the US Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) applied the principle of ‘fair market rents’ in the sector of rental 
housing at a 30% rent-to-income ratio (Kaufman, 1997; Mulroy & Ewalt, 1996). 
As for Switzerland, Thalman states, “The generally accepted affordability limit 
for rental housing in Switzerland, like in many other countries, is such that 
basic expenditures on housing should not exceed 25% of household income” 
(Thalmann, 1999, p. 1941).
Some countries did not explicitly set an affordability limit, but it was im-
plicit in the policy the state develops for its targeted housing allowance. Hills 
has noted that the “idea behind the German model of the housing allowance 
is that rent for adequate housing should not exceed 25% of total household 
expenditures; though it may be as much as 30% for single-member house-
holds” (1990, p. 160). There is always a normative and even subjective judge-
ment involved in setting an affordability limit, and it would be difficult to 
determine such a limit by ‘objective’ means, as any method selected for this 
purpose can easily be questioned from a scientific perspective. A certain de-
velopment in this regard is the ‘quasi-normative’ approach to housing afford-
ability (Lux, 2007), used in this book for the assessment of efficiency of rent 
regulation in the Czech Republic.
The normative aspect of determining the affordability limit is moreover 
just one of the problems connected with measuring and evaluating hous-
ing affordability. Every indicator used to measure how affordable housing is 
for various groups of households must also be able to address the fact that 
an analysis of housing expenditures alone does not sufficiently take into ac-
count the quality of housing, the size of the housing inhabited, the protec-
tion of tenant rights, and other costs connected with housing (e.g., the costs 
of commuting). The main disadvantage to the concepts of housing expendi-
tures-to-income ratio and residual income is that they do not adequately take 
into account the individual attributes of housing, especially quality and loca-
tion. A high housing expenditures-to-income ratio (which at first glance looks 
like a problem of housing affordability), for instance, need not necessarily re-
sult from low household income or a generally high level of housing costs, but 
may instead derive from the fact that these households are living in flats that 
are too luxurious and/or too large in relation to their household size (e.g., a 
two-member household living in a four-bedroom flat). Were such households 
to move to more appropriate housing (which, again, can only be defined nor-
matively), then the housing expenditures-to-income ratio might decrease to 
a level that is not defined as unaffordable. A simple unadjusted calculation 
of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio may therefore give a distorted 
picture of how many households are genuinely struggling with housing af-
fordability. Consequently, many studies further refine the housing expendi-
tures-to-income ratio so that it better takes into account so-called housing 
over consumption (or under consumption) and housing quality.
An inspirational contribution to improving the measurement of the afford-
ability of rental housing was made by Thalmann (1999), who tried to include 
the physical condition of the housing and the amount of housing consump-
tion directly in the calculation of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio 
(and thus in the calculation of housing affordability). “Some households ex-
pend a large part of their incomes on housing because they wish to live at a 
high level of comfort ... on the other hand, the conventional index of afford-
ability overlooks needy households that are spending less on housing than 
the affordability limit. Many of those households are living in housing that is 
insufficient in size or quality, not because they would prefer to spend their in-
comes on other goods, but simply because they cannot afford adequate hous-
ing” (Thalmann, 1999, p. 1933). In order to determine what ‘adequate’ hous-
ing is, it is again necessary to apply certain norms. Thalmann applies a rule 
where an adequately sized flat is one in which the number of habitable rooms 
equals the number of inhabitants. His findings reveal widespread housing 
over-consumption in Switzerland, that is, the high standard of housing de-
manded by individual households. The data show that “85.4% of households 
in the sample over-consume housing” (Thalmann, 1999, p. 1938). His results 
indicate that while 18% of households have a housing expenditures-to-in-
come ratio higher than 25% (i.e., higher than what is normatively regarded as 
affordable), a full 13% of households (73% of the households whose housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio is above the affordability limit) would be able to 
afford housing that is adequate for them; in other words, if they lived in ad-
equate housing, their housing expenditures-to-income ratio would be below 
the affordability limit. Thalmann’s findings and his methodological approach 
are extremely useful for an analysis of housing affordability in the Czech Re-
public.
Given that the indicator approach to the analysis of housing affordability is 
one of the most commonly used methods in international comparisons, it 
will also be used in my analysis of housing affordability in the Czech Repub-
lic. The housing expenditures-to-income ratio will be especially used to ob-
serve the affordability of rental housing. In conformity with the points out-
lined above regarding the use of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio, 
the method was modified (see below) and defined as follows:
Housing expenditures-to-income ratio = monthly expenditures of a household on 
housing (rent, basic expenditures, aggregate expenditures) / monthly total net house-
hold income  100 (%),
where:
1. basic expenditures of the household on housing = the sum of expenditures 
on rent, central heating, hot water, electricity, gas, energy, water and sew-
age charges, and other municipal services;
2. aggregate expenditures of the household on housing = the sum of basic ex-
penditures on housing and expenditures on structural and home mainte-
nance, construction requirements, and the maintenance of household in-
stallations, loan repayments on the house or flat, and property taxes.
Housing affordability is analysed separately for households living in rental 
housing (municipal, state, and private rental flats) and households living in 
owner-occupied housing (privately owned flats or family homes). For the pur-
pose of monitoring the developments in the affordability of rental housing 
the calculation of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio logically encom-
passes only the basic expenditures of the household on housing; aggregate 
expenditures are included only in the analysis of affordability of the owner-
occupier housing.
The values of the indicators of the affordability are calculated using data 
from the Family Budget Surveys 1990-2003 (FBS 1990-2003) conducted annu-
ally by the Czech Statistical Office (CSO). This is an annual in-depth survey, 
which aims at monitoring the flows of cash and other assets in the budgets 
of a sample of selected households. The FBS’s respondent unit is the house-
hold, that is, a group of persons who live and run a household together. Every 
household included in the survey maintains a survey log, in which it records 
its incomes and expenditures over the course of a year. In the FBS the distri-
bution of households representing individual social categories is not designed 
to correspond to the distribution of such households in the population, so in 
my analysis weights are applied to the FBS data in order to overcome this de-
ficiency. To do this I used coefficients derived from data from the representa-
tive Microcensus 1992, 1996 surveys conducted by the Czech Statistical Office 
(data files FBS 1990-1997) or weights recommended by the Czech Statistical 
Office (FBS 1999-2003).
The FBS does not distinguish between expenditures on secondary hous-
ing (cottages or recreational homes) and expenditures on primary housing. In 
1990 14.3% of all households in the FBS indicated they also owned a recre-
ational home (according to the results of the 1991 Census – the percentage 
was 12.5%), while in 2001 the percentage, according to the same source, had 
decreased to 12.4% of households (according to the results of the Census 2001 
11.3% of households). Expenditures on secondary housing thus artificially 
increase the officially indicated housing expenditures-to-income of Czech 
households.
When calculating the housing expenditures-to-income ratio in EU coun-
tries, housing expenditures are usually purged of the sum of housing allow-
ances intended mainly to cover a household’s costs connected with housing. 
In the FBS up until 2003 the housing allowance was not monitored as a sepa-
rate item but together with other forms of social income included in the total 
household income. But the fact of whether the allowance is deducted from 
total household expenditures or, conversely, is included to increase total in-
come actually has a fundamental effect on the housing expenditures-to-in-
come ratio. The following example demonstrates how: consider a household 
that spends CZK 5,000 a month on housing, while its total net monthly in-
come is CZK 15,000. The housing expenditures-to-income ratio is 33.3%. As-
suming that the household is entitled to a housing allowance of CZK 1,000, if 
the allowance is included as part of household income, that ratio decreases to 
31.3%, but if it is deducted from expenditures on housing the ratio decreases 
to 26.7%. This departure from an otherwise customary practice outside the 
Czech Republic can, especially in international comparisons, also artificially 
increase the officially indicated housing expenditure-to-income ratio of Czech 
households.
In addition to the problems mentioned here, which are specific to the work 
with statistical data in the Czech Republic, it is also necessary to take into ac-
count some of the shortcomings of the indicator of the housing expenditures-
to-income ratio itself – especially the problem of housing over-consumption 
identified by Thalmann (1999). Therefore, in the analysis of housing afford-
ability in the Czech Republic the resulting data on the housing expenditures-
to-income ratio will be purged of housing over-consumption in order to avoid 
the Swiss situation, where households paying too much for their housing (or 
more exactly, whose housing expenditure-to-income ratio is above the afford-
ability limit) also include households that are over-consuming housing but 
could otherwise afford adequate housing.
Becoming the owner of one’s own home or flat tends to involve very high, 
albeit often one-off costs, which are connected with the process of property 
acquisition and therefore, in addition to analysing the housing expenditures-
to-income ratio based on aggregate housing expenditures, the affordability 
of owner-occupied housing is measured using an alternative indicator – the 
price-to-income ratio (the ratio of the average transaction price of housing to 
average net household income).
Finally, housing affordability is analysed separately for various segments of 
the housing market. As mentioned above, two basic segments of the housing 
market evolved during the transition period connected with access to hous-
ing. The housing policy of the previous regime and the continuation of rent 
controls and the application of privatisation of public dwellings at advanta-
geous price terms during the period of the economic transition are the main 
causes of the division of Czech society in terms of access to housing and ulti-
mately also the affordability of housing into two basic, clearly distinguishable 
(though hard-to-define) groups:
 the segment of households enjoying the advantages of ‘privileged’ hous-
ing, which includes households paying regulated rent, households who ac-
quired their own or cooperative housing in between 1948 and 1990 (social-
ism), and households who had the opportunity to buy their own housing 
during the privatisation of municipal flats after 1990, wherein flats were 
and still are sold at prices far below market prices;
 and the segment of households living in ‘non-privileged’ housing, con-
sisting of people who, precisely because of the existence of rent controls 
on flats in the ‘privileged’ segment, are paying unnecessarily high market 
rents (Lux & Sunega, 2004), and who, owing to fixed-term tenancy con-
tracts enjoy very little legislative protection against the actions of land-
lords (in contrast to the protections of sitting tenants), and people who 
have acquired their own or cooperative housing under market conditions 
and paid the price set by the market.
Unlike other social inequalities this inequality in access to housing did not 
develop out of market pressures but exclusively through the actions of the 
state and municipalities and through the central and local housing policy: 
what is all the more remarkable is that none of the income or social criteria 
that usually accompany other redistribution policies were taken into account 
in this case (see also the insider-outsider situation as a common outcome of 
transitional housing policies described in the first chapter of this book). This 
substantial economic subsidy (in the form of either low rent in rental hous-
ing or a price lower than the market price of the housing purchased) was 
not means-tested, and was unjustified from the perspective of social justice 
(Sunega, 2005, below). However, it is not the aim to make an evaluation of the 
housing policy reforms here; but for the analysis at hand the important find-
ing is that two notably distinct segments of the market have clearly taken 
shape. Therefore, the analysis of housing affordability was conducted sepa-
rately for the ‘privileged’ and for the ‘non-privileged’ housing sectors, and the 
results are presented in separate sections.
Given that at the time of writing this book no other guidelines existed, the 
following three normatively selected affordability limits for the housing ex-
penditures-to-income ratio are used: 20%, 25% and 33%. The most relevant af-
fordability limit in the Czech Republic is (corresponding also to international 
practices) considered to be a limit of 25%. In each section devoted to the af-
fordability of various types of housing tenure and housing in different market 
segments, the percentage of households whose housing expenditures-to-in-
come ratio exceeds the affordability limit is monitored.
The affordability of rental housing is monitored for the years 1991, 1993, 1995, 
1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003, based on data from the Family Budget Surveys. The 
housing expenditures-to-income ratios relate to the ‘privileged’ rental-hous-
ing sector, which includes rental flats owned by the municipality, the state or 
private landlords in which tenants pay regulated rent. The following data ad-
justments were made owing to the division of the analysis into special mar-
ket segments, the above-mentioned shortcomings of the FBS, and the general 
difficulties involved in using the housing expenditures-to-income ratio indi-
cator:
 an adjustment of the declared level of rent, owing to the fact that the anal-
ysis in this part refers only to the ‘privileged’ housing sector, and that a 
portion of households indicated in their survey logs the higher rent paid 
per m2 of the total floor area than how much the maximum (regulated) 
monthly rent for this type of flat in a given year was (this was either the 
result of a mistake, methodological error, or because they did not belong to 
the ‘privileged’ housing sector);
 an adjustment that takes into account expenditures on secondary housing 
(cottages, recreational homes), which in the FBS are not distinguished from 
those on primary housing;
 an adjustment that takes into account the housing allowance (which un-
fortunately was not observed separately in the FBS until 2003) based on the 
assumption that all eligible households applied for the housing allowance 
and the amount of the allowance consequently reduces housing expendi-
tures;
 an adjustment that takes into account housing over-consumption in con-
formity with the qualitative rule that the number of household members = 
the number of habitable rooms (adjustment based on Thalmann, 1999).
The first adjustment of the basic housing expenditures-to-income ratio is an 
adjustment of the rent level so that it corresponds to the level of rent in the 
‘privileged’ housing sector. It is likely that there are other justifications for 
this adjustment, as the nature of the FBS (which is almost a panel survey) is 
such that one can expect that the overwhelming majority of the households 
included in the survey do indeed live in the ‘privileged’ housing sector (i.e., in 
the rental sector paying regulated rent), but in the survey households record 
other expenditures connected with housing as a rent too. Given the constant 
and relatively large proportion of households (always around 30% of house-
holds) that in each of the years monitored (i.e., even at the start of the eco-
nomic transformation, when regulated rent applied to almost every house-
hold in the rental sector) cited a higher level of rent in the survey than what 
was the valid maximum regulated rent at the time, it is likely that a certain 
portion of households, constant over time, does not just record the net rent in 
their logs but indicates a level of rent that in reality includes expenditures on 
other services connected with occupying the home/flat.
In order to account for expenditures on secondary housing the difference 
was determined between the level of basic housing expenditures of house-
holds that owned a recreation home and the level of basic housing expen-
ditures of households that did not own a recreational home. Owners of rec-
reational homes tend mostly to be households with a larger number of 
members, who also usually reside in larger flats and thus also have higher ba-
sic expenditures on primary housing; so the differences in the level of basic 
housing expenditures were calculated while taking into account the size of 
the primary housing. The differences were also adjusted by a correction coef-
ficient that accounted for the size of the municipality where the household’s 
primary housing is located. Finally, for all households that indicated they own 
a recreational home the level of basic housing expenditures was reduced by 
the average observed difference in housing expenditures.
Another adjustment to the housing expenditures-to-income ratio intend-
ed to reflect the effect of the housing allowance (or other benefits exclusive-
ly targeting housing), which up until 2003 was not monitored separately in 
the FBS. Given that the main objective of this section of the book is to more 
accurately measure housing affordability, I have made a theoretical assump-
tion: every household entitled to the housing allowance actually applied for 
it. Even though in reality this was not the case, the fact that some households 
did not apply for housing allowance should not artificially increase the num-
ber of households endangered by low housing affordability. The amount of 
the housing allowance is calculated on the basis of reported household in-
comes. The housing allowance is then deducted from the basic housing ex-
penditures entered in the calculation of the housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio.
The problem of housing over-consumption has proven to be highly signif-
icant in the Czech housing sector. Housing over-consumption means that a 
household inhabits a flat that is more than adequate in size, and understand-
ably that can have a fundamental impact on the household’s housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratio. The most commonly used standard for determining 
the degree of housing consumption is the number of habitable rooms in the 
housing in relation to the number of household members.
As the first step, the amount of the average basic housing expenditures for 
households in the rental sector is calculated for each flat size (the number 
of rooms) and for individual municipality size categories (by population size). 
Then, following the rule that ‘number of rooms = number of household mem-
bers’, the degree of housing over-consumption is calculated for each house-
hold.25 Based on knowledge of the actual size of the flat occupied and the 
amount of housing over-consumption, it is possible to determine an adequate 
level of housing consumption for every household (meaning a flat in which 
the number of rooms corresponds to the number of household members) and 
a level of basic housing expenditures that corresponds to flat size in a munic-
ipality of the same size category in which the household currently resides. In 
other words, if a household with two members resides in a three-room rent-
al flat, then following this approach the amount of over-consumption is one 
room. Therefore, in the next step the household is assigned a level of basic 
housing expenditures for two-room flats in the same-sized municipality.26
Figure 3.13 illustrates the development of the unadjusted average basic 
housing expenditures-to-income ratio (marked as ‘ratio’) for the sum of all 
households in the ‘privileged’ rental sector and the effect of the above-de-
scribed adjustments on its value (marked as ‘ratio 4’). The curve marked ‘ra-
tio 1’ traces the development of basic housing expenditures-to-income ratio 
in individual years after rent adjustment. The curve marked ‘ratio 2’ shows 
the development of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio after rent ad-
justment and excluding the expenditures on secondary housing. The curve 
marked ‘ratio 3’ corresponds to the housing expenditures-to-income ratio af-
ter rent adjustment, excluding the expenditures on secondary housing, and 
reducing housing expenditures by the amount of the housing allowance. The 
curve marked as ‘ratio 4’ shows the basic housing expenditures-to-income ra-
tio after rent adjustment, excluding the expenditures on secondary housing, 
reducing housing expenditures by housing allowance and adjusting housing 
consumption (excluding over-consumption).
Figure 3.13 illustrates that housing over-consumption had the biggest ef-
fect on the difference between the value of the original unadjusted ratio and 
the resulting ratio in individual years. The average value of the unadjusted 
housing expenditures-to-income ratio in 1991 is 10.92%, in 1993 it increases 
to 16.20%, in 1995 it falls slightly to 16.10%, in 1997 it reaches 17.44%, in 1999 
21%, in 2001 21.31%, and in 2003 it increases even further to 21.90%. The year-
ly values of the adjusted housing expenditures-to-income ratio (‘ratio 4’) are 
9.37%, 14.72%, 14.29%, 15.47%, 18.10%, 17.91%, and 18.32%, respectively. In the 
final year of the analysis (2003) the difference between the unadjusted and 
the adjusted housing expenditures-to-income ratio is roughly four percentage 
points, which is a relatively significant difference.
Figure 3.13 also indicates that the biggest increase in the average ba-
sic housing expenditures-to-income ratio occurs in the years 1991-1993 and 
1997-1999. The differences in the values of the unadjusted and the adjusted 
ratio increase during the observed period. It is interesting, for example, that 
the effect of taking into account the housing allowance significantly increases 
between 1995 and 1999, decreases slightly in 2001, and decreases more nota-
bly in 2003. The reason for the increasing effect of the housing allowance be-
tween 1995 and 1999 on reducing the housing expenditures-to-income ratio is 
the growing proportion of households entitled to housing allowance and the 
effect of supplementary housing benefits in 1997 and 1999. Between 2001 and 
2003 the proportion of households entitled to the allowance decreased (from 
9.4% to 6.9%), while the average amount of the allowance remained virtually 
unchanged.
The effect of housing over-consumption over the course of the years be-
tween 1995 and 2003 decreases – if in 1995 the over-consumption formed 58% 
of value of difference between unadjusted and adjusted ratios, in 2003 it was 
only 39%. However, this is not because there is a decrease in the proportion 
of households over consuming housing; on the contrary, it increases (in 1995 
it was 26%, in 1999 34%, in 2001 35%, and in 2003 33%). The average amount of 
over-consumption in the period observed increases (from 1.13 rooms in 1995 
to 1.29 rooms in 2001, and 1.27 rooms in 2003). However, the structure of over-
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Figure 3.13 Average basic housing expenditures-to-income ratios in the Czech Republic, 1991-2003
Note: Data sets from the FBS 1991-1997 are weighted according to the Microcensus 1992, 1996; data sets from the FBS 
1999, 2001 and 2003 are weighted with coefficients recommended by the Czech Statistical Office.
Source: FBS 1991-2003, own computation
consumption changes: the number of households over-consuming housing 
in large flats increases, while the proportion of households over-consuming 
housing in smaller flats decreases. There is an economic rule that variable 
unit costs decrease at a larger volume; analogically, in larger flats the expen-
ditures on one room are lower than the expenditures on one room in smaller 
flats. This is the main reason for this finding.
A more detailed analysis of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio for 
individual groups of households would reveal the worst-off position of senior-
citizen households, which in all years have the highest housing expenditures-
to-income ratio. However, while in 2003 the value of the average unadjusted 
basic housing expenditures-to-income ratio of senior citizens was 29%, when 
factors that ‘artificially’ increase the housing expenditures-to-income ratio 
are taken into account this figure decreases to roughly 24%, thus by five per-
centage points. The main cause of the big difference is the effect of housing 
over-consumption common in this group of households.
Figure 3.14 shows the percentages of households in which the basic hous-
ing expenditures-to-income ratio in individual years exceeds the normatively 
set affordability limit at 20%, 25%, and 33%. I decided that for an analysis in 
the Czech Republic the most relevant affordability limit would be a housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio of 25%. In 2003 32% of households (one-third of 
households living in the ‘privileged’ rental housing sector) show an unadjust-
ed housing expenditures-to-income rate above the level of affordability limit 
of 25%; after adjusting the ratio the percentage decreases to 17%. Compared 
to the start of the transition period this is a vivid and sharp increase: while 
in 1991 the percentage of households with a housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio above the level of the affordability limit is just 2.6% (and after adjust-
ments even less than 1%), in 2001, ten years later, the percentage is ten times 
higher.
A closer analysis of inequalities between individual age, social, income, 
and professional categories of households reveals that housing in the ‘privi-
leged’ rental housing sector in no way means that the given household can-
not end up in financial difficulty. On the contrary, the degree of inequality be-
tween the highest-income and lowest-income households grows in time and 
many groups of households (individuals, some senior citizens, single moth-
ers) are exposed to a housing expenditures-to-income ratio above the afford-
ability limit even after the ratio is adjusted. One of the reasons for this might 
be that the ‘privileges’ in this market segment are too equally distributed be-
tween ‘the poor’ and ‘the wealthy’ and overall the equally high hidden eco-
nomic subsidy derived from regulated rent paradoxically exacerbates social 
differences instead of reducing them (Lux et al., 2004). Rent regulation is not 
targeted according to household income, and the housing allowance does not 
reflect real expenditures but rather only tariff expenditures on housing (see 
more on this in the next chapter).
A real quantification of the affordability of ‘unprivileged’ (market) rent-
al housing in the Czech housing environment cannot be made, as statistics 
on market rents are only very rarely collected by selected commercial insti-
tutions. Such surveys are limited to a small number of large towns and are 
based only on advertised rents. In the FBS the proportion of households truly 
paying market rent is marginal; this is the result of the method of data collec-
tion and also the fact that only a relatively small portion of Czech households 
lived in the ‘unprivileged’ segment of market rental housing.
However, to omit a special analysis of this sector of the market would be 
a distortion, and therefore I regard it as the ‘lesser evil’ to attempt an esti-
mate by using a modelling approach. That method involves estimating mar-
ket rent from the estimated market price of an occupied flat. Not much is 
known about the social and financial situation of households living in the 
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Figure 3.14 Percentage of households in the Czech Republic with a basic housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio higher than 20%, 25% and 33%, 1991-2003
Note: ratio – unadjusted basic housing expenditures-to-income ratio; ratio 4 – adjusted basic housing expenditures-to-
income ratio.
The data sets from the FBS 1991-1997 are weighted according to the Microcensus 1992, 1996; the data sets from the FBS 
1999, 2001 and 2003 are weighted with coefficients recommended by the Czech Statistical Office.
Source: FBS 1991-2003, own computation
unprivileged market rental sector, but the majority of experts incline toward 
the opinion that all social groups of households are represented in this sec-
tor, though they are of lower age. Therefore, for this purpose the data from 
the FBS 2002 are used with one basic restriction – only households headed 
by a person under the age of 40 are selected for the analysis.27 It is a fact 
that young people, after a certain period in their career, often attain on aver-
age higher incomes than older people – if we were to include in the analysis 
households headed by persons over the age of 40, then the resulting hous-
ing expenditures-to-income ratio would be higher, and if we were to include 
in the analysis households of senior citizens, then it would be much higher. 
However, these results could be regarded as distorted because there is little 
probability that elderly people will be living in market rental housing.
For rental flats of those households I estimated specific market rents as a 
product of average yield from residential housing investments in the Czech 
Republic and estimated market price of their flats. To estimate market rent 
it was therefore first necessary to estimate the market price of the rental flat 
occupied by selected household. House prices were estimated by the hedonic 
price (OLS) regression model (see, e.g., Lux et al., 2004) using data from the 
Ministry of Finance and the Czech Statistical Office on the transaction pric-
es in 2002. The hedonic price function is determined using the data set on 
housing prices, which includes the following variables: the date (documented 
by the financial bureau), type of real estate, transaction price, floor area (m2), 
depreciation of the property (in %), and size of the municipality and district. 
A series of semi-log hedonic regression models were tested with the aim of 
creating a model capable of maximising the percentage of the explained vari-
ability of the dependent variable (log house prices). The final model explains 
63.97% of the variability of the dependent variable (Adjusted R2) and the fol-
lowing explanatory variables were used: floor area (m2), floor area squared, a 
dummy variable for the category of housing depreciation (in relation to the 
age of the building or the period in which it was built), regional dummies, and 
the size of municipality. Table 3.9 presents the model’s specifications.
In order to calculate the annual market rent, the estimated price of the flat 
was subsequently multiplied by the annual yield of 6.5% corresponding to the 
net yield on investments into residential real estate in 2002. The yield value is 
the mean value between the value determined by the Ministry of Finance (ap-
pendix no. 34, ordinance no. 279/1997 Coll. of the Ministry of Finance) for 2002 
and the value indicated by the Institute for Regional Information for 2002 (IRI 
2002). The resulting unadjusted average basic housing expenditures-to-in-
come ratio for households living in the ‘unprivileged’ rental housing sector in 
2002 was 27.9%.; after taking into account expenditures on secondary hous-
ing it was 27.7%; after taking into account expenditures on secondary housing 
and the reduction of expenditures by the housing allowance it was 27.3%; and 
after taking into account expenditures on secondary housing, the reduction of 
expenditures by the housing allowance, and housing over-consumption it was 
25.6% (N = 326). If I use the affordability limit of 25% of the housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratio and with knowledge of all the preliminary assump-
tions (this is an estimated rather than a real situation), 49.6% of households 
from ‘unprivileged’ rental housing would have an unadjusted housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratio higher than the affordability limit and 43.7% of the 
same households would have an adjusted housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio higher than the affordability limit in 2002.
The analysis concentrates on owner-occupied flats as there are no households 
living in ‘privileged’ family houses; if I wanted to relevantly compare the situ-
ation in the segment of ‘privileged’ housing with the situation in the segment 
of ‘unprivileged’ housing then I would need to focus on the apartment seg-
ments. Results relating to the entire owner-occupied housing sector (i.e., in-
cluding households occupying family homes) will be, however, also presented 
at the end of this section.
In order to evaluate housing affordability for households that acquired 
their flats before 1989 or did so in the process of the privatisation of flats af-
ter 1989, it is only possible to use the indicator approach (the housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratio) on the FBS data, similar to the way it was used in 
the analysis of the rental sector. Given the nature of the FBS survey it can be 
assumed that only a marginal portion of sample households have acquired 
their housing on the open market at market prices; at least, there will not 
be enough of them for there to have any significant impact on the average 
results. In order to calculate the housing expenditures-to-income ratio, ag-
gregate housing expenditures will be used (instead of basic expenditures, as 
in the case of rental housing).28 The aggregate housing expenditures were 
purged of the effects of the housing allowance (since 1996 households in 
owner-occupied housing are also eligible for housing allowance), expendi-
tures on secondary housing, and housing over-consumption.
Figure 3.15 shows the development between 1997 and 2003 of the average 
aggregate housing expenditures-to-income ratio following each of the indi-
vidual adjustments; Figure 3.16 shows the percentage of households that ex-
ceed the affordability limit for the adjusted and unadjusted housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratio. In 2003 the average unadjusted aggregate housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio for these households reached almost 22%; the 
average adjusted ratio in the same year is 20%. According to Figure 3.16, in 
2003 30% of these households had an unadjusted housing expenditures-to-in-
come ratio higher than 25%, while 20% of households had an adjusted hous-
ing expenditures-to-income ratio higher than 25%.
In 2003 the unadjusted aggregate housing expenditures-to-income ratio 
would be 18.5% (in 1991 just 10.5%) and the adjusted ratio would be 17.2%. In 
2003, according to the unadjusted housing expenditures-to-income ratio, 21% 
of households living in the ‘privileged’ segment of owner-occupied housing 
would exceed the 25% affordability limit; according to the adjusted ratio the 
figure would be 11.5% of households. Clearly the effect of the adjustments on 
the levels of the housing expenditures-to-income ratio in the owner-occupied 
housing sector is less than it is in rental housing; but housing over-consump-
tion remains significant, and its significance increases over time.
The affordability of owner-occupied housing is often monitored using special 
indicator comparing the house prices and household incomes, rather than 
using the housing expenditures-to-income ratio. A standard indicator com-
monly used is the price-to-income ratio (P/I) – the ratio of the average (medi-
an) price of existing housing to the average (median) total annual net income 
of a household. This indicator shows how many annual net incomes the aver-
age (median-income) household would have to spend in order to be able to 
acquire an average (median-price) flat.
The household incomes reported in FBS surveys were compared to the av-
erage transaction prices of flats, as recorded by the Czech Statistical Office 
(since 1998, the year that the Czech Statistical Office began to systematically 
monitor house prices). Figure 3.17 shows a relatively sharp increase in P/I in-
dicator between 1998 and 2003 and its subsequent decline in 2004. Thus, with 
the exception of 2004, during the monitored period flat prices rose faster than 
household incomes. Given that the primary aim of this paper is to analyse 
the affordability of housing, the P/I indicator should be weighted by popula-
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Figure 3.15 Average aggregate housing expenditures-to-income ratios in the Czech 
Republic, 1997-2003
Note: the FBS 1997 data set is weighted according to the Microcensus 1996; the FBS data sets for 
1999, 2001 and 2003 are weighted with coefficients recommended by the Czech Statistical Office.
Source: FBS 1997-2003, own computation
tion size, as there is a difference if the indicator value is high in a region with 
a population of one million and the indicator value is low in another region 
with a population of only 300,000 inhabitants (number of transactions reflects 
this differentiation only partially). The values of the indicator were weighted 
by the population size in individual Czech regions and then within these re-
gions by municipality size. Figure 3.18 shows the development of the weight-
ed P/I for the period between 1998 and 2003. It is evident that the value of the 
indicator in 2003 is in reality higher after weighting than what has been indi-
cated in Figure 3.17.
Between 1998 and 2003 alone (i.e., within the space of six years) the aver-
age value of P/I increased from 1.6 to 2.8 (the weighted indicator), or in other 
words, it almost doubled! While a slight decline in house prices that ensued 
(after the Czech Republic became a member of the EU, which resulted in a 
partial burst of the price bubble) helped to increase the affordability of owner-
occupied housing, it was by no means enough to offset the effect of the pre-
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Figure 3.16 Percentage of households in the Czech Republic with aggregate housing expenditures-to-income 
ratios above 20%, 25% and 33%, 1997-2003
Note: ratio – unadjusted aggregate housing expenditures-to-income ratio, ratio 3 – adjusted aggregate housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio (taking into account the effects of secondary housing, the housing allowance, and housing 
over-consumption).
The FBS 1997 data set is weighted according to the Microcensus 1996; the FBS data sets for 1999, 2001 and 2003 are 
weighted with coefficients recommended by the Czech Statistical Office.
Source: FBS 1997-2003, own computation
ceding increase. It may be assumed that at the start of the 1990s the value of 
P/I was significantly lower than in 1998, so the affordability of ‘unprivileged’ 
owner-occupied housing worsened over the course of the transformation.
An alternative way in which to monitor the affordability of owner-occupied 
housing and better compare it with the affordability of housing in the ‘privi-
leged’ segment of the housing market (and with the affordability of housing 
in the rental sector) is to use the housing expenditures-to-income ratio; in 
this case aggregate housing expenditures, including also repayments of mort-
gage credits used to purchase housing. As in the case of the ratio used in the 
rental sector, here the housing expenditures-to-income ratio is defined as the 
average share of the sum of monthly annuity payments on standard mort-
gage credit obtained for the purchase of existing housing (though at real mar-
ket prices in 2002) and all other monthly expenditures connected with hous-
ing out of the total net monthly income of the household.
Since the necessary statistics do not exist, I used again a simulated model 
situation, in which all current flat owners under the age of 40 (or in which the 
head of the household is under the age of 40) listed in FBS 2002 are paying 
mortgage instalments on the flat they are living in at an amount that corre-
sponds to the price of their flat in 2002. As in the case of ‘unprivileged’ rent-
al housing we do not know who bought the flat when, so the model situa-
tion does not correspond to reality. However, it does show how high the total 
housing expenditures-to-income ratio would be for young Czech flat-owners 
if they lived in the ‘unprivileged’ segment of the market, that is, in flats ac-
quired at market prices in 2002.
The market price of owner-occupied flats surveyed by FBS 2002 has al-
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Figure 3.17 The development of P/I in the Czech Republic, 1998-2004
Source: Czech Statistical Office, own computation 
ready been estimated using the hedonic price model described above. In 2002 
households were able to use housing savings loan and mortgage credit to fi-
nance their housing needs, and this was a standard combination of financ-
ing in that year. At the same time the maximum LTV for mortgage loans was 
limited by law to 70%. Therefore, to calculate the housing expenditures-to-in-
come ratio I assumed that households did apply for mortgage credit to cover 
70% of the purchasing price of an older, existing flat, with a maturity term 
of 20 years, and that they obtained the remaining amount (to cover the re-
maining 30% of the flat’s purchase price) from a housing savings scheme. The 
household saved half of this sum, and it obtained the other half in the form 
of credit from a housing savings bank at an annual interest rate of 6%.The an-
nual interest rate29 on the mortgage loan was 5.73%.
The calculation of housing expenditures-to-income ratio for 2002 took into 
account tax relief, namely, a reduction of the income tax base by the amount 
of interest paid on both types of loan up to a maximum of CZK 300,000 an-
nually. The amount of this tax saving was determined from the difference 
between disposable income calculated from the tax base minus the sum of 
interest and disposable income calculated from the tax base without any re-
ductions. Given that the FBS only consistently distinguishes the incomes of 
the head of the household and the head’s spouse, the tax saving was calcu-
lated separately for the income of the household head and spouse, and the 
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Figure 3.18 The development of weighted P/I in the Czech Republic,1998-2003
Source: Czech Statistical Office, own computation
higher of the two incomes was included in the analysis (in other words, it 
was logically assumed that the interest deduction would be used by the one 
whose income would result in a higher tax saving).
The average unadjusted aggregate housing expenditures-to-income ratio 
in 2002 for households belonging to this housing market segment was 31.1%; 
after taking into account secondary housing expenditures it was 31.1% (thus, 
unchanged); it dropped to 30.6% after taking into account the reduction of ex-
penditures by the housing allowance; and after taking into account housing 
over-consumption it was finally 29.7% (N = 147). In 2002 the unadjusted hous-
ing expenditures-to-income ratio of 60.8% of the households in this housing 
segment exceeded the affordability limit (25%) and the adjusted housing ex-
penditures-to income ratio of 57.2% of households exceeded the affordability 
limit.
The standard way of measuring housing affordability is with the aid of the 
indicator approach, that is using the housing expenditures-to-income ratio. 
This indicator alone is incapable of taking into account housing quality (es-
pecially the degree of housing consumption), and therefore it is usually ad-
justed in the literature. In my opinion, measuring the housing expenditures-
to-income ratio in the Czech environment requires additional adjustments 
to account for deficiencies in data collection and adjustments to account for 
the fact that this country, like other post-socialist countries, is experiencing 
a period of transformation. For these reasons I monitored the development 
of housing affordability separately for the owner-occupied and rental sectors, 
and also separately for housing in the ‘privileged’ and the ‘unprivileged’ seg-
ments of the housing market. The results can only be employed while bearing 
in mind the fact that some cases are based only on modelled situations.
As Table 3.10 shows, the housing expenditures-to-income ratio differs sub-
stantially between individual market segments. Although households living 
in owner-occupied flats in the ‘privileged’ segment of the market show on av-
erage the same housing expenditures-to-income ratio as households living in 
rental flats in the ‘privileged’ market segment, the housing expenditures-to-
income ratio of households headed by a person under 40 who purchased a 
flat in 2002 would be roughly 10 percentage points higher than that of hous-
ing owners in the ‘privileged’ market segment, and if instead of buying a flat 
these households were to opt for market rental housing their average housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio would be roughly 8 percentage points higher 
than that of households in the ‘privileged’ segment of the rental market. Ac-
cording to the adjusted housing expenditures-to-income ratio, 44% of tenant 
households in the ‘unprivileged’ segment of the market (as opposed to 17% 
of tenant households in the ‘privileged’ segment of the market), and 57% of 
households in owner-occupied flats in the ‘unprivileged’ segment of the mar-
ket (as opposed to 20% in the ‘privileged’ segment of the market) would have 
a housing expenditures-to-income ratio that exceeds the affordability limit 
established in this analysis – that is, higher than 25%.
Table 3.10 shows how significant the effects of the adjustments to the 
housing expenditures-to-income ratio might be – among households in the 
‘privileged’ rental segment of the market, the adjustments described above 
lead to a reduction of the average ratio by 3.6 percentage points and a reduc-
tion of the percentage of households whose housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio exceeds the affordability limit by 15 percentage points. The adjustments 
to the ratio are less significant in owner-occupied housing sector and are far 
less significant in both ‘unprivileged’ segments of the housing market (for 
housing expenditure-to-income ratio 1.6 and 1.4 percentage points, respec-
tively).

The purpose of this chapter is to assess selected state interventions in the 
field of housing consumption (housing subsidies) in the Czech Republic from 
the perspective of their effectiveness and subordinated efficiency. For that I 
use the theory and methodological device of welfare economics described in 
Chapter 1. This chapter should especially answer the second research ques-
tion, which is as follows:
2.  How effective and efficient were state interventions in the field of housing con-
sumption during the transition in the Czech Republic if the theoretical framework 
and methodological device of welfare economics is used for such assessment? How 
effective were such interventions from the point of view of both vertical and hori-
zontal effectiveness? How efficient were such interventions if we narrow the wide 
concept of efficiency to the cost-benefit analysis of state interventions in the field 
of housing consumption (i.e., subordinate efficiency to effectiveness)? How efficient 
and effective were these interventions when assessed against the assumptions on 
efficiency and effectiveness of subsidies?
Table 4.1 shows the structure of housing subsidies (state housing expendi-
tures) between 1999 and 2005. The temporary items (e.g., subsidies to cover 
damages caused by floods in 1999 and 2002 or subsidies directed to one proj-
ect) are not listed but are included in the total amounts. I distinguished sub-
sidies directed at promoting the supply of rental housing (light grey), demand 
for rental housing (medium grey) and subsidies to promote homeownership 
(dark grey). The items of expenditure are also divided separately according to 
the executive authority responsible for their allocation – Ministry for Regional 
Development (MRD), State Fund for Housing Development (SFHD), Ministry of 
Finance (MF) and Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA). The fiscal sub-
sidies in the form of tax relief on mortgage interests and tax exemption on 
interests on housing savings are also estimated (no official figures are provid-
ed by either MF or MRD). The estimate of public costs of tax relief is calculat-
ed as a multiple of outstanding mortgage balance (loans for households and 
for residential purposes), average interest rate on mortgage loans and average 
income tax rate for each particular year. The estimate of tax loss following 
from exemption of interests on housing savings is calculated as a multiple of 
the total savings on savings accounts held by all housing savings banks, aver-
age interest on savings and capital income tax rate for each particular year.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the responsibility for housing pol-
icy formation and implementation is divided among three Ministries in the 
Czech Republic (with SFHD being just the executive body to fulfil programmes 
prepared mainly by MRD). Housing allowances remain within the responsibil-
ity of MLSA as a part of general social policy and the most important pro-
grammes supporting owner-occupied housing (state premium to housing sav-


ings, tax relief) remain within the responsibility of MF. Though, officially, MRD 
is responsible for state housing policy (preparation of long-term strategies), 
its competence is substantially fragmented by the interests of representatives 
of other two Ministries. Table 4.1 also makes clear that the exclusive respon-
sibility for housing policy taken by MRD is not accompanied by the appropri-
ate power in the allocation of financial resources – 71% of total state housing 
expenditures were allocated by MF and only 20% of total expenditures were 
allocated by MRD or SFHD in 2005. This inconsistency between formal respon-
sibilities and factual powers of individual ministries is a very important factor 
explaining the formation of housing policy in the Czech Republic.
As is also made clear in Table 4.1, public expenditure in support of owner-
occupied housing dominates recent Czech housing policy. In 2005, the sup-
ply-side subsidies for construction of new municipal, supported or social-care 
housing amounted to CZK 2.5 bn and the demand-side subsidies for housing 
allowances amounted also to CZK 2.5 bn. However, support for acquisition or 
reconstruction of own (coop) housing in the form of qualified loans for first-
time buyers, interest subsidies, state premiums to housing savings, tax relief 
and tax interest exemption, amounted at the same time to a total of CZK 23 
bn; that is, it was almost five times more than public expenditures support-
ing rental housing. Moreover, part of the finished municipal rental housing 
was constructed on terms allowing easy transformation into cooperative form 
(thus some subsidies served, de facto, as support for homeownership) and part 
of the housing allowance was allocated among homeowners. The scale of to-
tal public support for homeownership strongly contrasts with the fact that 
the Czech Republic was one of the few transition countries (as we saw in the 
previous chapter) that did not follow the path of mass public housing privati-
sation and preserved substantial rental housing stock.
It is necessary to point out that Table 4.1 does not include important, yet 
difficult to measure, economic subsidies. I mentioned in Chapter 2 that one 
similarity in housing policy reforms among the selected transition countries 
was that a substantial part of the allocated subsidies was hidden in the form 
of economic subsidies. Basically, there were two main economic subsidies: 
one for tenants who enjoyed low regulated rents and the other for homeown-
ers who purchased their housing for prices well under their market levels. 
These subsidies are not included in the table, simply because they, albeit large, 
are not fully comparable with other types of listed subsidies and their size is 
very difficult to estimate.
However, negligence of the economic subsidy for tenants leads, for exam-
ple, to a biased value of housing allowance subsidy which is low now (due 
to rent regulation) but which would be far greater if rents were increased to 
market levels; another example may be the impact on the public cost of pub-
lic housing maintenance (not done properly nowadays) and/or public costs 
deriving from failed international arbitrage due to the fact that rent regula-
tion may breach the basic human rights of private landlords. Therefore, an at-
tempt has been made to estimate the amount of this subsidy, employing the 
relatively complex simulation model fully described in Lux, Sunega (2004) and 
partially in the next section of this book as well. The model simulates tenure 
choice among households living in rent-regulated housing (using Family Bud-
get Survey data) when controlled rents are gradually increased. It also simu-
lates the situation on the housing market when the supply of vacant market 
rental housing rises as a consequence of the migration of better-off house-
holds to homeownership, thereby estimating equilibrium market rents (which 
were substantially lower than existing market rents distorted by regulation it-
self). The economic subsidy is computed as the difference between equilibri-
um market rents and current regulated rents. The subsidy totalled about CZK 
10 bn in 2002 and due to a decreasing share of rent-regulated housing in total 
housing stock decreased to about CZK 7-8 bn in 2005.
Estimating the size of the second economic subsidy derived from public 
housing privatisation is more difficult. As mentioned above, more than half of 
the total public housing stock was sold between 1990 and 2004; mostly for low 
‘residual’ prices to tenants. Due to the highly variable conditions applied to mu-
nicipal housing privatisation between different points of time as well as at each 
point of time among different municipalities, it is simply impossible to calcu-
late this economic subsidy exactly. There are no central statistics that could be 
used for the purpose. Based on partial information on privatisation prices col-
lected for Prague and some other cities by the Institute for Urban Development, 
the annual level of it would be close to or more than the annual economic sub-
sidy stemming from rent regulation (i.e., equal or higher than CZK 10 bn).
In sum, hidden economic subsidies would be the most important annual 
housing subsidies; it is also worth of mentioning that economic subsidy from 
rent-regulation is not fully paid by the public authorities – part of it is covered 
by private landlords, and this is now subject to judicial proceedings.
In the following sections I will try to evaluate the effectiveness of selected 
housing subsidies in the Czech Republic. The effectiveness will be measured 
by comparing household income distribution with the distribution (real or 
estimated) of selected housing subsidies (state interventions in the field of 
housing consumption), mostly in the year of 2002. In so doing I will test the 
assumptions of vertical and horizontal effectiveness elaborated upon in the 
first chapter of this book:
Main assumption 1: Effective subsidies assist lower-income (needy) households more 
than higher-income (less needy) households. (Vertical effectiveness)
Main assumption 2: Effective subsidies do not exclude any lower-income (needy) 
households. (Horizontal effectiveness)
Sub assumption 1: The absolute amount of subsidy should be significantly higher 
in the group of lower-income (needy) households than in the group of higher-income 
households (less needy).
Sub assumption 2: The subsidy should contribute to a reduction in the level of in-
equality in the society.
To test the above assumptions I will use statistical data from the Family Bud-
get Survey of 2002. This survey includes necessary information on household 
incomes and household housing expenditures and the year of the survey was 
chosen precisely because for that year (using the same data set) I also made 
an econometric estimate of equilibrium market rents allowing for assessment 
of economic subsidy stemming from rent regulation. If the data permits, I will 
compute all the necessary indicators of income inequality and subsidy distri-
bution, as stated in the first chapter (standard deviation, variance of the log-
income and others).
In one case the assessment of subsidy distribution draws on a different da-
ta set (information from the Ministry of Finance) and in one case it also draws 
on data from the national Housing Attitude Survey 2001 conducted by the In-
stitute of Sociology in 2001 on a sample of 3,357 respondents. This is because 
for many housing subsidies there is no registered information about eligible 
households whatsoever; nor could I find the distribution of these subsidies in 
the Family Budget Survey data. Partial information about distribution is how-
ever contained in MF statistics or this sociological survey.
In two cases (supply-side subsidies in the field of rental housing and eco-
nomic subsidy stemming from privatisation of public housing) I could not use 
the attitude survey and so these results are estimated using other informa-
tion sources. This ‘flexibility’ in methodology on subsidy effectiveness mea-
surement is a prerequisite for presenting any kind of generalised conclusions 
here since data on the monitoring of allocation of housing subsidies is un-
available (not provided by any audit, ministerial or other central organisa-
tions) and additional statistical sources are also rare.
The sections below present the conclusions of the assessment of effec-
tiveness of the following subsidies: economic subsidies (one stemming from 
rent regulation and the second from public housing privatisation), housing al-
lowance, supply-side subsidies in the field of rental housing, tax subsidy and 
state premium to housing savings scheme.
From the perspective of effectiveness, rent regulation could be justified, as 
with other housing policy instruments, by the redistribution of resources in 
favour of lower-income households. If that were the case then primarily low-
er-income households should be living in rent-regulated flats and this group 
of households ought to be the recipients of most of the resources contained 
in this economic subsidy. Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of households liv-
ing in the regulated rent housing sector in the total number of households 
in individual categories according to total household income or equivalent 
household income.
As Figure 4.1 makes clear, rent regulation was almost equally applied to 
both ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ households. As many as 10% of the wealthiest Czech 
households (according to equivalent income ranking in the 10th decile of the 
income distribution) lived in a flat with regulated rent and this percentage 
was not significantly lower than among the poorest households (according to 
the equivalent income in the 1st decile of the income distribution: 10.6%). The 
hypothesis was tested as to whether households living in flats with regulated 
rent are roughly equally represented across individual income deciles. This 
hypothesis cannot be rejected as the results of the chi-square test indicate a 
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Figure 4.1 The percentage of households in the Czech Republic ‘profiting’ from regulated rent, 2002
 N = 3,291 n = 857
Source: FBS 2002
95% level of significance.
Another possible method of evaluating the equity effect of rent regulation 
is by drawing the distribution of the economic subsidy stemming from rent 
regulation. The level of economic subsidy should be calculated as the differ-
ence between the equilibrium market rent that would probably emerge after 
rent deregulation and the actual regulated rent. Equilibrium market rents in 
the Czech environment can be estimated, for example, using methods that 
were proposed by Lux et al. (2004) and Lux & Sunega (2004). They are briefly 
described below.
In terms of pure economic theory, as long as certain conditions are met 
(perfectly competitive market, perfect dissemination of information among 
market actors, zero transaction costs, etc.), the price of real estate should be 
determined as the sum of expected discounted revenue from investment into 
a property, that is, the sum of expected discounted revenue from rent (plus 
potential capital gains from the sale of the property at the time of sale):
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PA - the current equilibrium price of the property;
R1…Rn - rent in year 1 to rent in year n;
i - interest rate (the interest rate from alternative assets, or mortgage credit);
Pp - selling price of the real estate in year n;
Pk - purchasing price of the real estate;
n - the duration of possession of the real estate.
Given that real estate investments are generally long term in character, the 
price of a property should be determined as a quotient of the rent and the 
discount rate (usually at the level of rates on mortgage credit, or alternative 
assets). In other words, for a sufficiently large n (e.g., n = 30) and roughly equal 
R, if we abstract from the capital gains at the time of sale, then:
i
R
PA = iPR A=and therefore:
If we know the current market price of a property, and that price is the equi-
librium price, then the level of rent could be calculated as the product of the 
market price of the property and the discount rate. However, when applied 
to housing, this principle for calculating the equilibrium level of rent, based 
on the principle of dividend discount models (models used to determine the 
‘correct’ market value of shares; that value is compared to the current market 
value, which makes it possible to determine whether a given market share 
is undervalued or overvalued), has numerous weaknesses, for which it is 
criticised. One reason is that as an economic good, housing has a number of 
specific features that distinguish it from other assets. Therefore this method 
of determining equilibrium rent may be somewhat misleading, especially in 
Czech circumstances, where housing prices were distorted to some extent 
owing to the continued existence of the first-generation rent regulation and 
other aspects of economic transition.
In order to determine the equilibrium market rent level, a relatively com-
plex simulation model of ‘shock’ rent deregulation was developed instead us-
ing data from the Family Budget Survey 2002 (FBS, 2002). The model was de-
signed to determine at what level of rent a sufficient number of rental flats 
are vacated so as to satisfy the demand of needy households (households liv-
ing in overcrowding conditions or households living in temporal tenures).
The rational part of the theory of tenure choice is based on the decision 
whether it is more of an advantage to rent or buy housing. For this purpose 
the household compares the net cost of rent (i.e., rent after deducting any 
housing allowance the household may be receiving) and the user costs of 
owner-occupied housing. The standard way of calculating user costs (UC), ad-
justed here for the specific terms of mortgage financing in the Czech Republic 
with a maximum loan-to-value of 70% in that time, is as follows:
( ) eoe PgiPgitUC 3,07,010 −+++−++−= ,
where t is the marginal tax rate for the household member with the highest 
income, i is the nominal interest rate on mortgage credit,  is the rate of de-
preciation,  is the real estate tax rate, g is the expected nominal price appre-
ciation rate of the given real estate in the future, and i0 the opportunity costs 
from the use of personal savings to cover 30% of the cost of the real estate. In 
other words, annual user costs include the sum of annual interests paid on 
mortgage credit (and lost revenue from the potential use of personal savings 
in other investments, e.g., the purchase of government bonds), but reduced 
by the option of deducting interest paid on mortgage credit from income tax 
base. Alongside the adjusted sum of paid interests, user costs also include de-
preciation and real estate tax. The expected price appreciation of the prop-
erty is then deducted from this sum, as unlike rental housing the purchase of 
owner-occupied housing is also an investment, often the biggest investment 
in the life of a household.
For the purpose of simulations, we set i at the level of average interest rate 
on mortgage credits granted on housing purchase in 2002 (6.7%), i0 at the level 
of the average yield on long-term government bonds in 2002 (4.5%),  at the 
level of 1%, t according to particular income tax rates valid in 2002, and  was 
excluded from the equation owing to its marginal significance. The expected 
price appreciation of real estate g was estimated separately for eight individ-
ual geographic zones. The average annual expected appreciation for a 20-year 
outlook (determined in an effort to eliminate the effects of short-term price 
fluctuations) were then around 1.5% in Prague and zero in the eights zone.
The price of housing Pe in 2002 was estimated by means of testing hedonic 
price models (OLS) using data from MF and the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) on 
the transaction prices of housing in 2002 (the same model as applied for hous-
ing affordability analysis in the previous chapter). For every household sur-
veyed in FBS 2002 living in the rent-regulated housing sector, the house price 
and subsequent user costs were determined for the case were they to acquire 
owner-occupied housing corresponding in size and location to the rental flat 
they occupy at present. We assumed that if a household satisfies certain age 
and income criteria while the potential user costs of owner-occupied housing 
are lower than the new (simulated) level of regulated rent, then that household 
will exit the rental sector and enter the owner-occupied housing sector. We al-
so assumed that as soon as the number of vacated flats in the rent-regulated 
housing sector equal the total number of ‘needy’ households, then the rent de-
regulation process will stop and a demand-determined equilibrium rent will 
emerge. The number of needy households in individual regions of the Czech 
Republic was estimated using data from the survey Social Conditions of House-
holds 2001 (SSD, 2001) carried out by the Czech Statistical Office in 2001.
From the perspective of the whole rental housing market, another impor-
tant question is how landlord behaviour might reflect the level of demand-
determined equilibrium rent, established by means of the method described 
above; in other words, would demand-determined equilibrium rent provide 
investors with at least the minimal amount of returns on invested capital 
required for them to be willing to lease their flats? We studied income and 
capital returns on residential real estate investments in advanced countries 
(using, e.g., the Investment Property Databank) and their relations to the rate 
of return on government bonds; after that we established the minimum net 
income return on real estate investments in the Czech Republic in 2002 at a 
level of 3.75% of flat market price. If the real return rate is lower, it can be as-
sumed that private landlords would probably begin increasingly to sell their 
properties. Therefore the whole market equilibrium rent was set at a level of 
demand-determined equilibrium rent in places where this was higher than 
minimum income return on investments in residential real estates, while it 
was set at a level of minimum income return on investments in residential 
real estates in places where the demand-determined equilibrium rent was 
lower than such a minimum income return.
Figure 4.2 shows how in 2002 the total economic subsidy derived from rent 
regulation (defined as the difference between equilibrium rent and actual 
regulated rent) was distributed by total net household income and equivalent 
income, using data from the FBS 2002. Clearly in 2002, higher-income house-
holds and middle-income households were the main recipients of economic 
subsidy in the form of regulated rent, while the lowest-income households 
benefited from this subsidy relatively the least. The main reason is that high-
er-income households lived in larger flats than lower income households 
where the difference between market and regulated rents was also higher.
With regard to distribution of the economic subsidy from rent regula-
tion, whether the average subsidy amount differs significantly between indi-
vidual income deciles of households was tested by statistical tests. The LSD 
test shows that the average level of subsidy for households in the last two 
equivalent income deciles was statistically significantly higher than the aver-
age level of subsidy to the lowest-income households in the first two equiva-
lent income deciles. The criterion selected to indicate an instrument’s high 
effectiveness was the kind of redistribution where 90% of the total sum of the 
subsidy goes to 50% of the households with the lowest incomes and at the 
same time 75% of the total sum of the subsidy goes to 30% of the households 
with the lowest incomes. The economic subsidy following from rent regula-
tion failed to satisfy this criterion. Only around 46% of the total amount of 
the subsidy was received by 50% of the households with the lowest equivalent 
incomes, and 30% of the households with the lowest equivalent incomes re-
ceived only 25% of the economic subsidy.
Table 4.2 summarises the values of different indicators of income inequal-
ity; the values were calculated using equivalent income, firstly without the 
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of the sum of economic subsidy among tenants in the Czech Republic living in 
regulated rental housing, 2002
 Source: FBS 2002; own computation
subsidy and then with the economic subsidy (i.e., the household income was 
increased by the amount of the subsidy).
The data in the table show that while standard deviation, variance of the 
log-income and mean income ratio of 5% of the highest-income and 5% of the 
lowest-income households indicate that income inequality increased in soci-
ety when the economic subsidy to households paying regulated rent is taken 
into account, only the variation coefficient indicates the opposite trend. The 
reason why the variation coefficient shows the opposite trend in comparison 
to other indicators is probably the fact that to a large extent middle-income 
households profited from the subsidy; because the variation coefficient is not 
sensitive to the level at which redistribution takes place, the value of the co-
efficient indicates lower inequality in income distribution after the subsidy. 
However, the most informative indicator is probably the variance of the log-
income, which gives greater weight to the lower-income groups.
In all systems of rent regulation (social housing) some low-income house-
holds may actually be excluded from the right to get rent regulated housing 
(immigrants, non-residents etc.). However, the system applied in the Czech 
Republic was, from the point of view of horizontal effectiveness, even more 
discriminating. Rent regulation and strong tenant protection had the charac-
ter of a safety net for existing tenants while new households had, due to the 
low tenant turnover and end of the mass state rental housing construction, 
few chances to get involved. Though it is hardly measurable explicitly, a sub-
stantial part of needy new households (young couples and families, singles 
after divorce) were, in fact, completely excluded from the eligibility for this 
type of subsidy.
Due to the fact that price conditions on public housing privatisation vary both 
in time and space it is difficult to estimate (or simulate) distribution of the 
amount of economic subsidy stemming from public housing privatisation. Al-
though we know what rent tenants paid, we do not know what price home-
owners paid for their owner-occupied housing. Therefore we cannot measure 
the effectiveness of this subsidy in the same way as the previous economic 
subsidy.
As the social structure of tenants living in rent-regulated housing (mea-
sured by household income distribution) changes slightly towards lower in-
come households in time this is a very weak sign that distribution of eco-
nomic subsidy from public housing privatisation is skewed more towards 
higher income households than rent regulation. Some really poor households 
or households of pensioners with relatively low income decided not to take 
part in the privatisation and stayed on as protected tenants. The target popu-
lation is generally similar to the target population of the first economic sub-
sidy though, naturally, tenants in restituted (though rent-controlled) housing 
are excluded. Both factors taken together may lead to the somewhat vague 
conclusion that the effectiveness of economic subsidies following from public 
housing privatisation might be even lower than the effectiveness of rent regu-
lation demonstrated above. There is however no other way than this reason-
ing to confirm this supposition.
Based on simulations using data from FBS 2002 Figure 4.3 shows how the sum 
of potentially paid housing allowances (in the form valid till the end of 2006) 
would be distributed among households according to their total net income 
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of households in the Czech Republic entitled to housing allowance, 2002
N = 3,292
Source: FBS 2002
and equivalent income, if all eligible households had asked for the allowance. 
Figure 4.3 shows that the housing allowance was genuinely designed to help 
lower-income households in particular.
Table 4.3 presents the values of the indicators of inequality of income dis-
tribution before and after the housing allowance is taken into account; the 
values of the indicators refer to equivalent income. The data in the table show 
that the housing allowance contributed unequivocally to reducing income in-
equality in society, and from this perspective it can be regarded as effective. 
The housing allowance satisfied the normative criterion of effectiveness: 50% 
of the lowest-income households (by equivalent income) would be the recipi-
ents of 99% of the total sum that would be paid in housing allowances (under 
the conditions indicated above), and 30% of the lowest-income households 
would receive approximately 97% of the total sum paid in the form of housing 
allowances.
However, the allowance’s major flaw was the fact that the equation did not 
take into account real housing expenditure but only the tariff component of 
the subsistence minimum, which reflected the assumed (notional) housing 
costs of a household living in rent-regulated housing. In this way it breached 
the imperative of horizontal effectiveness. Households living in market rent-
al housing, paying several times higher market rents, were thus excluded 
from any truly effective help from the state. They often had an income higher 
than the ceiling because they would not have been able to live there other-
wise - the potential housing allowance computed from tariffs applied in the 
‘privileged’ rental sector would have been, even in the case of low income, in-
significant and would not have allowed them to stay in the flat. This serious 
shortcoming leads to the conclusion that even housing allowance, a means-
tested targeted benefit, failed to fully meet the effectiveness criteria.
Social rented housing is not defined in the Czech Republic on the central lev-
el and is only occasionally defined on the local level (municipalities). There 
is no legislative framework for non-profit housing associations. Though rent 
control has been applied (and is still applied) to all running tenancies, it is 
not designed as a part of social policy (targeting those in housing need). Only 
a few municipal flats became vacant annually (tenant protection allows the 
transfer of a flat with regulated rent to other households and this creates the 
grounds for massive black market practices). Such vacant municipal flats are 
partially rented out again at market rents (highest bid) and partially as regu-
lated rents to those in housing need. Only the last segment (allocation of va-
cant municipal flats with regulated rents to those in need) may seriously be 
considered social rented housing. It is, however, impossible to estimate the 
number of such flats.
The central administration refuses to label any part of housing stock as so-
cial rented housing but, in some cases, the term refers only to the following 
housing stock:
 Supported housing – new municipal rental housing constructed under the 
programme introduced in 2003 by the Ministry for Regional Development. 
The grants are provided to municipalities for the purpose of construction 
(exceptionally reconstruction) of municipal rental flats. These flats may 
be allocated only among people who face housing accessibility problems 
due to their special needs (resulting from their health, age, unpleasant life 
circumstances) and who are endangered by social exclusion. This hous-
ing includes: protected housing (for the handicapped and old people need-
ing special flat design and social care), half-way housing (for people living in 
risky social environments who are unable to solve their social situation by 
themselves, such as young adults leaving children homes, people return-
ing from prison, single parents, victims of domestic violence) and start-up 
housing (for people for whom housing is inaccessible, even after all existing 
means of housing and social policy are used). Altogether there were 2,568 
supported flats till July 2006 (i.e., constructed between January 2003 and Ju-
ly 2006): 2,458 protected flats, 69 half-way flats and 41 start-up flats.
 New municipal rental housing – constructed under the programme intro-
duced in 1995 by the Ministry for Regional Development. The scale of 
housing output was about 62,000 housing starts till the end of 2002. Due 
to the fact that there were no abiding cost or income ceilings (targeting) 
for dwelling allocation and mainly the fact that the programme was trans-
formed in a way that allowed speculation and abuse (lost character of mu-
nicipal rental housing), it was highly criticised and, finally, largely amend-
ed in 2003. In 2003 the cooperative form was forbidden, cost and income 
ceilings were introduced and the subsidy increased. Since 2003 the alloca-
tion of flats has become income targeted and, more importantly, flats can-
not be transferred to the cooperative form and remain as municipal rent-
al housing. They may be allocated only to singles with a monthly income 
lower than a 0.8 multiple of the average monthly wage in the Czech Re-
public and among households with more members and a monthly income 
lower than a 1.5 multiple of the average monthly wage. About 7,000 flats 
were built under this reformed programme between 2003 and July 2006.
 Housing with social care – new municipal housing constructed under the 
programme introduced in 1995 and finished in 2002 by the Ministry for Re-
gional Development for seniors and other people needing 24-hour social 
care. The small new apartments serve the elderly and handicapped people 
and social care support is provided there. About 7,500 flats with social care 
were built in the period 1995-2002. Since 2003 housing with social care is 
formally part of the protected housing programme (total size of protected 
housing constructed since 2003 is estimated above).
 ‘Holobyt’ (shelter) – municipal housing of a very basic standard (one room, 
common bath and kitchen facilities) in abandoned buildings (former in-
dustrial buildings, barracks, empty lodging houses) or in new, very basic 
building at the edges of cities, occupied exclusively by people and house-
holds evicted for long-term rent arrears. Many occupants are Roma house-
holds. About one third of all municipalities dispose of some ‘holobyt’; how-
ever an estimate of the total number of flats is impossible to make.
Altogether, taking a very broad definition of social housing that includes all 
existing rent-regulated municipal housing (constructed before 1989) and all 
new municipal housing constructed during the transition (even some ‘qua-
si-rental’ flats), the total would have reached 610,000 municipal dwellings in 
2001 (17% of housing stock). However, taking a more serious definition of so-
cial housing as rental housing with rents below market rates and allocated 
administratively according to the income and social situation of the applicant, 
then it would include only existing municipal housing that was vacated and 
rented out again during the transition for regulated rents to those in need (by 
a very rough estimate about 6,000 flats), only the new municipal housing that 
was constructed since 2003 when the programme of the Ministry for Region-
al Development stopped being abused (about 7,000 flats), supported housing 
(2,568 flats) and housing with social care (7,500 flats). In this case the total 
would be only about 23,100 dwellings, that is, about 0.6% of housing stock. 
This shows how ineffective the Czech national housing policy remained in 
the field of real supply-side subsidies to target those in need.
Vacant municipal flats are allocated according to very different specific 
criteria set by the municipalities. A part of the vacant flats is often allocat-
ed among people offering the highest rent (the envelope method where ap-
plicants send in bids on rent and the highest bid wins), but the majority of 
vacant flats are allocated to people who need low regulated rents – the defi-
nition of need (social criteria) is left, however, to the municipalities. Many 
municipalities (mostly the bigger ones) have a point-giving system for fulfill-
ing some criteria (measuring the need for housing) but the most of smaller 
municipalities decide on an ad hoc basis. Even when a point system exists, the 
criteria are often not very ‘social’ ones – points are given mainly for having 
a permanent address in a particular town for some period of time (non-res-
idents are disadvantaged), number of years on waiting list, size of household 
(overcrowding) and source of permanent income (sometimes health condi-
tions, family rupture). In Brno or Prague, the two largest Czech cities, the mu-
nicipal boroughs who manage the municipal housing stock apply no income 
criteria. In fact, households with higher incomes may have a preferred status 
compared to those with lower incomes because of some criteria that are re-
lated to the source of permanent income. For example in the Brno-Zabovresky 
municipality (information is for 2002), an applicant with income from em-
ployment or business obtained 20 points, an applicant with income from a 
disability pension obtained ten points and an applicant living on social sup-
port (getting subsistence minimum) obtained zero points. The more points, 
the better the position on the waiting list. Municipalities tried to avoid future 
rent arrears in this way.
As with rent regulation and housing allowance, it is also possible to analyse 
the effectiveness of another form of public support – tax relief – using data 
(estimates) from the Ministry of Finance for people who submit individual in-
come tax declarations.30 Tax subsidy generally (the possibility to deduct, from 
the tax base or the calculated tax payable, the full or partial amount of inter-
est or the portion of the principal from mortgage credits, or relief from the 
tax on imputed rent or on capital gains) is the common form of subsidising 
owner-occupied housing.
However, making a relevant calculation of the amount and distribution of 
this public subsidy is no simple matter. In order to calculate it we must first de-
termine how we intend to look at owner-occupied housing. Is owner-occupied 
housing a consumer good, investment good or financial asset? As O’Sullivan 
(1985) pointed out, this decision “is by no means trivial. If someone is of the 
opinion that owner-occupied housing should be viewed as a consumer good, 
then the main subject of debate is the option of deduction of interest from tax-
es. No other consumer good receives a subsidy of this kind …. However, if we 
regard owner-occupied housing as an investment good, then the perspective 
from which the tax deduction is viewed changes entirely, as at that moment it 
becomes analogous to the practice of deducting as costs interest on credit that 
has been obtained for the purpose of purchasing equipment necessary for pro-
duction in a standard firm” (O’Sullivan, 1985, p. 6).
On the other hand, in the latter case it is necessary to regard the owner of 
a dwelling exactly as if he were a typical investor, and thus, specifically in the 
case of the housing market, as a private landlord; all the more complicated 
about this perspective is that the owner is not just the landlord but also the 
tenant of the dwelling that he has purchased and occupies. A typical landlord 
must, after deducting his costs, pay tax on the rent he collects from his ten-
ants – and so too should the owner-(self)landlord, although the rent, which he 
is essentially collecting from himself, is implicit rather than real. Part of his 
taxable income is moreover not just income from rent but also income from 
capital appreciation, that is, the gain from the increase in the value of the 
residential real estate over time. The homeowner has to pay not just the tax 
on imputed rent but also the tax on capital appreciation (capital gains tax).
To sum up the discussion so far, if, for the purpose of calculating the tax 
subsidy, I regard owner-occupied housing as a consumer good, then the main 
tax subsidy is the option to deduct interest on mortgage credit from the tax 
base, because this kind of support is not accorded to any other kind of con-
sumption good. However, if I look at owner-occupied housing as an invest-
ment good, then the deduction of interest from the tax base is perfectly ac-
ceptable (in fact, it would be wrong to set any kind of maximum limit on this 
kind of deduction as that could be seen as a form of tax penalty) and the 
main public tax subsidy comes in the form of relief from paying tax on im-
puted rent and the capital gains tax.
In the Czech Republic the possibility to deduct an almost unrestricted 
amount of interest from housing loans (both mortgage and housing savings 
loans) used for the purchase of permanent housing from income tax base is 
not compensated for by imputed rent taxation (the concept of imputed rent is 
generally not well known) or effectively by capital gains taxation (people are 
exempt from this tax two years on from the purchase or even sooner, if the 
capital gain is used for another permanent housing purchase). Therefore we 
can look at the tax subsidy from the perspective of both the consumer and 
the investor. For the purpose of effectiveness (as well as subordinated effi-
ciency) assessment in this book I will regard housing as a consumption good 
and will therefore measure how the tax relief on interest from housing loans 
is distributed according to household income. The main reason to opt for this 
perspective is the simplicity of the measurement and also the focus of this 
book on housing consumption.
Figure 4.4 shows that the distribution of the fiscal advantages derived from 
the possibility to deduct interests from housing savings loans and mortgage 
loans from income tax base was in the Czech Republic strongly skewed in 
favour of the highest-income taxpayers. If the analysis were also to include 
those taxpayers whose tax declarations are submitted by their employers, 
the distribution of benefits would probably not be as clearly distorted in fa-
vour of people with the highest incomes but the picture would not change 
substantially. This housing subsidy was therefore likely the most regressive 
housing subsidy in the Czech Republic. This is also the case in other advanced 
countries, as it is always middle to high-income households that acquire 
owner-occupied housing, which is why in some countries this tax relief has 
been completely abolished (UK) or seriously restricted (France, Scandinavian 
countries). The figure shows that 50% of the lowest-income taxpayers divide 
up only just under 1.3% of the total subsidy from tax relief, and 30% of the 
lowest-income taxpayers receive only 0.43% of the total sum of this subsidy.
It was not possible to compute values of other indicators of the level of 
income inequality before and after the subsidy because only the cumulative 
percentage distribution of the subsidy among specific income groups (deciles) 
was available. From the perspective of horizontal effectiveness, all lower in-
come taxpayers were actually excluded from this subsidy as they would not 
have met the solvency criteria of the banks in 2002.
Although the state premium to housing saving schemes is the highest explicit 
state housing expenditure, we know nothing about its recipients. Allocation 
of state premium is not subject to means-testing (unlike e.g., in Germany) 
and savings are generally made by those households that have income suf-
ficiently high to set part of it aside. It is often said that the main profit from 
housing savings scheme subsidisation goes to the middle class. The only evi-
dence comes from sociological surveys (on national sample of population) 
asking people if and how they use the housing savings scheme.
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of the total fiscal loss to the state budget of the Czech Republic 
due to tax relief, according to the personal income from economic activity (population of 
individuals submitting their individual tax statement), 2001
Source: Ministry of Finance
One such survey, Housing Attitudes 2001 conducted by the Institute of So-
ciology on a national sample of 3,357 respondents, which I managed in 2001, 
proved that 48% of those who ranked their household as low-income, did not 
and did not intend to have a housing savings account. The same applied to 
only 26% of those who ranked their household as middle-income and 21% of 
those who ranked their household as high-income (altogether 7% of respon-
dents perceived their household as high-income, 45% as middle income, and 
48% as low-income). As indicated by adjusted residuals, those who ranked 
their household in the middle-income group used or intended to use the 
scheme significantly more for general savings (i.e., not for housing) and those 
who ranked their household in the high-income group used or intended to 
use the scheme (both savings and loans) significantly more for housing pur-
poses. The differences among respondents according to perceived income 
situation of their households are statistically highly significant (Pearson chi-
square had a value of 223 with 8 degrees of freedom). This shows that effec-
tiveness of state premium on housing savings was, probably, also very low.
Figure 4.5 is an attempt to capture the distribution of selected housing sub-
sidies in a Lorenz curve. In view of the fact that many subsidies are not in-
come-tested and thus the income of applicants cannot be ascertained even 
from alternative sources, we can draw only the distribution of the housing al-
lowance (according to the total equivalent income and FBS 2002 simulations), 
the distribution of an indirect subsidy following from tax relief (according to 
the total gross income of a taxpayer, applies only to people submitting their 
own tax assessment basis and according to the MF) and distribution of the 
economic subsidy following from rent regulation (according to total equiva-
lent income and according to FBS 2002 simulations).
Among the analysed housing policy instruments, housing allowance was 
most targeted at the households with the lowest income; practically the entire 
volume of state funds paid out in the form of the housing allowance was di-
vided among 20% of households with the lowest income. The curve capturing 
the distribution of economic subsidy in the form of rent regulation most ap-
proximates the curve of equal income distribution and therefore it is clear that 
low-income households and high-income households benefited from rent reg-
ulation almost equally. Tax relief, on the contrary, benefited particular house-
holds with the highest income; 90% of households divided among themselves 
less than 20% of the total volume of this indirect support, the remaining 80% 
of the support went to 10% of households with the highest income.
The effectiveness of three selected housing subsidies was especially evalu-
ated: economic subsidy stemming from rent regulation, tax relief and hous-
ing allowance. Given that both in the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian concepts 
of the welfare state effectiveness is linked to equality, the analysis of effec-
tiveness was based on two criteria. The first criterion was whether the three 
instruments contribute to a reduction of the level of inequality in society. To 
this end several indicators of income inequality were used. The second crite-
rion was based on a comparison of the real distribution of the subsidy among 
various income groups with a normative criterion of effective distribution. Ef-
fective distribution of a subsidy was regarded as distribution of the subsidy 
where 90% of the sum of resources was distributed among 50% of the low-
est-income households, and 75% of the sum of the subsidy was distributed 
among 30% of the lowest-income households. A test was also made of the hy-
pothesis of whether the percentage of households with an entitlement to the 
subsidy is significantly higher among the lowest-income deciles in compari-
son with the percentage of households entitled to the subsidy in the highest-
income deciles.
The results of the tests showed that households most likely paying regu-
lated rent were relatively evenly distributed across the individual income 
deciles. It also confirmed that the economic subsidy following from regulat-
ed rent was significantly higher among highest-income households in com-
parison with the lowest-income households. Rent regulation did not fulfil 
the normative criterion of effectiveness either, as 50% of the lowest-income 
households received approximately 46% of the sum of the subsidy (to satisfy 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution curve of selected housing subsidies in the Czech Republic
Sources: FBS 2002, Microcensus 1996, Ministry of Finance, own computation
the criterion of effectiveness the figure should be 90%), and 30% of the lowest-
income households received approximately 25% of the sum of the subsidy (to 
satisfy the criterion of effectiveness it should be 75%).
The main group of recipients of tax subsidy was formed primarily by high-
est-income households, and therefore the effectiveness of this form of sub-
sidy was very low. The percentage of households that took advantage of this 
form of support was clearly significantly higher among the highest-income 
households. The Lorenz curve showed that of the instruments evaluated here 
this form of subsidy unequivocally favoured the highest-income households.
Unlike the other instruments evaluated here, housing allowance is a 
means-tested benefit, and therefore it is natural that the percentage of house-
holds entitled to housing allowance was obviously highest among the lowest-
income households. The distribution of this subsidy was also clearly directed 
in favour of the lowest-income households, which were the largest recipients 
of the sum that would hypothetically be paid out in housing allowances. The 
indicators of income inequality revealed that the housing allowances did 
contribute to a reduction in the level of income inequality in society. This is 
confirmed again in the depiction of the distribution of the subsidy using the 
Lorenz curve. The housing allowance also satisfied the selected normative 
criterion of effectiveness, given that 50% of the lowest-income households 
would be the recipients of 99% of the sum of the subsidy, and 30% of the low-
est-income households would be the recipients of 97% of the sum of resourc-
es paid out as housing allowances. However, housing allowance did not meet 
the criterion of horizontal effectiveness as some needy households were ex-
cluded from eligibility (those paying market rents).
Although the available data sources do not allow full empirical verification, 
it may be assumed that the other housing policy instruments aimed at sup-
porting homeownership tenure – economic subsidy stemming from privati-
sation of public housing and state premiums to housing savings – also, very 
probably, displayed relatively low effectiveness. The same applies to supply-
side subsidies in the field of rental housing – low effectiveness was demon-
strated by showing the gap in the share of housing stock that could be la-
belled social housing, if I use a wide or narrow definition of social housing.
Here I intend to assess the efficiency (subordinated to the concept of effec-
tiveness) of selected housing subsidies in the Czech Republic; the goal is to 
assess particular subsidies against the following assumption:
Main assumption: Subsidies are efficient when it is not possible to meet redistributive 
goals in the field of housing consumption in a less costly way, that is, under an alter-
native setting of the subsidy or an alternative setting of the whole set of subsidies.
I have previously mentioned and justified why the concept of efficiency is, 
in my book, subordinated to the concept of effectiveness and how difficult 
is to measure the efficiency of subsidies if wider interactions between mar-
kets were also taken into account. The wider economic impact of subsidy 
alterations, asking for the use of econometrics and additional data sources, 
is therefore measured and evaluated only for one type of subsidy – econom-
ic subsidy stemming from rent regulation. For all other types of subsidies I 
will only look at whether any short-term public savings could be achieved if 
current subsidy rules are changed (with no taking into account of the inter-
actions with other housing subsidies and with only weak attention paid to 
wider economic and social consequences). This ‘restricted’ methodological 
approach is the result of the limitations of econometrics and is also well re-
flected by the subordinated position of efficiency in my policy evaluations.
In the following sections I will evaluate the efficiency of economic subsidy 
from rent regulation, housing allowance, tax subsidy and state premium to 
housing savings scheme.
The total amount of economic subsidy allocated to households living in rent-
regulated housing is difficult to calculate but it was estimated at a level of 
CZK 10 bn in 2002 and CZK 7-8 bn in 2005. If estimated correctly, it could be 
one of the largest housing subsidies in the Czech Republic (next to state pre-
mium to housing savings scheme). From an economic perspective, rent regu-
lation in its current design has caused incalculable damage. The negative eco-
nomic effects include in particular:
 ineffective allocation of flats – many households occupy flats that are 
disproportionately large in relation to household size, while many oth-
er households occupy flats that are too small or are completely excluded 
from the sector of rent-regulated housing; all households are thus trapped 
in the ‘golden cages’ they were allotted many years ago, when they were 
in quite different circumstances (well documented by surveys Housing At-
titudes 2001, Social Conditions of Households 2002 and others);
 the creation of a perpetual and artificial shortage of flats (long municipal 
waiting lists documented by the survey Local Government and Housing in 
2001 and regular surveys by the Institute of Urban Development among se-
lected municipalities);
 the market rent applied in vacated or newly built rental flats is skewed and 
exceeds the equilibrium rent, which is the rent level that would be estab-
lished if rent regulation did not exist (see Maclennan, 1982; Fallis, 1985; Lux 
et al., 2004; Lux & Sunega, 2004);
 the large black market primarily in municipal rental housing;
 the growing number of uninhabited (vacant) flats in the rental housing 
sector (documented by census data between 1991 and 2001);
 the lack of sufficient resources to modernise and repair the housing stock, 
prolonging the poor quality of housing and increasing the hidden deficit of 
repairs and modernisation inherited from the ineffective management of 
flats under the previous regime.31
As described theoretically by Maclennan (1982) and Fallis (1985) in their hous-
ing economics monographs, rent regulation in one housing market segment 
may have a substantial impact on rent prices in another market segment 
where rents are negotiated freely (rent regulation is often applied on ‘old’ run-
ning tenancies whereas it is withdrawn for new tenancies). This theoretical 
argument has been partially verified in the Czech environment by economet-
ric simulations made by Petr Sunega and myself (see Chapter 4, or for more 
detail, Lux & Sunega, 2004). The simulation of the housing market and con-
sequences of rent growth in rent-controlled housing was based on the as-
sumption that people would choose their tenure rationally and therefore 
they would decide to leave rental housing to homeownership if the rent paid 
to the landlord (net of housing allowance) rose higher than the user costs of 
homeownership. When demand for rent-controlled housing is saturated (de-
mand gradually decreases due to the rent growth in the rent-controlled hous-
ing segment and gets saturated by the growing number of vacant rental flats) 
and, at the same time, landlords earn appropriate returns from renting their 
properties (returns comparable to yields from alternative investments taking 
into account the specific risk premium), market rents are assumed to be in 
equilibrium. In Prague, the equilibrium market rents would be, according to 
the results of the simulations, about one third lower than the skewed ‘market’ 
rents in 2002 if rent control had been immediately abolished.
Rent regulation is also an important factor behind the black market prac-
tices which were common and widespread in the country until very recent-
ly (unlike in most developed or transition countries). Generally, many ten-
ants who did not need their rental flats rented them on the open market for 
market rents without the consent of the landlord (mostly municipality). The 
other form was ‘to sell’ the right for regulated rent and protected tenancy on 
the open market; ‘the price’ for such title was in 2002 between half and two-
thirds of the price of the comparable owner-occupied dwelling. It has been 
partially proved (Lux et al., 2006) that rent regulation also leads to a decrease 
in household mobility aspirations and may thus increase the unemployment 
rate in the Czech Republic.
A special new econometric methodology has been applied here to measure 
‘adequate’ (‘efficient’, ‘optimal’) rents in the rent-controlled sector to attain 
efficient rent policy (using Lux, 2007). This methodology was introduced as a 
‘quasi-normative approach to housing affordability’ and it was originally re-
lated to the housing affordability issue.
It is often cited that the main goal of housing policy reforms for demand-
side subsidies was to decrease public spending and increase policy efficien-
cy (Maclennan & More, 1997; Harloe, 1994: Priemus, 1997; Ghekiere, 1992; 
Borgegard & Davidson, 2000). Let me thus define the percentage value of an 
increase or decrease in total public housing expenditures PCt,t+1 incurred by 
the rent increase in the rent-controlled housing stock as relative public costs 
(RPCt+1):
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The level of rent in rent-controlled housing that leads to the lowest relative 
public cost might be perceived as an economic quasi-norm on ‘optimal’ rents 
(from the point of view of efficiency). Under such rents the total public cost 
will be lowest. During simulations of relative public costs I would assume that 
basic housing affordability norms (targeting criteria, affordability limit) are 
well incorporated into the existing housing allowance formula. It means that 
for the recent level of regulated rents the housing allowance equation well 
reflects the social norms connected with housing affordability (e.g., what ef-
fort ratio for particular type of household is perceived as too high and there-
fore requires state help in the form of an allowance). However, both notional 
housing costs (tariffs) and part of the subsistence minimum (designated for 
housing expenditures) incorporated in the specific Czech housing allowance 
(see above) should be uprated proportionally to the simulated rent increase at 
each stage of the simulation. In this manner those who already receive the al-
lowance will not be affected by a rent increase and will still pay a similar pro-
portion of their income on housing. The uprating will also increase the maxi-
mum income in the equation, and this will allow other needy households 
(including middle income households at the low end) to apply for a benefit. In 
this manner the simulation of ‘optimal’ or ‘efficient’ rents in rent-controlled 
housing would not breach the effectiveness imperative of subsidies – effec-
tiveness of subsidies to tenants is assumed to be assured by distributional 
parameters incorporated in the housing allowance formula.
In my simulations, I employ real public costs and benefits of rent change 
under the real economic, social and institutional conditions of particular so-
ciety. This may be defined as a ‘context-based’ approach in contrast to the 
‘universally-applied’ approach based on pure housing economic theory. The 
econometric public cost-benefit analysis will thus take into account not only 
the most relevant public cost and benefit items, but also the side effects of a 
particular housing allowance and housing policy changes generally.32 In this 
way the proposed economic quasi-norms reflect a real situation more satis-
factorily than economic quasi-norms derived from economic theory.
To begin with, it is necessary to identify the main public cost items used in 
simulations. As the aim is to measure the relative public costs (RPCt+1 ), only 
those public costs that change with rent level are selected: the revenue subsi-
dy to municipal landlords (RSt ), public housing construction costs (HCt ), public 
housing allowance costs (HACt ), Consumer Price Index costs (CPIt ) and costs 
arising from voids in municipal dwellings (CVVt ).
33 The following equation 
shows the expected correlation between the variable and rent price.
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Consumer Price Index costs are the public costs of up-rating pensions and so-
cial benefits when rent increases are reflected in the consumer price index. 
Costs via voids in municipal housing are included in an attempt to estimate 
the costs of residualisation of municipal housing, which are often overlooked. 
The higher the rents, the higher the proportion of occupants in rental dwell-
ings coming from the lower income strata of society due to the outflow of bet-
ter-off households to homeownership. This in turn has empirically verified ef-
fects on costs via voids in the residualised municipal housing stock. A higher 
vacancy rate in social housing is a well-known side effect of the policy that 
gives preference to demand-side subsidies over supply-side subsidies, and 
this fact should not be ignored. Residualisation of rental housing also gives 
rise to the potential costs from rent arrears, but these are not included in the 
simulation because it has already been demonstrated elsewhere that rent ar-
rears are not dependent on rent levels if the amount of the benefit fully com-
pensates for the increase in rent for benefit recipients (More et al., 2003, p. 88; 
Housing Corporation 1997, p. 12).
Many research studies in the UK have also analysed the impact of a rent 
increase on labour market incentives (Bradshaw & Millar, 1991; Wilcox, 1993a; 
Wilcox, 1993b; Wilcox, 1994; Ford & Wilcox, 1994; Ford et al., 1995; Kearns et al., 
1996; Kempson et al., 1997; Wilcox & Sutherland, 1997; Bingley & Walker, 1998; 
Ford et al., 1998; Pryce, 1999, etc.). While it is not the aim of this book to sum-
marise the findings of these studies, it is worth noting here that they all give 
consideration to the question of whether or not the UK housing benefit with 
a relatively sharp taper leads to the poverty and unemployment trap. Though 
there are rational economic reasons why it may do so, analyses of empirical 
data have shown that this hypothesis does not necessarily apply to certain 
types of households, and even when it does the effect may be negligible. The 
taper of the Czech housing allowance was relatively slight (0.1) and this, to-
gether with the findings from British housing research, means that labour 
market implications can be excluded from the analysis.
In the simulated model the quasi-norms on ‘optimal’ rents are estimated 
on the basis of a single year, and therefore it is possible to assume that all 
other income and demographic variables during the simulated rent-increase 
stages remain constant. The simulation estimates the relative public costs of 
higher rents in the rent-controlled housing sector in 2002.
The simulations presented in this analysis draw on several data sets. The 
main data source was again FBS 2002. With the use of data from the Housing 
Attitudes 2001 survey it was possible to test a Logit model designed to calcu-
late the probability of a household moving out of the rent-controlled hous-
ing sector. The Social Condition Survey 2001, conducted by the Czech Statistical 
Office on a representative sample of 10,599 Czech households, and the KISEB 
database of market rents, run by the Institute for Regional Information, were 
used as sources to estimate the demand for rent-controlled housing. Data on 
transaction house prices in 2002 from the Czech Statistical Office were again 
used to estimate house prices.
Any increase in rents would be connected with an outflow of better-off 
households from the rent-regulated sector. The reason for this is that the in-
creasing housing costs of these households are not compensated by a ben-
efit. A rational household compares its net rent (rent after deducting a po-
tential housing allowance) and the user costs of comparable owner-occupied 
housing, and finally chooses the cheaper option. For the computation of user 
costs I used here the same equation, same variables and same values of these 
variables as for the estimate of economic subsidy from rent regulation made 
in the previous chapter. The expected price appreciation g was, however, ex-
cluded in the first step, as it is not entirely clear whether Czech households 
take price appreciation into account when they make decisions about moving. 
However, price appreciation can be a very important aspect of tenure choice, 
and therefore it was included in the sensitivity analysis of the model.
The price of the dwelling was estimated using a hedonic price regression 
model, again similar to the one used both for the housing affordability anal-
ysis and estimate of economic subsidy following from rent regulation (see 
above, adjusted R2 was almost 64%). However, the tenure choice analysis is re-
fined here. The fact that the move to owner-occupied housing is rational from 
the economic point of view is not enough to lead people to move in reality. 
First, the purchase price of the new dwelling must be affordable, or, more pre-
cisely, mortgage loans must be accessible and the household must be able to 
meet the solvency criteria of the particular bank in order to receive a loan 
(credit constraints). Second, people must be inclined to move – for example, 
older people are much less willing to move than the young, even if mov-
ing would save them money. Many people would prefer to adjust their con-
sumption patterns than to move to their own housing. Three conditions were 
therefore set in order to determine the probability that a household would be 
willing to move out of rent-controlled rental housing to owner-occupied hous-
ing:
 movement to homeownership is beneficial (user costs < net rent);
 the household meets the solvency criteria for receiving a mortgage credit; 
and
 estimated probability of movement (computed by move-stay Logit model) 
equals 1.
The criteria applied by the leading mortgage lender in the Czech Republic 
were used in order to define precise credit criteria. The Logit regression used 
to determine move-stay probability was run on a sub-sample taken from the 
Housing Attitudes 2001 data. The final model is presented in Table 4.4. The sub-
sample contained only respondents living in rent-controlled housing. In the 
analysis the Nagelkerke R2 equalled 0.235 and almost 70% of predictions were 
correct. As expected the probability of moving was influenced mainly by the 
size of residence (the bigger the residence, the higher the probability of mov-
ing), the age of the respondent (the higher the age, the lower the probabil-
ity of moving), the age of the dwelling (the older the dwelling the higher the 
probability of moving out) and the size of the dwelling in relation to the size 
of household (overcrowding increases the probability of moving).
After behavioural reactions to rent increases were simulated the total pub-
lic costs were computed. The first cost item monitored in the simulation was 
public expenditure on housing allowances, calculated as the percentage of house-
holds eligible for the housing allowance at a given simulated rent level,34 mul-
tiplied by the total number of households living in rental dwellings and the 
average simulated housing allowance for a given rent level.
Second, the simulation took into account the revenue subsidy to municipali-
ties, which generally amounts to the difference between the costs of manage-
ment and maintenance of municipal housing and municipal rental income. 
In reality, there is no such a subsidy in the Czech Republic and therefore the 
question may be posed: why should it be included in the public costs? The 
absence of revenue subsidy contributes to the deterioration of the housing 
stock and the poor efficiency of housing management because rental income 
does not cover necessary management and maintenance costs. At some point 
somebody has to pay the accumulated debt on housing maintenance. How-
ever, the level of such a debt is very difficult to measure. The revenue subsidy 
(computed as the difference between ‘cost’ and regulated rent) thus repre-
sents here the current value of necessary future public investments. Accord-
ing to the findings from Ministry for Regional Development, the annual cost 
rent in second-hand flats is determined as 2.8% of the dwelling price. This 
rent includes only maintenance and management costs; capital costs are ex-
cluded because the municipalities received the housing stock through a no-
charge transfer from state at the beginning of the transition period. The reve-
nue subsidy is therefore counted as the difference between real rental income 
under the simulated rent level and rental income from above defined cost 
rent. It is important to note that the revenue subsidy for municipalities may 
also be negative – if rental income exceeds the M&M costs then municipali-
ties achieve additional public benefit (i.e., negative public subsidy).
Third, the simulation also includes the costs arising from the pension and so-
cial benefit up-rating (CPI costs). The adjusted weight of the rent in the consumer 
basket used for the purpose of up-rating pensions and benefits was 2.344% in 
2002. Therefore, a 10% rent increase in rent-regulated flats would result in a 
0.2344% increase in the consumer price index (CPI). According to information 
from Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (and its research institute), a 10% 
rent increase could result in additional annual public costs arising from the 
pension and social benefit uprating that would amount to CZK 463 million.
Fourth, as no reliable model for estimating the costs via voids of municipal 
landlords could be found from the municipal performance data (there are al-
most no voids recorded in 2001), the simulations used the following assump-
tion: today there are no voids, and empty flats will appear only when the 
number of vacated municipal flats at a particular stage of simulation exceeds 
the estimated additional (unsatisfied, hidden) demand for rent-controlled 
housing in a given region.
Finally, the simulation calculated the subsidies for the construction of new 
public rental dwellings. In order to calculate the cost of these subsidies, it was 
necessary to presume a certain norm of need for new public housing con-
struction. The norm was defined as the number of dwellings capable of sat-
isfying 10% of the estimated additional demand for rent-controlled housing 
in a given region. The higher the rents in the rent-controlled sector, the high-
er the tenant turnover and the lower the unsatisfied demand for this type 
of housing would be – this would consequently lead to lower public housing 
construction costs. Though there is no specific reason to set the norm at a 
level of 10% of additional demand, the impact that changing the norm to 20% 
or even 50% of additional demand has on quasi-norms on rents is negligible 
(see the sensitivity analysis below).
The ‘cost’ rent of new dwellings is defined as the total of all capital costs 
(mortgage repayments) and other management and maintenance costs (cal-
culated as 2% of the property value).35 The difference between collected rent, 
which equals the regulated rent at a given stage in the simulation, and ‘cost’ 
rent would be covered by public subsidies for construction of new public 
rental dwellings – either in the form of a capital grant or a qualified loan. The 
costs to the public budgets arising from grants and qualified loans were ex-
pressed in the simulation in their net current values in order to clearly dis-
tinguish the costs of the grant from those of the qualified credit. A financial 
optimisation programme was developed which sought an optimal combina-
tion of a grant, qualified and commercial credit to cover capital costs of new 
public housing construction at a given rent level while ensuring the lowest 
possible total public costs (see Appendix C). In this manner I estimated the 
public housing construction costs.
Figure 4.6 shows the final shape of the relative public-cost curve. Clearly there 
was a relatively large scope for rent increases in Czech rent-controlled hous-
ing to meet the assumption of efficiency of this economic subsidy. Within this 
framework the rents should be, however, raised only to 220% of current lev-
els, because it is evident that any rent increase above this would not result 
in public savings. Though, on average, such an increase in rents would not be 
sufficient to raise the rent to market levels, according to the simulated public 
cost-benefit analysis, when particular income, demographic and other condi-
tions valid in 2002 were taken into account, a higher rent increase appears 
not to be a rational policy goal from the point of view of efficiency.
Figure 4.7 shows the change in each public cost item incurred by 10% regu-
lated rent increase. CPI costs and revenue subsidies to municipal landlords 
change linearly with rents while housing allowance costs, public housing 
construction costs and costs via voids are far more dependent on the behav-
ioural aspects of the simulations – moving from rental to owner-occupied 
housing. The figure also shows the significance of CPI costs that grow faster 
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Figure 4.6 Relative public costs and rents
Source: FBS 2002, own computation
than housing allowance costs in the specific Czech environment.
The model was based on several assumptions, which, if they were to 
change, could change the results of the simulations too. Firstly, we should 
find out which cost items have the greatest impact on simulation results. The 
following is a partial elasticity of total public costs according to each cost 
item. The elasticity (E) shows a percentage change in total public costs in-
curred by a 1% change in a particular cost item.
CPI
PC
CVV
PC
HAC
PC
HC
PC
RS
PC
E RS =
E HC =
E HAC =
E CVV =
E CPI =
= 0.1038%,
= 0.8379%,
= 0.0489%,
= 0.0093%,
= 0.4049%.
Evidently housing construction costs and CPI costs form the most important 
items in the total public costs summary. However, the real impact of particu-
lar cost items is far more important. As the public-costs relationship with rent 
level is not always fully linear, I analysed the changes caused by a 10% rent 
increase (t = 1.1). The percentage changes in particular cost items and their 
weighted impact (elasticity is used as a weight) on relative public costs are:
RSt=1.1 = −56.14%
HCt=1.1 = −8.35%
HACt=1.1 = 17.19%
CVVt=1.1 = 114.64%
CPI
Total
RSt=1.1  E 
RS = −5.83%
HCt=1.1  E 
HC = −7.00%
HACt=1.1  E 
HAC = 0.84%
CVVt=1.1  E 
CVV = 1.07%
= 4.05%
= −6.87%
The CPI weighted impact is calculated as a residual impact. The sum of 
weighted impacts is equal to almost 7% total public cost decrease (i.e., public 
savings incurred by a 10% rent price increase). As we see, public housing con-
struction costs not only have the highest elasticity but also the highest dy-
namic (-7%). Obviously revenue subsidies to municipal landlords (-5.8%) and 
CPI costs (4%) also have a high dynamic. Conversely, housing allowance costs 
have relatively low elasticity and the lowest dynamic. This is partly a result of 
the household structure in rent-controlled housing (a significant proportion 
of households had high incomes).
As public housing construction costs show the highest elasticity and the 
highest total dynamic, this particular cost item should be focused on in sen-
sitivity analysis. There may be a problem connected with the expected scale 
of needy housing construction. Simultaneously, municipalities may be able to 
solve part of the problem with empty flats by their demolition or sale. The 
movement from rental housing to owner-occupied housing may also be dif-
ferent, if tenants’ decisions take into account future price appreciation. The 
following assumption changes were therefore tested:
1. A change in the annual ‘need’ norm, that is, the demand for public housing 
construction from 10% of the additional demand for rent-controlled hous-
ing to 30% and 50% of the additional demand for rent-controlled housing.
2. A decrease in the costs via voids in municipal housing to 50%.
3. The inclusion of the expected price appreciation into tenure choice. The 
expected price appreciation (g in the equation on user costs calculation) 
was estimated separately for eight zones according to past price increas-
es. All Czech counties were divided into eight zones based on average an-
nual price change in 1998-2002. Under the assumed price cycles the ex-
pected annual appreciation oscillated around 1.5% in the capital of Prague 
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Figure 4.7 Separate public cost items and rents
Source: FBS 2002, own computation
(Zone 1) and was close to zero in Zone 8, composed of counties with the 
lowest past price increases.
As Figure 4.8 makes clear, only the inclusion of the expected price appreciation 
into tenure choice simulations moved the ‘quasi-norm’ on ‘optimal’ (‘efficient’) 
rents from a level equal to 220% of current rents to a level equal to 180% of 
current rents. It is possible to assume that some people rely on price apprecia-
tion and also perceive housing as an investment, while many others consider 
housing purely as a consumption good and do not see any benefit from fu-
ture capital gains. Taking into account the fact that other important costs aris-
ing from the residualisation of public housing could not be included, it is still 
possible to conclude that the government reference point on rents (the quasi-
norm on regulated rents from the point of view of efficiency) should have been 
‘somewhere’ between 180% and 220% of controlled rents in 2002.
Further elaboration of these conclusions (re-computation for specific mar-
ket segments, regions, cities and, especially, social groups of households) 
would be needed if they should really be used for practical implementation. 
The purpose of presenting these simulations here is just a rough estimate of 
how big the difference might be between efficient state rent policy (‘optimal’ 
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rents) and the actual situation in 2002. The results show that the efficiency of 
economic subsidies in this field was very low because the difference between 
‘optimal’ and real rents in the rent-controlled housing sector was very high.
One serious problem with housing allowance in the form valid until 2006, 
pointed out in a study by Mareš (2001), was its low take-up, that is, the number 
of actual applicants was lower than the number of eligible households. “Refer-
ence generally is made to the ‘non-take up of social security benefits’, that is, 
benefits are not drawn by the people they are designed for, and to an indicator 
of one form of crisis in the effectiveness of the welfare state – wherein it fails 
to accomplish its objectives” (Mareš, 2001, p. 3). According to Mareš, less than 
40% of households eligible for housing allowance in 1996 applied for it, and 
similarly in 1999, only around 60% of eligible households applied for it. Among 
the reasons Mareš cites are the relatively general problems associated with all 
social benefits: values that prevent a person from letting themselves be de-
pendent on support, rational calculations of its real benefit considering the 
costs involved in applying for it, a lack of information, the effort to avoid being 
stigmatised, a lack of capability (Mareš, 2001, p. 12).
However, in the case of the housing allowance there was, in my opinion, 
an important specific reason for its low take-up. As noted in my evaluation of 
effectiveness of housing allowance, the allowance is tenure-neutral, does not 
take into account real housing costs and tariffs used in formula simply ignore 
the existence of market rents. The main fault of the allowance lies therefore 
in the fact that it is allocated not according to the level of housing expendi-
tures (being e.g., much lower for outright owners) but only according to the 
household income situation. Consequently, many eligible homeowners with 
relatively low housing expenditures do not apply for the allowance; in this 
way the state offers help as well to those who do not need it (while excluding 
those who need it). This can be demonstrated by drawing the distribution of 
housing allowances not according to household income (as was done in the 
evaluation of its effectiveness) but according to housing expenditure-to-in-
come ratio assuming again a 100% take-up of an allowance.
Figure 4.9 presents the distribution of the sum of potentially paid housing 
allowances among households with varying levels of total housing expendi-
ture-to-income ratio, if I assume expenditures being before allowance (the 1st 
decile corresponds to a low level of housing expenditure-to-income ratio, the 
10th decile to a high level of housing expenditure-to-income ratio) under the 
situation of 100% take-up in 2002 (again, using data from FBS, 2002). It ap-
pears that the allowance did not adequately target households with higher 
expenditure-to-income ratio, as, for example, 5% of the sum of potentially 
paid allowances would be distributed among households with the lowest level 
of this ratio (1st decile). It is necessary to note that targeting households with 
high housing expenditure-to-income ratio should be the main objective of 
housing allowances; targeting households according to the household income 
is just a by-product of the main goal of the allowance.
The efficiency of housing allowance was due to low take-up and inap-
propriate targeting according to real expenditures-to-income ratio (caused 
by its ‘tenure-neutral’ setting) definitely lower than optimal. There could be 
substantial state savings if the allowance was better targeted to those for 
whom housing really was unaffordable, that is, whose housing expenditure-
to-income ratio was high. Outright homeowners needed less state aid than 
households living in the rental sector. On the other hand, there was no sign 
that the allocation of housing allowances would lead to rent inflation – as the 
allowance could hardly be used by tenants paying market rents and as it was 
related to rents regulated administratively, its role was thus more connected 
with social policy tasks than with the specific goals of national housing policy.
It is generally very difficult to find a tool for assessing the efficiency of tax 
subsidy; it is definitely more difficult than assessing its effectiveness. One 
possible approach would be to estimate the influence of tax subsidy on hous-
ing demand and house prices but I lack the appropriate data to do so. Clearly, 
in many cases the tax subsidies increase the level of housing consumption 
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Figure 4.9 The distribution of total sum of housing allowances in the Czech Republic, 
according to the housing expenditures-to-income ratio (assumed 100% take up), 2002
N = 3,292
Source: FBS 2002 
only among high-income groups of society and have a marginal effect on 
housing consumption (affordability) among those in need of state assistance. 
The withdrawal of tax subsidies might thus have an effect only on prices and 
consumption in high-level housing market segment but we cannot demon-
strate it with the data available here. The only thing I can do is to evaluate the 
scale of tax subsidies in the Czech Republic in comparison with some other 
developed countries; for this purpose I will use the findings of a recent paper 
(Lux, 2005a).
The biggest public tax subsidy (and the biggest violation of both tax neu-
trality and tenure neutrality) can be found in countries that allow almost un-
limited deduction of interest (principal) on mortgage credits from the income 
tax base using the marginal income tax rate (which is usually progressive, 
and the highest tax rate is usually higher than the standard tax rate on capi-
tal income) and where neither imputed rent nor capital gains are taxed. In 
many countries capital gains tax is not collected regularly, only in the case of 
the sale of real estate, when it becomes possible to make the best calculation 
of the amount of capital appreciation – the base then equals the difference 
between the purchasing price and the selling price. Given that this arrange-
ment benefits owners who never move or at least move rarely, this form of 
taxation does not fully represent a consistent capital gains taxation. In addi-
tion, payment of this type of tax is often ‘deferred’ for several years, and if the 
income from the sale of the real estate is used within the time frame of defer-
ral to purchase another piece of real estate for residential use, then it may be 
completely relieved or at least deferred again until the newly purchased real 
estate is sold.
The following international comparison of tax subsidies in 19 selected 
countries refers to both possible forms of public tax subsidy: (1) the deduction 
from the tax base or directly from taxes payable of interest or a part of the 
principal from mortgage credit used to purchase owner-occupied housing (a 
public subsidy of owner-occupied housing as a consumer good), and (2) relief 
from payment of tax on imputed rent and on capital appreciation (a public 
subsidy of owner-occupied housing as an investment good). Figure 4.10 shows 
how selected countries are divided according to the significance of the public 
tax subsidy; this scheme of course provides only an orientation, as in order to 
rank countries by their total public tax subsidies I would require exact figures 
on the current values of these subsidies per capita in each country.
A consistent form of taxation of owner-occupied housing is where people 
on the one hand are unable to use the tax deduction of interest on mortgage 
credit obtained for purchasing owner-occupied housing, but on the other 
hand where they do not have to pay tax on imputed rent and tax on capital 
appreciation (i.e., owner-occupied housing is regarded as a consumer good). 
Also consistent is the kind of taxation of owner-occupied housing where the 
owners can take advantage of the tax deduction of interest on credit obtained 
to purchase their housing but still pay tax on imputed rent and capital appre-
ciation (i.e., owner-occupied housing is regarded as an investment good).
Some countries are situated somewhere between the two. For example, in 
Norway, owner-occupied housing is regarded as an investment good (tax de-
duction of interest is allowed and imputed rent is taxed), but capital gains 
are not taxed. Conversely, in Greece capital gains are taxed, but, except for 
unusually large houses, imputed rent is not taxed. In Austria, owner-occupied 
housing is regarded more as a consumer good, but the option of tax deduction 
of the interest exists in a quite limited form. In Germany it is not possible to 
write off interests from the tax base, but in the past for homeowners (regard-
less of whether they used credit or not to purchase their dwelling) there was a 
limited opportunity in the first eight years after buying a dwelling to deduct a 
certain portion of the purchase price from the tax base as depreciation – this 
form of tax advantage was replaced in 1996 with a new grant system, so by 
2004-2005 it related to only a small proportion of homeowners.
In the countries listed in Figure 4.10 with inconsistent taxation of owner-
occupied housing and with a public tax subsidy of owner-occupied housing, 
what usually happens is that the option to deduct the interests from income 
tax base is not accompanied by an obligation to pay tax on imputed rent and 
capital gains (in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, however, it is necessary to 
keep in mind that imputed rent is actually taxed in the form of a higher prop-
erty tax, and thus their relative position is in reality closer to that of Norway 
and Greece). For the purpose of tax deduction of the interest on mortgage 
credit, the taxation rate used in these countries is lower than the highest 
marginal income tax rate applied in those countries, which to a certain extent 
reduces the level of public subsidy.
Finally, in countries with the most inconsistent taxation of owner-occupied 
housing, listed in the right-hand column of Figure 4.10, owner-occupied hous-
ing receives the maximum possible public tax subsidy because the deduction 
of interest on mortgage credit is usually applied through higher marginal in-
come tax rates, and owners either explicitly or de facto do not pay the tax on 
either imputed rent or capital gains. Although the Netherlands ranks among 
the countries that allow taxpayers to deduct the interest on mortgage credit 
under the marginal income tax rate, the level of public subsidy in this country 
is reduced by a small tax on imputed rent. Similarly, in Belgium there exists, al-
beit very limited, a tax on imputed rent, and the deduction of interest on credit 
under the marginal income tax rate is temporally limited and progressively re-
duces after five years of credit repayment. For this reason, these two countries 
are also presented in Figure 4.10 as located somewhere in the middle.
In the majority of the advanced countries monitored here, the taxation 
of owner-occupied housing was relatively consistent and mainly held the 
viewpoint of owner-occupied housing as a consumer good. The largest de-
gree of inconsistency was found in the US, Portugal, and in the Czech Repub-
lic as well; the Czech Republic was thus one of a relatively small segment of 
countries that applied the ‘extreme’ maximum tax subsidy. It can therefore 
be concluded that public budgets in the Czech Republic paid a relatively very 
high price for this regressive support of acquisition of owner-occupied hous-
ing and, taking into account the effectiveness of this subsidy, there are defi-
nitely many opportunities (reform approaches) to save public expenditures in 
this field without endangering the affordability of owner-occupied housing for 
low-income (needy) households at the same time. Efficiency of the tax sub-
sidy in the Czech Republic is therefore low.
The original purpose of housing savings schemes was mainly to offer low-
interest and easily available credits for housing purchase and modernisation, 
that is, the system was originally introduced to help people overcome the ‘tilt’ 
problem and increase affordability of housing loans. The efficiency of public 
support of the system of housing savings may therefore be demonstrated by 
the value of the coefficient of the outstanding loan-to-savings balance (the 
share of the balance of loan accounts to the balance of savings accounts). 
We can see in Figure 4.11 that even many years after the introduction of the 
scheme the balance reached only 30.8% by 30 June 2005 and the system was 
still characterised by excessive savings and low demand for loans. Although 
from 2002 onwards (after stagnation and a slight decline in 1999-2002) the 
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Figure 4.10 Public tax subsidy in selected developed countries
value of loan-to-savings balance shows a tendency to increase, it was still be-
low the level of developed countries with a similar system of housing savings 
(Austria, Germany) in the middle of 2005, where it ranged between 70% and 
80%. It is worthy of repetition that if savers do not take out a loan from the 
scheme they can use their savings (including state premiums) for any pur-
pose.
The reason for the low value of the loan-to-savings balance in the Czech 
Republic may be the too ‘generous’ state support, which attracted an exces-
sively large number of clients (‘good brothers’) into the system. The state pre-
mium on housing savings is definitely higher than in Germany or Austria and 
its generosity, which remained even after the partial reform of the system 
in 2004, has been admitted even by representatives of two housing savings 
banks participating in the survey evaluating the efficiency of market-based 
housing finance system in the Czech Republic (see more in Lux et al., 2005; 
Sunega & Lux, 2007). Due to the generous state premium no other savings 
product (at the same level of risk and for particular limit of savings) on the 
financial market could compete with the housing saving scheme. The optimal 
amount of annual savings maximising interest return is equal to CZK 18,000, 
yielding interest of about 27% on annual savings amount for pre-reform con-
tracts (contracts concluded before 2004). Effective interest rate on the total of 
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Figure 4.11 Loan activity of building savings banks in the Czech Republic, 1997-2005
Note: The line shows the share of the outstanding loans granted in a given year to savings (deposits) on the savings 
accounts of housing savings banks in a given year, in % (i.e., the coefficient of the outstanding loan-to-savings balance). 
Source: Ministry of Finance, own computation
savings is lower but is still a double-digit number annually for the five-year 
savings period while the interest rate on a five-year banking deposit was at 
the same time only close to 4% a year. Moreover, people can hold onto ‘old’ 
contracts (pre-reform contracts) for decades (they can continue to save even 
after five years under the original set of interest and premium conditions) 
and many savers do so.
The high public costs and not very transparent outcomes of the whole sys-
tem are often defended by the argument that housing savings schemes were 
introduced not to support housing consumption but more to support house-
hold saving behaviour. However, even this argument has been proven false by 
Plischke (2007). She clearly demonstrated that total net savings as a percent-
age of a country’s GDP is definitely not higher in the Czech Republic (with its 
system of state-supported housing savings) than in Poland (without such a 
system) and according to time series data there is no sign that the introduc-
tion of the housing savings scheme led to growth in the propensity to save. 
She found a clear inconsistency between the development of value of balance 
on housing savings accounts and development of net savings as percentage of 
GDP between 2001 and 2004 – while the first sharply grew, the second sharply 
declined throughout this period. Moreover, she showed how partial reform of 
the housing savings scheme at the begin of 2004 had an impact on house-
hold savings behaviour – many savers switched their time deposits to a hous-
ing savings account in 2003 to be eligible for pre-reform high state premium 
while the overall level of time deposit savings (including savings held both by 
commercial banks and housing savings banks) remained stable.
The value of the spread (defined as the difference between cost of funds 
and average interest rate on loans extended from housing savings schemes) 
for housing savings banks has been estimated as being probably significantly 
higher than for mortgage lenders. The reasons for this could be the lower vol-
ume of granted loans, the fixed interest rate for the whole period of loan re-
payment and the possibility to prepay the loan any time free of penalty. Such 
loan conditions increase operating costs. Housing savings banks also offer 
low-value loans and administration of such loans could be more expensive 
(when we consider marginal costs) than in the case of mortgage loans. How-
ever, the higher level of spread may also be a sign of hidden ‘product’ monop-
olisation and inefficiency because in their loan activities they do not, in fact, 
compete with mortgage lenders. All housing savings banks are members of 
larger financial groups; generally, the parent bank (universal bank) owns one 
housing savings bank and sometimes one specialised mortgage bank as well. 
In other words, though housing savings banks could offer loans with lower in-
terests than universal or mortgage banks (thanks to cheaper deposits assured 
by state subsidisation) they are not doing so as in this case they would com-
pete directly with their partners in the same financial group.
The housing savings system played a very important role at the beginning 
of transition when mortgages were either not yet introduced or unaffordable 
for most of the population. However, the comparative advantages gradually 
disappeared. The system is in acute need of reform but due to the bad legisla-
tive framework this would be very difficult. The system (including the level 
of state premium) may be changed only by a law passed by parliament (and 
not by a decision of the government); lobbying of powerful banking groups is 
however much more effective in parliament than among government mem-
bers. The state premium is set by law in its absolute value (not relating to 
general economic conditions) and the government cannot adjust the premi-
um level to react to changing inflation and interest rate conditions in finan-
cial markets. This makes the whole system very rigid and unresponsive to the 
changing economic environment.
In the efficiency part of housing policy (subsidy) evaluation I dealt with eco-
nomic subsidy stemming from rent regulation, housing allowance, state pre-
mium to housing savings scheme and tax relief. The efficiency of all men-
tioned subsidies is probably sub-optimal though I cannot make any judgment 
on tax relief; especially low efficiency was detected in the case of the eco-
nomic subsidy stemming from rent regulation and state premiums to housing 
savings. The sub-optimal result for housing allowance is one of the outcomes 
of housing allowance being perceived more as a general social benefit than a 
housing policy tool in the Czech Republic. As the responsibility for housing al-
lowance lies within MLSA, it might be related to other social benefits as well 
but it shows substantial efficiency failures when the goals and perspectives of 
national housing policy are taken into account.
I have shown the deep gap between ‘efficient’ and real rent prices in rent-
controlled housing sector and demonstrated low efficiency of state premiums 
to housing savings both by performance of housing savings bank (low loan-
to-savings balance, competition constraints) as well as by savers’ behaviour 
(switching savings from other deposits by holding overall savings rate con-
stant). In the case of tax relief I was able only to show that the Czech Republic 
belongs among countries with the highest inconsistency in housing taxation, 
that is among countries with maximal fiscal subsidies to promote homeown-
ership. The actual efficiency has not been evaluated here as data were not 
available for that time.
The previous chapter assessed selected state interventions in the field of 
housing consumption (housing subsidies) in the Czech Republic. In Chapter 2, 
however, I noted that inappropriate targeting of huge economic subsidies al-
located during the 1990s has also been described in other transition countries. 
Therefore the question is whether low effectiveness and efficiency of housing 
subsidies (including new ones) is either specific to the Czech Republic or a 
common feature of housing policy reform in all (or most) transition countries? 
If this is not a shared phenomenon then the question arises: what factors vis-
ible through international comparison can explain the low effectiveness and 
efficiency of Czech public subsidies?
In the Introduction I stated that the main goal of this book is not compara-
tive. However, in some cases only international comparison can help under-
standing of the particular situation in one country. Therefore I have included 
a partial comparison of housing policy changes in six transitional countries, 
using the outcome of a Local Government and Housing project conducted in 
2000 and 2001. This project gathered details of policy programmes direct-
ly from country experts and through intense discussion with the research 
team – and not only from secondary sources alone – and thus met the imper-
atives on international comparative research discussed above. The selected 
countries were the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Poland.
This fifth chapter expands on the second chapter by presenting an eval-
uation of the efficiency and effectiveness of housing policy interventions in 
the field of housing consumption in the selected transition countries. Again, 
the concept of welfare economics has been used for the evaluation; due to a 
lack of data this could only be done partially and only for those countries that 
took part in the project. In summary, the purpose of this chapter is to answer 
the third research question, which is, as follows:
3.   How efficient and effective were state interventions in other transition countries 
(if the imperative on individual openness of researchers during the international 
comparison of housing policies is met)? What explanations for particular levels of 
effectiveness and related (subordinated) efficiency of state interventions in the field 
of housing consumption in the Czech Republic can be found in a partial interna-
tional comparison? Can such a partial international comparison help me to under-
stand the specific situation in the Czech Republic?
Table 5.1 shows the main socio-economic indicators for the selected transi-
tion countries in the time of the comparative research, that is between 1999 
and 2001. With the exception of Slovakia, the total population was shrink-
ing, particularly in those countries with the lowest GDP per capita (Bulgaria, 
Romania) and Estonia. The Czech Republic had the highest percentage of its 
population living in urban areas, while Romania and Slovakia were among 
the countries with the lowest level of urbanisation. Bulgaria and Romania 
had the lowest GDP per capita and Bulgaria and Slovakia were struggling with 
high unemployment.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide summaries of general housing conditions and 
tenure structure in that time. The most significant changes in tenure struc-
ture appeared in Estonia, Slovakia and Romania; these are consequences of 
large-scale public housing privatisation. In the Czech Republic and Poland, 
due to the slower tempo of privatisation, municipalities remained the largest 
landlords of rental housing in 2001. Unfortunately, the figure indicating the 
share of private rental housing of the total housing stock was not available, 
though this housing sector was present in all analysed countries. The highest 
share was probably in Estonia and the Czech Republic, where restitution of 
property to former owners applied to a relatively large amount of expropri-
ated residential housing. The number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants was 
relatively high in Estonia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. From this point of 
view, it would seem that these countries were characterised by housing suffi-
ciency.36 Poland had the lowest number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants and 
as the only country in our comparison probably suffered from a real shortage 
of housing units.
The selected countries were grouped into three types according to the public 
housing privatisation strategy: (1) Fast privatisers (Romania, Estonia, and Slova-
kia); (2) Slow privatisers (Czech Republic, Poland); and (3) Bulgaria. Only a weak 
association between a country’s per capita GDP and its privatisation approach 
can be detected but certainly such a relationship cannot be supported. Figure 
5.1 draws a comparison of approaches to public housing privatisation (hom-
eownership versus rental model) with the level of decentralisation in the field 
of rental housing sector. The y axis represents the application/non-applica-
tion of right-to-buy policy. Higher decentralisation in the segment of rental 
housing, measured on the x axis, is assumed to be connected with:
 higher freedom in rent setting and dwelling allocation for both private and 
public landlords (abolition or substantial limitation of central rent control 
and/or central public dwelling allocation criteria);
 lower state (legal) tenant protection in both private and public rental hous-
ing; and
 larger competence of local governments in allocation of housing allowanc-
es to tenants.
Here follow the main facts that influenced the positioning of countries in Fig-
ure 5.1. In Romania the rents were regulated by the state and allocation of va-
cant public dwellings was also limited by central criteria. In Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic rent regulation and tenant protection had been maintained 
although municipalities were free to allocate vacant or new dwellings. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, in Estonia rent regulation was abolished at a 
state level and only half of the municipalities applied some kind of rent reg-
ulation on their territories. Estonian municipalities could also substantially 
shape housing allowances by setting expenditure ceilings. Though rents were 
controlled in Poland, the ceiling set in the Act was relatively high to allow 
municipalities higher rent deregulation, with rents reflecting a dwelling prop-
erty value. The Polish municipalities were responsible for housing allowance 
payments. Slovakia applied only a partial right-to-buy policy.
There is one clear logical implication. The policy orientated towards the ho-
meownership model, accompanied by low privatisation prices or even ‘no-cost’ 
sales (Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania), leads to rapid residualisation of public hous-
ing. This is connected to social segregation (only the lowest income households 
or pensioners do not use their right to purchase a dwelling) and a strengthen-
ing of tensions between tenants in public and private (restituted) housing sec-
tors. The problem with tenants in restituted houses appeared in all countries 
belonging to the fast privatisers that offered very advantageous right-to-buy 
options to public housing tenants. This problem was gradually solved in Roma-
nia and Bulgaria by giving tenants priority in municipal housing allocations or 
in Estonia by allocating privatisation vouchers among them (see country profile 
details in Lux et al., 2003). In the converse situation, tenants in restituted hous-
es in Poland and the Czech Republic obtained neither preferential state subsi-
dies nor any preference in vacant municipal housing allocation.
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(right-to-buy policy)
Small decentralisation
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of state housing policies
Theoretically, no privatisation approach can be evaluated as purely bad 
from the point of view of economic efficiency. Large-scale public housing pri-
vatisation (homeownership model) is the speediest way of dealing with the 
burden of socialist heritage, cutting public subsidies substantially and sup-
porting the housing market (though it leads to tensions between different 
groups of society due to its very low effectiveness). On the other hand, policy 
orientated towards the rental model helps maintain a significant rental sec-
tor (possibly allowing higher labour mobility in the future), guards against so-
cial segregation and spatial residualisation and allows more substantial rent 
price deregulation. Existing public rental housing can be used to assist social-
ly needy households with lower incomes in the future and this may produce 
substantial public savings (no need to subsidise needy households in other 
ways, e.g., support for new social housing construction or down-payment sub-
sidies for housing purchase).
If I want to compare the countries according to the efficiency and effective-
ness of their supply and demand-side housing subsidies in the field of hous-
ing consumption, I would need to specify the assumptions for such evalua-
tion, as I did during the same evaluation made for the specifically Czech case. 
However, these assumptions need to take into account the limited possibility 
of getting any reliable statistical data in those countries for that time.
Let me thus assume demand-side subsidies as effective if:
 the housing allowance model does not use notional housing costs (tariffs) 
and instead includes actual costs and expenditure ceilings in the equation 
(capped by ceilings);
 the housing allowance model applies ‘optimal’ taper which has only a 
modest poverty/unemployment trap effect.
The effect of using notional instead of actual costs in housing allowance com-
putation has already been discussed in the second chapter. Notional costs 
are generally set at a low level (level of rents in ‘privileged’ rental sector) and 
those households living in free market (‘unprivileged’) rental housing paying 
rents several times higher are thus excluded from any effective help. More-
over, the reliance of such models on income as the only criterion and not tak-
ing into account actual housing costs may lead to the situation when a sub-
stantial share of households with low actual housing expenditure-to-income 
ratio may also be eligible for a benefit (see the situation in the Czech Republic 
above). In other words, under such conditions the allowance helps those who 
do not need help and, in contrast, refuses effective help to those who need it. 
My assumption is not by far universal: if there were not two levels of rents for 
the same dwellings (market and regulated; market rents being several times 
higher than regulated) and if notional costs relating to one rent price level are 
set separately for each municipality (to catch regional deviations from aver-
age house and rent prices) the housing allowance with notional costs may al-
so be effective. High taper incorporated into housing allowance model is also 
not very effective as it may lead to a poverty/unemployment trap if benefi-
ciaries prefer unemployment and benefit dependency as a better option than 
looking for a new job.
Let me assume supply-side subsidies as effective if:
 there is a clear definition of social housing in a particular country;
 subsidies are directly or indirectly targeted to households in social need;
 subsidies are more designed for rental housing than for homeownership;
 central ‘old’ non-targeted rent regulation rules are abolished or, at least, 
rent control power is transferred into the competence of municipalities.
Precise definition of policy goals (provision of social housing) certainly helps 
to enhance the effectiveness of potential subsidies (or, at least, to better its 
evaluation). Targeting new supply-side subsidies as well as allocating exist-
ing public flats with controlled rents among needy households (application of 
means testing) is a basic condition of any truly effective help. Moreover, only 
regular income inspections of beneficiaries can prevent the situation where 
higher income households profit from ‘social’ rents. If household income 
exceeds the ceiling set by the Act or the subsidy programme then landlords 
should have the right to make appropriate rent adjustments.
The preference of rental housing programmes to subsidisation of home-
ownership (via down payment subsidies) is justified because, from the point 
of view of effectiveness in the latter case, targeting is less strict (see the eval-
uation of subsidies to promote homeownership in the Czech Republic). This is 
a natural consequence of high house prices and a sharp decrease in financial 
affordability of owner-occupied housing in the region. It can be assumed that 
the majority of needy households in the selected transition countries would 
need to cover the substantial costs of house purchase through such a subsidy 
because they are not eligible for mortgage loans to cover the residual costs. 
Moreover, the down payment subsidies can be abused (speculative sales by 
future homeowners) even if forbidden by law; political representatives can be 
expected to abolish possible restrictions on house sales just because it is pop-
ular and/or such restrictions may be found as unconstitutional (breaching the 
right for free disposal connected with private ownership).
If allocation of new ‘social’ rented dwellings were really based on means 
testing and if regular income inspections were applied, then households no-
ticing an increase in their incomes will be forced to move out of the sector 
and vacated flats will serve another needy household. This is, however, not 
possible in the case of down payment subsidies for house purchase or con-
struction. On the other hand, in some environments subsidies directed to 
non-profit social housing may lead to stigmatisation and social segregation 
while promoting homeownership may contribute better to wider welfare 
goals (health, education) and prevent, at least partially, deepening social seg-
regation. As this discussion is closely concerned with the evaluation of the 
comparative benefits of demand and supply-side subsidies, on the general 
level it is far from over (despite current policy shifts to demand-side subsidies 
and possibly only temporary homeownership promotion). My assumption is 
related more to the particular situation in transition societies where housing 
affordability for needy households is perceived as a far more important is-
sue than social segregation, a preference clearly proven by the survey of local 
government representatives conducted for the above-mentioned comparative 
project in selected transitional countries. Housing affordability is mentioned 
as the main target of local housing policies in all the selected transition coun-
tries. In contrast, social inclusion (social segregation prevention) is regarded 
as the least important or almost the least important local housing policy tar-
get in the same countries (see Lux et al., 2003).
The criteria based on abolition or substantial change to the ‘old’ central 
rent regulation rules applied to existing rental housing (often both public and 
restituted private rental stock) is also crucial because such regulation benefits 
a substantial share of higher income households (Lux, 2001). The untargeted 
‘first generation’ rent control not only distorts the housing market but it is 
also connected with considerable social injustice.
Let me assume demand-side subsidies as efficient if:
 the housing allowance model takes account of regional and area price dif-
ferences when setting housing expenditure ceilings (notional costs, maxi-
mum notional costs);
 the housing allowance model applies a normative rate of burden that rises 
with housing costs and the income of an applicant;
 both municipal and state budgets co-finance housing allowance payments.
Regional differentiation in notional costs or notional maximum costs that are 
included in the allowance calculation may lead to public expenditure savings 
as there may be (and in reality are) huge house price differences between re-
gions and cities in one country. If prices (or rents) are lower in some region, 
the ceiling may also be lower, and vice versa. The form of the normative rate of 
burden was discussed in Chapter 2. This criterion means, in other words, that 
households moving to a more expensive dwelling (better equipped and/or in 
a better location) are expected to meet a higher proportion of housing costs. 
Public spending can be lower than in a case when such a condition is not ap-
plied.
Co-financing of allowance payments decreases state expenditures by mak-
ing municipal rent policies more careful and efficient. Municipalities partially 
responsible for paying the allowance due will increase the rents in their hous-
ing stock only if it does not lead to substantial increase in allowance pay-
ments. I assume that total public expenditures on housing allowances (infla-
tion effect) may thus be lower than if municipalities are free to set the rents 
and the state budget alone will cover the costs of rising rents.
Let me assume supply-side subsidies as efficient if:
 subsidies for rental housing construction are allocated more among pri-
vate non-profit housing associations than among municipalities;
 subsidy programmes presuppose the participation of private capital; and
 subsidies are ‘sustainable’ in the long term (the state budget will have 
enough resources to cover the demand of applicants in the future).
Although municipalities may also be efficient developers of new social hous-
ing the general trend based mainly on the past experience both in EU coun-
tries as well as transition societies is to strengthen the role of private non-
profit entities (housing associations, cooperatives) (Maclennan & More, 1997). 
Though unconfirmed by empirical research, one assumes that housing asso-
ciations are more efficient in planning and housing management than pub-
lic authorities, purely because they are responsible for their losses. This form 
of new social housing development allows for higher participation of private 
capital and further cuts in potential housing subsidies.
Though some programmes (mostly subsidies for young people) are targeted 
at people in housing need, they are often prepared in such a way that does 
not allow long-term sustainability (limited resources, too many applicants, 
long waiting period). These poorly designed programmes are more expres-
sions of political populism rather than efficient housing policy instruments.
To make the conclusions from this partial international comparison straight-
forward and really helpful to understand the particular situation in the Czech 
Republic I will evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of subsidies together 
(i.e., assuming that both policy targets are closely connected). There are sev-
eral possible trade-offs between the requirements of subsidy efficiency and 
subsidy effectiveness. One example can be private capital participation which 
is always assumed in the case of subsidies promoting the homeownership, 
but they are less present in subsidies for new social rental housing construc-
tion. In the instances of such trade-offs, in my evaluation the decisive influ-
ence would have been assigned to subsidy effectiveness, which is consistent 
with the subordination of efficiency to effectiveness in this book. The target-
ing of public support is the main purpose of public intervention; economic 
efficiency should only ensure that the costs of the intervention are as lowest 
as possible.
Figure 5.2 summarises the comparison of state housing policies in the 
field of housing consumption in the selected transition countries around the 
years 2000 and 2001. Based on the criteria outlined above, Poland was the only 
country with a relatively high level of efficiency/effectiveness in both demand 
and supply-side subsidies. It had a legal definition of social housing, hous-
ing association legislation and subsidies were allocated mainly for new social 
rental housing construction among non-profit housing associations. A subsidy 
took the form of a qualified loan and covered only part of total construction 
costs (the remainder had to be covered from private resources). The allocation 
of social flats was subject to means-testing and associations made regular in-
come inspections of beneficiaries (every two years). ‘Old’ rent regulation was 
slighter and the housing allowance model was counted with actual housing 
costs limited by indirectly set ceilings (reflecting the regional differentiation 
in rent prices), applied normative rate of burden increasing with income level 
and a gentle taper did not lead to the poverty trap. The total payment due 
was co-financed from both state and municipal budgets.
Similarly, the Estonian housing allowance (subsistence benefit) model 
did not use flat notional costs and maximum notional cost were set at a lo-
cal level (reflected regional differentiation in housing costs), therefore it pro-
vided more effective help to those in need than the Czech or Slovakian mod-
els. However, the high taper and exclusive state financing disadvantaged the 
model in comparison with the Polish housing allowance model. On the one 
hand, Estonia had already abolished a central system of ‘old’ rent regulation 
and introduced a legal definition of social housing. On the other hand the Es-
tonian government supported only purchase or construction of owner-occu-
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Figure 5.2 Assessment of housing subsidies
pied housing regardless of the applicant’s income and did not introduce any 
non-profit housing associations.
Romania and Slovakia introduced programmes for new ‘social’ rental 
housing construction (means testing is applied during the allocation of dwell-
ings) but in that time neither country introduced non-profit housing associa-
tions nor abolished ‘old’ first-generation rent controls. The Slovakian model 
of housing allowance did not reflect regional price differentiation and pro-
grammes supporting purchase or construction of owner-occupied housing 
were not always sustainable in the long term (many applicants and long wait-
ing period). At the time Romania had no significant demand-side subsidies 
and Bulgaria was the only country to not have implemented decisive supply 
or demand-side subsidies (with the exception of temporal energy allowance).
Surprising was the relative position of the Czech Republic. The Czech 
housing allowance model used only flat notional housing costs, taking no ac-
count of regional differentiation in prices/rents nor reflecting the higher lev-
el of market rents. Allowances were paid solely from the state budget. There 
was no legal definition of social housing, no legislation on housing associa-
tions and the ‘old’ system of untargeted central rent control had been main-
tained in both the public and private rental sector. Though the programme 
for new ‘municipal’ rental housing construction allowed for private capital 
participation, it often led to some kind of ‘quasi-rental’ tenure. As it did not 
include means testing the effectiveness of this subsidy was low. No other mu-
nicipal social housing development programmes following the rules of Slova-
kian case were introduced at the time.
If we compare Figure 5.1 with Figure 5.2, we can draw relatively important 
conclusions. The most effective/efficient subsidies were implemented in the 
country where general policy orientated towards the rental model was ac-
companied by decentralisation in the rental housing sector (Poland). If we ex-
clude Bulgaria and Romania from the comparison (as they miss some types of 
subsidy), the least effective/efficient subsidies appeared in the country where 
policy orientated towards the rental model was accompanied by a low level of 
decentralisation in the rental housing sector (the Czech Republic).
This is not just because higher decentralisation itself leads to higher ef-
ficiency/effectiveness of subsidies measured according to our criteria (co-
financing of allowances, abolition of ‘old’ central state rent regulation). This 
may also be due to the fact that when the old inefficient practices are simply 
decentralised to the local level or indirectly abolished (e.g., through housing 
privatisation) the central administration has, very probably, stopped being at-
tacked by various interest groups wanting to keep those practices alive. This 
might allow the central government to prepare new more efficient/effective 
subsidies with no need to look for any kind of hybrid solution between the 
relics of the past and new initiatives. Decentralisation may thus help central 
governments to clear the table and make a new start.
The comparison of housing conditions in particular countries uncovers an-
other empirical implication. The relative housing sufficiency (Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, and Estonia) leads to lower effectiveness/efficiency of housing 
subsidies while relative housing insufficiency (Poland) leads to the opposite. 
The factor of housing need (housing shortage) may have some influence on 
the actual efficiency and effectiveness of state subsidies because a country 
in acute need of new housing cannot afford to experiment with hybrids of 
new and old practices. However, further empirical work on a bigger sample 
of transitional countries is needed to confirm such a conclusion. The general 
macro-economic situation is influential only if any policy instrument is intro-
duced at all. Bulgaria and Romania, the poorest countries in our comparison, 
had only limited public and private sources to provide effective and efficient 
help to those needing support.
The final chapter of the book should especially answer the following research 
questions:
4.  What general conclusions can be drawn about the application of the role of ‘under-
standing paternalist’ by the Czech state between 1990 and 2005? What reasons 
for particular levels of effectiveness and related (subordinated) efficiency of state 
interventions in the field of housing consumption can be found from housing sys-
tem evolution analysis? What influence did ideologies (norms), traditional problem 
solution patterns and institutional as well as political structures have on the de-
velopment of specific state interventions in the field of housing consumption, and 
what effects did they have on the efficiency and effectiveness of these state inter-
ventions?
5.  Do the main findings of the research conducted for this book show whether it is 
possible to increase efficiency and effectiveness of state intervention in the field of 
housing consumption in the Czech Republic? If so, what would be the policy recom-
mendations?
Several potential causes for the relatively low efficiency and effectiveness of 
housing subsidies in the field of housing consumption during the transition 
in the Czech Republic emerge from detailed descriptions of Czech housing 
system development:
 government instability (since 1996, mainly due to the proportional election 
system);
 the frequent presence of coalition governments with small politically weak 
and always centre-orientated Christian democrats (KDU-CSL) often taking 
the post of the Minister for Regional Development (responsible for housing 
policy);
 the hard-line communists (KSCM) taking second place for a long time in 
parliamentary elections (till 1998);
 very high level of decentralisation of power and the increasing influence of 
mayors of smaller cities on central policies – mayoral lobbying could there-
fore direct central policies to satisfy their own ‘immodest’ interests;
 fragmentation of the responsibility for central housing policy among three 
ministries – Ministry for Regional Development, Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs – and lack of any or, at least, efficient 
cooperation between them;
 ‘populism’ (‘banking socialism’, ‘state capitalism’) of the leading right-wing 
party (ODS) in the first phase of transition preferring short-term achieve-
ments (safety nets, ad hoc reactions), over-employment and excessive 
wealth redistribution to long-term economic growth and modern social 
and housing policies (causing, probably, the economic recession in the sec-
ond part of 1990s or the acceleration of high public budget deficits espe-
cially when the stream of privatised income dried up);
 general fear of political representation in the first phase of transition that 
to alter behaviour patterns common during the communism in this field 
might cause social disorder, breach social peace and endanger the transi-
tional project;
 lengthy period (1998-2006) of government led by ‘market-weak’ social dem-
ocrats (CSSD) trying to establish (preserve) a strong welfare state and in 
the field of housing policy representing the interests of sitting tenants;
 the inherited institutional culture of clientelism and corruption that cre-
ated excellent conditions for social networking and the increasing power 
of lobby groups (all clearly evident during enterprise privatisation), that is 
the factors opposing to higher transparency in government spending (no 
questioning of the efficiency and effectiveness of policies, nor measure-
ment, analysis, or monitoring);
 traditional social norms of Czech society (egalitarism, ‘think left, vote 
right’) coming from traditional animosities to the nobility and Catholic 
Church;
 the inherited normative expectations of Czechs to receive free ‘gifts’ from 
the ‘omnipotent’ state, especially when it concerned the housing;
 the inherited focus of public policymakers and politicians on extensive 
housing indicators (e.g., how much new housing has been built with no at-
tention paid to where and to whom it was allocated) and only very slow 
recognition of the need to define new types of policy assessment means;
 traditionally much attention paid to the ‘social question’, social policy, soli-
darity (again a clearly apparent social norm since 1918);
 due to the large shadow economy, means testing became highly unreli-
able – any kind of targeting of subsidies (increasing the potential effective-
ness of subsidies) would miss its goal;
 relatively good housing conditions supported by a low number of foreign 
immigrants;
 the objective effort of politicians to support the highly taxed middle class 
that received only little from the otherwise generous social support sys-
tem;
 the objective effort of politicians to liberalize energy prices first (gas, oil, 
electricity) and increased utility costs then remained only few room for 
further increase in housing expenditures (e.g., through growth in rents).
Another twofold reason might be found first in the intransigent unwilling-
ness of political representatives to alter views and behaviour patterns in this 
sphere (despite similar action taken in other areas) that had been carried over 
from the era of the previous regime, and secondly in the effort to maintain a 
false image of housing as such a unique and ‘non-marketable’ good that re-
form in this area could lead to political instability and the disruption of the 
entire transformation process. Housing might be intended, and not only in 
the Czech Republic, to absorb the shock coming from other reforms and com-
pensate for the loss resulting from liberalisation in other sectors of the econ-
omy. The security of having ‘a roof over one’s head’ was meant to bridge the 
discomfort from the loss of other social securities.
The main question is: despite the negative social effects of prevailing rent 
regulation leading to the creation of artificial social inequalities and social 
tension, why was (and still is) system reform confronted with so much po-
litical obstruction? One answer is the high level of other household expenses, 
a problem I mentioned above. This problem could be solved by means of an 
housing allowance to needy households, which estimates (Lux et al., 2003) in-
dicate would be eight times less costly to the state budget than public support 
for a housing savings scheme and after calculating the increased rental in-
come to municipalities from higher rents it would ultimately have a positive 
effect on total public budgets. However, the main reason is likely to be outside 
of purely rational financial analysis.
To generally determine which factors may lie behind the limited efficiency 
and effectiveness of subsidies in housing policy, I conducted interviews with 
two former ministers who had been responsible for housing policy and one 
interview with high-ranking public official, all of the same ministry (Ministry 
for Regional Development). An enormous amount of empirical data would be 
required to perform a real structural analysis of the significance of individual 
factors (moreover for multiple countries, in order to allow for a comparison of 
the effect of structural factors), but such data are not available (or would be 
very difficult to obtain), and therefore there is no other option but to partially 
determine the significance of these factors indirectly instead, that is, from the 
opinions of those people who prepared and implemented housing policy dur-
ing the economic transition. Selected statements of the respondents are pre-
sented below in italics.
The respondents most often referred to factors concerned with the politi-
cal system’s immaturity, lack of qualified political representatives, the unwill-
ingness of political representatives to elaborate on long-term concepts, their 
mistrust of research and of recommendations from ministry officials, and the 
strong influence of the personal opinions of the country’s former premier for 
many years, Mr. Vaclav Klaus.
“..the life of society was dominated by politicking and not politics. If the life of society 
had been dominated by politics, then politics would have had to communicate with 
science…that isn’t done, because it’s politicking that’s going on, and it is uneducated 
people who are engaging in that politicking, fools who just happened to get into poli-
tics, where no educated person wants to be…”
“The political situation was such that the left ended up without any qualified people. 
The qualified people were subject to intimidation, the qualified people were excluded 
from society by anti-communism.”
“They were politicking, the right and the left. .... The left didn’t understand enough, it 
had no concept…”
“I’ll tell you that even in housing Klaus was an enemy of concepts. And any concept, 
surely, should be preceded by some kind of analysis. So perhaps that could be a rea-
son. The housing policy concept was passed by the government, in a curtailed form, 
only because Klaus wasn’t present in the government at the time.”
“Klaus just cast a shadow on rent deregulation. In the government he really did say 
that if they were going to talk about deregulation then only without him, he really 
used his mother as an argument…And the landlords didn’t make too much noise, un-
til 1998 … when the initiated process was halted when it was only halfway done.”
“Why didn’t they look to Austria?… The left didn’t pick up on the Austrian experience 
because the political conditions didn’t exist for. .. there was no political force here to 
reach an agreement.“
In response to the question of whether some kind of test of the targeting and 
financial costs was carried out before the introduction of the housing savings 
scheme: “I don’t know, I wasn’t in top politics at that time, it’s but not very likely. I 
think maybe that it was actually an MP bill. Even though it was obviously prepared 
by the Ministry of Finance, but I don’t know. I wasn’t that interested in it, so I can’t 
tell you. I know more about the time when I was in or around the government, then 
it was simply a battle. … But about anything else, about testing, say, there was no 
discussion.”
It is necessary to add that the research sphere in this area was also weak and 
largely influenced by ideological clichés inherited from the previous regime. 
Respondents relatively often referred to the fact that the transformation pro-
cess was under way during a time when everything was done by trial and er-
ror. Naturally, this case is no different in other transition countries and there-
fore this factor can hardly explain the specific position of the Czech Republic 
within the cluster of transition countries.
“I wanted to say that many things were done chaotically, there’s no question about 
that. Someone would just come along with this fantastic idea and it was put into play 
without the requisite analyses.”
“As for efficiency, everyone was learning about all that as they went along… It 
couldn’t be solved in a year or two. That was the price of transformation … So, ev-
erything basically proceeded along by trial and error. What was worse were those 
populist proclamations, like, we will give loans to young people … and then also the 
inexperience of those politicians.... I’ll just think this up, and there were x number 
of those. Also, the distrust of public servants and of people who write about these 
things.”
Paradoxically, the extensive decentralisation of power also played a role to 
an extent unparalleled in any other transition country. Because more than 
6,000 municipalities with elected political representation were established in 
the Czech Republic (for a population of ten million), a substantial portion of 
top political representatives began to be recruited from or at least influenced 
by people from the ranks of municipal mayors, who in top politics were mis-
trustful of independent analyses in the field of research and who also tended 
to assert the interests of the municipalities rather than the general principles 
of how a social system should operate.
“It is usually political factors, but in the entire spectrum of politics because the mu-
nicipalities got rental flats from the state, then they built new ones. Housing policy 
was always executed at the local level….this created the strong influence of the may-
ors.”
In response to the question of why the respondent, supposedly operating at 
the level of the municipality, supported the untargeted privatisation of flats 
sold to tenants at less than half their market value while doing nothing for 
those without housing who had to pay high market rents: “Well, the question 
is whether the municipality was able to make that distinction… I understand what 
you’re getting at, of course, why should the well-off receive further support like this, 
but it’s probably not realistic, because that’s decided by the municipal council. The 
majority decides, and that includes poor, rich, middle ranks, the poor are maybe there, 
but maybe they don’t get involved.... At that time a state administration periodical, 
or one of the local authorities published a recommendation saying that the number of 
flats remaining in the ownership of the municipality should be around 10-15% of the 
total number of flats in that municipality’s territory. But then ODS came along and 
that was that. Everything was swept out, even ideas like that, because a council isn’t 
required to adhere to what their predecessors set up. That is not thought through, it 
will come back to haunt the municipality. Well, I still believe that, it’s the reality of 
politics at the local level. So I don’t know how to answer that for you.”
Also cited were factors relating to the political structure, especially in the 
case of governments formed by the left:
“I think that the main reason on the side of the Social Democrats is that **** (influ-
ential Social Democrat deputy) convinced them that they won the elections thanks 
to voters in regulated flats…he managed to do that, so they were afraid to change 
anything.”
The absence of any qualified policy was compensated for by well-prepared 
lobbying that was very effective in transition countries:
“How housing savings was set up, for example, well, there were consultations with 
Germans and Austrians, where building savings operates perfectly, but today that’s 
obviously also the past, but it was something at a certain stage. *** picked that up, 
and really insisted on it, who he got it from I don’t know, I’d have remembered a 
name…so they always picked on these fragments without any theoretical foundation.”
“At the time we had a survey available, I don’t even know who did it, it was just a 
survey, which revealed that only 5% of the people who complete their housing savings 
use the funds for a purpose other than housing. Perhaps not as strictly as defined by 
law, that it goes on furnishing one’s flat, but definitely not on buying cars.” (The re-
sults of this survey, which can no longer be traced, contrast with the results 
of the Housing Attitudes 2001 survey carried out on a national sample of re-
spondents by the Institute of Sociology AS CR; however, it is not known who 
conducted the survey).
“Corruption in the creation of those programmes, legislation, I don’t think so…. Hous-
ing saving banks, in my view, know how to lobby well… so even an initially relatively 
bold proposal for a system amendment was considerably toned down in Parliament, 
because the savings banks simply know how to approach politicians…. I think that 
the lobbying was strong but still fair.”
“These MPs are strongly manipulated by local politicians… so they convinced them, 
that’s the way to go (untargeted programme for the construction of quasi-
ownership ‘municipal’ housing operating between 1995 and 2002). The mayors 
didn’t want to deal with the poor...****, mayors and building companies, and **** al-
ways wanted to oblige the mayors, so the mayors loved it, the building firms loved it 
too, everyone wanted it….”
In response to whether lobbying had a direct effect: “Of course it does. But that 
has to do with the fact that the neoliberal concept lacks any social context, lacks any 
analysis of the social consequences. I mean, it’s terrible who they give state support 
funds to…”
“Certainly there were far more tenants with regulated rent, the pressure in that direc-
tion was much stronger, and it was the transition period, which means, I remember, 
say, when we increased rents, my drivers at the ministry cursed me, even as a minis-
ter.’’
An interesting question is why rent deregulation was such a thorn in the side 
of many politicians on both right and left, while relatively substantial increas-
es in the costs of energy, increases often introduced by enterprises in which 
the state had a substantial ownership share, were usually approved without 
difficulty.
“I think that it was because, first of all, these firms that supply energy had a more 
powerful lobby. Some, like the energy company, were still in the hands of the state 
and clearly the fact that rent increases were always made on July 1 played a role here. 
It seems strange, but I think it was because the state budget was passed in Novem-
ber, December, when they determined the estimated inflation including energy prices; 
there was agreement on the level of the increase in energy costs. And rent always 
came along later on having missed the boat, there was no room left for it. This is my 
layman’s view, but I think that’s it. So a role was played by politics and company lob-
bying. The private landlords never had that kind of lobby, nor did the tenants even, 
definitely that union of landlords at the time, or whatever they were called, the asso-
ciation of landlords, was not operating yet they way it did in later years. The fact that 
rents were frozen, that there were no increases at all, I think that was a fatal error.”
More than a few times the argument was raised about people’s expectations, 
inherited behavioural patterns, and consensual politics. The main parameter 
of housing policy success under the previous regime was the scope of hous-
ing construction, the number of newly built flats. This ‘performance indicator’ 
was also adopted in the transition-era housing policy – it was not important 
for whom housing was being built, the quality of housing construction, or 
whether public subsidies might have some negative effects on the function-
ing of the market; what was important was the scope of housing construction.
“It’s politics, so there’s a certain feeling here in society, and it’s not, at least that’s the 
way we saw it, it’s just not possible to cut things off so easily. Especially when the 
premier just couldn’t accept it and labelled us as deregulators.”
“Capitalism yes, but with a human face, the socialist kind….”
“The aim generally was to activate housing construction itself. No one was building. 
So it was just to get some construction going, generally just to shake up the mar-
ket….At least that’s how politicians saw it.”
In response to the direct question of whether the respondent agreed that a 
certain role could have been played by the fact that housing conditions in the 
Czech Republic were relatively good and essentially ‘everyone had a place to 
live’, one respondent agreed but the remaining two respondents rejected this 
factor, as they were convinced of the existence of a housing shortage. In one 
interview the argument arose that there was enough public financial resourc-
es compared to other transition countries.
“When there was little money, then they thought more about where it went. Here bil-
lions were flowing all the time, so no one was really interested in where; there was 
always enough to hand out. The curves were going up, right? The main emphasis was 
on expanding housing construction, whatever it takes, that kind of nominal, social 
engineering view, that more and more is being built, but that involves how much it 
costs, how it’s inappropriately set, how it’s actually acting as an inhibitor...no one 
was much interested in that.”
As expected, what often surfaced in these interviews were evasive responses, 
excuses, or even a refusal to respond to direct questions about inefficiency.
“I’ll tell you, I really don’t know how to answer that for you, I don’t know and I don’t 
want to speculate.”
“I must admit, I wasn’t that high up in top politics that I’d have been able to do that.”
“How am I supposed to answer to you for Klaus?”
“That’s true. We didn’t work that out, there was too little time.”
“I can’t judge that, I must admit I’m a bit one-sided in that area. I always used to 
look at housing savings – at that time and with that concept and so forth – as an in-
strument of housing policy, that’s true. And I can’t really compare it with anything.”
“I was vehemently opposing (the privatisation of municipal flats), I took a stand 
against it in the government, but I soon figured out that I was talking to myself. Be-
cause it was good for the Ministry of Finance, it was able to rid itself of the pressure 
from the municipalities looking for subsidies from the state budget.”
“..and even now I still say, my God, were you or weren’t you the minister?”
There are two types of factors that may lie behind the low level of efficiency 
and effectiveness of housing policy: explicit factors (expressed by the actors 
themselves) and implicit factors (structural, latent). Explicit factors include 
mainly the lack of sufficient qualifications on the part of political representa-
tives and their ‘politicking’; the distrust politicians felt towards the research 
sphere and towards recommendations from ministry officials; on the political 
right an unwillingness to accept long-term concepts, and on the political left 
an inability to come up with a conceptual solution; the strong influence of 
municipal mayors on central housing policy; the need to find solutions quick-
ly without the opportunity to test them; and the relatively strong lobbying en-
gaged in by interest groups.
Also cited among explicit factors was the need to take into account the at-
titudes and expectations of Czech citizens, who simply could not be ‘cut off’ 
from previous experiences and behavioural patterns; this is consistent with 
the way in which the transition to democracy is understood as a transforma-
tion or reconstitution of old institutional conditions in a new environment, 
but also its relatively strong influence in the Czech environment falls within 
the framework of ‘consensual politics’ (to a certain extent populism) practised 
by the first Czech transition governments of right-wing parties.
By way of illustration, according to the survey Housing Attitudes 2001 car-
ried out on a national sample of the adult population, a full 44% of the re-
spondents who answered the question still believed in 2001 that the state 
should regulate the housing market more than it had been to that time, and 
over 36% were inclined to agree that the state should regulate the housing 
market as much as it had been to that time – 62% of respondents believed 
that the state should regulate the price of building materials; 57% of respon-
dents believed that the state should regulate the price of flats and houses for 
sale; 78% of respondents felt that it should regulate the rent levels and 87% 
of respondents the costs of energy connected with housing. It is clear that 
regulation in connection with the housing market, however ineffective it may 
have been, enjoyed the wide support of the public. These opinions changed 
over time as the ineffectiveness of regulations became more apparent (see, 
for example, the results of the survey by the Public Opinion Research Centre 
(CVVM) in 2006 at www.soc.cas.cz/seb), but the change was more gradual and 
over the long term.
Things were no different with respect to the housing savings scheme – re-
gardless of the fact that higher-income households received the largest pub-
lic benefits, in the CVVM survey on a national sample of roughly 1,000 adults 
conducted in 2006, 83% of respondents felt that the housing savings scheme 
was a very or rather effective instrument for solving housing problems (hous-
ing savings were evaluated best out of all the state’s housing policy instru-
ments assessed in this survey); conversely, respondents evaluated the target-
ed housing allowance as the least effective.
The targeting of public housing subsidies to those who need it and the ef-
ficiency of such support were not demanded by the public, were not monitored 
or questioned in the media, were not the subject of political debate and essen-
tially did not come up at all in public discourse. It was automatically expected 
that expenditures in housing policy would be ineffective and have character of 
universal eligibility. Housing savings scheme was popular because it allowed 
people to obtain support from the state simply on the basis of a household 
creating savings; rarely did anyone question whether the state should use tax 
revenue to support people’s savings, but the majority of middle class members 
were probably glad that they are getting something from the state back. Hous-
ing policy was not viewed as being part of social policy but rather as some-
thing separate from it, which cannot target just the needy; perhaps because 
the problem of housing affordability is common to everyone (housing is unaf-
fordable even for the substantial middle-income category of the population), 
because the allocation of flats was universal and free until not too long ago, 
and because everyone had been entitled to some state assistance at the time. 
The concept of housing policy extensively focusing on the scope of housing 
construction was similarly adopted: what was important is the number of 
newly built flats. It did not matter where they were built, for whom, at what 
level of quality, how they were allocated and whether any public support could 
have a negative impact on the market or social inequality.
The case is the same with rent regulation and the privatisation of flats – a 
survey like Housing Attitudes 2001 demonstrates that there is, for example, a 
large group of people who disagreed with the privatisation of municipal flats 
(usually tenants living in private rental flats or people oriented towards the 
political left), but who, on the other hand, vehemently supported rent regula-
tion; equally there was a large group of people who disagreed with rent reg-
ulation (usually the homeowners and people oriented towards the political 
right), who vehemently supported the privatisation of municipal flats. ‘Regu-
lation’ is a term of the political left, while ‘privatisation’ is a term of the po-
litical right, and no one dug further into the fact that the result is essentially 
the same untargeted economic subsidy for current inhabitants of municipal 
flats, which divides the market into ‘privileged’ and ‘unprivileged’ housing. 
The ideological clash between the ‘ideal’ right (neoliberalism) and the ‘ideal’ 
left (a generous welfare state), which, however, has often gone no further than 
just a clash of narratives, has so exhausted the political and public discourse 
that there has been little space left for criticising public expenditures within 
housing policy in terms of effectiveness and efficiency (both of which lie out-
side ideology). The interviews demonstrated that the perspective (evaluation) 
of efficiency and effectiveness of public subsidies was never considered, was 
never a topic of discussion, and for many (including former members of the 
government) it was an entirely new idea, even partly incomprehensible.
The question is why this perspective never entered into public or politi-
cal discourse, why it remained outside the area of housing policy? Part of the 
reason may be that in the search for ‘ideological purity’ on both sides of the 
political spectrum and the rhetorical conflict there was little room left for it, 
but the answer is also clearly connected with another group of factors that 
are implicit, unexpressed, and latent. Is the reason the fact that there was no 
acute housing shortage in the Czech Republic, even though respondents tend-
ed to reject this factor? Or is what lies behind the unstable governments the 
persistence of an unreformed form of communism, the culture of clientelism 
and corruption? It is very difficult to answer these questions; probably each 
suggested reason had a certain amount of influence, and only in combina-
tion did they lead to the given outcome. The factor of the relatively strong 
political representation of the unreformed Communist Party in Parliament 
certainly ranks among the weaker factors (given the successful effort to cut 
the Communists off from any real political influence), while conversely the 
stronger factors, though this claim remains on a hypothetical level, are likely 
to include clientelism in the transformation culture and the strong influence 
of lobbying filling in for the absence of any independent research, or the re-
tention of inherited behavioural patterns, ‘consensual politics’, unaltered ex-
pectations relating to universal state assistance in the area of housing and 
an emphasis on extensive indicators of housing policy success (the scope of 
housing construction).
The theoretical imperative behind public intervention in the area of housing 
consumption should be the creation of a rational mix of supply and demand-
side subsidies that reacts as flexibly as possible to changes in the housing 
market and economy in general. Other imperatives should be efficiency and 
effectiveness (horizontal and vertical effectiveness) of subsidies (with the 
knowledge that fulfilling both these imperatives at the same time is often 
impossible), neutrality in the allocation of public support in relation to vari-
ous housing tenures (owner-occupied or rental housing), the transparency of 
rules on subsidy distribution and especially the ability to monitor adherence 
to such rules, sustainability (support should satisfy the needs of all those who 
are eligible for it and thus should not create waiting lists or result in a short-
age of finance, etc.) and equality among the mediators in the subsidy distri-
bution (in the sense that all potential ‘mediators’ in the allocation of support, 
in particular the private and public institutions, should be treated in equal 
standing).
The Czech housing policy was far unequivocally skewed in favour of own-
er-occupied housing (which violates the neutrality imperative) and in favour 
of demand-side subsidies (which may violate the imperative of rational mix 
of demand and supply-side subsidies, though deeper analyses would be re-
quired to draw such a conclusion). The explicit priority of the policy to sup-
port demand was balanced by large economic subsidies that by their latent 
nature are forms of supply-side subsidies (in both rental and in the owner-
occupied housing sectors); however these forms of support are temporary and 
will soon come to an end. Czech housing policy is in violation of the impera-
tive of transparency owing to the high, though latent and often overlooked 
economic subsidies, the division of responsibility for housing policy among 
three ministries, and especially the absence of any evaluation or monitoring 
of subsidy distribution. The majority of programmes, however, are sustainable 
from the perspective that eligible applicants do obtain the support they are 
entitled to within a reasonable period of time.
Table 6.1 presents a summary of evaluations of how well specific instru-
ments of housing policy in the field of housing consumption applied in the 
Czech Republic meet the selected theoretical imperatives for how housing 
policy should operate. This is not an exhaustive list. The evaluation is very 
general and in many cases, owing to the absence of information, is based on 
logical estimates or secondary information (data). The programmes evaluated 
best are marked in medium grey, and the programmes evaluated worst are in 
dark grey. On the basis of this evaluation, the best include the programme for 
the construction of supported housing and the housing allowance; to some 
extent also the programme for the construction of municipal rental flats for 
limited-income households (based on conditions valid since 2003) and prefer-
ential loans for young first-time buyers. The worst evaluated forms of public 
support include economic subsidies in the area of rental and owner-occupied 
housing (rent regulation and the privatisation of flats) and support for the 
construction of municipal rental flats based on conditions valid up to the end 
of 2002; to some extent as well support for the construction of rental housing 
as part of foreign investment incentives, the state premium on building sav-
ings, the interest subsidy and tax subsidy.
If the programmes have something in common, then it is their relative lack 
of transparency deriving mainly from the inability to execute any simple sub-
sequent monitoring/audit of subsidy use (with the one exception of housing 
allowance); also, the equality of ‘mediators’ in the allocation of subsidies is 
violated in many respects given that support can only be distributed among 
some actors (municipalities in the case of support for the construction of 
rental flats; specialised banks in the case of the state premium on housing 
savings; and owners of prefab flats in the case of support targeting the mod-
ernisation of the housing stock).
In the case of public support of any kind, most important is its effective-
ness, that is whether the support is directed at those who really need it; ef-
ficiency is merely a ‘safety catch’, indicating whether these people could be 
helped by less costly means. Effectiveness is evaluated both vertically and 
horizontally. Support for the construction of municipal rental flats in the form 
valid to the end of 2002 has a limited degree of vertical and horizontal effec-
tiveness (owing to the absence of targeting and to specific abuses detected 
later), as does rent regulation and the large amount of untargeted subsidies 
for owner-occupied housing: the interest subsidy, the tax subsidy, the eco-
nomic subsidy derived from the privatisation of municipal flats, and to some 
extent also the support for the modernisation of prefab buildings. In all these 
cases it has either been demonstrated or it can be expected that subsidies are 
regressive in nature, that support is not income or otherwise targeted.
A high degree of vertical effectiveness is evident only in some forms of 
support for rental housing, particularly housing allowance, but also in the 
case of construction of municipal supported housing; and to some extent 
also for the construction of municipal rental flats for limited-income house-
holds (based on the conditions valid since the start of 2003). Among the pro-
grammes directed at owner-occupied housing an acceptable degree of ef-
fectiveness is observed only in the case of favourable state loans to young 
first-time buyers and to some extent also in the case of the state premium on 
housing savings (given its limited maximum and, based on secondary data, 
that it is not as regressive as, for example, tax subsidy).
A simple infrastructure and the flexibility of instruments were evaluated 
not only with respect to the established rules, but also to the need to con-
struct a more complex infrastructure for the allocation of support, to the fu-
ture possibility of changing both rules and the infrastructure, as well as to the 
assumed or real opportunities for potential mediators or ultimate recipients 
of this support to effectively lobby for given conditions to be retained even 
when the conditions need to be changed. The majority of public forms of sup-
port, with the exclusion of economic subsidies, attain a middling or high de-
gree of flexibility, while those evaluated highest were the housing allowance 
and favourable state loans. Payment of the housing allowance responds flexi-
bly to the current economic situation (even though the notional housing costs 
need to be amended) and as in the case of state loans one can expect that the 
effect of lobbying will not be so strong as to threaten any change in the terms 
attached to it. The theoretical possibility of changing conditions is somewhat 
lower in the case of support directed at the construction of municipal rent-
al flats, because municipalities can act together to exert strong pressure (as 
has been demonstrated by interviews); in the case of interest subsidies and 
tax subsidy, where a strong pressure group can be formed by large financial 
groups (however the amount of the tax subsidy is also determined by the in-
come tax rate, and here the influence and interests of financial groups are 
more complex); and in the case of the programme of support for the mod-
ernisation of prefab buildings, where housing cooperatives in particular rep-
resent this kind of pressure group (their influence is evident especially under 
the governments of political left). The state premium on housing savings is 
characterised by a very low degree of flexibility and a very rigid infrastructure; 
it is very difficult to carry out any change in this area and lobbing is thus very 
effective.
From the perspective of sustainability (the relative sufficiency of financial 
resources even in the long term for the ultimate recipients of support) the 
forms of support evaluated best were the subsidies for construction of sup-
ported housing and municipal rental housing based on the conditions valid 
since the start of 2003; conversely, those evaluated the worst were both eco-
nomic subsidies and to some extent also support for the construction of mu-
nicipal rental flats based on the conditions valid to the end of 2002; support 
for the construction of rental flats as part of foreign investment incentives, 
the interest subsidy; and the state premium on housing savings. Subsidies 
in the area of owner-occupied housing, in particular the interest subsidy, but 
also the premium on housing savings, tax subsidy, favourable loans, and sup-
port for the modernisation of prefab buildings have the potential to become a 
heavy burden on the state budget.
Support for the construction of municipal rental flats based on the original 
conditions (valid until the end of 2002) and the interest subsidy have been al-
ready cancelled or halted. A new form of support for the construction of mu-
nicipal flats, valid since 2003, is already income or otherwise targeted, and is 
directed at an area in which the private rental sector usually expresses little 
interest (and therefore private investment has not been crowded out).
In 2006 we saw preparations for a new Deregulation Act which was passed 
by Parliament at the beginning of 2007. This act aims to gradually deregulate 
regulated rents up to the end of 2010. It should end the inherited ‘first gen-
eration’ rent control system and subsequent untargeted economic subsidies. 
The same applies for economic subsidies in the field of privatization of pub-
lic housing. Due to rent deregulation the municipalities began thinking about 
ending privatisation of their housing (or continuing privatisation, but under 
market conditions).
Support for the construction of rental flats as an foreign investment incen-
tive, the premium on housing savings, and tax subsidy were evaluated the 
worst instruments of Czech housing policy still existing in 2008, which need 
significant reforms of the terms by which they are applied. Owing to short-
comings from the perspective of horizontal effectiveness, the current housing 
allowance also requires partial changes to its terms. This reform could take 
the following form:
 The state premium on housing savings should be reduced and income-
targeted (only households under a certain income limit should be entitled 
to it); it should be automatically tied to interest rate changes, so that the 
amount of the premium responds flexibly to macro-economic changes, or 
it should be made possible for the government to decide on its amount.
 Subsidies for the construction of flats as part of foreign investment incen-
tives should be abolished; this is also evident from the results of a study by 
Lux et al. (2007, 2007a).
 Tax subsidy should be abolished or strongly limited given that it signifi-
cantly strengthens tax inconsistency, affects the tenure neutrality and is 
highly regressive. There are numerous examples of such restrictions: these 
can be applied through the notional tax rate used for the purpose of relief, 
through a reduction of the maximum amount of deductible interest, and 
through time limits within which this support can be taken advantage of 
(e.g., it would only apply for the first several years following the purchase 
of dwelling).
 The part of housing allowance that relates to the notional housing expen-
ditures should take into account the existence of ‘unprivileged’ market 
rental housing. There should be reductions in the level of allowances pro-
vided among homeowners in order to avoid unnecessary wastage.
The exclusive orientation of Czech housing policy towards owner-occupied 
housing needs to be changed, and this should be done with the creation of 
other targeted programmes and subsidies in the area of rental housing. Given 
that housing policy is currently explicitly focused on demand-side subsidies, 
a strengthening of public support for rental housing on the supply side is one 
particular option. This kind of support can, for example, take the form of sim-
ply creating a legislative framework and effective grant system for non-prof-
it rental housing, the shortage of which will become fully evident in coming 
years. Another form could be the creation of the kind of motivational incen-
tives that would lead municipalities towards more responsible policy in man-
aging their housing stock and towards finding effective solutions to social 
problems – the creation of a segment of social flats located in various build-
ings owned by the municipality or in buildings containing already privatised 
housing units, in order to prevent social segregation. It is also necessary to 
reduce the fragmentation of housing policy among different ministries. Initi-
ating a serious discussion on the scope and consequences of latent economic 
subsidies (and a discussion of the future, after these are gradually eliminated) 
and especially strengthening neutrality and transparency with subsequent 
monitoring of efficiency and effectiveness of subsidies appear to be the main 
challenges that Czech housing policy is now faced with.

The book focuses on a description of the unique process of housing system 
establishment (reform) that formed a part of the general economic transition 
towards market economy in the Czech Republic. As the process of an estab-
lishment (reform) of the housing system itself is very complex, it was nec-
essary to narrow the topic to some particular facts. The transition has been 
understood as the process of building a new social environment, new poli-
cies and new institutions. Such a process is highly regulated and shaped by 
the leading political power, representatives of the state. The strong role of the 
state is one of the prerequisites of transition even though its ultimate aim 
might be to substantially decrease the power of the state. During transition 
the ideological myths of the past are abandoned and empty ‘interpretation’ 
space has to be filled. In highly centralised post-socialist societies, represen-
tatives of the state played the decisive role in such a process. Thus the be-
haviour (actions, interventions) of the state in the field of housing formed the 
main research focus of this book; sometimes this type of analysis is labelled 
state-centered analysis or policy analysis.
The activities of the state in the field of housing, however, vary largely as 
there are many fields in which the state may intervene. Both governments 
and citizens in transition societies pay special attention to the ‘housing-
needs problem’ or ‘housing affordability problem’. Due to the fact that wors-
ening housing affordability could endanger public support for the whole tran-
sition project, the housing affordability became the most recurrent housing 
issue and policy target during the transition. Though again a complex issue, 
housing affordability is especially connected with the level and quality of 
housing consumption and therefore the state interventions directed to influ-
ence housing consumption (explicit or implicit subsidies to hold or increase 
housing affordability) were chosen as the focus of my book.
The goal was to describe, evaluate and analyse state housing policy in the 
field of housing consumption between 1990 and 2005 in the Czech Republic. 
For this purpose I made:
 a description and evaluation of housing policy in the field of housing con-
sumption in the Czech Republic between 1990-2005; basing the evaluation 
on policy outcomes (performance) and placing it in a comparative context; 
and
 an analysis of possible causes of particular Czech transitional housing pol-
icy in the field of housing consumption (derived both through internation-
al comparison of relevant factors as well as an analysis of societal norms, 
ideologies and institutions peculiar to the Czech Republic).
In the theoretical introduction I noted that state housing policies in the field 
of housing consumption are theoretically led by the effort to eliminate mar-
ket failures and ensure that the housing market functions more efficiently, 
and by the effort to redistribute housing consumption or, to put it more pre-
cisely, to ensure that standard (healthy) housing is affordable to all groups 
of society. This double role of the state has been defined as the state acting 
both as a rational economist and an understanding paternalist. The role of 
rational economist derives in particular from the definition of the economic 
optimum developed by Vilfredo Pareto. According to it, the market finds itself 
in an optimum if there is no other possible allocation of goods that could 
increase the utility of one of the participants without decreasing the utility 
of the others. The state thus functions as the guarantor of market efficien-
cy and the optimal allocation of goods. The state enters the housing market 
also as an understanding paternalist, with certain (divergent) concepts of a 
welfare state. It is clear that the scope and type of public interventions de-
pend largely upon which type of welfare concept a particular administration 
favours.
The dual role of the ‘ideal’ state can be practically written into the policies 
directed towards the (economic) efficiency of housing-market functioning on 
the one hand, and towards the (social) effectiveness (equity) in distribution 
of housing services on the other; both thus simultaneously include alloca-
tive efficiency and income distribution. I wrote that common trade-off situa-
tions arise between efficiency and effectiveness; redistributive interventions, 
though very effective, may distort efficient housing market functioning, that 
is being at the same time inefficient.
Effectiveness (equity) is closely associated with the idea of equity, social 
justice, and the welfare state; it relates to ‘fair’ income distribution. As such, 
it is closely connected with a particular (unique) welfare state regime, par-
ticular social norms, and particular traditions. However, this concept has 
been, at least partially, generalised into the assumption that whatever state 
redistribution of wealth is finally applied, it should reduce social inequality 
in society, that is the redistribution policies should help those worse off on 
the costs of those better off. Welfare economics distinguishes between verti-
cal and horizontal effectiveness. Vertical effectiveness measures the degree of 
redistribution of income, consumption and wealth from the rich to the poor. 
For a particular housing subsidy it measures the extent to which the subsi-
dy is actually allocated to those who really need help, that is to low-income 
households, and in this way reduces social and income inequalities in society. 
Horizontal effectiveness is connected especially with the idea that all needy 
(poor) households have equal and unrestricted access to public subsidies. For 
a particular housing subsidy it measures whether there is any needy (poor) 
household that is explicitly or implicitly excluded from the possibility to ap-
ply for the subsidy.
The theoretical concept of effectiveness has been fully applied in this book; 
including the evaluation of both vertical and horizontal effectiveness. Howev-
er, the concept of efficiency is much broader. It relates also to the state inter-
ventions connected with the general functioning of the housing market and 
not specifically in the field of housing consumption. Therefore I narrowed my 
analysis to solely the efficiency of those state interventions that have direct 
influence on housing consumption. In this way I related the concept of effi-
ciency to the concept of effectiveness and, from some perspective, I subordi-
nated the concept of efficiency to the concept of effectiveness.
The main assumptions used to evaluate effectiveness and efficiency of 
housing subsidies were as follows:
Main assumption 1: Effective subsidies assist lower-income (needy) households more 
than higher-income (less needy) households. (Vertical effectiveness)
Main assumption 2: Effective subsidies do not exclude any lower-income (needy) 
household. (Horizontal effectiveness)
Main assumption 3: Subsidies are efficient when it is not possible to meet the redis-
tributive goals in the field of housing consumption in a less costly way, that is, under 
an alternative setting of the subsidy or an alternative setting of the whole set of sub-
sidies.
These assumptions were used to measure the effectiveness and efficiency 
of selected transition housing subsidies in the Czech Republic; various data 
sources, econometric simulations (especially in the case of ‘hidden’ econom-
ic subsidies) and sets of statistical measures of inequality were employed 
for this purpose. Besides the detailed evaluation of subsidies in the national 
context, a similar methodological device though somewhat restricted in its 
assumptions was also used to measure and compare the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of selected housing subsidies in five other Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. This international comparison respected the imperative of 
‘individual openness’ during comparative research; the lack of it is mentioned 
here as the main reason behind misunderstanding in some comparative stud-
ies.
The second important orientation of the book was to find the answer to the 
question of what were the main factors influencing the particular efficiency 
and effectiveness of housing subsidies in the Czech Republic? The first goal of 
the book lay thus in the evaluation of housing subsidies and the second one 
in the explanation of the evaluation results. To meet the second goal, I need-
ed to provide the detailed context of housing policy formation (reformation) 
and apply the appropriate housing system theories. In this respect, I took in-
spiration especially from those theoretical studies that stressed in context of 
housing system formation the importance (influence) of:
 ideology, social norms;
 traditional problem solution patterns (path dependence);
 current social and political structures.
Path dependence refers to the tendency of problem solutions to become 
locked in and difficult to change. In other words, past experience, past form 
and content of public discourse, past methods to problem solutions, past 
policies and ideologies and past forms and behaviour of institutions strongly 
influence the present situation. The concept is related to the regulation ap-
proach trying to find long-standing specific national patterns of housing 
policies reflected in specific types of social regulation (social policies). Politi-
cal structuralism, conversely, stresses more the role that interests of specific 
political parties may have on the shaping and development of diverse hous-
ing policies in various countries; it stresses the political context of housing 
provision and creates the typology of possible state interventions. The role of 
social norms (ideology) in specific housing system development (especially 
in tenure structure) is also very important. The social constructivism puts its 
main emphasis on meanings (ideas, norms) assigned to reality than to real-
ity in itself; the ideological framework affects ‘political tenure strategy’ and 
thus governments create environments that favour one or another type of 
tenure and strongly influence the tenure decisions of its citizens. The above-
mentioned theoretical concepts helped me to take an analytical view on the 
causes of particular transition housing policy in the Czech Republic.
In this part of the book final chapter I will repeat all my research questions 
and present the main findings that seek to answer them. The following sum-
mary thus forms the overview of main results of my research.
My first research question was as follows:
What was the background to the development of the specific housing policy and hous-
ing system in the Czech Republic? What were the ideologies (norms), traditional prob-
lem solution patterns and institutional as well as political structures that might influ-
ence the formation and development of the housing system (including the formation of 
general social policy and its history)?
Reforms in the field of housing in the Czech Republic were, as one might ex-
pect, numerous and often the by-products of wider economic (price liberalisa-
tion) or political (decentralisation of power) transitional reform strategies. If I 
were to select the main features, I would propose the following list.
The revenue subsidies for existing state rental dwellings and capital sub-
sidies for new state rental housing construction known from the period of 
socialism practically disappeared; prices of construction materials were lib-
eralised and quickly increased; and both factors led to radical house price 
growth and a sharp drop in housing construction volumes (till 1996). Despite 
that the Czech Republic had 424 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants in 2001. Com-
parison with other developed and transitional countries confirms its relative 
housing sufficiency.
Though officially the state denied to continue in the socialistic concept 
of cheap state rental housing considered to be a pure public good outside of 
market relations, it abolished many former regulations and allowed for hous-
ing market institutions to emerge, several important decisions of the early 
transition governments, such as preservation of the socialist type of rent con-
trol and tenant protection, represented surviving patterns of the ideology of 
socialism under new market environment.
The state decentralised some powers and responsibilities in the housing 
field to the municipal level (more than 6,000 independent local governments 
per 10 million inhabitants of the Czech Republic emerged, representing an 
example of the highest decentralisation of power among post-socialist coun-
tries) and this decentralisation of power was accompanied by a free transfer 
of former state rental housing to the ownership of municipalities. The resti-
tution of expropriated property to former owners or their descendents, the 
free transfer of state housing into municipal ownership and its subsequent 
privatisation (sale) under advantageous conditions mostly to sitting tenants 
(though no central right-to-buy policy was applied), the transformation of co-
operative housing and exclusion of vacant dwellings from rent regulation all 
led to significant changes in tenure structure. These changes, however, were 
not as substantial as in many other transition societies – increase in home-
ownership rate (by more than ten percentage points between 1991 and 2001) 
and conversely a reduction in the share of rental flats (by almost 11 percent-
age points). While the share of cooperative housing decreased, the share of 
private rental housing increased.
Rent regulation was maintained in all occupied rental flats (whether res-
tituted or public) and its deregulation proceeded relatively slowly during the 
early phase of transition (governments led by the main right-wing political 
party till 1998). Later on the regulated rents were even frozen in real val-
ues (1998-2002) and also in nominal values (2002-2006) by governments led 
by left-wing social democrats. The deep gap between regulated and ‘mar-
ket’ rents was preserved till the end of 2006 and this created the grounds for 
many social tensions. Rent regulation and favourable privatisation of munici-
pal housing were the main allocation sources of substantial economic sub-
sidies which became the most important housing subsidies during the tran-
sitional period. Among the new explicit subsidies worth mentioning are the 
housing allowance, several supply-side subsidies for construction of munic-
ipal housing, tax relief on housing loans, interest subsidy to mortgage loan 
and the state premium to housing savings scheme.
Chapter 2, starting with a brief comparison of housing policy and housing 
system changes in several transition societies, has already argued that one 
group of subsidies is generally not measured and definitely not demonstrated 
in official statistical figures: economic subsidies. These often hidden subsidies 
are equal to the difference between market and actual price for goods and 
services. In other words, people pay less for some service (housing) than they 
would pay under market conditions.
In my analysis of selected transition countries I showed that the same part 
of the population (existing occupants of public housing) received basically 
similar economic subsidy – either in the form of owner-occupied flats pur-
chased for a very low price (or even obtained for free) or in the form of rent-
al housing with low regulated rent and strong pre-transition type of tenancy 
protection. The economic subsidies probably formed the main housing sub-
sidies during the transition. The income or social situation of eligible house-
holds was not deemed important; the only criterion was the occupancy title. 
These subsidies therefore divided households into two very disparate groups. 
The ‘insiders’ enjoyed low housing costs and tenancy protection (with no re-
gard to their social needs or income levels) while the ‘outsiders’ were often 
left to the uncompromising market forces. This insider-outsider tension was, 
in fact, even more substantial due to the fact that market housing was inflat-
ed by the lack of incentive for ‘insiders’ to move or rationalise housing con-
sumption. In this context, I wrote about the segmentation of housing market 
into the ‘privileged’ and ‘unprivileged’ segments – housing expenditures for 
otherwise comparable housing in these two segments differed strongly.
The reforms (price liberalisation, end of state housing construction) led to 
a worsening of housing affordability, especially for households living in the 
‘unprivileged’ market segment (with no access to economic subsidies). As 
has been demonstrated by thorough analysis of developments in housing 
affordability in the Czech Republic, the housing expenditure-to-income ra-
tio for households in ‘unprivileged’ owner-occupied housing was roughly 10 
percentage points higher than that of housing owners in the ‘privileged’ mar-
ket segment, and the ratio for household in ‘unprivileged’ rental housing was 
roughly 8 percentage points higher than that of households in the ‘privileged’ 
segment of the rental market. According to the adjusted housing expendi-
tures-to-income ratio, 44% of households in the ‘unprivileged’ rental market 
segment (as opposed to 17% of households in the ‘privileged’ rental market 
segment), and 57% of households in owner-occupied flats in the ‘unprivileged’ 
market segment (as opposed to 20% in the ‘privileged’ segment) would have a 
housing expenditures-to-income ratio that exceeds the normative affordabil-
ity limit of 25%.
With regard to the wider context in which housing policy was shaped and 
reshaped after 1990, and taking into account the selected theoretical concepts 
described above, the following contextual features were found to be especially 
important in understanding particular housing policy actions and their effec-
tiveness/efficiency in the Czech environment:
 The parliamentary character of the political system, the proportional type 
of electoral system to the main Chamber and the necessity of investiture 
of the incoming government all had important consequences on govern-
ment stability in the Czech Republic; since 1996 lack of effective govern-
ment (unstable due to the very weak majority support) has been the main 
feature of the political situation.
 The right-wing (‘market-strong’) political party ODS led the government in 
the period 1992-1998; the left-wing (‘market-weak’) political party CSSD led 
the government in the period 1998-2006.
 The communists, the second and later third most powerful political par-
ty in transitional politics did not transform themselves into a democratic 
left-wing party and continued to be embedded by communist rhetoric and 
day-to-day politics in the pre-1989 past; on the other hand, they were suc-
cessfully cut off from any real influence on political and/or institutional re-
forms (unlike in many other transition societies).
 Clientelism (influential informal networks, establishment of powerful lob-
bying networks), the inherited culture of illegal income (shadow econo-
my, ‘preying on the state’) and corruption were among institutional pat-
terns that survived the change of regime and were very characteristic of 
the transitional time; clientelism, corruption and the law-breaking culture 
were the main reasons for the rather negative evaluation of enterprise pri-
vatisation. During privatisation, former managers of state companies (of-
ten unskilled but well-established in networks) received relatively large 
powers. Many new owners of investment funds established in the course of 
voucher privatisation abused the capital invested by the public.
 The early transitional Czech government led by right-wing ODS is often 
considered to be ‘stuck in social democratic, consensual politics’ though 
its rhetoric was quite the opposite – advocating free market and economic 
liberalism. In other words, ‘right-wing liberalism’ seemed to be acceptable 
to Czech society only when it was limited to rhetoric and accompanied by 
social-democratic practice (‘think left, vote right’).
 One of the main consequences of ‘consensual politics’ was ‘banking social-
ism’ or ‘state capitalism’. State-owned banks were forced to extend risky 
credit to ineffective industry, thus maintaining an artificially low unem-
ployment rate; after a short period of ‘functioning’, this system saw the 
emergence of a huge banking crisis, unexpected economic recession and 
massive state budget expenditure to stabilise the banking sector (1996-
1997).
 Czech society is traditionally suspicious of nobility and the Church (it is 
very atheistic) and, since the period of the Austrian Empire and especial-
ly the period of the first Czechoslovak Republic established after WWI, it 
is very sensitive to social issues, social problems, and social equality (this 
may be connected specifically to Czech nationalism); even now the Czech 
level of income inequality and poverty rate are among the lowest in the 
European Union. The social and economic consequences of the economic 
recession in 1930s became an important part of the collective memory of 
Czech society.
 Although during communism it was almost folklore to blame the state 
for low living standards and for any shortcoming (logically, the state was 
omnipotent), in reality the dependence on the paternalistic and monopo-
listic state was a powerful social norm. The ‘social contract’ contained the 
people’s tolerance of ideological, cultural and political suppression in ex-
change for the other party in the contract, the state, continuing to provide 
them with promised gifts – employment, free housing, free education, free 
health care and so forth. This contract could not be deleted from people 
minds as quickly as it was dissolved in practice.
 Transitional social policy (till 2005) had to reflect the traditional atten-
tion paid to social issues and the living collective memory of the generous 
state: its goal was to create a relatively soft ‘welfare state cushion’ to pre-
serve social order by such means as highly progressive income taxing, high 
social insurance payments, regular valorisation of the subsistence mini-
mum, a two-component structure of subsistence minimum and relatively 
generous social benefits. The system remained highly redistributive, with 
an especially high burden put on the middle classes (‘excessive solidarity’). 
The establishment of this generous social state was part of the ‘consensual 
politics’ of the early transition governments led by the right-wing ODS and 
contrasted strongly with the political rhetoric of its representatives.
 The imperatives of efficiency, effectiveness and long-term sustainability 
in policy interventions were not taken into account in the early transition 
phase. Governments (led both by right-wing and left-wing parties) estab-
lished a comfortable ‘welfare state cushion’, which helped to preserve low 
income inequality and a low poverty rate in a society. However, when the 
stream of income from enterprise privatisation started to dry up the costs 
of the social state became unbearable and led to increasing state deficit; 
another price paid for this generous social policy was the prolongation of 
the people’s false expectations of the omnipotent and paternalistic state.
 ‘The demographic revolution’ started after 1989 when natality and nupti-
ality rates substantially decreased. Since 1994 the population has shown 
negative natural growth; total fertility rate fell to less than 1.14 children in 
2001, which is one of the lowest rates in the world.
My second research question was as follows:
How effective and efficient were state interventions in the field of housing consump-
tion during the transition in the Czech Republic if the theoretical framework and 
methodological device of welfare economics is used for such assessment? How effec-
tive were such interventions from the point of view of both vertical and horizontal 
effectiveness? How efficient were such interventions if we narrow the wide concept 
of efficiency to the cost-benefit analysis of state interventions in the field of housing 
consumption (i.e., subordinate efficiency to effectiveness)? How efficient and effective 
were these interventions when assessed against the assumptions on efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of subsidies?
The effectiveness of three selected housing subsidies was especially evalu-
ated: economic subsidy stemming from rent regulation, tax relief and hous-
ing allowance. Given that in both the Rawlsian and Utilitarian concepts of the 
welfare state effectiveness is linked to equality, the analysis of effectiveness 
was based on two criteria. The first criterion was the evaluation of to what 
degree did the three instruments contribute to a reduction of the level of in-
equality in society. To this end several indicators of income inequality were 
used (standard deviation, the coefficient of variation, the variation of the in-
come logarithm, the mean income ratio of 5% of the lowest-income house-
holds and 5% of the highest-income households, and the Gini coefficient 
illustrated by the Lorenz curve). The second criterion was based on a compar-
ison of the real distribution of subsidy among various income groups with a 
normative criterion of effective distribution. Effective distribution of a subsidy 
was regarded as distribution of the subsidy where 90% of the sum of resourc-
es was distributed among 50% of the lowest-income households, while 75% 
of the subsidy sum was distributed among 30% of the lowest-income house-
holds.
The results of the tests showed that households most likely paying regu-
lated rent were relatively evenly distributed across the individual income de-
ciles. It also confirmed that the economic subsidy following from regulated 
rent was significantly higher among the highest-income households in com-
parison with the lowest-income households.The Lorenz curve illustrates that 
this form of subsidy was closest to the curve of equal income distribution, 
that is, households across the income spectrum benefited from it to roughly 
the same degree. This economic subsidy did not fulfil the normative criterion 
of effectiveness, as 50% of the lowest-income households received approxi-
mately 46% of the sum of the subsidy, and 30% of the lowest-income house-
holds received approximately 25% of the sum of the subsidy.
The main group of recipients of indirect fiscal support in the form of a tax 
relief was formed primarily by highest-income households, and therefore 
the effectiveness of this form of subsidy was very low. Clearly the percentage 
of households that took advantage of this form of support was significantly 
higher among the highest-income households. The Lorenz curve shows that 
of the instruments evaluated here this form of subsidy was unequivocally di-
rected mostly in favour of the highest-income households.
Unlike the other instruments the housing allowance is a means-tested 
benefit. Naturally the percentage of households entitled to the housing allow-
ance was highest among lowest-income households, and no highest-income 
households qualified to receive housing allowance. The indicators of income 
inequality revealed that housing allowance do contribute to a reduction in 
the level of income inequality in society. This was confirmed again in the de-
piction of the distribution of the subsidy in the Lorenz curve. The housing al-
lowance also satisfied the selected normative criterion of effectiveness, given 
that 50% of the lowest-income households would be the recipients of 99% of 
the sum of the subsidy, and 30% of the lowest-income households would be 
the recipients of 97% of the sum of resources paid out as housing allowanc-
es. However, housing allowance did not meet the criterion of horizontal ef-
fectiveness as some needy households were actually excluded from eligibility 
(households paying market rents).
Although the available data sources did not allow me to verify this directly, 
it could be detected from other survey data sources that other selected hous-
ing subsidies (economic subsidy stemming from privatisation of public hous-
ing, state premium to housing savings scheme and supply-side subsidies for 
construction of ‘municipal’ housing) also displayed very low effectiveness.
For the efficiency part of the housing policy evaluation I dealt with eco-
nomic subsidies stemming from rent regulation, housing allowance, state 
premium to housing savings scheme and tax relief. The efficiency of all these 
subsidies is sub-optimal with the possible exception of tax relief which I 
could not judge directly; especially low efficiency was detected in the case of 
economic subsidy stemming from rent regulation and in the case of state pre-
mium to housing savings scheme. Through the application of robust econo-
metric methods the analytical results pointed especially to the profound gap 
between ‘efficient’ and real rent prices in the rent-controlled housing sector. I 
also demonstrated the low efficiency of state premium to housing savings by 
the performance of both housing savings banks (low loan-to-savings balance, 
competition constraints) and savers (switching savings from other deposits 
by holding overall savings rate constant). In the case of tax relief I was able 
only to show that the Czech Republic belongs among countries with the high-
est inconsistency in taxing on housing (in favour of homeownership), that is 
among countries with maximal fiscal subsidies to promote homeownership. 
The efficiency itself was not evaluated as data were not available at the time.
In conclusion, the overall evaluation of Czech housing policy from the 
point of effectiveness and subordinated efficiency was relatively negative. 
Housing policy was based on one-time untargeted economic subsidies that 
could not be sustained, even for pure financial reasons, in the long-term and 
were shown to be ineffective/inefficient; other explicit housing subsidies also 
had serious drawbacks from the viewpoint of vertical effectiveness (tax re-
lief, supply-side subsidies, state premium to housing savings scheme), hori-
zontal effectiveness (housing allowances) and/or efficiency (especially state 
premium to housing savings scheme). Though the Czech Republic entered the 
transition period with relatively sufficient housing stock and, compared with 
other transitional societies, relatively better housing quality, housing subsi-
dies in the field of housing consumption were overwhelmingly ineffective and 
inefficient. They increased social and income inequalities in Czech society 
and also strengthened the division of the housing market into ‘privileged’ and 
‘unprivileged’ housing segments.
My third research question, designed to help me understand the specific situ-
ation in the Czech Republic was as follows:
How efficient and effective were state interventions in other transition countries (if 
the imperative on individual openness of researchers during the international compar-
ison of housing policies is met)? What explanations for particular levels of effective-
ness and related (subordinated) efficiency of state interventions in the field of housing 
consumption in the Czech Republic can be found in a partial international compari-
son? Can such a partial international comparison help me to understand the specific 
situation in the Czech Republic?
A partial international comparison of housing policy changes in six transition 
countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania) 
conducted in 2001 shows that the Czech Republic belonged to the group of 
countries with the least effective demand and supply-side subsidies. Though 
in this case the assumptions on effectiveness and efficiency were somewhat 
narrow, due to limited information and data accessibility, it was clear that the 
targeting and efficiency of housing subsidies in the Czech Republic were eval-
uated as more badly off than in neighbouring transition countries.
Based on criteria outlined in the fifth chapter, Poland was the only coun-
try with a relatively high level of efficiency/effectiveness of both demand and 
supply-side subsidies. It had a legal definition for social housing, housing as-
sociation legislation and it allocated subsidies mainly for new social rental 
housing construction among non-profit housing associations. The subsidy 
took the form of a qualified loan and covered only part of total construction 
costs (the remainder had to be covered from private sources). The allocation 
of social flats was subject to means-testing and associations made regular in-
come inspections of beneficiaries (every two years). ‘Old’ rent regulation was 
slighter and the housing allowance model counted with actual housing costs 
limited by indirectly set ceilings (reflecting the regional differentiation in rent 
prices). The applied normative rate of burden increased with income level and 
a gentle taper did not lead to the poverty trap. The total payment due was co-
financed from both state and municipal budgets.
Similarly, the Estonian housing allowance (subsistence benefit) model did 
not use flat notional costs. The maximum notional cost was set at the local 
level (reflecting regional differentiation in housing costs), therefore it provid-
ed more effective help to those in need than the Czech or Slovakian models. 
However, its high degree of taper and exclusive state financing disadvantaged 
the model in comparison with the Polish housing allowance model. On the 
one hand, Estonia had abolished the central system of ‘old’ rent regulation 
and introduced the legal definition for social housing; on the other hand the 
government supported only purchase/construction of owner-occupied hous-
ing regardless of the applicant’s income and introduced no types of non-profit 
housing associations.
Romania and Slovakia introduced programmes for new ‘social’ rental 
housing construction (means testing was applied during the dwellings’ allo-
cation) but both countries neither introduced non-profit housing associations 
at that time nor carried out regular income inspections, nor did they abol-
ish ‘old’ rent controls. The Slovakian housing allowance model did not reflect 
regional price differentiation. Programmes supporting purchase/construction 
of owner-occupied housing were not always sustainable in the long term. Ro-
mania had no significant demand-side subsidy while Bulgaria was the only 
country without decisive supply-side or demand-side subsidies (with the ex-
ception of temporal energy allowance) implemented at that time.
The relative position of the Czech Republic was surprising. The Czech 
housing allowance model used only flat notional housing costs which took no 
regard of regional differentiation in prices/rents and did not reflect the high-
er level of market rents. Allowances were paid solely from the state budget. 
There was no legal definition for social housing, no legislation on non-profit 
housing associations and the ‘old’ system of untargeted central rent control 
was maintained in both the public and private rental sectors. Though the pro-
gramme for new municipal rental housing construction allowed for private 
capital participation, it often led to some kind of ‘quasi-rental’ tenure. As it 
did not include means testing, the effectiveness of this programme was low. 
No other municipal social housing development programmes following the 
rules of Slovakian case were introduced at that time.
The most effective/efficient subsidies were thus implemented in the coun-
try where the general policy orientated towards the rental model was accom-
panied by decentralisation in the rental sector of housing (Poland). If I ex-
clude Bulgaria and Romania from the comparison (as some types of subsidies 
were missing), the least effective/efficient subsidies appeared in the coun-
try where policy orientated towards the rental model was accompanied by 
a low level of decentralisation in the rental sector of housing (Czech Repub-
lic). However, this is not just because higher decentralisation in itself leads to 
higher efficiency/effectiveness of subsidies. It may also be due to the fact that 
if some old inefficient practices are decentralised to the local level or indirect-
ly abolished (e.g., through housing privatisation) central administration very 
probably has simply stopped being attacked by various interest groups want-
ing to keep those old practices alive. This might allow the central government 
to prepare new, more efficient/effective subsidies with no need to look for any 
kind of hybrid solution between past relics and new initiatives. Decentralisa-
tion may thus help central governments to clear the table and start afresh. 
Until the government is, however, occupied by problems connected with cul-
tural patterns surviving from the previous regimes, there is little political will 
to prepare or introduce new, more effective/efficient subsidies.
From the comparison of housing conditions in particular countries we can 
discern another empirical implication. Relative housing sufficiency (Czech Re-
public, Slovakia, and Estonia) leads to lower effectiveness/efficiency of hous-
ing subsidies whereas relative housing insufficiency (Poland) leads to the op-
posite. The factor of housing need (housing shortage) may thus have some 
influence on actual efficiency and effectiveness of state subsidies because a 
country in an acute need of new housing cannot afford to experiment with 
hybrids of new and old practices. However, further empirical work on a bigger 
sample of transitional countries would be needed to confirm such a conclu-
sion.
I hypothesised that the relatively poorer efficiency/effectiveness of housing 
subsidies in the Czech Republic may be caused by the fact that the general 
policy orientated towards the rental model was not accompanied by real de-
centralisation in the rental sector of housing (especially in the field of rent 
setting); the relative housing sufficiency might be also an important factor. 
There may be, however, several other reasons for the ineffective/inefficient 
character of policies in the field of housing consumption in the Czech Repub-
lic; reasons that could be raised only from a detailed study of the specific pol-
icy context in the Czech Republic. My fourth research question was thus as 
follows:
What general conclusions can be drawn about the application of the role of ‘under-
standing paternalist’ by the Czech state between 1990 and 2005? What reasons for 
particular levels of effectiveness and related (subordinated) efficiency of state inter-
ventions in the field of housing consumption can be found from housing system evo-
lution analysis? What influence did ideologies (norms), traditional problem solution 
patterns and institutional as well as political structures have on the development of 
specific state interventions in the field of housing consumption, and what effects did 
they have on the efficiency and effectiveness of these state interventions?
From the detailed description of the context briefly mentioned above I found 
the following specific ‘national’ factors (reasons) as potential explanations for 
the low effectiveness and efficiency of housing subsidies in the Czech Repub-
lic:
 political factors
 government instability stemming from the proportional election system 
(since 1996);
 small politically weak and centre-orientated Christian democrats (KDU-
CSL) often taking the post of Minister for Regional Development (re-
sponsible for housing policy) in various coalition governments;
 high degree of decentralised power and an increasing influence of often 
unqualified mayors of smaller cities on central policies;
 fragmentation of the responsibility for central housing policy among 
three ministries and lack of efficient cooperation between them;
 lack of qualified economists (as well as experts in general) in the main 
left-wing political party (CSSD);
 long period (1998-2006) of governments led by ‘market-weak’ social 
democrats (CSSD) trying to establish a strong welfare state and in hous-
ing policy representing mainly the interests of sitting tenants.
 ideological factors
 traditional egalitarism of Czech society (‘think left-vote right’) coming 
from traditional animosities to the nobility and Catholic Church;
 distrust of long-term strategies (concepts) in the ideology of leading 
right-wing political party (ODS) stemming from the experience with 
planning economy;
 ‘populism’ (‘banking socialism’, ‘state capitalism’) of leading right-wing 
political party (ODS) preferring short-term achievements (safety nets, 
soft welfare-state cushion, ad hoc reactions), over-employment and ex-
cessive wealth redistribution to long-term sustainable economic growth 
(and leading later to public budget deficits accelerating when the stream 
of privatisation income dried up);
 general fear of political representation that to alter behaviour patterns 
common during communism in this field might cause social disorder, 
breach social peace and endanger the transitional project;
 the hard-line communists (KSCM) taking second rank in parliamentary 
elections till 1998 continued to follow the ideology of general equality 
and universal applicability even under the circumstances of growing in-
come and social inequality.
 path dependence
 the inherited institutional culture of clientelism and corruption oppos-
ing higher transparency in government spending (efficiency and effec-
tiveness of policies has not been investigated, measured, analysed, or 
monitored);
 the inherited expectations of the Czech population to receive free ‘gifts’ 
from the ‘omnipotent’ state, especially when it concerns the housing;
 the inherited focus of policymakers and politicians on extensive hous-
ing indicators (e.g., scale of housing construction with no attention be-
ing paid to where and whom it was allocated) and only very slow recog-
nition of the need to define new types of policy assessment means.
 institutional (social) factors
 due to the large shadow economy means testing (targeted to those in 
need) became highly unreliable;
 relatively good housing conditions supported by low number of foreign 
immigrants;
 the objective effort to help the highly taxed middle class that received 
only a little from the otherwise generous social support system.
An enormous amount of empirical data would be required to perform a real 
structural analysis of the significance of individual factors but such data were 
not available. Therefore I had instead no other option but to determine the 
significance of these factors indirectly, that is, from the opinions of those peo-
ple who implemented housing policy during the observed period. I conducted 
in-depth interviews with two former ministers responsible for the prepara-
tion and implementation of housing policy in the Czech Republic, and one 
interview with a high-ranking public official working in the field of national 
housing policy.
Basically, we can define two categories of factors that may lie behind the 
low level of efficiency and effectiveness of housing policy: explicit (expressed 
by the interviewed actors themselves) and implicit (structural, latent). Accord-
ing to the interview results, explicit factors mainly include: the inadequate 
qualifications of political representatives and their ‘politicking’; the distrust 
politicians felt towards the research sphere and towards ministry officers; an 
unwillingness on the political right to accept long-term concepts, and an in-
ability to come up with a conceptual solution on the political left; the strong 
influence of municipal mayors on central housing policy; the need to find so-
lutions quickly without the opportunity to test them; and the relatively strong 
lobbying engaged in by interest groups.
Included among other cited explicit factors belongs the need to take into 
account the attitudes and expectations of Czech citizens, who simply could 
not be ‘cut off’ from their previous experience and behavioural patterns; 
this was consistent with so called ‘consensual politics’ practised by the first 
Czech transition government led by the right-wing ODS. The targeting of pub-
lic housing subsidies to those who need it was not demanded by the public, 
nor monitored or questioned in the media. Housing policy was not viewed 
as being part of social policy but rather as something separate from it, which 
should not target the needy especially; perhaps because the problem of hous-
ing affordability is common to everyone and because the allocation of flats 
was universal and free up until not too long ago.
The concept of housing policy focusing extensively on the scope of hous-
ing construction was similarly adopted: what was important is the number 
of newly built flats, and it did not matter where they were built, for whom, at 
what level of quality, or how they were allocated. Officials did not care that 
public support of such housing construction had a negative impact on the 
market functioning and/or strengthens income and social inequalities. It be-
came apparent during the interviews that the perspective (evaluation) of ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of public subsidies was never considered, was nev-
er the subject of discussion, and is for many an entirely new idea and partly 
even incomprehensible to them.
The question remains why this perspective never entered into public or 
political discourse, why it remained outside the area of housing policy? The 
answer is clearly connected with another group of factors that are implicit, 
unexpressed, and latent. Is the reason the fact that there was no acute hous-
ing shortage in the Czech Republic, even though respondents tended to re-
ject this factor? Or is it what lies behind the unstable government, the per-
sistence of an unreformed form of Communist Party or the persistence of the 
culture of clientelism and corruption? It is very difficult to answer these ques-
tions; probably each factor has had a certain amount of influence, and only in 
combination did they lead to the given outcome. The factor of the relatively 
strong political representation of the unreformed Communist Party in parlia-
ment certainly ranks among the weaker factors. Though this converse claim 
remains on a hypothetical level, the stronger factors are likely to include rela-
tive housing sufficiency, the long period of government led by ‘market-weak’ 
Social Democrats, and the inherited culture of clientelism leading to increas-
ing power of lobbying filling in the absence of any independent research. The 
retention of inherited behavioural patterns, ‘consensual politics’, was surely 
also influential; such politics found especially good ground in the Czech con-
text, traditionally critical of ‘differences’ (nobles, alternative values, inequali-
ties in wealth) and giving much attention to social peace and uniformity.
My last research question, designed to represent the application of feedback 
from the results of all the analyses presented in this book, is as follows:
Do the main findings of the research conducted for this book show whether it is possi-
ble to increase efficiency and effectiveness of state intervention in the field of housing 
consumption in the Czech Republic? If so, what would be the policy recommendations?
In its final part, the book elaborates on a most important set of policy rec-
ommendations that would help to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
housing subsidies. As mentioned earlier, Czech housing policy was unequivo-
cally skewed in favour of owner-occupied housing (which violates the neu-
trality imperative) and in favour of demand-side subsidies (which may vio-
late the imperative of rational mix of demand and supply-side subsidies). The 
explicit priority focus of the policy to support demand has been balanced by 
large latent economic subsidies that by nature are forms of supply-side sub-
sidies (in both rental and owner-occupied housing sectors); however they are 
temporary in duration and will come to an end very soon. Owing to the high, 
though latent and often overlooked, economic subsidies, the division of re-
sponsibility for housing policy among three ministries, and especially due to 
the absence of any form of evaluation and monitoring of subsidy distribution, 
Czech housing policy is in violation of the imperative of transparency.
Based on this evaluation, the best programmes would include one such for 
the construction of supported housing and the housing allowance; to some 
extent also a programme for the construction of municipal rental flats for 
low-income households (based on conditions valid since 2003) and prefer-
ential loans for young first-time buyers. The worst evaluated forms of public 
support included economic subsidies in the area of rental and owner-occu-
pied housing (rent regulation and the privatisation of flats) and support for 
the construction of municipal rental flats based on conditions valid up to the 
end of 2002; also to some extent, support for the construction of rental hous-
ing as part of foreign investment incentives, the state premium on housing 
savings, the interest subsidy and the tax subsidy.
If the programmes have something in common, then it is their relative lack 
of transparency deriving mainly from the inability to execute any simple sub-
sequent monitoring/audit of the subsidy use (with the sole exception of hous-
ing allowance); also, the equality of ‘mediators’ in the allocation of subsidies 
is violated in many respects given that support can only be distributed among 
some actors. Particularly the transparency of the conditions for all housing 
subsidies must be substantially improved as well as the subsequent control of 
real subsidy take-up. Often there is no information about the real distribution 
of subsidies, that is information about the final beneficiaries. The monitoring 
systems simply do not exist. Such a fact excludes any possibility of effective 
control of state-intervention goals.
Support for the construction of rental flats as an foreign investment incen-
tive, the premium on housing savings, and the tax subsidy were evaluated as 
the worst instruments of Czech housing policy, still existing in 2008, that ar-
guably need significant reform. The housing allowance, owing to shortcom-
ings from the perspective of horizontal effectiveness, would also require par-
tial changes to its terms. This reform could take the following shape:
 The state premium on housing savings should be reduced and income-tar-
geted. It should be automatically tied to interest rate changes so that the 
amount of the premium responds flexibly to macro-economic changes, or 
it should be made possible for the government to decide on its amount.
 Subsidies for the construction of flats as part of foreign investment incen-
tives should be abolished.
 The tax subsidy should be abolished or strongly limited given that it sig-
nificantly strengthens tax inconsistency, affects the tenure neutrality and 
is highly regressive.
 The part of the housing allowance that relates to notional housing ex-
penditure should take into account the existence of ‘unprivileged’ market 
rental housing. There should be some reduction in the level of allowances 
provided among homeowners in order to avoid unnecessary wastage.
Given that housing policy is currently explicitly focused especially on sup-
porting owner-occupied housing by demand-side subsidies, a strengthening 
of public support for rental housing on the supply side has been suggested. 
This kind of support can, for example, take the form of creating a legislative 
framework and a system of grants for non-profit rental housing. Another form 
could be the creation of motivational incentives that would lead municipali-
ties towards more responsible policy in managing their housing stock – the 
establishment of a segment of social flats. It is also necessary to reduce the 
fragmentation of housing policy among different ministries. Initiating a se-
rious discussion on the scope and consequences of economic subsidies and 
strengthening neutrality and transparency with subsequent monitoring of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of subsidies appear to be the main challenges 
now facing Czech housing policy.

Public housing policy
The double role of public authorities as rational economists and understanding 
paternalists may be illustrated from the point of view of the welfare economy 
in Figure A.1 (Edgeworth box), which is based on the analysis of the welfare 
function W:
W = W [U1 (x11, X12,...,x1m), U2 (x21, x22,...,X2m), ....Un (Xn1, xn2,....,xnm)]
where U1 through Un indicate the level of total utility given by consumption 
x1,...,xm of goods by individual n citizens. Figure A.1 shows a situation in which 
there are only two consumers in society (A and B) and two consumer goods 
(X and Y); the consumption of good X by consumer A is captured on axis OAX 
and by consumer B on axis OBX, and the consumption of good Y by consum-
er A on axis OAY and by consumer B on axis OBY. The total consumption of 
consumer A is then measured from the starting point OA and the total con-
sumption of consumer B from the opposite starting point OB. Curves An cre-
ate indifference curves of consumer A (i.e., the combination of goods X and 
Y bringing consumer A the same utility), curves Bn create indifference curves 
of consumer B. The ‘contraction curve’ connecting points OA and OB indicates 
all combinations of consumption of X and Y where the value of the marginal 
substitution in consumption of goods X and Y is the same for both consum-
ers (i.e., it connects points where the indifference curves of both consumers 
meet and any movement outside this curve means a worsening of the situa-
tion for at least one of the consumers).
Let me assume, for example, that the initial division of consumption 
of goods X and Y is located at point c in Figure A.1 where consumer A con-
sumes XA units of good X and YA units of good Y and consumer B consumes 
XB units of good X and YB units of good Y (it is obvious that consumer B is 
far richer than A since he may consume far more goods X and Y than con-
sumer A). If, through market improvement (intervention of public authori-
ties) the division of consumption moves from point c to point d, consumer B 
becomes ‘better off’ (he moves up to a higher indifference curve from B12 to 
B14) and consumer A does not become ‘worse off’ (since he remains on the 
same indifference curve A4, i.e., he achieves the same total utility). The shift 
from point c to point d constitutes a Pareto improvement. Similarly, a shift 
from point c to point e also constitutes a Pareto improvement and this time 
the poor consumer A becomes ‘better off’; consumer A arrives at a higher 
indifference curve and consumer B remains on the same indifference curve 
B12. Shifts from point c to points d and e always lead to greater allocation ef-
ficiency, a more optimal division of goods, while points d and e are equal with 
respect to pure efficiency (i.e., from the point of view of a public authority 
as rational economist). If a public authority performed only the role of rational 
economist, its role would end by improving the efficiency of market function-
ing (e.g., elimination of a monopoly) leading from point c to point d or e.
Public entities, however, also enter the housing market as understanding 
paternalists and come with a certain concept of a welfare state. Since there 
are several concepts of the welfare state, let me outline briefly the potential 
conduct of a public authority ‘headed’ by libertarians, utilitarians, egalitar-
ians, and socialists:
 Libertarianism – For libertarians the only way to improve social welfare 
is a Pareto improvement, that is a shift from point c to any point on the 
contraction curve (but not shifts along the contraction curve as such). Any 
pressure or policy leading to a further redistribution of wealth (e.g., a shift 
from point d to point k) is not desirable from a traditional liberal point of 
view (English political economy of the 18th century) or from the neo-liberal 
point of view represented by Hayek and Friedman in the second half of the 
20th century.
 Utilitarianism – The objective of utilitarians is to maximise the total util-
ity of everyone. Thus, similar to libertarians, utilitarians would support the 
shift from point c to any point on the contraction curve. Unlike libertarians, 
however, some utilitarians consider the utility to be a cardinally measur-
able variable (i.e., one that can be expressed in monetary or other measur-
able units). If both consumers A and B have an identical marginal utility of 
income functions (i.e., an income growth by an unit brings both of them 
the same growth in utility) the starting point for seeking the optimal dis-
tribution of goods is point g where both consumers consume the same 
e
 
g  
YA
f
A8
XB
c
OBY YB
XA XOA
h
jk
A4
B12
B14
d
A10
B8
B10
Source: Barr (1993, p. 74)
Figure A.1 Distribution of consumption of two goods between consumers A and B
amount of goods X and Y. A Pareto improvement is possible from point g 
to point k, where the two consumers would be located on the same level of 
measurable utility functions (indifference curves A10, B10, (i.e., each of them 
would achieve 10 units of measurable utility); consumption distribution 
corresponding to point k on the contraction curve would thus, according 
to their perception of the welfare state, correspond to the ideal. If, howev-
er, the marginal utility of the income functions differed among individual 
consumers, the optimum allocation point would be different.
 Rawls’s egalitarianism – According to Rawls (1995), goods should be distrib-
uted according to rational social justice while assuming the existence of 
a ‘veil of ignorance’ concerning the future position of all society members 
on the market; that is, distribution of goods should be adjusted as long as 
each new structure improves the total utility of the poorest member on the 
market. Rawls’ theory of social justice is based on the imperative to im-
prove the situation of the most disadvantaged person in the market (there-
fore, a shift from point c to point d would not be desirable although it does 
constitute a Pareto improvement). The shift from point d to point k is desir-
able from the point of view of Rawls’ theory, although it does not consti-
tute a Pareto improvement because the ‘poorer’ consumer A benefits to the 
detriment of the ‘richer’ consumer B. Like some utilitarians, egalitarians 
would consider the distribution corresponding to point k to be ideal.
 Socialism – According to the basic thesis of socialism, all goods should be 
allocated completely equally; that is, like Rawls, socialists consider any 
shift towards point k to be desirable although it does not constitute a Pa-
reto improvement and the situation of one may improve to the detriment 
of another.
Public housing instruments
Let me assume that the preference of a given needy household is reflected in 
indifference curves U1, U2 and U3 which connect all combinations of the con-
sumption of housing and other goods that bring the household the same util-
ity. Curve AB indicates the income limit curve of the household, mathemati-
cally speaking:
y = p1x1 + p2x2
Here y is the income of the household and p1, p2 are the prices of both goods 
and x1, x2 are the consumed amounts of both goods (x2 represents the amount 
of consumed housing services, housing). The household that desires to maxi-
mise its utility will opt for a consumption combination that will correspond 
to point C1, where the income limit curve touches the highest possible indif-
ference curve. Let us now presume that state intervention will result in a de-
crease in the cost of housing to p2’. The income limit curve will then, thanks 
to the decreased cost of housing, move from AB to AC. The new income limit 
curve AC can be mathematically captured thus:
y = p1x1 + p2'x2
Because only the cost of housing decreases, point A remains the start-
ing point of the income limit curve on the axis measuring the consumption 
of other goods. In such a case, a rationally thinking household will opt for 
a combination of consumption in point C2 on the higher indifference curve 
U2; it will spend more on housing (x2-2) and may consume more of the other 
good (though what happens depends on the shape of the indifference curve). 
Let me now presume that the public authority, instead of decreasing the cost 
of housing, gives the needy household an income-tested cash allowance, the 
payment of which is as costly for public budgets as the original intervention 
consisting of decreasing the market prices of housing. Then the income limit 
curve moves from AB to DE, and mathematically we can describe curve DE 
thus:
y + (p2 – p2')x2-2 = p1x1 + p2x2
Since point C2 is the point where the income limit curve AC touches the in-
difference curve U2 and since indifference curves are usually convex toward 
the beginning, part of the income limit curve DE must be above the level of 
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Figure A.2 Comparison of the efficiency of cash allowance vs. price regulation
indifference curve U2. Consequently, the household receiving an equally cost-
ly cash allowance is able to achieve a greater indifference curve (U3 ) than it 
could if the intervention were to result in a decrease in the cost of housing, 
and opts for a combination of consumption corresponding to point C3 in Fig-
ure A.2.

The following is a list of the main possible social objectives of local govern-
ment or national housing programmes:
 higher affordability of housing for middle and low-income households;
 higher quality of housing;
 social mix;
 higher labour/tenant mobility;
 sustainable development of housing conditions;
 specific shortages (housing care, sheltered and supervised housing for dis-
abled, handicapped, elderly, homeless people and children without parents);
 tenant participation.
Higher affordability of housing for middle and low-income households
The examples of possible local or national housing programmes include:
 Housing allowances (HA)
 Effectiveness – Has the programme fulfilled the objectives of its develop-
ers (a decrease in the average rent-to-income ratio and the household 
structure of HA beneficiaries can be used)? Is the percentage of house-
holds receiving HA high enough to have a decisive influence on higher 
affordability of housing for middle and low-income households? Are 
some households excluded from HA due to the formula or other restric-
tive provisions (e.g., needy households living in the market rental sec-
tor)? What is the share of households that apply for HA out of the to-
tal number of households eligible for HA? If the share is low, why don’t 
households want to apply for HA? Do HA really help those who are ex-
pected to be helped (low income households) or does the insufficient 
targeting lead to a relatively high share of higher income households 
among the HA beneficiaries?
 Efficiency – What is the share of HA expenditure on total state/local 
housing expenditures? Is there an empirical test of the correlation be-
tween the introduction of HA and rent price growth in an uncontrolled 
(market) rental sector? What is the estimated impact of HA introduction 
on rent price inflation? What other state/local expenditures rose due to 
the inflation caused by the introduction of HA? Is there any economet-
ric analysis comparing the overall demand side expenditure (HA) with 
the situation when the same amount of sources is used for supply side 
subsidies (e.g., new construction of social housing, improvement of cur-
rent housing stock, etc.)? Does a higher HA (in association with higher 
rents), when factored according to the particular formula of HA applied 
in a particular country, raise the probability that the household will 
choose not to work instead of pursuing economic activity? Is there clear 
evidence of demotivation from a particular HA model (poverty trap)? Is 
this problem quantified in some way?
 Rent regulation/setting/pooling
 Effectiveness – Is rent regulation truly targeted at socially needy popula-
tions? Are some socially needy groups of households excluded from the 
sector where rents are controlled by public authorities (by excess de-
mand or insufficient monitoring of rent-controlled housing stock)? Are 
there provisions allowing for a rise in regulated rents when the income 
of households living in the controlled sector rises? Do rent deregula-
tion processes reflect the different levels of social needs of the different 
households?
 Efficiency – What is the effect of rent control on labour mobility (e.g., 
number of re-lets in a controlled sector and market sector or the re-
sults of household mobility studies can be used)? What is the amount 
of reconstruction/improvement investments in the controlled sector 
compared to the market sector? What is the average difference between 
rents in controlled and uncontrolled housing sectors for the same kind 
of dwellings in the same locations (or, at least, same size of residence)? 
Do rents reflect the property values of dwellings in a controlled sector? 
Is there any evidence of under-occupation/over-consumption in the 
rent-controlled sector? How much do households from old dwellings 
subsidise the households living in new dwellings in the case of rent-
pooling? What are the complementary public expenditures connected 
with the rise of rents (e.g., rise in Retail Price Index  rise in public ex-
penditures on pensions or social transfers)?
 Allocation policy
 Effectiveness – Are dwellings with lower rents allocated among house-
holds with lower income and vice versa (in cases of municipal or alter-
native management rental housing)? Is the maximum income limit ap-
plied in the allocation of social housing (means testing)? Are any groups 
of households excluded from the allocation of current social housing? 
Do municipalities require a period of permanent residence in the area 
of the local authority when households apply for social housing? Is 
there a stigma attached to social housing leading to a situation where-
by other needy households decline to apply for social housing? Does a 
point system reflect the real social needs in different localities?
 Efficiency – If the rent-setting mechanism is based on income, what in-
centives are given to encourage members of a household to begin or 
continue work instead of being unemployed? How is the difference 
managed between the housing costs of social landlords and income 
flowing from rent, related to applicant income? Is there any economet-
ric analysis comparing the expenditures of a specific allocation policy to 
expenditures on HA when the same level of rent-to-income ratio is as-
sured? Are higher income households forced to leave the social housing 
sector?
 New social housing construction (provided by various management forms)
 Effectiveness – Has the programme fulfilled the objectives of its devel-
opers (e.g., housing for low and middle-income households)? Is the 
maximum income limit applied in the allocation of new social hous-
ing (means testing)? Does the programme lead to filtering (e.g., house-
holds applying for new social dwellings must let their former municipal 
rental dwellings for allocation to new socially needy households)? Can 
the programme be used (or abused) for other purposes due to bad leg-
islation, rules or insufficient control (e.g., quasi-ownership housing in-
stead of rental housing, housing for higher income households instead 
of housing for low or middle-income households, etc.)? Are there effec-
tive provisions to prevent this situation? Are any households from tar-
get groups excluded from new social housing allocation, if so, then why?
 Efficiency – What are the construction costs per square metre of new 
social housing compared to the construction costs of other private or 
public sector providers, including other authorities offering housing of 
similar type and quality and on a similar scale, while excluding the land 
price (comparative cost analysis)? Are construction-cost limits applied 
when public subsidies are allocated? Do rents in new social dwellings 
cover the total costs connected with maintenance, administration, re-
pairs and construction after the deduction of subsidies, low or zero land 
price, tax advantages, etc.? Do rents reflect the property value of dwell-
ings (location, quality, and services)? What is the average rent price of 
new social housing for differently sized dwellings in comparison to the 
rents of new rental dwellings in other controlled or uncontrolled rent-
al sectors in the same location? What is the average net present value 
(NPV) of new social housing investment (counting grants, interest sub-
sidies, etc.) compared to the NPV of investments in the construction 
of new private rental dwellings? Are there any studies quantifying the 
scale of the crowding out effect of social housing construction? Are 
there any econometric tests comparing the overall expenditures of de-
mand side subsidies (HA) with the same level of supply side subsidies 
(social housing construction)?
 Privatisation of rental dwellings (higher affordability of ownership housing)
 Effectiveness – Did lower and middle-income households privatise their 
dwellings? Were they interested in the privatisation process? What in-
centives were created by state or local authorities to encourage lower 
and middle-income households to privatise their dwellings?
 Efficiency – What was the average difference between the market price of 
dwellings and the price of dwellings used for privatisation, broken down 
by size of residence or location? Do new owners take care of their prop-
erties (i.e., pay enough to the repair funds to assure the maintenance 
and improvement of the dwellings)? What percent of privatised dwell-
ings were sold immediately after privatisation? What are the measures 
applied to prevent speculation or the dilapidation of buildings being pri-
vatised?
Higher quality of housing
Examples of possible local/national housing programmes include:
 Refurbishment/reconstruction of dwellings
 Effectiveness – Has the programme fulfilled the objectives of its develop-
ers (e.g., improvement in the locations where it was expected, the ex-
pected scale of improvement works, etc.)? Do tenants (or other people 
directly influenced by the programme) participate in the design and 
practical application of the programme?
 Efficiency – Are costs of refurbishment/reconstruction lower than the 
costs of demolition and new housing construction (including direct 
costs plus higher maintenance costs and risk premiums in the case of 
refurbishment/reconstruction of low-quality dwellings)? Were the costs 
of the programme covered or at least partially funded by private capi-
tal? In the event homeowners benefit, will they cover a substantial part 
of the improvement costs? In the event tenants benefit, will the costs 
of improvements to the dwellings be covered (at least partially) through 
higher rents in the improved dwellings?
 Regeneration of neighbourhood
 Effectiveness and efficiency can be evaluated by answering the same ques-
tions as in the case of refurbishment/regeneration of dwellings.
 New social housing construction
 Effectiveness – Are there explicit requirements concerning the quality of 
new social housing dwellings (e.g., size of dwelling, materials used, and 
insulation standards)? Could the developers avoid meeting these pro-
visions? How are the developers encouraged to increase the quality of 
housing?
 Efficiency – see above.
Social mix
Examples of possible local/national housing programmes include:
 Allocation policy
 Effectiveness – Does the allocation policy in current and/or new munici-
pal housing and/or housing managed by new legal forms (with the im-
portant role of municipality) assure the maintenance or recovery of the 
social mix in different locations/blocks of flats? How? When analysing 
the time series, is the effect of allocation policy on the maintenance 
of the social mix only short-term or can it be expected to remain long 
term? Is any trend raised from time-series analysis that could serve as 
evidence for the answer of the previous question?
 Efficiency – see above.
 Rent setting/regulation/pooling
 Effectiveness – Is the rent-setting mechanism or rent regulation designed 
in a way that leads to a social mix of population and prevents social 
exclusion? Is the effect of rent policy on the maintenance of social mix 
only short-term or it can be expected to last? Is any trend raised from 
time-series analysis that could serve as evidence for the answer of the 
previous question?
 Efficiency – see above.
 Refurbishment/reconstruction of dwellings and regeneration of dwellings
 Effectiveness – Are there any social survey results confirming that im-
provement programmes helped to maintain the social mix in particular 
districts or blocks of flats? Are the inhabitants living in areas or dwell-
ings chosen for improvement participating in the project design and 
application? Do social landlords conduct regular tenant-satisfaction 
surveys? Is the effect of refurbishment projects on the maintenance of 
social mix short-term or it can be expected to last? Is there any trend 
raised from time-series analysis that could serve as evidence for the an-
swer of the previous question?
 Efficiency – see above.

The programme is looking for the minimum of the following equation:
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iK max - maximum interest rate on qualified loan (5% p.a.);
i - discount rate (5% p.a.);
n - loan maturity (25 years);
Ji - loan principal for region i;
JKi - qualified loan principal for region i;
iKi - optimised interest rate of a qualified loan for region i.
under the following conditions:
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, where
Pi - cost price of an average new dwelling in region i;
iT - market interest rate for mortgage loans in 2002 (6.7% p.a.);
OCi - running costs (management and maintenance costs) - 2% of Pi;
NR -  normative rent (equal to rent in rent-controlled sector at a particular 
stage of simulation).
If the equation does not have a solution even when iki  0 and Ji = 0, then 
the principal of a qualified loan gradually decreases using the following rela-
tion: JKi(1-z), where z = 0,0001. A qualified loan is thus substituted by a grant. 
In each step of iteration the decrease in principal of a qualified loan is con-
nected to the decrease of total construction costs till the moment when costs 
are lower or equal to normative rent (or when the full qualified loan is substi-
tuted by a grant). Only if under such a condition the normative rent still does 
not cover the construction costs (subsidised by grant), then the difference be-
tween costs and normative rent is supposed to be covered by regular revenue 
subsidies.
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The objective of this book was to fill in the gaps and to some extent further 
the knowledge in accounts that reinterpret and evaluate the processes that 
occurred in the Czech Republic over the course of the economic transition. 
The book describes and analyses the housing system establishment (reform) 
in the Czech Republic after 1990. Transition was mainly the process of build-
ing new (or transforming old) social institutions. It was far from spontane-
ous; on the contrary, it was highly regulated and shaped by political power, 
especially by the representatives of the state. The behaviour (actions, inter-
ventions) of the state in the field of housing thus formed the main research 
focus of the book.
The state may intervene in many fields – housing production, housing con-
sumption, land zoning, housing finance, distribution and redistribution, al-
location, location. Both governments and citizens of transition societies paid 
special attention to the ‘housing needs problem’ or ‘housing affordability 
problem’; housing affordability became the most reiterated housing issue and 
policy target. Housing affordability is especially connected to the level and 
quality of housing consumption and therefore the book pays special atten-
tion to those state interventions directed at influencing housing consumption 
(explicit or implicit subsidies to maintain or increase housing affordability). 
These interventions were not only described but also assessed, because de-
scription alone does not allow full understanding of their impact on housing 
consumption or housing affordability. The prerequisite for such an evaluation 
was also the detailed description of social, economic and political contexts in 
which the Czech housing system emerged; and at least partial international 
comparison with situation in other transition countries.
The policies (interventions) were evaluated, on the background of wider 
context and international comparison, from the point of view of their effi-
ciency and effectiveness. The efficiency was defined through the Pareto lens: 
if any alternative allocation of goods increases utility from consumption for 
at least one actor on the market and at the same time does not decrease 
utility from consumption for other actors then we say such allocation is in-
efficient and there is room for improvement in market performance. Such 
improvement may often be ensured only by state intervention. For housing 
markets, particular examples of market failure may be the existence of oli-
gopoly or monopoly in housing finance or production, asymmetric informa-
tion among market agents (information access barriers), externalities dur-
ing housing production or consumption. An example of this inefficiency may, 
however, also be the situation when the state spends tax-payers’ money for 
production and allocation of goods or services that could be allocated simi-
larly (or even more efficiently) by private entities, or the situation when alter-
native subsidy settings can produce, under the condition of holding the same 
quality and quantity of consumption distribution, public savings.
Effectiveness is closely associated with the idea of equity, social justice. As 
such, it is closely connected with particular welfare state regimes, particular 
social norms, and particular redistributive policies. Effectiveness may be un-
derstood as the degree to which the originally defined redistributive goals of 
state intervention are met, that is, whether public funds are actually spent 
where they were allocated and whether those for whom they were intend-
ed actually are helped. However, the concept of effectiveness is not left to a 
vague ‘definition infinity’; welfare economists did not want to leave the con-
cept of effectiveness solely to the will of lawmakers or governments, who 
often do not define the intention of the intervention at all. The concept was 
thus, at least partially, generalised into the common shared assumption that 
whatever state redistribution of wealth is finally applied, it should decrease 
social inequality in society, that is, redistribution policies should help the 
worse-off with the costs of the better-off.
Welfare economics distinguishes between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ ef-
fectiveness. Vertical effectiveness measures the degree of redistribution of 
income, consumption and wealth from the rich to the poor. In the case of 
particular housing subsidy it measures the extent to which such subsidy 
is actually allocated to those who really need help, that is to low-income 
households. It measures whether it ultimately decreases social and income 
inequality in society. Horizontal effectiveness is connected with the idea of 
setting a minimum standard of consumption (income, wealth) that would be 
ensured for all members of society, as well as with the assumption that all 
needy (poor) households have equal and unrestricted access to subsidies, that 
is none of the poor (needy, low income) are excluded from such redistribu-
tion. In the case of particular housing subsidy it measures whether any needy 
(poor) household is not eligible to apply for the subsidy.
The concept of effectiveness was fully applied in this book, including the 
evaluation of both vertical and horizontal effectiveness. State actions in the 
field of income or wealth redistribution have a direct impact on housing con-
sumption. However, the concept of efficiency is much broader. It also relates 
to state interventions concerned with the general functioning of the hous-
ing market, covering for example problems such as price speculations, oli-
gopoly structures in housing supply, restrictive urban planning, asymmetric 
information, etc. Therefore, the concept of efficiency has been limited to the 
efficiency of those state interventions that have direct influence on housing 
consumption, or defined more precisely, those state interventions aimed at 
redistributing wealth, goods or income. Efficiency was limited to the analysis 
of possible public savings under an alternative subsidy setting, or under an 
alternative set of subsidies. Efficiency was thus subordinated to effectiveness 
and narrowed to potential public savings.
The first chapter of the book discussed theoretical and methodological de-
vice used to describe and evaluate the housing systems, housing subsidies, 
and the role of the state in the field of housing. This discussion helped to an-
swer preliminary questions and outline main research questions of the book.
The second, mainly descriptive chapter, focused on a partial internation-
al comparison of housing policies in the field of housing consumption in six 
selected transition countries. Its main purpose was to show what generally 
happened during transition in the field of housing policy and what similari-
ties as well as differences among transition countries can be detected in this 
process. The main conclusion was that in all selected transition countries the 
same part of the population (existing occupants of public housing) received 
basically similar economic subsidy – either in the form of owner-occupied 
flats purchased for a very low price (or even obtained for free) or in the form 
of rental housing with low regulated rent and strong pre-transition type of 
tenancy protection. The economic subsidies probably formed the main hous-
ing subsidies during the early phase of transition. The income or social situa-
tion of eligible households was not deemed important; the only criterion was 
the occupancy title. These subsidies therefore divided households into two 
very disparate groups. The ‘insiders’ enjoyed low housing costs and tenancy 
protection (with no regard to their social needs or income levels) while the 
‘outsiders’ were often left to the uncompromising market forces. In this con-
text, the segmentation of housing market into the ‘privileged’ and ‘unprivi-
leged’ segments has been pronounced – housing expenditures for otherwise 
comparable housing in these two segments differed strongly.
In the third chapter, again more or less descriptive, the context in which 
housing policy was formed and reformed during transition in the Czech Re-
public has been described. This included descriptions of the political, insti-
tutional, economic and demographic contexts as well as the history of both 
social and housing policies applied in the territory of the current Czech Re-
public in the past. This chapter also comprehensively described and discuss 
the changes in housing conditions (including tenure structure), housing pol-
icy, housing finance and housing affordability in the period 1990-2005 in the 
Czech Republic.
The main goal of the fourth chapter, analytical by nature, was to evaluate 
the effectiveness and subordinated efficiency of state interventions in the 
field of housing consumption (policies) introduced in the Czech Republic in 
the period 1990-2005. In conclusion, the overall evaluation of Czech housing 
policy was relatively negative. Housing policy was based on one-time untar-
geted economic subsidies that could not be sustained, even for pure financial 
reasons, in the long-term and were shown to be ineffective/inefficient; other 
evaluated housing subsidies also had serious drawbacks from the viewpoint 
of vertical effectiveness (tax relief, supply-side subsidies, state premium to 
housing savings scheme), horizontal effectiveness (housing allowances) and/
or efficiency (especially state premium to housing savings scheme). Though 
the Czech Republic entered the transition period with relatively sufficient 
housing stock and, compared with other transitional societies, relatively bet-
ter housing quality, housing subsidies in the field of housing consumption 
were overwhelmingly ineffective and inefficient. They increased social and in-
come inequalities in Czech society and also strengthened the division of the 
housing market into ‘privileged’ and ‘unprivileged’ housing segments.
The fifth chapter, again analytical, compared, albeit partially, the effective-
ness and subordinated efficiency of housing subsidies among selected transi-
tion countries. Its main purpose was to detect at least some reasons for the 
application of specific policies in the Czech Republic, as well as the reasons 
for the particular effectiveness and subordinated efficiency of Czech hous-
ing subsidies. The aim was to discover which specific ‘national’ factors are 
visible only via network of several ‘out-national’ reference points. The most 
effective/efficient subsidies were found in the country where the general 
policy orientated towards the rental model was accompanied by decentrali-
sation in the rental sector of housing (Poland). The least effective/efficient 
subsidies appeared in the country where policy orientated towards the rental 
model was accompanied by a low level of decentralisation in the rental sec-
tor of housing (Czech Republic). It may also be due to the fact that if some 
old inefficient practices are decentralised to the local level or indirectly abol-
ished (e.g., through housing privatisation) central administration has simply 
stopped being attacked by various interest groups wanting to keep those old 
practices alive. This might allow the central government to prepare new, more 
efficient/effective subsidies with no need to look for any kind of hybrid solu-
tion between past relics and new initiatives. From the comparison of housing 
conditions in particular countries another empirical implication has been dis-
cerned. Relative housing sufficiency leads to lower effectiveness/efficiency of 
housing subsidies whereas relative housing insufficiency leads to the oppo-
site. The factor of housing need (housing shortage) may thus have some influ-
ence on actual efficiency and effectiveness of state subsidies because a coun-
try in an acute need of new housing cannot afford to experiment with hybrids 
of new and old practices. However, further empirical work on a bigger sample 
of transitional countries would be needed to confirm such a conclusion.
The sixth chapter attempted to find other reasons (other than following 
from international comparison) for the introduction of particular types of 
policies as well as for the particular levels of effectiveness and subordinat-
ed efficiency of housing subsidies specific to the Czech Republic. According 
to the results of interviews with several housing policy makers, the factors 
mainly include: the inadequate qualifications of political representatives and 
their ‘politicking’; the distrust politicians felt towards the research sphere 
and towards ministry officers; an unwillingness on the political right to ac-
cept long-term concepts, and an inability to come up with a conceptual solu-
tion on the political left; the strong influence of municipal mayors on central 
housing policy; the need to find solutions quickly without the opportunity to 
test them; and the relatively strong lobbying engaged in by interest groups. 
Housing policy was not viewed as being part of social policy but rather as 
something separate from it, which should not target the needy especially. The 
concept of housing policy focusing extensively on the scope of housing con-
struction was similarly adopted: what was important is the number of newly 
built flats, and it did not matter where they were built, for whom, at what 
level of quality, or how they were allocated. Officials did not care that pub-
lic support of such housing construction had a negative impact on the mar-
ket functioning and/or strengthens income and social inequalities. It became 
apparent during the interviews that the perspective (evaluation) of efficiency 
and effectiveness of public subsidies was never considered, was never the 
subject of discussion, and is for many an entirely new idea and partly even 
incomprehensible to them.
The seventh and concluding chapter of the book summarises the main 
findings and provides an overview of the conclusions (answers) to all research 
questions, including the most important housing policy recommendations.

Martin Lux
Het doel van dit boek is om de kennis die beschreven staat in artikelen, waar-
in de processen die in Tsjechië plaatsvonden tijdens de economische over-
gang opnieuw geïnterpreteerd en geëvalueerd worden, samen te brengen 
en waar mogelijk uit te breiden. Het boek beschrijft en analyseert (de her-
vorming van) het volkshuisvestingsbeleid in Tsjechië na 1990. De overgang 
bestond met name uit het opzetten van nieuwe danwel het omvormen van 
bestaande sociale instituties. En dat ging niet vanzelf; integendeel, deze over-
gang was sterk gereguleerd en geregisseerd door de politiek en met name 
door de vertegenwoordigers van de overheid. De interventies van de overheid 
op het gebied van de volkshuisvesting vormen de belangrijkste bron van on-
derzoek in dit boek.
De overheid kan interveniëren in verschillende gebieden: woningproduc-
tie, woonconsumptie, grondbestemming, woningfinanciering, verdeling en 
herverdeling, toewijzing en locatie. Zowel overheden als burgers in transi-
tielanden besteden speciale aandacht aan de problemen op het gebied van 
‘beschikbaarheid’ en ‘betaalbaarheid’ van woningen, waarbij het probleem 
van de ‘betaalbaarheid’ de boventoon voert en het vaakst als beleidsdoel ge-
noemd wordt. De betaalbaarheid van woningen is sterk verbonden met de 
omvang en de kwaliteit van de woonconsumptie; het boek gaat dan ook die-
per in op overheidsinterventies gericht op de beïnvloeding van de wooncon-
sumptie (zoals directe of indirecte subsidies om de betaalbaarheid van wo-
ningen te handhaven of te verbeteren). Deze interventies worden niet alleen 
beschreven maar ook geëvalueerd, omdat een beschrijving alleen niet genoeg 
inzicht geeft in de impact van de maatregelen op de woonconsumptie of de 
betaalbaarheid van woningen. Voor een dergelijke evaluatie is een gedetail-
leerde beschrijving nodig van de sociale, economische en politieke context 
waarbinnen het Tsjechische volkshuisvestingssysteem zich heeft ontwikkeld, 
evenals een (gedeeltelijke) internationale vergelijking met de situatie in an-
dere transitielanden.
De efficiëntie en effectiviteit van het beleid (de interventies) zijn geëvalu-
eerd vanuit deze achtergronden en internationale vergelijking. De efficiëntie 
van het beleid is gedefinieerd door middel van het Pareto-optimum: als een 
alternatieve toewijzing van goederen het nut uit consumptie voor ten min-
ste één speler op de markt verbetert en tegelijkertijd niet leidt tot een ver-
mindering van het nut uit consumptie voor andere spelers, is een dergelijke 
toewijzing inefficiënt en is er ruimte voor verbetering van de marktwerking. 
Een dergelijke verbetering kan vaak alleen door interventie van de overheid 
tot stand worden gebracht. Typische voorbeelden van marktfalen op de wo-
ningmarkt zijn het bestaan van een oligopolie of monopolie op het gebied 
van financiering of productie, asymmetrische informatie tussen spelers op 
de markt (waarbij sommige spelers geen toegang hebben tot bepaalde infor-
matie), en externe omstandigheden die productie of consumptie beïnvloeden. 
Een ander voorbeeld van dergelijke inefficiëntie kan een situatie zijn waarin 
de overheid belastinggeld gebruikt voor de productie en toewijzing van goe-
deren of diensten die net zo goed (of zelfs efficiënter) door private partijen 
toegewezen hadden kunnen worden. Of een situatie waarin een alternatieve 
verdeling van subsidies (aangenomen dat dit zou resulteren in een gelijk-
waardige kwaliteit en omvang van de consumptieverdeling) besparingen voor 
de overheid zou kunnen opleveren.
Effectiviteit hangt sterk samen met het idee van gelijkheid, van sociale 
rechtvaardigheid. Het is dan ook sterk verbonden met bepaalde welvaarts-
samenlevingen, bepaalde sociale normen en waarden en bepaalde herver-
delingsprincipes. Effectiviteit kan gezien worden als de mate waarin de 
oorspronkelijke herverdelingsdoelen die ten grondslag liggen aan overheids-
interventies gehaald zijn. Met andere woorden: of publieke gelden daadwer-
kelijk zijn uitgegeven aan die zaken waar ze voor bedoeld waren en of dege-
nen voor wie deze gelden bestemd waren er ook daadwerkelijk mee geholpen 
zijn. Maar het concept effectiviteit is geen helder omschreven begrip: wel-
vaartseconomen hebben dit niet willen overlaten aan juristen of overheden, 
die de achterliggende intentie van een interventie doorgaans niet helder defi-
niëren. Het concept is dan ook (gedeeltelijk) gegeneraliseerd tot de algemene 
aanname dat herverdeling van welvaart door de overheid altijd zou moeten 
leiden tot vermindering van sociale ongelijkheid in een samenleving. Met an-
dere woorden: herverdeling zou ertoe moeten leiden dat de sterkste schou-
ders de zwaarste lasten dragen.
De welvaartseconomie maakt onderscheid tussen ‘verticale’ en ‘horizon-
tale’ effectiviteit. Verticale effectiviteit meet de mate van herverdeling van 
inkomen, consumptie en bezit van de welgestelden naar de minder welge-
stelden. Bij bepaalde vormen van woonsubsidie meet verticale effectiviteit de 
mate waarin de subsidie daadwerkelijk terecht komt bij degenen die deze het 
hardst nodig hebben: de huishoudens met de laagste inkomens. Zo wordt ge-
meten of de subsidie de sociale en inkomensongelijkheid in een samenleving 
uiteindelijk vermindert. Horizontale effectiviteit heeft te maken met de idee 
dat er een minimale standaard van consumptie (inkomen, bezit) vastgesteld 
zou moeten worden die voor alle leden van de samenleving gegarandeerd zou 
moeten zijn, en met de aanname dat alle minder welgestelde huishoudens 
gelijkwaardige en onbeperkte toegang tot subsidies hebben en er dus geen 
minder welgestelde huishoudens zijn die niet van deze herverdeling kunnen 
profiteren. Bij bepaalde vormen van woonsubsidie meet horizontale effecti-
viteit of er ook minder welgestelde huishoudens zijn die niet in aanmerking 
komen voor deze subsidie.
Het effectiviteitsconcept is in dit hele boek toegepast, inclusief de evalu-
atie van zowel verticale als horizontale effectiviteit. Interventies door de over-
heid op het gebied van herverdeling van inkomen of bezit hebben een directe 
invloed op de woonconsumptie. Het concept efficiëntie is echter veel breder. 
Dit omvat immers ook overheidsinterventies die te maken hebben met het 
algemene functioneren van de woningmarkt en die gericht zijn op proble-
men zoals prijsspeculatie, oligopolische structuren aan de aanbodkant, een 
restrictief stadsplanningsbeleid, asymmetrische informatie, enzovoort. Om 
die reden is het concept efficiëntie in dit boek beperkt tot de efficiëntie van 
overheidsinterventies die een directe invloed hebben op de woonconsump-
tie, oftewel overheidsinterventies die gericht zijn op de herverdeling van bezit, 
goederen of inkomen. Hierbij is alleen gekeken naar de analyse van mogelijke 
overheidsbesparingen bij een alternatieve verdeling van subsidies, of bij een 
alternatieve vorm van subsidies. Efficiëntie is dus ondergeschikt gemaakt aan 
effectiviteit en betreft hier alleen mogelijke overheidsbesparingen.
In het eerste hoofdstuk van het boek worden de theorie en methode uit-
eengezet waarmee de woonsystemen, woonsubsidies en de rol van de over-
heid op het gebied van wonen zijn beschreven en geëvalueerd. Met behulp 
van dit overzicht kunnen voorlopige vragen beantwoord worden en krijgen de 
belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen uit het boek hun vorm.
Het tweede hoofdstuk is voornamelijk beschrijvend van aard en behandelt 
een (gedeeltelijke) internationale vergelijking van volkshuisvestingsbeleid op 
het gebied van woonconsumptie in zes geselecteerde landen in een economi-
sche situatie van transitie. Doel hiervan is te laten zien wat er tijdens de over-
gang gebeurde op het gebied van woonbeleid en of er in dit proces verschil-
len danwel overeenkomsten tussen de onderzochte landen te ontdekken zijn. 
De belangrijkste conclusie hierbij is dat in al deze landen hetzelfde deel van 
de bevolking (bestaande bewoners van sociale woningbouw) eenzelfde soort 
subsidie ontving, hetzij in de vorm van koopflats die tegen een sterk geredu-
ceerde prijs (of soms zelfs gratis) werden aangeboden, hetzij in de vorm van 
huurwoningen met een lage, gereguleerde huur en sterke huurbescherming 
op het niveau van voor de transitie. Deze economische subsidies waren de 
belangrijkste vorm van woonsubsidie in de beginfase van de transitie. Het in-
komen of de sociale status van de huishoudens die hiervoor in aanmerking 
kwamen deed er niet toe; het enige criterium was de soort huisvesting (soci-
ale woningbouw). Daardoor ontstond een sterke tweedeling onder huishou-
dens in deze landen. De ‘insiders’ profiteerden van lage woonkosten en hoge 
huurbescherming (ongeacht hun inkomen of sociale situatie), en de ‘outsi-
ders’ werden overgelaten aan de grillen van de markt. In deze context is de 
verdeling van de woonmarkt in bevoorrechte en onbevoorrechte segmenten 
duidelijk zichtbaar: de kosten voor – op andere fronten vergelijkbare – huis-
vesting in deze twee segmenten varieerden immers sterk.
In het derde hoofdstuk, dat eveneens min of meer beschrijvend van aard 
is, komt de context aan de orde waarin het volkshuisvestingsbeleid in Tsje-
chië tijdens de overgang gevormd en hervormd werd. Hierbij gaat het om be-
schrijvingen van de politieke, institutionele, economische en demografische 
context, maar ook om de geschiedenis van het sociale beleid en volkshuisves-
tingsbeleid in het gebied dat het tegenwoordige Tsjechië beslaat. Daarnaast 
beschrijft en evalueert dit hoofdstuk de veranderingen op het gebied van 
huisvesting (waaronder het huurstelsel), sociale woningbouwbeleid en finan-
ciering en betaalbaarheid van woningen in de periode 1990-2005 in Tsjechië.
Het belangrijkste doel van het vierde hoofdstuk, dat analytisch van aard is, 
is de effectiviteit en daarmee de efficiëntie van interventies in het volkshuis-
vestingsbeleid in Tsjechië in de periode 1990-2005 te evalueren. De conclusie 
luidt dat deze evaluatie van het Tsjechische volkshuisvestingsbeleid over het 
algemeen een relatief negatief beeld laat zien. Het beleid was gebaseerd op 
eenmalige, ondoelmatige economische subsidies die op de lange termijn niet 
gehandhaafd konden worden, zelfs niet om puur financiële redenen, en die 
bovendien ineffectief en inefficiënt bleken. Andere onderzochte volkshuisves-
tingssubsidies hadden eveneens belangrijke tekortkomingen vanuit het oog-
punt van verticale effectiviteit (belastingaftrek, subsidies vanuit de aanbod-
kant, overheidssteun aan woningbouwprojecten) en horizontale effectiviteit 
(huursubsidie) en/of efficiëntie (met name door overheidsbijdragen aan wo-
ningbouwprojecten). Hoewel Tsjechië aan het begin van de transitieperiode 
relatief gezien over voldoende woningvoorraad beschikte in vergelijking met 
andere landen in transitie, en deze woningvoorraad van betere kwaliteit was, 
waren de woonconsumptiesubsidies zonder meer ineffectief en inefficiënt. 
De subsidies vergrootten de sociale- en inkomensongelijkheid in Tsjechië en 
versterkten bovendien de verdeling van de woningmarkt in bevoorrechte en 
onbevoorrechte segmenten.
Het vijfde hoofdstuk, ook weer analytisch van aard, bevat een (gedeeltelij-
ke) vergelijking van de effectiviteit en daarmee de efficiëntie van woonsubsi-
dies in geselecteerde transitielanden. Het belangrijkste doel van dit hoofdstuk 
is om mogelijke redenen te achterhalen waarom bepaalde beleidsmaatrege-
len in Tsjechië werden toegepast en waarom deze subsidies wel of juist niet 
effectief en efficiënt waren. Doel hierbij is om na te gaan welke specifieke ‘na-
tionale’ factoren alleen zichtbaar worden door middel van een netwerk van 
verschillende ‘buiten-nationale’ referentiepunten. De meest effectieve en ef-
ficiënte subsidiemaatregelen waren te vinden in Polen, het land waar het al-
gemene beleid, gericht op het huurmodel, gepaard ging met decentralisatie 
van de huursector. De minst effectieve en efficiënte subsidiemaatregelen wa-
ren te vinden in Tsjechië, het land waar het algemene beleid, gericht op het 
huurmodel, gepaard ging met een lage mate van decentralisatie van de huur-
sector. Het kan ook zo zijn dat de centrale overheid, wanneer bepaalde, inef-
ficiënte praktijken gedecentraliseerd worden naar lokaal niveau of wanneer 
deze indirect worden afgeschaft (bijvoorbeeld door privatisering van wonin-
gen), simpelweg niet langer onder vuur wordt genomen door de verschillende 
belangengroepen die willen dat de bestaande praktijken gehandhaafd blijven. 
Hierdoor kan de centrale overheid nieuwe, effectievere en efficiëntere subsi-
dies ontwikkelen zonder te hoeven zoeken naar een soort hybride oplossing 
die het midden houdt tussen overblijfselen uit het verleden en nieuwe ini-
tiatieven. Uit de vergelijking van het sociale woningbouwbeleid in bepaalde 
landen komt een andere empirische implicatie naar voren. Een relatief vol-
doende aantal beschikbare woningen leidt tot een lagere effectiviteit en effici-
entie van woonsubsidies, terwijl een relatief onvoldoende aantal beschikbare 
woningen leidt tot het tegenovergestelde. De factor woonbehoefte (tekort aan 
woningen) kan dus van invloed zijn op de feitelijke effectiviteit en efficiën-
tie van overheidssubsidies, omdat een land waarin een directe behoefte aan 
nieuwe woningen bestaat het zich niet kan permitteren om te experimente-
ren met hybride beleidsmaatregelen die oude en nieuwe praktijken combine-
ren. Om een dergelijke conclusie te bevestigen is echter meer empirisch on-
derzoek in een groter aantal landen in transitie noodzakelijk.
In het zesde hoofdstuk is geprobeerd om andere redenen te vinden (die 
niet voortkomen uit de internationale vergelijking) voor de introductie van 
bepaalde soorten beleid en voor de specifieke mate van effectiviteit en effici-
entie van de woonsubsidies in Tsjechië. Uit de interviews met verschillende 
beleidsmakers uit de volkshuisvesting komen de volgende factoren naar vo-
ren: politieke vertegenwoordigers die niet naar behoren gekwalificeerd zijn en 
hun ‘politieke spelletjes’; het wantrouwen van wetenschappers en ministerië-
le ambtenaren door politici; de onbereidwilligheid van politiek rechts om lan-
getermijnconcepten te accepteren en het onvermogen van politiek links om 
met een conceptuele oplossing te komen; de grote invloed van burgemeesters 
op het centrale volkshuisvestingsbeleid; de noodzaak om voor snelle oplos-
singen te kiezen zonder dat er de mogelijkheid is om deze te testen; en de 
relatief sterke lobby van belangengroeperingen. Het volkshuisvestingsbeleid 
werd niet gezien als onderdeel van het sociaal beleid maar als een op zichzelf 
staand beleid dat niet noodzakelijkerwijs gericht was op de lage inkomens. 
Het beleid ten opzichte van nieuwbouw liet een vergelijkbaar beeld zien: het 
enige wat telde was het aantal flats dat gebouwd werd – het maakte niet uit 
waar ze werden gebouwd, voor wie, van welke kwaliteit ze waren of hoe ze 
vervolgens werden toegewezen. Het kon ambtenaren weinig schelen dat dit 
beleid een negatieve invloed had op het functioneren van de markt of leidde 
tot meer inkomens- en sociale ongelijkheid. Uit de interviews bleek dat evalu-
atie van de effectiviteit en efficiëntie van overheidssubsidies nooit was over-
wogen of zelfs maar onderwerp was geweest van discussie en dat dit voor ve-
len een geheel nieuw en gedeeltelijk zelfs onbegrijpelijk idee was.
Het zevende en laatste hoofdstuk van het boek vat de belangrijkste bevin-
dingen samen, geeft een overzicht van de conclusies van (of antwoorden op) 
alle onderzoeksvragen en bevat een aantal belangrijke aanbevelingen voor 
het in de toekomst te voeren volkshuisvestingsbeleid.
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